

# MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

*Volume XXIX*  
1967



PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
TORONTO, CANADA

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED  
TO THE MEMORY OF  
REVEREND JOSEPH THOMAS MUCKLE, C.S.B.  
MEMBER OF THE FOUNDING STAFF  
PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

*All correspondence regarding articles should be addressed to*

T. P. McLaughlin, C.S.B., Editor  
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES  
59 Queen's Park  
TORONTO 5, CANADA

*All correspondence regarding orders and subscriptions should be addressed to*

J. P. Morro, C.S.B., Director of Publications  
59 Queen's Park  
TORONTO 5, CANADA

Subscription \$10.00 a Year

*Mediaeval Studies does not accept books for review*

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*Printed at*  
IMPRIMERIE UNIVERSA, WETTEREN BELGIUM


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JOSEPH THOMAS MUCKLE

## JOSEPH THOMAS MUCKLE

1887-1967

Joseph Thomas Muckle was born in the State of New York on January 22, 1887; he was one of nine children. Three of them became secular priests and one sister became a nun. Only one brother survived Father Muckle, but by a scant three weeks. Father Muckle died on May 9, 1967. He was buried in Toronto; the Most Rev. Philip Pocock, Chancellor of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, celebrated the funeral Mass, and Rev. E. J. McCorkell, C.S.B., one-time president of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, preached the sermon.

Joseph Muckle devoted his life to education. After elementary and secondary education in New York State, he came to St. Michael's College, where he completed the Senior Matriculation; in 1907 he entered the Congregation of Priests of St. Basil. After profession he enrolled in honour Classics in the University of Toronto. He withdrew from the University at the end of the third year to pursue his studies in Theology. After ordination to the priesthood, June 29, 1915, he registered in the School of Letters in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., where he received the A.M. degree in 1916. That same autumn, Muckle began his long teaching career, through high school, university and graduate studies; first, from 1916-1919, he taught in the department of Classics at St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto; then, from 1919-1923, he was superior of Assumption College, Windsor, where he negotiated the agreement for affiliation of Assumption College with the University of Western Ontario. In 1923 Muckle left Windsor for St. Thomas High School in Houston, Texas, and finally, in 1926, he returned to the department of Classics of St. Michael's College, Toronto. At that time, the authorities of St. Michael's were engaged in discussions with Etienne Gilson about a graduate department or Institute for the study of the thought of the Middle Ages. This Institute began in 1929 and was granted a pontifical charter in 1939. Courses in palaeography and mediaeval Latin were to be an important part of its programme. Muckle was prevailed upon to prepare himself to direct these studies. Accordingly, he spent some time at the Universities of Chicago and Harvard studying both palaeography and mediaeval Latin and in gathering together a bibliography for a working library on these disciplines. In those years very few centres in North America had more than a mild interest in either palaeography or mediaeval Latin. Consequently, Muckle went to Europe both

to supplement his knowledge and to seek further holdings for the library. In addition to palaeography and Latin, he introduced a serious study of the classical sources of Patristic and mediaeval culture. For many years he lectured on this phase of the classical heritage in such a way that students became interested in the Classics. At heart, he was a philologist and concerned primarily with language and literature rather than with history and philosophy. He was a careful scholar and demanding of students who, at first, often considered him something of an ogre, but later appreciated the fact that *admonere voluit, non mordere*.

Father Muckle's talents were varied and received recognition. For many years he was local councillor in the houses to which he was assigned. From 1932-36 he was on the General Council of the Basilian Fathers. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1946 and awarded two honorary degrees, a D. Litt. from the University of Western Ontario in 1947 and an LL.D. from Assumption University of Windsor in 1957, the year of his retirement as professor at the Pontifical Institute. He was also a member of the presidential committee which drew up the Innis report in 1947 on the reorganization of the School of Graduate Studies in the University of Toronto. Much of Muckle's work has not been, nor is likely to be, replaced. The ideals of scholarship which he instilled in his many students will endure as long as learning is in honour.

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# The Non-Comic *Merchant's Tale*, Maximianus, and the Sources

ALBERT E. HARTUNG

DESPITE its extraordinary range and variety, most of the criticism of the *Merchant's Tale* has taken its direction from the anomaly that the tale is felt to present. Here, the general position has been, is the most un-Chaucerian of all the *Canterbury Tales*. In the world of Chaucerian sunlight, humor, and geniality, here is the unexpected cloud, a savage, corrosive indictment of man's irresistible tendency to make a fool of himself. There is no need to survey extensively the specific contributions critics have made to this approach to the tale. Since the critics who have espoused this approach are among the most considerable of the Chaucerian scholars, their views should be sufficiently familiar by now.<sup>1</sup> Although it by no means does justice to the richness and subtlety of the criticism on behalf of this approach, it is sufficient to say that the main positions taken here are that the tale is appropriate to the teller and that, as a result, the fury of the just-married Merchant informs the whole production, appearing in the tale as savage irony with overtones of disgust and obscenity. Our expected reaction to the tale is to be complete lack of sympathy with any of the characters (except possibly Justinus) and, indeed, revulsion at the main character January, who brutally illustrates the potential horrors of senile

<sup>1</sup> The chief critical statements supporting this approach to the *Merchant's Tale* have been the following: G. L. Kittredge, "Chaucer's Discussion of Marriage," *MP*, 9 (1912), 435-467; G. L. Kittredge, *Chaucer and His Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), 201-202; Germaine Dempster, *Dramatic Irony in Chaucer* (Stanford, 1932), 46-58; J. S. P. Tatlock, "Chaucer's *Merchant's Tale*," *MP*, 33 (1935-36), 367-381; Germaine Dempster, "The Original Teller of the *Merchant's Tale*," *MP*, 36 (1938-39), 1-8; Howard R. Patch, *On Rereading Chaucer* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 226-228, 249-251; G. G. Sedgewick, "The Structure of the *Merchant's Tale*," *UTQ*, 17 (1947-48), 337-345; C. Hugh Holman, "Courtly Love in the *Merchant's* and *Franklin's Tales*," *ELH*, 18 (1951), 241-252; Charles A. Owen, Jr., "The Crucial Passages in Five of the *Canterbury Tales*: A Study in Irony and Symbol," *JEGP*, 52 (1953), 294-311; R. M. Lumiansky, *Of Sondry Folk: the Dramatic Principle in the Canterbury Tales* (Austin, 1955), 152-175. Two articles which have appeared since the preparation of this paper support this approach on philosophical-theological grounds: Gertrude M. White, "'Hoolynesse or Dotage': The Merchant's January," *PQ*, 44 (1965), 397-404; George D. Economou, "Januarie's Sin against Nature: The *Merchant's Tale* and the *Roman de la Rose*," *CL*, 17 (1965), 251-257.

self-deception and intellectual blindness which refuses to be cured. Our final understanding of the tale is to be a realization that it is really biographical in terms of the Merchant and is his personal confession on the road to Canterbury. Germaine Dempster, speaking of the mood of "intense bitterness" that pervades the tale, presents a statement that might be considered characteristic of this approach. Chaucer's effectiveness in using irony "is due largely to the intensity and subtlety of the individual strokes, but even more to their number, to that inexhaustible power of invention which allowed Chaucer to keep up through his long tale the mood of fierce irony so boldly pitched at its highest point in the opening pages... [The Merchant's irony] is unique in its continual and exceptionally definite suggestion of the teller's resentful and embittered state."<sup>2</sup>

Not every critic, however, has adopted this point of view. Feeling that the strenuous cataloguing of every element in the poem as ironical was a disservice to the intentions of Chaucer, some critics have sought to rectify what they considered an imbalance in interpretation. Some of these critics have admitted the existence of the ironical intention in the tale and even many of the elements of cruelty on Chaucer's part. But these, they claim, are not the whole story. For side by side with these elements are others which in a sense take the curse off the tale. Besides savage satire there is humor, there is lyricism, there are even elements of compassion and pathos.<sup>3</sup> Still other critics go further in their divergence from the conventional approach to the tale. Feeling the claim of savageness and sustained irony to be greatly overemphasized, they oppose the view that January is the butt of angry satire. He is rather to be considered a comic character and the tale a comic tale. Moreover, these critics claim, the tale can not be read as a dramatic speech of the Merchant, for there is no particular appropriateness of it to its teller. Since this view disagrees so strikingly with the general opinion of the majority of Chaucerians and since it represents the most recent tendency in the criticism of the *Merchant's Tale*, it is worth serious consideration.<sup>4</sup> It will be the task, therefore, of this paper to consider the specific claims of this view and to suggest ways in which these claims may be evaluated. The principal means of making

<sup>2</sup> Germaine Dempster, *Dramatic Irony in Chaucer*, 57-58.

<sup>3</sup> See particularly Percy Van Dyke Shelly, *The Living Chaucer* (Philadelphia, 1940), 188-190, 255-259 and J. A. Burrow, "Irony in the *Merchant's Tale*," *Anglia*, 75 (1957), 199-208.

<sup>4</sup> The principal statements of this point of view are John C. McGalliard, "Chaucerian Comedy: The *Merchant's Tale*, Jonson, and Molière," *PQ*, 25 (1946), 343-370; Bertrand H. Bronson, *In Search of Chaucer* (Toronto, 1960), 64-65; Bertrand H. Bronson, "Afterthoughts on the *Merchant's Tale*," *SP*, 58 (1961), 583-596; Robert M. Jordan, "The Non-Dramatic Disunity of the *Merchant's Tale*," *PMLA*, 78 (1963), 293-299.

this evaluation will be to consider what the conventionally accepted sources of the tale tell us about Chaucer's intention. In addition, this paper will present the case for considering the *Elegies of Maximianus* as an additional source for the tale and as shedding further light on the nature of it. First, however, it is necessary to consider some of the more notable directions that this new view of the "comic" *Merchant's Tale* takes.

The first step in opposing the conventional view of the *Merchant's Tale* has been to detach the tale from the teller. The aids to this detachment have been the state of the manuscripts and what Sedgewick referred to as the "'seculeer' heresy." The *Merchant's Prologue* is missing in over half of the manuscripts which contain the *Merchant's Tale*. Furthermore the allusions in the tale to "thise fooles that been seculeer" and to "folk in seculer estaat" have sounded for some a false note and have encouraged them to believe that the *Merchant's Tale* was originally the property of some other pilgrim, or, at the least, existed without assignment to any pilgrim. Thus Bronson states that it is "an unforced assumption that the Prologue and the Tale were composed at different times" and, further, that it is "no strain to believe that the Tale was in existence before it was assigned to its present teller."<sup>5</sup> The lineal ancestor of this point of view is Baugh, who on the basis of Chaucer's use of the word "seculeer" and what he considered the homiletic manner of the tale made a case for its original assignment to a cleric, specifically the Friar.<sup>6</sup> It is, of course, a considerably forced assumption that the absence of the *Merchant's Prologue* in the *cd* manuscripts proves anything, except that the  $\sqrt{cd}$  editor did not have it. Difficulty in obtaining links was characteristic of the  $\sqrt{cd}$  editor. Most obviously the absence of the Prologue is attributable to this difficulty. Moreover, even though the Prologue is missing in  $\sqrt{cd}$  the tale itself is regularly assigned to the Merchant. The textual evidence is such that it cannot lead one to assume anything about the possibility of alternate assignment. Similarly the use of the word "seculeer" to build a case for alternate assignment rests upon shaky ground. To make it prove anything, one must ignore the usual meaning of the word as "layman" both in all its other occurrences in Chaucer and in its occurrence in Chaucer's source, the *Miroir de Mariage*. The view that Chaucer wrote the *Merchant's Tale* before he thought of assigning it to the Merchant, that he noticed that nothing in the *General Prologue* prepared us for the assignment after he made it, and that he therefore provided a *Merchant's Prologue* which had the

<sup>5</sup> Bronson, *SP*, 58 (1961), 584.

<sup>6</sup> Albert C. Baugh, "The Original Teller of the *Merchant's Tale*," *MP*, 35 (1937-38), 15-26. See Mrs. Dempster's reply, *MP*, 36 (1938-39), 1-8.

effect of infusing an otherwise comic tale with its own bitterness — this view rests only upon conjecture.

However, the artistic quality of the tale itself, as interpreted by some, has been used to support the view that the *Merchant's Tale* is not the unified, dramatically appropriate tale it is conventionally believed to be. Chief among the elements in the tale which have been pointed out as difficult to reconcile with the conventional interpretation are those passages which are not directed specifically at the characters in the tale and which seem to be primarily comic rather than satiric. Thus the Pluto-Proserpine passage, which is pointed out by Tatlock as in keeping with the grimly bitter tone of the tale, is under the new view shown to be characterized by a rather engaging humor, or, if satire, certainly a gentle satire. And, indeed, one must admit that many of the aspects of this passage strike one as comic rather than savage. When Proserpine replies to Pluto's charges against the dishonesty of wives in general and May in particular, her speech, to a modern ear and probably to a medieval ear as well, deliciously reflects the contempt that a member of the Establishment must inevitably feel toward a member of a minority group outside the pale, no matter how famous.<sup>7</sup>

What rekketh me of youre auctoritees ?  
I woot wel that this Jew, this Salomon,  
Foond of us wommen fooles many oon.

(E 2276-78)

In addition to the humor of Pluto's "I yeve it up !," the humor of a "queene of Fayerye" sitting in judgment on Solomon and finding him lacking as measured by Old Testament standards hardly seems to be appropriate to Tatlock's characterization of the passage as one in which the "dusky Gods of Hades" do not "redress the balance of earth."<sup>8</sup> And yet we cannot be sure that the passage is as lighthearted as some of its more recent interpreters think. After all, it is Pluto and Proserpine that Chaucer gives us, not God and St. Peter. And if, in spite of the mention of Claudian, these are creatures of Faërie, we must not be so hasty to assume that for Chaucer's audience, sophisticated or not, fairies had the sterilized charm and harmlessness they have for us today. Quite conceivably they brought with them from the other world a greater degree of impressiveness than their classical equivalents would have.

In similar fashion other passages of the tale have been shown to be inappropriate to the conventional interpretation of the tale. And yet for

<sup>7</sup> All citations of Chaucer are from Robinson's 2nd edition.

<sup>8</sup> Tatlock, *MP*, 33 (1935-36), 372-3.

each of these passages the ironist has his answer ready. If the passage describing the wedding feast (E 1709-1741) be pointed out as having a lyric fulness, it may be answered that the lyricism makes the passage all the more ironical when we consider what the reality being described really is and that the teller of the tale, who intrudes here, leaves no doubt on this point.

When tendre youthe hath wedded stoupyng age,  
There is swich myrthe that it may not be writen.  
Assayeth it youreself, thanne may ye witen  
If that I lye or noon in this matiere.

(E 1738-41)

Similarly the gorgeousness of the description of January's garden, the high-flown rhetoric of the apostrophe to Fortune (E 2057 ff.), even the fabliau ending have been adduced to support the position that the tale is essentially a comic one rather than a bitterly satiric one, and thus not especially appropriate to its teller.

These strictures on the conventional interpretation have a considerable value, for they correct the extreme view which refuses to admit the possibility of modulations of tone or of levels of intensity which quite clearly characterize the tale. However, the strictures themselves tend toward extremes when they deal with the two chief obstacles to any attempt to cut the tale completely adrift from the disillusioned and savage character of its teller and from the conception of it as primarily ironical and bitter. These obstacles are the long passage in praise of marriage (E 1267-1392) at the beginning of the tale and the character of January himself.

The attempts to relieve the passage praising marriage from the burden of irony have a curious kinship with the attempt, on textual grounds, to get rid of the Merchant as teller of the tale. Generally the new view has been to regard the passage as January's musings, not as the Merchant's statement of January's musings (with all its potential for ironic exploitation).<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the whole passage has even been attributed, not to the Merchant, not to January, but to "the familiar Chaucerian innocent."<sup>10</sup> It is difficult to know how to reply to this view except to repeat what seems to be obvious. The textual evidence supports the closeness of the relationship between the tale and prologue. Thus Chaucer intended us to believe that the Merchant told the tale. The passage praising marriage, since it is spoken by the Merchant, cannot be taken at face value and must be charged with the state of mind that the Merchant reveals in his prologue. The allusions,

<sup>9</sup> McGalliard, *PQ*, 25 (1946), 352-54; Bronson, *SP*, 58 (1961), 588-91.

<sup>10</sup> Jordan, *PMLA*, 78 (1963), 294-95.

which operate on two levels, and the ironic exaggerations are compatible with this state of mind. It is, of course, part of January's characterization that the passage can be taken at face value by him. To assume that a 14th century Merchant would be incapable of such a performance is to ignore a convention that we have no difficulty accepting in other tales (e.g., the Miller's), and, probably, it is always dangerous to make any assumptions about the intellectual or literary capabilities of any member of the medieval middle class.

Still, one cannot "prove" which interpretation of the encomium on marriage is the right one — just as one cannot prove which interpretation of January's character is the most reliable. For against the conventional view that January is treated most savagely of all, that his character leads us furthest into the gloomy depths which lie at the heart of the tale, has sprung up the view that January is, rather, a comic character — both in his being a representation of *senex amans*, who had a long previous tradition as a comic character, and in the specific figure he cuts in the tale itself, which is claimed to be that of a personification rather than a person.<sup>11</sup> It is, of course, impossible to draw the line where savagery ends and a calmer and more comic irony begins, or to legislate just how a person ought to respond to January. Part of the problem comes from the variety of the very powerful feelings that the picture of senility combined with sexual appetite is likely to arouse in any reader. Another part of the problem is the possibly distinctive way we in our times deal with these feelings. We seem to try to make them laughable. One may have serious doubts that this was the reaction of the 14th century or of Chaucer himself. And perhaps it is Chaucer's conception of the *Merchant's Tale* rather than our own that we should be concerned with, since our own must inevitably be permeated with attitudes that Chaucer would have found at least puzzling, possibly even idiotic. Here the sources of the *Merchant's Tale* can be useful, for if there can be disagreement about the meaning of the different elements of the tale, there can be no disagreement about what Chaucer did with his sources. And Chaucer's treatment of his sources is perhaps the only objective evidence that can tell us what Chaucer thought of the material he was working with and what he wanted to do with it.

\* \* \*

For purposes of source study the *Merchant's Tale* can be most profitably divided into three major movements. The first of these is the delineation of

<sup>11</sup> See especially Bronson, *SP*, 58 (1961), 593; and Jordan, *PMLA*, 78 (1963), 296.

January's state of mind before he has selected May as his wife, as reported both in January's own words and in the words of the Merchant who gives his own analysis of what was passing through January's mind. The second movement, which begins with the marriage of May and January, presents in vivid detail the picture of January on his nuptial bed and arranges the love affair between May and Damian. The third movement, after the description of January's garden, begins with January's blindness and continues with the rest of the development of the fabliau conclusion of the tale which restores January's sight. Of these three movements, the first and third have been most solidly related to specific sources, respectively the *Miroir de Mariage* and the various versions of the fruit tree story. In fact, if the *Merchant's Tale* has an origin in a literary experience, one would be strongly tempted to believe that the experience was Chaucer's reading of the *Miroir de Mariage*, both from the definiteness and the closeness of the parallels between the two. Yet there can be just as little doubt that it is the essential ingredient of the second movement, January's old age, which dominates the other two sections of the tale. The special significance that this gives that part of the tale which is related to the *Miroir* has been frequently pointed out. The protagonist of the *Miroir*, Franc Vouloir, is not old but of a suitable age for marriage. Similarly none of the duped husbands in the fruit tree analogues are old. Their essential characteristic is merely that they are blind and jealous. Therefore any conclusions as to what Chaucer's attitude toward his material was must be ultimately derived from a consideration of the fact of January's old age, particularly his old age in combination with his amorous tendencies. We must ask what is likely to have caused Chaucer to take up the motif of old age and employ it in modifying sources from which it is absent. And having done that, we must consider the most likely sources for the motif of old age itself. Then, finally, we should be able to observe how Chaucer responded to these sources and how this response indicates his own feeling about the tale.

An investigation of this sort can never hope to establish beyond the shadow of a doubt the process by which Chaucer put his tale together, dealing as it does with the subtlest mechanisms of the creative imagination. It has been advanced as a reasonable assumption that the starting point for the whole process was Chaucer's reading in the *Miroir de Mariage*. The strong effect this work had upon his imagination is shown by his extensive and detailed use of it in both the *Wife's Prologue* and the *Merchant's Tale*. It was in many ways, evidently, a controlling influence in his construction of the marriage group. However, if we seek in the *Miroir* for allusions to old age which might have suggested to Chaucer the conception of the senile January, there is remarkably little to help us. The best possibility, already pointed out by Germaine Dempster, in those parts of the

*Miroir* most directly relevant to the *Merchant's Tale* is the allusion to Tobit and Anna.<sup>12</sup> Significantly it deals with Tobit's blindness.

Thobie perdit sa lueur,  
Mais sa femme lui fut aidable,  
Treshumble, doulce et charitable,  
Et a lui garder entendri  
Tant que Dieux clarté lui rendi...

(ll. 252-256)

There is no particular allusion to old age here. However, a later passage on Tobit does mention old age and follows the mention with a statement of the desirability of avoiding carnal sin.

Or garde...  
... que ta femme en tes vieuxx jours  
Soit a ta vieillesse secours,  
Ainsi comme fut la vieille Anne  
Au grant Thobie. Et ne te dampne  
De suir en ce temps obscur  
Pechié de char, car ou futur  
En seroit ta vie abregiée,  
Et en la fin t'aime dampnée...

(ll. 418-430)

To be sure, the motifs of blindness, old age, and carnality are to be found combined in these two passages, and it would be interesting to conjecture that it was this that led Chaucer from the *Miroir* to the conception of amorous senility which we find in the central section of the *Merchant's Tale*. But the allusion is really too slight to put confidence in it, and two considerations rather militate against its being the catalyst which was responsible for the creation of January. These are, first, the frequent use Chaucer has made of the conception of impotent old age in his works, and, second, the specific use in the *Merchant's Tale* he has made of the *Miroir* passages in question.

A survey of Chaucer's works reveals the striking fact that the sexual inability of old age appears in a number of places over what must have been a long stretch of time. Possibly the earliest significant use of it is that in the *Shipman's Tale* where, although there is no implication that the husband is old, there is the decided implication by the wife (false as it turns out) that her husband is unable to satisfy her in bed. The *Wife of Bath's Prologue* develops this idea more fully with the recital of the treatment of the three old husbands.

<sup>12</sup> Dempster, *Dramatic Irony in Chaucer*, 50, fn. 91. The quotations from the *Miroir* are from Bryan and Dempster, *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*, 335.

Unnethe myghte they the statut holde  
 In which that they were bounden  
 unto me.

(D 198-9)

The *Merchant's Tale* is, of course, the fullest treatment of this idea, yet it appears in what are presumably later works. The *Miller's Tale* presents us with the old husband-young wife combination. The *Reeve's Prologue* deals with the inevitable residuum of lust in old age.

For in oure wyl ther stiketh evere a nayl,  
 To have an hoor heed and a grene tayl,  
 As hath a leek...

(A 3877-9)

Even the *Envoy to Scogan* may be considered as a gently ironical treatment of the same motif. The God of Love, despite the insult to his power, will not be avenged

On the, ne me, ne noon of oure figure;  
 We shul of him have neyther hurt ne cure.

(ll. 27-8)

The conclusion we must draw from these examples is that the motif under consideration was a characteristic concern of Chaucer, certainly before the *Merchant's Tale* was written, and certainly after.

This view seems compatible with the use that Chaucer made of the *Miroir* passages in question. For they strongly suggest the following lines in the *Merchant's Tale*.

To take a wyf it is a glorious thyng  
 And namely whan a man is oold and hoor...

(E 1268-9)

For who can be so buxom as a wyf?  
 Who is so trewe, and eek so ententyf  
 To kepe him, syk and hool, as is his make ?  
 For wele or wo she wole hym nat forsake;  
 She nys nat wery hym to love and serve,  
 Thogh that he lye bedrede, til he sterue.

(E 1287-92)

It is possibly the story of Tobit and Anna itself suggested by the *Miroir*, rather than the treatment of it in the *Miroir*, that is responsible for the praise of wife as helpmate. But the impression we get from Chaucer's use of the *Miroir* in the *Merchant's Tale* in these passages (and, indeed, in others as well) is that he approached the *Miroir* with a predetermined notion of what he wanted to do and was looking for helpful material. This seems particularly apparent in Chaucer's perversion of the *Miroir's* argument that a wife is a help to her husband in his old age. Of course she is if, like

Tobit and Anna, they have grown old together, and if the wife is like Anna. In the *Merchant's Tale* the argument is, or becomes, one of the desirability of an old man's marrying a young wife. It is made this way by Chaucer's suppression of all reference to Tobit and Anna here as well as in the list of Old Testament heroines (E 1362-1374), whom Chaucer is careful to make a pretty dubious lot. Anna could not have fitted here. She was too irreproachable as a wife. Thus, on the grounds both of the pervasiveness of Chaucer's concern with the sexual inability of old age and of the nature of his use of the *Miroir*, it seems reasonable to believe that in his conception of the *Merchant's Tale*, *senex amans* was the starting point.

The question is, what is most likely to have been the cause of this conception in Chaucer's mind in the first place? A means to an answer is perhaps best provided by the *Miller's Tale*. Of John the Carpenter we learn

He knew nat Catoun, for his wit was rude,  
That bad man sholde wedde his simylitude.  
Men sholde wedden after hire estaat,  
For youthe and elde is often at debaat.

(A 3227-30)

Although the attribution to Cato is inaccurate, since the origin of the passage is from *Facetus*, it suggests the use in the similar old husband-young wife context of the *Merchant's Tale* of another Catonian precept.

Suffre thy wyves tongue, as Catoun bit...

(E 1377)

There is, of course, nothing unusual in Chaucer's use of the *Disticha Catonis*.<sup>13</sup> But it is interesting to observe in the *Merchant's Tale* that there is also a reference to Claudian as author of *De Raptu Proserpinae*. Both the *Disticha* and the *De Raptu* were parts of what was possibly one of the best known books of the middle ages, the *Liber Catonianus*.<sup>14</sup> This book, which served as the first Latin reader for school boys, must inevitably have been known to Chaucer, most probably with the following contents: the *Disticha Catonis*, the *Fabulae Aviani*, the *Ecloga Theoduli*, the *Elegiae Maximiani*, the *Achilleid* of Statius, and the *De Raptu Proserpinae*. Of these literary works,

<sup>13</sup> On the subject of Chaucer's use of Cato, particularly for parody, see Richard Hazelton, "Chaucer and Cato," *Speculum*, 35 (1960), 357-380.

<sup>14</sup> On the popularity of the *Liber Catonianus* see W. J. Chase, "The Distichs of Cato," in *University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History*, No. 7 (1922), 1-11. On the form in which it would have been known to Chaucer see R. A. Pratt, "The Importance of Manuscripts for the Study of Medieval Education, as Revealed by the Learning of Chaucer," *Progress of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, Bulletin No. 20 (1949), 45-6. On the relevance of it to Chaucer studies see R. A. Pratt, "Karl Young's Work on the Learning of Chaucer," in *A Memoir of Karl Young* (New Haven, 1946), 45-55.

which so strongly permeated the education of the times, the elegies of Maximianus are worth particular note because of their subject and its treatment: the miseries of old age dealt with in an often strongly erotic context. It would be surprising if, in the *Merchant's Tale* which has allusions to Claudian and Cato and which combines eroticism and senility, we did not find an influence from that other member of the Cato book, Maximianus, which combines both these motifs.

The assumption that Chaucer must have known Maximianus is made certain by Chaucer's specific use of a passage from the first elegy in the *Pardoner's Tale*.<sup>15</sup> But Maximianus must be particularly interesting to us as "showing us what Chaucer, or any other literate person, read, not through intellectual curiosity or industrious searching, but through his inevitable experience as a school boy."<sup>16</sup> Maximianus is, therefore, interesting to us, not as a source providing specific and close originals for passages in Chaucer, but as a body of received doctrine on senility inculcated in Chaucer during his childhood and, as a result, a presumably inescapable influence thereafter. In order to examine the nature of this influence it is necessary to give a summary of the elegies.

I. After a preliminary lament on old age, Maximianus tells of his youth, of his brilliance as an orator, of his physical beauty and strength. Imperious to physical discomforts, able to endure all vicissitudes, he was admired and sought by mothers as a prospective son-in-law, but because of coldness and fastidiousness he remained unattached. And now these past accomplishments and triumphs are occasions of pain because of the living death which is old age. The decay of the senses and the intelligence make the old man a physical horror. Nature, itself, in the old man is on the verge of collapse and nothing is left to console him, except his tongue which drives all from him. Shrunk in size and bent toward the earth which he asks to receive him, the old man is the prey of all ills. Even sleep deserts him. Time afflicts everything, but he who has once been happy is doubly afflicted.

II. The poet tells of Lycoris, his mistress, who, now that he has grown old, has abandoned him in the search for experience with younger men. Unlike animals who despite their irrationality seek their accustomed

<sup>15</sup> The passage is Maximianus, I, 223-28, pointed out by Kittredge as Chaucer's source for C 727-38. See G. L. Kittredge, *American Journal of Philology*, 9 (1888), 84. The edition of Maximianus used in the preparation of this paper is R. Webster, *The Elegies of Maximianus* (Princeton, 1900).

<sup>16</sup> *A Memoir of Karl Young*, 48.

haunts, man seeks only the novelty of the present. Yet despite her excuse of the loss of his youthful charm, the poet accuses Lycoris of wronging him. Even the olympic victor cherishes the courser with whom he has grown old. It is cruel to have painful memories.

III. The poet, speaking of the days of his youth, tells of a love affair with Aquilina, carried on furtively because of the obstacles of his tutor and her mother. The affair discovered, Aquilina is beaten by her mother and flees to the poet with her passion more highly enflamed by the blows. Troubled, the poet goes to Boethius who bribes the parents to connive at the affair. But with the charm of secrecy removed, the poet loses his ardor and the affair comes to an end.

IV. Smitten in his young manhood (presumably) by an overwhelming passion for Candida, the poet has her constantly in his thoughts, so much so that while sleeping he speaks her name. Her father overhearing him suspects him. Thus the poet can reproach only himself for the revelation. But now in old age there is nothing that is worthy of reproach. Even vice has fled.

V. Sent in his old age as an ambassador to the East, Maximianus is ensnared by the attractions of a young Greek beauty. In addition to her physical charms, her abilities at singing, dancing, and making verses render her more attractive. Her breasts and rounded thighs enflame the poet to embrace her until she cries out, and, feeling himself to be a new Ulysses hearing the Sirens, he succumbs to her. Thus he passes his first night with her in a way that could hardly be expected of an old man. But on the second all his ardor has vanished. The girl, at first believing that some other woman has robbed him of his strength, rebukes him. But the poet laments his old age as the cause of his inability. After unsuccessfully attempting to rekindle him, she laments the situation in an address to the *mentula*. Chided for this by the poet, she replies in a lengthy passage that it is the downfall of love as a ruler of the universe that she laments and leaves him as the dead are left after a funeral.

VI. In a brief epilogue the poet laments the slowness of death from old age. It is only through his sorrow that he knows he is living.

The summary, of course, can give no sense of the wealth of detail with which the miseries of old age are exemplified in contrast to the happiness or, if not happiness, at least the sense of being alive, of youthful days. Nor can it reproduce the tone of lament which is made even more powerful by the fact that the elegies are told in the first person.

If we seek to find close and detailed parallels between Maximianus and

the *Merchant's Tale*, there is not much to point out. Possibly the fastidiousness of Maximianus which kept him from permitting himself to be attached to any woman has its counterpart in January's fastidiousness, for quite other reasons, in the proper selection of a mate. It is true that many of the details of this fastidiousness are quite clearly derived from the *Miroir*, specifically the requirement that the prospective wife be young and beautiful (*Miroir*, ll. 722-731 — *Sources and Analogues*, p. 336). Yet the physical direction January's deliberations take are closer in tone to Maximianus.

horrebam tenues, horrebam corpore pingues,  
non mihi grata brevis, non mihi longa fuit.  
cum media tantum dilexi ludere forma;  
maior enim mediis gratia rebus inest.  
  
· · · · ·  
quaerebam gracilem, sed quae non macra fuisset:  
carnis ad officium carnea membra placent.

(I, 79-86)

The despising of the extremes of thinness and stoutness, of shortness and tallness, the desire for slenderness which stops short of being leanness do not, it is true, constitute a source for January's deliberations. But they may suggest the physical tone: "Hir myddel small, hire armes longe and sklen-dre" (E 1602), and his weighing of alternatives before his choice (E1580-93)

In like manner the fact that January's deliberations were to a large extent in the shape of inward musings may owe something to Maximianus, who in Elegy IV tells the reader that the image of Candida had so impressed itself upon him that he retained it even in her absence.

singula visa semel semper memorare libebat  
haerebant animo nocte dieque meo.  
saepe velut visae laetabar imagine formae,  
et procul absenti voce manuque fui.

(IV, 17-20)

In addition to the strikingly similar contexts, "animo nocte dieque meo" strongly suggest the "day," "soul," "night" verbal echoes in the following:

Heigh fantasye and curious bisynesse  
Fro day to day gan in the soule impresse  
Of Januarie abolute his mariage.  
Many fair shap and many a fair visage  
Ther passeth thurgh his herte nyght by nyght...

(E 1577-80)

A more persuasive parallel occurs in Elegy V. Maximianus is ensnared in his old age by the young Greek beauty.

urebant oculos stantes duraeque papillae  
et quas astringens clauderet una manus.  
ah, quantum mentem stomachi fultura movebat  
atque sub exhausto pectore pingue femur !  
terrebar teneros astringere fortiter artus:  
visa per amplexus ossa sonare meos  
'grandia' clamabat 'tua nunc me brachia laedunt:  
non tolerant pondus subdita membra tuum.'

(V, 27-34)

The Chaucerian counterpart is January's contemplation of May after their marriage before the wedding feast is over.

This Januarie is ravysshed in a traunce  
At every tyme he looked on hir face;  
But in his herte he gan hire to manace  
That he that nyght in armes wolde hire streyne  
Harder than evere Paris dide Eleyne.  
But nathelees yet hadde he greet pitee  
That thilke nyght offenden hire moste he...

(E 1750-1756)

On the surface there seems to be no particular connection between the two passages. On the one hand there is Chaucer's statement of January's state of mind as he impatiently waits for the annoying formalities of the wedding ceremony to get over with. The whole passage is presented in rather general terms. In contrast, Maximianus specifies the physical details of the situation. The girl's firm, small breasts, the roundness of her thigh under "hir myddel small" ("sub exhausto pectore") enflame the poet to an embrace in which he believes he hears her bones crack. She cries out that his arms wound her and that she cannot bear his weight. Yet the passage is extremely significant in showing us how we must assess the relationship between Chaucer and the kind of influence Maximianus was. First of all we must note the similar contexts in which both passages occur. In both, an old man sexually aroused goes on to enjoy the object of his affections. In both, successive experience leaves something to be desired. At precisely the same place in both these contexts occur the preliminary stimulation (specified in one, generally stated in the other) and the detail of the embrace:

terrebar teneros astringere fortiter artus  
... clamabat 'tua nunc me brachia laedunt...';  
That he that nyght in armes wolde hire  
streyn  
Harder than evere Paris dide Elevyne.

The point of the passage is that January is feeling all the emotions which, for an old voluntary, are inherent in the situation Maximianus describes.

What he sees, in his mind's eye, is the list of charms that Maximianus presents. His anticipated response to those charms is the violent embrace that we find in Maximianus. In keeping with his role, January has a suitable response to what he imagines must be May's inevitable reaction to his impetuous ardor. She, like the girl in Maximianus, will cry out, and he, of course, will pity her.

But rather than in such precise details, it is in the general strategy of Chaucer's management of his tale that we find the comparison with Maximianus most instructive. For we must realize that Chaucer was perfectly well aware of the choices that Maximianus gave him in dealing with the subject of old age combined with sexuality. And in Chaucer's acceptance of some of these choices, in his modification of others, in his outright rejection of still others, we can see what his intentions were. For example, we must admit that Chaucer accepted the basic situation of Elegy V as a *modus operandi* for the central part of the *Merchant's Tale*. An old man, sexually stimulated by a young girl, forgets (or attempts to forget) his age and acts the part of the vigorous lover. His efforts are met with a possibly dubious success at first and with a lack of success later on. Granting that Chaucer took this basic situation from Maximianus, we are immediately aware of the modifications he made in it. In Maximianus it is the girl who by Grecian ruses entraps the poet. In Chaucer it is the man who buys the girl for his wife. In Maximianus there is no delay between the stimulation and the act itself. In Chaucer there is a considerable delay enforced by the formalities of the wedding celebration which gives ample space for the presentation of January's impatience. In Maximianus the poet is unable to resist his impulses and is overwhelmed by them despite himself. In Chaucer, January, despite his impatience, is careful to resort to chemical stimulation with the help of Daun Constantyn's book of aphrodisiacs, so that his impulses will be what he wants them to be. In Maximianus what happens is a natural event. In Chaucer it is January's artificially contrived creation.

But the most important modification Chaucer introduced is that of a different point of view. In Maximianus the speaker is the actor and thus the reader has an opportunity for involvement and sympathy that only the first person technique can give. Chaucer's conception of the basic situation in terms of an outsider looking on with the ability of judging January's motives enables him to treat the episode in an entirely different manner. We are more clearly aware of the ulterior motives and the sense of calculation in January's speeches and deeds. We do not sympathize, we judge.

Of course, it might be said that the differences are so many and so complete, and the likenesses so few, that really there is little justification for claiming a relationship. But it must be remembered that no attempt

is being made to show that Maximianus is a "source." The claim is simply that Maximianus is the statement on amorous senility that Chaucer would have known longest and most intimately. As such it became the kind of basic part of the equipment of his mind that, consciously or unconsciously, would lend itself to such extreme variation and serve as a catalyst for it. Intuitively Chaucer would reject what in Maximianus was not appropriate to his purpose. For example, the tone of lament which pervades the elegies has no part in the *Merchant's Tale*. More striking is Chaucer's avoidance of erotic detail, which is so prominent in Maximianus. It is surprising to realize that Chaucer proceeds with an unusual delicacy in the *Merchant's Tale*, of all places. In the passage on January's anticipations, considered above (E 1750-1756), we have seen how Chaucer made his statement general rather than physically specific. In like manner Chaucer completely rejects the frank statement of sexual collapse in Maximianus as well as the address to the *mentula*. The reason is not far to seek. Chaucer intends our attention to be directed at January, not diverted by erotic detail.

However, the ultimate purpose of our consideration of Maximianus is to see whether it helps to resolve the question of whether the *Merchant's Tale* is primarily comic or serious. As a starting point it is well to insist that, viewed through medieval, and modern, eyes, Maximianus is hardly conducive to a comic view of old age. The position that old age is a misery is emphatically developed with sobering detail. Second, it is well to be aware of the distinguished company with which Maximianus appears in the Cato book. These works were valued not merely because of their suitability for the study of Latin, but in addition because of their excellence for inculcating desirable moral precepts in their young readers. In one such collection Maximianus is labeled *liber ethicorum*.<sup>17</sup> This is not to say that the pretensions of January considered against reality do not have comic potentialities. But we must remember that Chaucer must have been trained to think of old age in moral and ethical terms, and we must remind ourselves that Chaucer took very few liberties with the basic positions of his age. As we have seen above, Chaucer by his management of the central part of the *Merchant's Tale* takes care to avoid giving us any of those things in Maximianus which would lead us to sympathize and understand. Instead of the stimulation of the old lover in Maximianus we have January's gloating. Instead of the sexual collapse, we have January grimly hanging on in the face of the evidence. Instead of our attention's being on the act, it is directed at the compulsions of the actor. And these compul-

<sup>17</sup> Webster, *The Elegies of Maximianus*, 19. See also R. Ellis, "On the Elegies of Maximianus," *American Journal of Philology*, 5 (1884), 7-8.

sions, natural enough in a different context, are here made to seem fraudulent. In contrast to Maximianus, Chaucer's treatment detaches us from involvement and leads us in the direction of criticism and judgment, the essential ingredients of satiric intent. The degree of intensity of the satire must always be a matter of debate, but considering the background from which Chaucer took his conception, it was, in Chaucer's mind, more likely to have been strong than weak.

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To insist so much on the importance of Maximianus may seem to be the same thing as minimizing the importance of the generally accepted source for Chaucer's picture of the aged lover, Boccaccio's *Ameto*. Such is not the case, however, for there is little question that the *Ameto* must have also been in Chaucer's mind while he was working on the central part of the *Merchant's Tale*. As with Maximianus, there is every reason to believe that Chaucer knew the *Ameto*. It was a youthful work of Boccaccio. It was popular, and widely distributed. In addition the cumulative effect of the resemblances between it and Chaucer's work in general, as listed by Tatlock, makes Chaucer's knowledge of it a more than reasonable assumption.<sup>18</sup> Paradoxically, the relationship between the *Ameto* and the *Merchant's Tale* must be considered in the light of what must have been, in Chaucer's mind, an evident relationship between the *Ameto* and Maximianus. The fact is that in Agapes' recital of her existence with her husband there are details which would inevitably suggest similar details in Maximianus. The sexual collapse of the poet in Maximianus' fifth elegy and the attempts of the girl to rekindle him suggest the analogous details in the *Ameto* of the old husband's complete inability and his attempts to stimulate himself.<sup>19</sup>

(The narrator is speaking to the girl):  
 "fac quodcumque potes, nos cessimus..."

protinus argutas admovit turpiter artes  
 meque cupid flammis vivificare suis.

(V, 79-82)

... e freddissimo si crede me di sè accendere  
 con cotali atti, là dove io piuttosto di lui  
 accendo l'animo che 'l misero corpo.

(p. 124)

<sup>18</sup> J. S. P. Tatlock, "Boccaccio and the Plan of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*," *Anglia*, 37 (1913), 69-117.

<sup>19</sup> Citations from the *Ameto* are from I. Moutier, ed., *Opere Volgari di Giovanni Boccaccio*, vol. 15 (Florence, 1833).

The contexts of the two are somewhat different, to be sure. Nevertheless, the employment of "cotali atti" ("turpiter artes") to bring about a situation that is hopeless of accomplishment from the start would certainly suggest a likeness between the two works to a person who knew both of them, as Chaucer did.

But it is primarily in Maximianus' first elegy, which deals most strikingly with the physical effects of old age, that we find such connections. The point is not that Boccaccio was drawing from Maximianus, for with a common subject similar details could quite easily be arrived at independently. The point is that Chaucer in reading one work would inevitably have the other suggested to him. Thus in both the *Ameto* and Elegy I we find the common details of the wrinkled skin and the trembling head of old age. In addition, there is the sleeplessness of old age, a particular burden to the narrator in Maximianus and, for quite different reasons, to Agapes in her marriage. But two parallels, in particular, would seem to put the connection in Chaucer's mind between Maximianus and the *Ameto* on quite solid ground. The first is the description of the eyes in old age.

quondam ridentes oculi, nunc fonte perenni  
deplangunt poenas nocte dieque suas;  
et quos grata prius ciliorum serta tegebant,  
desuper incumbens hispida silva premit,  
ac velut inclusi caeco condunter in antro:  
torvum nescio quid heu furiale vident.

(I, 137-42)  
Egli ha ancora, che più mi spiace, gli occhi più rossi che bianchi,  
nascosi sotto grottose ciglia, folte di bianchi peli, e continuo sono  
lagrimosi...

(p. 123)

The eyes, hidden under cavernous, thick eyebrows in the *Ameto*, are a striking suggestion of the eyebrows like a bristly forest making the eyes seem to be hidden in a gloomy cave of Maximianus. In both the eyes continually weep: "fonte perenni deplangunt"; "continuo sono lagrimosi." It is difficult to believe that Chaucer would not have been struck by the resemblance between the two.

The second parallel is the description of the old man who, bent by his years, looks at the ground.

nec caelum spectare licet, sed prona senectus  
terram, qua genita est et redditura, videt...

(I, 217-8)  
Nel suo andare continuamente curvo la terra mira, la quale credo  
contempli lui tosto dover ricevere...

(p. 124)

The description of old age, bent and looking at the earth which will soon receive it, is a common one.<sup>20</sup> But we know from the *Pardoner's Tale* the powerful effect its occurrence in Maximianus had on Chaucer's imagination. He could hardly help but be sensitive to the similarity between it and Agapes' description of her husband, in spite of the difference created by the hopeful asperity in Agapes' remark.

The parallelisms pointed out do not seek to do more than establish the extreme likelihood that Chaucer, in creating his conception of *senex amans*, would have thought of Maximianus and the *Ameto* in terms of one another. When we go on to consider the use of the *Ameto* in the central section of the *Merchant's Tale* we see a further confirmation of this assumption. For the first thing one becomes aware of is that the *Ameto* provides Chaucer with material necessary for his purpose that he could not have found in Maximianus. First of all, it establishes marriage as the context in which the action occurs. Second, it deals with the ingredient of money as necessary for the marriage in the first place. Third, and most important, it provides details of the senile lover in bed as seen through the eyes of someone else, specifically someone who is not likely to be favorably impressed. Yet Chaucer makes considerable changes in the *Ameto*. If he rejects the first person point of view of Maximianus, he also avoids the first person point of view of Agapes in the *Ameto*, which would direct our attention and our sympathy to the lady in the case. January is not as decrepit as Agapes' husband, who is appalling. Instead he is closer in age to the Maximianus of Elegy V. In his management of details Chaucer particularly shows his divergence from the *Ameto*, as, for example, in the following.

... e la barba grossa e prolissa, nè più nè meno pugnente che le penne d'un  
istrice . . . . .  
... stanti nel morbido letto, mi raccoglie nelle sue braccia, e di non piacevole  
peso preme il candido collo. E poichè egli ha molte volte con la fetida bocca,  
non baciata, ma scombavata la mia...

(pp. 123-4)

He lulleth hire, he kisseth hire ful ofte;  
With thilkke brustles of his berd unsoft,  
Lyk to the skyn of houndfyssh, sharp as  
brere —  
For he was shave al newe in his manere —  
He rubbeth hire abouthehir tendre face...

(E 1823-27)

No one will deny that Chaucer's treatment is more powerful than Boccaccio's. But it is not more powerful because it is more lurid or sensational. Rearranging the order of the details, which are separated in the *Ameto*,

<sup>20</sup> See Webster, 82, note on I, 218.

Chaucer brings the beard and the bed into a meaningful relationship. Rejecting the details, bordering on depravity, of the connubial kisses in the *Ameto*, Chaucer concentrates on one detail, the roughness of January's beard. He gives us a reason for its roughness; January was newly shaved. He ignores the comparison with the quills of the hedgehog in the *Ameto*, which tends toward the grotesque, and instead gives us as a comparison the skin of a dog shark, which is uglier and rings truer. Generally Chaucer's technique with those details of the *Ameto* which he uses is to put them in a meaningful relationship to the action, not merely to list them, as they are in his source. More remarkable is the number of the details which the *Ameto* makes available to him that he does not use. Those of the appearance of the eyes and the bent stature, dealt with above, are not used, nor are the details of the wrinkled skin, the trembling head, the pendulous lips, and the rotten teeth, all of which are in the *Ameto*. Nor is January, despite his heavily implied ineptitude, quite so hopelessly, and specifically, far gone as Agapes' husband. The effect, as in Chaucer's use of Maximianus, is one of considerable restraint. Chaucer is careful not to go too far.

Maximianus and the *Ameto*, close in subject matter and, evidently, close together in Chaucer's mind, are put to use in the same section of the *Merchant's Tale* in ways which complement each other. The relationship between them, the ways in which they are used, and the differing natures of Chaucer's acquaintance with them are likely to give us our best notion of the genesis of the *Merchant's Tale*. Preoccupied, as he must have been after the Wife of Bath, with the literary possibilities of marriage, it seems reasonable to believe that Chaucer turned to the *Ameto*, in part a series of accounts of unhappy marriages. The story of Agapes would have suggested Maximianus to him, and the two together fused into a new creation, Chaucer's conception of *senex amans*, which brought within it the debate from the *Miroir* and, as we shall see below, the fruit-tree story. Whether or not we agree that this was the process, we must agree that the senile lover of the central part of the *Merchant's Tale*, when we consider the backgrounds from which he comes, presents us with a masterful example of the creative imagination at work.

However, our primary purpose is to see what light Chaucer's use of the *Ameto* can shed on his own conception of the tale he was writing. Again, as with Maximianus, Chaucer's management of point of view serves to detach the reader. Again, when we compare Agapes' description of her old husband and his love making with the *Merchant's Tale*, we notice the same suppression of erotic detail and the focus on the actor rather than the act. Most striking of all is Chaucer's rejection of details which tend toward the grotesque, for the ultimate effect of Agapes' husband is that he is grotesque. January, in contrast, remains within the realm of human

credibility and thus remains a human concern. His lapses are less defensible and our judgment of them is more biting because we recognize their relevance to ourselves. With Agapes' husband we don't really care. Again, the satiric intent seems evident, and, again, it is in the direction of the serious rather than the comic.

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The final part of our consideration of what Chaucer's sources tell us about his attitude toward the *Merchant's Tale* will take into account his management of the pear tree story. Most scholars, by implication at least, feel that the fabliau ending of the *Merchant's Tale* was the last part of the tale to fall into place in Chaucer's imagination and that it must have been suggested to him by one of the sources for the earlier parts of the tale. Principal among those advanced have been various passages in the *Miroir*.<sup>21</sup> However, it seems, considering the importance of the *Ameto* in Chaucer's original conception, that Tatlock's suggestion is more persuasive — that Chaucer got his idea from the account of Adiona in the *Ameto*, whose husband was the child of a pear tree and a nymph.<sup>22</sup> The passage itself, which Tatlock does not cite, makes the connection more striking.

...Pomona sollecita alli spaziosi orti avendo veduto dell' umore d'un giovanetto rampollo di pero d'un antico e robusto pedale...

(pp. 84-5)

The fact that not only the pear tree is mentioned but also its trunk suggests more strongly than anything in the *Miroir* the *Novellino* analogue, where the trunk of the tree figures quite prominently, as it does in Chaucer. (See *Sources and Analogues*, p. 342). It is quite probable that this detail served as a trigger suggesting the pear tree fabliau, and quite probable also that its appearance in the literary environment of the *Ameto* suggested the fabliau's adaptability to the general conception of senile amorousness.

This conclusion takes on added credibility when we consider a striking and obvious change that Chaucer has made in what must have been his source for the pear tree story.<sup>23</sup> Despite the wealth of comment this final part of the tale has received, this change and its significance have been ignored. In the *Novellino* analogue which, in the beginning of the fabliau at least, presumably represents the closest approximation to Chaucer's

<sup>21</sup> See J. L. Lowes, "Chaucer and the *Miroir de Mariage*," *MP*, 8 (1910-11), 180-1. Also Dempster, *Dramatic Irony*, 50, n. 91.

<sup>22</sup> Tatlock, *Anglia*, 37 (1913), 83, 102-3.

<sup>23</sup> For a brilliant reconstruction of Chaucer's source see G. Dempster, "On the Source of the Deception Story in the *Merchant's Tale*," *MP*, 34 (1936), 133-54.

actual source, we find the following sequence: (1) a rich man has a beautiful wife; (2) he is very jealous and possessive; (3) he becomes blind and never allows his wife to leave him; (4) a young man falls in love with her; (5) she pities the young man and, by the method we know, ultimately grants his wish. The *Novellino* version is here considered closer to Chaucer's source than any of the other versions because it alone has the husband become blind in the course of the tale. But when we compare with it Chaucer's handling of the tale we notice the striking fact that, unlike the *Novellino* version, the wife's infidelity is arranged for *before* the blindness. Chaucer has taken the beginning of the fabliau, removed it from its usual context, and made it central to that portion of his tale which presents the picture of the old lover most fully. This change in structure makes it quite plausible that for Chaucer the pear tree story was associated with those influences he received from the *Ameto*, and hence supports the assumption that the account of Adiona suggested the fabliau to him in the first place. But it is the reasons for the change that reveal both the relationship of the fabliau to the rest of the tale and Chaucer's intentions most clearly.

Obviously, if Chaucer's purpose in modifying the influence of Maximianus and the *Ameto* has been to diminish the amount of sympathy we feel for January, there is a considerable advantage in making May decide to be unfaithful before January becomes blind. No matter what the compulsions of the wife might be, her taking advantage of her husband's blindness from the first would direct at least some of our sympathy to the husband. Chaucer, by the change, avoids this possibility. But the change is also significant in other ways. In the *Novellino* and the other versions the motivation of the wife, if it is anything other than sexual appetite combined with woman's deceitful nature, is the irksome restraint imposed on her by her blind husband's jealousy which does not permit her out of his grasp. If Chaucer rejects the structure which makes this motivation the only one possible, it is reasonable to assume that he must also reject the motivation too. The key to Chaucer's intentions in making the change is the fact that it gives him the opportunity to have January begin the process which concludes with May in Damian's arms in the pear tree. And in the motivation behind this fact we can find the reason for Chaucer's making the change in the first place.

The passage in which January sends May to Damian has been variously interpreted. Most critics agree on the irony of the situation, but on the question of January's motive they are not so clear, and, with one exception, they seem to have missed the essential point of the whole passage.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The exception is B. F. Huppé, *A Reading of the Canterbury Tales* (New York, 1964), 159. The focus of Professor Huppé's analysis is on other things than source relationships.

January's motive has been variously attributed to his obliging nature, to his desire to appear magnanimous before his new wife, to his own goodness and generosity. Even Mrs. Dempster refers to the event as an "amusing stroke... comedy."<sup>25</sup> What is not taken into account is the fact that January, before he sends May, at first says that he will go himself.

But after mete, as soone as evere I may,  
I wol myself visite hym, and eek May...

(E 1914-5)

The visit by January, of course, never materializes. We find out why in a succeeding couplet after he tells May that she should visit Damian.

And telleth hym that I wol hym visite  
Have I no thyng but rested me a lite...

(E 1925-6)

The reason that January does not go is, obviously, sexual exhaustion. Chaucer's presentation of May's return to her chamber leaves no doubt on the subject.

He taketh hire, and kisseth hire ful ofte,  
And leyde hym doun to slepe, and that anon.

(E 1948-9)

After May returns from reading Damian's letter and January is awakened by the cough (not by Donne's "excess of joy"), the sense of strain is evident.

He wolde of hire, he seyde, han som pleasaunce,  
And seyde hir clothes dide hym encombraunce...

(E 1959-60)

It is not a problem that Damian has later in the tale, even under far more difficult circumstances.

Similarly, Chaucer's bringing May and Damian together before the blindness, allows him to make another point. After the wedding night has come to an end,

Up ryseth Januarie; but fresshe May  
Heeld hire chambre unto the fourthe day,  
As usage is of wyves for the beste.

(E 1859-61)

Later on we learn again,

The moone, that at noon was thilke day  
That Januarie hath wedded fresshe May  
In two of Tawr, was into Cancre glyden;  
So longe hath Mayus in hir chambre abyden,

<sup>25</sup> *Dramatic Irony*, 55.

As custume is unto thise nobles alle.  
 A bryde shal nat eten in the halle  
 Til dayes foure, or thre dayes atte leeste,  
 Ypassed been; thanne lat hire go to feeste.  
 The fourthe day compleet fro noon to noon,  
 Whan that the heighe masse was ydoon,  
 In halle sit this Januarie and May...

(E 1885-95)

The use of fourteen lines to establish the length of time that May remained in her chamber seems excessive when we recall Chaucer's usual economical methods in handling narrative details. A single mention of the time May spends in her chamber would be enough, if it were necessary, and it hardly seems necessary to mention it at all. But the repeated emphasis on the four days occurs immediately before January sends May to visit Damian. It would seem probable that it bears some relationship to what follows. Obviously, one point that Chaucer is making, and emphasizing so that we do not miss it, is that May yields to the very first temptation that she meets, without preliminaries, without persuasion. Probably she was not aware of Damian's existence until she heard January mention him at the table. The more significant point, however, seems to be that during those four days May's experience was strictly limited to January. Presumably the effect that he must have had on her on the first night did not improve on successive nights. Thus if it is January's sexual exhaustion that causes him to send May to Damian, it is the four days experience with January himself that has predisposed her to make the choice that she inevitably does. Only after this takes place and May has made her decision and acquainted Damian with it, does Chaucer take us back into the fabliau and permit January to become blind.

The relevance of Chaucer's source manipulation in this part of the tale to the problem of determining what his own attitude was toward his subject is unquestionable. Again, as in his use of Maximianus and the *Ameto*, Chaucer directs our attention to those aspects of the aged lover which make our criticism sharper. The motivation for May cannot be her husband's jealousy and constraint, for those do not come until after the blindness. It must be January himself. The role of the husband in the analogues of the pear-tree story is merely that of obstacle; in the *Merchant's Tale* he is the instigator. He is made culpable, therefore, and the tone becomes one of criticism rather than humorous contemplation.

\* \* \*

The purpose of this article has been to see what light Chaucer's handling of his sources throws on his own attitude toward the tale. Such an analysis

cannot hope to provide evidence to help us distinguish levels of intensity. For example, it cannot support Tatlock's thesis that the tale is savage and bitter. And such an analysis cannot hope to make very much headway against the difficulty of determining the exact content of words like "comic" and "serious." But if in recent criticisms of the *Merchant's Tale* the word "comic" means lighthearted, genial, or a sense of the incongruous or ridiculous as inherent in life itself, Chaucer's handling of his sources seems to show that he thought of the *Merchant's Tale* in primarily non-comic terms. His use of the sources shows us that he wishes to detach us from sympathetic involvement and establish us in a position of judgment, that he wishes to avoid caricature and bring his subject within the range of human credibility, that he wishes to assign guilt. When we add to these considerations the fact that old age with its ultimate horrors was a serious contemplation of Chaucer's age and that Chaucer would have been early introduced to it in those terms, it would seem that we must recognize the serious basis of the tale.

*Lehigh University.*

# Actuality in the “Prima Via” of St Thomas

JOSEPH OWENS C.Ss.R.

THE operative feature in the reasoning of St Thomas’ *prima via* (*Summa Theologiae*, I, 2, 3c), one may readily see, is the notion of actuality. The argument consists in analyzing the movement experienced in the sensible world into actuality and potentiality, and explaining it as a process in which something is being brought from potentiality into actuality by a movent already actual in the pertinent respect. Movement tends towards the actuality into which it brings its subject — towards heat, for instance, in wood that is being made warm. It requires a movent that is already in actuality in this regard — in the case of heating, a movent that is already hot. The movent, in fact, imparts motion insofar as it is in that state of actuality — *movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu*. With this understanding of motion clearly established, the primary movent is shown to be imparting motion without being moved by anything else. In the setting, what else can the conclusion mean except that the primary movent is of itself in a state of actuality from the viewpoint of imparting motion, and is not being brought into that actuality by anything else?

The external framework of the argument is taken obviously enough from Aristotle. With the Stagirite, however, the notions of actuality and potentiality were comparatively simple. Actuality coincided with form, potentiality with matter.<sup>1</sup> Motion, accordingly, terminated in the form that was being acquired. The form was the ultimate actuality towards which the motion tended. But could this be so for St Thomas? Does not the situation with him become much more complicated? For St Thomas nothing is actual except through existence.<sup>2</sup> Existence is the actuality of every form, both substantial and accidental.<sup>3</sup> Becoming anything means

<sup>1</sup> The equation of form with actuality and of matter with potentiality may be seen clearly enough in Aristotle, *Metaph.* H 2,1042b9-1043a28, and the other passages listed by Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.*, 251a16-20 and 785b55-61. On the skeleton form that underlies the argument from motion both in Aristotle and in the different versions of it in St Thomas Aquinas, see my article “Aquinas and the Proof from the ‘Physics,’” *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 122-148.

<sup>2</sup> “Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est:...” *ST*, I, 4, 1, ad 3m. “...vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in actu: unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse.” *ST*, I, 5, 2, ad 4m. “Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur.” *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m.

<sup>3</sup> “...unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum.” *ST*, I, 4, 1,

being moved towards new existence.<sup>4</sup> It is in new existence that every motion terminates.<sup>5</sup>

What do these considerations imply? Can they mean anything else than that the process of bringing something to a new actuality is ultimately a process of bringing it to some new existence? Only by being made to exist can anything, whether substance or accident, be actualized for Aquinas. Existence is the ultimate actuality in which every process from potentiality to actuality must end.<sup>6</sup> There is no way in St Thomas by which something can be brought into actuality except by being brought into existence.

If this is the overall metaphysical conception of actuality in St Thomas, is it possible to detach the *prima via* from a setting in which actuality always involves existence? Can the actuality of the primary mover, the actuality that enables it to impart motion without being moved, be anything other than existence itself? Will it not have to be existence that is not being brought into actuality by anything else? Will it not be existence that is there of itself? What else could be considered actual in regard to everything

ad 3m. "...esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae." *ST*, I, 54, 1c. "Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis,..." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, Leonine no. 22. "Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum,..." *De Pot.*, 7, 2, ad 9m.

On the immediate background of *actus essentiae* in Albert the Great, see L. G. Geiger, "La vie, acte essentiel de l'âme — l'*esse*, acte de l'essence d'après Albert-le-Grand," *Etudes d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale*, 17 (1962), 49-116. Geiger notes that this formula does not give rise to any new problem in Albert: "On la trouve d'un bout à l'autre de son œuvre. Les formules, en se répétant presque identiques, montrent qu'Albert exprime là une thèse dont le fond ne semble jamais avoir fait problème pour lui: ..." *Ibid.*, p. 50. The notion seems to stem from the illustration of light as used to explain being — see Geiger, p. 50, n. 11, and p. 103, n. 195. A glance at the source indicated by Geiger in Anselm shows how the expression could easily arise: "Quemadmodum enim sese habent ad invicem lux et lucere et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia et esse et ens, hoc est existens sive subsistens." *Monologion*, c. VI; ed. F. S. Schmitt (Seckau, 1938), p. 20.15-16. So, with Albert: "...sicut lucere refertur ad actum, ita et esse." *In III Sent.*, d. 2, a. 5; ed. Borgnet, 28, 27a. As long as no attention was paid to the way in which being is originally grasped through judgment, the conception of being that was expressed by the infinitive *esse* could be equated with the actuality expressed by other infinitives and then transferred from the level of operation to the level of primary actuality, without encountering any new problems.

<sup>4</sup> "Licet alicui existenti accidat motus, tamen motus est praeter esse rei. Nullum autem corporeum est causa alicuius rei nisi in quantum movetur... Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicuius rei in quantum est esse, sed est causa eius quod est moveri ad esse, quod est fieri rei." *CG*, 3, 65, Adhuc licet. Cf. *Comp. Theol.*, I, 11.

<sup>5</sup> "Hoc autem est esse, ad quod generatio et omnis motus terminatur: omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia antequam esse acquirat." *CG*, II, 52, Item cum omne.

<sup>6</sup> "Ultimus autem actus est ipsum esse. Cum enim omnis motus sit exitus de potentia in actum, oportet illud esse ultimum actum in quod tendit omnis motus." *Comp. Theol.*, I, 11, Verardo no. 21.

contained in and required by the perfections towards which all the members in the series of things moved are being brought? And is this not enough to show at once its identity with the God who had revealed himself in the verse of *Exodus* (III, 14), quoted in the *Sed contra* of the present article, solely in terms of being: *Ego sum qui sum?*

Some objections may easily arise against this reading of the *prima via*. First, does it not give each accident a corresponding existence of its own, really distinct from the existence of the substance as well as from the nature of the accident? Is not this notion of a distinct accidental existence rejected by leading Thomists of the last four centuries? Secondly, according to the order of presentation followed by St Thomas, the primary movent is not identified with subsistent existence till several articles later. Does this not mean that St Thomas *first* establishes the notion of a primary movent in general, and only *later* draws out the conclusion that the primary movent must be its own existence? What justifies an interpreter in reading into the starting point of the *prima via* existential considerations that Aquinas does indeed develop elsewhere, but which he does not even mention in this particular argument? Is not that a subversion of the order given to the demonstration by St Thomas himself?

Thirdly, if the argument is kept on the purely metaphysical plane of existence, how can it avoid ending as another version of the much controverted ontological argument, quite as the cosmological argument does in the Kantian setting? Does not every purely metaphysical argument for the existence of God, in fact, ultimately coincide with the ontological argument? Are not the terms "metaphysical" and "ontological" interchangeable even in this respect? Finally, does not an interpretation of the *prima via* as well of the other *viae* in terms of existence mean that they are all merged into one common procedure for proving the existence of God? Is any possibility left for effectively distinguishing the different *viae* one from another?

These objections deserve careful consideration. They are distinct from one another in character. Each calls for separate treatment. Accordingly they will be examined one by one in the following sections of this article.

## I

First, does this way of understanding the *prima via* mean that each accident has its own existence, really distinct from the existence of the substance? Undoubtedly it does. A new accident, for instance a degree of heat that did not exist before, is brought into being. There is new existence now over and above the existence of the substance. It is existence

that was not there before, existence in which the motion terminates. It is existence that is now really present. It is accordingly really distinct from the substantial existence that was already there and that will remain after the heat, for example, ceases to exist. There is not the least doubt that this reading of the *prima via* means that the existence of an accident is really distinct from the existence of the substance.

These considerations, however, do not at all mean that a real distinction is being presupposed between the accident and its own existence. No such distinction is in any way being presumed. All that is understood is that the accident exists and that its existence is recognized as really distinct from the existence of the substance. Whether its existence is really distinct from its own nature remains an open question. Accordingly no real distinction of existence from thing, either in substance or in accident, is presupposed in this understanding of the *prima via*. The question of a real distinction between nature and being can be approached only after the existence of God has been already demonstrated.

Nevertheless, one may rightly insist, will not this view of the *prima via* later have to face a situation in which it will entail the conclusion that the existence of an accident is really distinct from the accident itself as well as from the existence of the substance? If the accident has its own existence, really distinct from that of the substance, will it not come under the further reasoning that everything produced by the first cause, mediately as well as immediately, is really distinct from its own existence? How can this consequence avoid bringing the interpretation into a head on collision with the position of outstanding Thomistic scholars that accidents do not have a really distinct existence of their own, an existence that would be proportionate to their nature and therefore really distinct from substantial existence as well as from their nature?

In St Thomas himself, however, there are abundant passages that ascribe a superadded and characteristically different existence to the accidents.<sup>7</sup> The existence of any accident is of course naturally dependent

<sup>7</sup> E.g. "Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae; oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae, et ab ipso dependens; et tanto uniuscuiusque eorum esse est prius vel posterius, quanto forma accidentalis, secundum propriam rationem, fuerit propinquior substantiae vel magis perfecta." *CG*, IV, 14, Leonine no. 7c. The relevant texts throughout the works of St Thomas have been collected and discussed in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Barry F. Brown, "The Being of Accidents according to St. Thomas Aquinas," University of Toronto, 1966. From a comprehensive study of the texts, Dr Brown concludes: "The accidental being is therefore really distinct from substantial being. Any attempt to identify the two is to forget that for St. Thomas, change is the reduction of potency not only to formal act, but also to that entitative act that is given by the formal act, be it accidental or substantial. And to forget this is to make St. Thomas implicitly

upon the existence of the substance in which the accident inheres. The accidental existence is termed *in esse*, and not *esse* without qualification. Yet *in esse* is a kind of *esse*, a way of being. In this framework St Thomas may be found at times ascribing *esse* to accidents, and at times denying it to them.<sup>8</sup> When understood without qualification, *esse* is naturally refused to accidents. It would make them substances. But that does not at all imply that the *in esse* of the accident is really identical with the *esse* of the substance. Rather, they are two different kinds of existence, unable to coincide in reality with each other. Each is proportionate to the kind of essence it makes exist. If the essence is a substance, the corresponding existence will be substantial. If the essence is an accident, the new existence will be accidental.<sup>9</sup> The substance will exist in a new way by the accidental existence, and in a way that is really distinct from the substantial existence it already possessed. One may also say that the accident itself exists through the accidental existence. But in speaking that way, one is making the accident a subject of predication and thereby representing it as a substance. Nevertheless, one is not deceived for an instant into judging that the accident exists in itself. In saying that the accident exists, one means that the substance is actually being qualified by it. For this the two really distinct existential actualities are required, the *esse* of the substance and the *in esse* of the accident. The *in esse* of the accident is an existence that is really added over and above the existence of the substance.

It may well be that the objections in the more recent Thomistic tradition against the really distinct being of accidents will disappear under more careful clarification. The common objection seems to be that to give an

deny the reality of accidental change itself. An accident *depends* in being upon substance; it is *not* one in being with it." *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219 (quoted with permission of the author). For the modern commentators who oppose this interpretation, see *ibid.*, pp. 281-283, nn. 31-39.

<sup>8</sup> Compare, for instance, these two texts from the *Summa Theologiae*: "Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidentis. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est in esse subiecto, accidentis enim esse est in esse" (I, 28, 2c) and "Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur" (I, 90, 2c). The reason lies in the way an accident, when considered by itself and made the subject of predication, has to be represented as a substance while lacking the being of a substance: "Pro tanto autem videntur accidentia in abstracto significata esse non entia, quia nihil ipsorum est aptum natum secundum se esse; immo cuiuslibet eorum esse est alteri in esse, et non est possibile aliquid eorum separari a substantia; et ideo quando significantur in abstracto quasi sint secundum se entia et a substantia separata. videtur quod sint non entia." *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 1, Cathala no. 1253. Cf. *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, no. 894.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. "...sicut se habet substantia ad esse sibi debitum, ita et qualitas ad esse sui generis conveniens." *In III Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, Resp.; ed. Moos, III, 8 (no. 12). Cf. *CG*, IV, 14, 7c (text supra, n. 7).

accident an existence of its own is to turn it into a substance. But a substance is an independent nature in respect of receiving existence, while an accident can receive existence only in dependence upon a substance. There is no question of an accident being given an existence that would be naturally independent of another and substantial existence. The accident is not being given *esse* without qualification. It is given only *in esse*. But both these come under the multisignificant notion of existence. In saying that an accident has its own existence, then, one does not at all mean that it exists like a substance. One means only that it is actually modifying a substance. Existence cannot be reduced to a single meaning. Its range is as wide as the multiplicity of essences that specify it.

In saying that motion has existence, then, or in speaking of the existence of motion, one is not saying anything else than that something is being moved. By making motion the subject of predication in the proposition "Motion has existence," one is not at all imagining that motion has existence in itself, like a stone or a tree. To speak about motion and reason about motion one has to think that way. One has to represent motion as a substance. But that does not at all lead one to judge that motion is a substance. All one means is that something is actually being moved. Motion cannot have in reality any existence in separation from the subject in which it is occurring. From a metaphysical standpoint the two propositions "Some things are being moved in this world" and "Motion really exists" are equivalent. They are both expressing the same truth. In English the notion of being, as involved here, is expressed in the verbal form "are being moved." In Latin it is only implied in the passive tense in "aliqua moventur."<sup>10</sup> But no matter how one expresses it, one cannot speak of the existence of motion without thereby meaning that something, in the sense of a substance, is being moved. The statement "Some things are being moved in this world" expresses the existential actuality of motion with all the cogency required for its functioning as the operative feature in a reasoning process. This actuality is not the existence of the substance that was present before the motion started. It is a new existence, accidental in character, and superadded in reality to the already present substantial existence of the thing that is being moved.

<sup>10</sup> For St Thomas every finite verb implicitly contains the notion of being: "Quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicit *esse*, quia currere est currentem *esse*..." *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, no. 18. "Quia vero quaeradum praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum Est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid *esse*. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum Est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis." *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9, no. 893.

## II

A second objection is that according to the order of presentation in the *Summa Theologiae* a primary movent is first demonstrated, and only several articles afterwards is it shown to be identical with its own existence. This is alleged to indicate that the order of procedure is first to establish a primary movent, and then, after further reasoning, to arrive at its identity with subsistent existence. This objection is crucial, and calls for an exceptionally penetrating inquiry into the procedure of St Thomas in the actual setting of the argument.

What is reached as the immediate conclusion of the *prima via* is described as “aliquid primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.” It is a primary movent in the sense that all understand it to be God. The immediate identification of a primary movent with God may well occasion misgivings, in the light of the argument’s Aristotelian background. An Aristotelian primary movent cannot readily be understood as the God revealed in the sacred Scriptures.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly the procedure by which St Thomas shows that the primary movent is identified with its existence and is unique and infinite in perfection, should be examined carefully. Is this a conclusion drawn by him from the notion of primary movent in general? Or is the primary movent already understood by him as existential actuality in the conclusion of the *prima via*, before any further conclusions are deduced?

The first consequence drawn from the consideration of God as primary movent is that he is not a body:

Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum: ut patet inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est corpus (*ST*, I, 3, 1c).

In the second reason given for this conclusion, the argument from actuality

<sup>11</sup> The plurality of the Aristotelian separate substances, as opposed to the unicity of the Christian God, should be enough to raise suspicions. Even today, however, a warning against confusing the philosophy of St Thomas with that of Aristotle seems necessary, and is strongly worded by Gilson: “Nous avons dit et répété sur tous les tons pendant des siècles, que la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin était celle d’Aristote. Ceux qui l’ont dit ont fini par le faire croire, et le pis est qu’eux-mêmes l’ont crû. Beaucoup le croient encore aujourd’hui, à tel point qu’ils tiennent presque pour une hérésie la proposition pourtant évidente que la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin n’est pas celle d’Aristote. Le langage est le même, la technique de la démonstration est semblable, mais le contenu de la doctrine est différent.” E. Gilson, “Trois leçons sur le Thomisme et sa situation présente,” *Seminarium*, IV (1965), 692-693.

and potentiality is now brought to bear upon the primary *being* without explicit mention of the primary movent:

Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia: quia quod est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod in Deo sit aliquid in potentia (*ibid.*).

The reasoning repeats the principle of the *prima via* that what is in potency can be brought to actuality only through a being that is already in actuality. Then, in drawing the consequence that nothing in God is in a state of potentiality, it has recourse to a conclusion said to be already established, namely that God is the primary being. Where was that conclusion stated? Was it mentioned anywhere in the argument that proceeds from motion by way of actuality and potentiality, the *prima via*? True, what brings something from potentiality to actuality was designated “a being in actuality” (*ens actu*) in the *prima via*, just as it is called *ens actu* here. But does that justify an interpreter in straightway identifying primary movent and primary being with each other? If it does, it would mean that throughout the *prima via* St Thomas is thinking primarily in terms of being and is definitely regarding his conclusion in terms of being.

But could not the backward reference be to the conclusion of one of the other four *viae*, even though the setting in the present passage is the argument of potentiality and actuality? The most likely perhaps would be the fourth *via*. There God was shown to be *maxime ens*. No one need object to equating *maxime ens* with *primum ens*, even though *primum ens* is not mentioned. The two expressions are obviously equivalent against the Aristotelian background in which the greatest is the cause of all the other instances that share its characteristic.<sup>12</sup> But by the same norm one could likewise equate the expression *primum ens* with the conclusion of the *secunda*

<sup>12</sup> "...a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things)..." *Metaph. a* 1,993b24-26; Oxford tr. This passage of Aristotle, referred to explicitly by St Thomas in the *quarta via* (*ST*, I, 2, 3c; cf. *CG*, I, 13), can equally well be phrased by him in terms of the first in a genus as cause of the rest: "...illud quod est *primum in quolibet genere, est causa omnium eorum quae sunt post*, ut dicitur in *II Metaphys.*" *ST*, III, 56, 1c.

The general procedure may be seen clearly enough in the *Contra Gentiles*: ‘Ostensum est supra aliquid esse quod per se necesse est esse, quod Deus est. Hoc igitur esse quod necesse est, si est alicui quidditati quae non est quod ipsum est,...’ (I, 22). Necessary existence has been reached as the first cause (*CG*, I, 15, *Amplius*), and then this existence is shown to belong to no quiddity that is not itself. The reasoning is from existence to identity with essence, and not from an essence to identity with existence.

*via*, that God is the first efficient cause — *causam efficientem primam*. Since there is no question, then, of literally equating *primum ens* with anything yet established in the demonstration of God's existence, why not remain within the context of the reasoning through actuality and potentiality? One would then regard the notion *primum ens* as understood in what follows in the *prima via* upon the principle “*de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu.*” Every movent is a movent insofar as it is an *ens actu*. In this understanding of a movent in the *prima via*, the ensuing stages through the series of movents to the primary movent would require that the primary movent be regarded as the primary *ens actu*. Reasoning later in the setting of actuality and potentiality, St Thomas could therefore readily refer back to the *primum movens* as the *primum ens*.

Even so, however, what allows the conclusion that in such a first being there can be nothing in potentiality? No reason is explicitly given. One might suggest that if the first being had any potentiality it would require something still prior to itself to actualize the potentiality, and would not be any longer the first movent or the first being. But does this reason hold, just by itself? Today many thinkers, especially against a Whiteheadian background, feel no qualms in acknowledging God as the first being and at the same time allowing change in him and the addition of new real relations.<sup>13</sup> Why, then, might not the primary movent or the primary being be actual of itself, and yet be in potentiality in regard to aspects or virtualities that do not affect its status as primary movent of the series under consideration? Aristotle had an answer carefully worked out. Cosmic motion was eternal and uniform. Any potency whatsoever in a primary movent would introduce possibility of some change, and would therefore fail to account for the eternal uniformity of the cosmic motion.<sup>14</sup> St Thomas cannot accept the eternity of cosmic motion as a fact. He cannot make his own the Aristotelian reason for the lack of all potentiality

<sup>13</sup> E.g. “God is primordially one, namely, he is the primordial unity of relevance of the many potential forms: in the process he acquires a consequent multiplicity, which the primordial character absorbs into its own unity.” Alfred N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, reprint (New York, 1941), 529. This is meant in express contrast to the Aristotelian ‘unmoved mover’ and the traditional Christian transcendent creator; see *ibid.*, 519. For the position that real relations to the world are possible in God, see W. E. Stokes, “Is God Really Related to this World?”, *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 39 (1965), 145-151. Fr. Stokes’ conclusion is: “Between a philosophy of creative act which excludes the possibility of the real relation of God to the world and a modal philosophy which demands reciprocal relations between God and the world, it is possible to posit a ‘third position’: a philosophy of creative act with real but asymmetrical relations between God and the world.” *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>14</sup> *Metaph.* A 6,1071b17-20. Cf. *Ph.* VIII 6,258b10-259b28; 10,267b2-5.

in the primary movent. Yet he does make his own, without feeling any strain, the Aristotelian conclusion.<sup>15</sup> How can he do this? No reason at all is given in the present context. But a reason is required, and there must be one understood, if the conclusion of St Thomas regarding the lack of all potentiality in the primary being is to be accepted as valid. Does the reasoning in the immediately following article (*ST*, I, 3, 2) throw any light upon the ground that allows him to draw this conclusion?

The article (*ST*, I, 3, 2) is meant to show that there is no matter in God. As its first reason it states that matter is in potentiality. But in referring back to the already mentioned assertion that there is no potentiality in God the primary being, it uses the expression "pure actuality" as the equivalent of the notion involved: "Ostensum est autem quod Deus est actus purus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate" (*ST*, I, 3, 2c). That God is pure actuality can hardly be regarded as a new conclusion. It is rather the converse side of the proposition that there is no potentiality present in him. In Aristotle<sup>16</sup> this consideration is not brought out expressly. Yet St Thomas does not feel the least hesitation in referring to the conclusion explicitly as pure actuality, without any need of explanation. Why does this way of formulating the notion come so spontaneously to St Thomas' mind?

No answer is to be found in the present article (*ST*, I, 3, 2), nor any further light on the grounds that allow St Thomas to identify with the Christian God the pure actuality reached through the *prima via*. In the third argument in the body of the present article, God is in contrast to matter described as essentially form: "Est igitur per essentiam suam forma" (*ST*, I, 3, 2c). This stresses the puzzling nature of the whole situation. In Aristotle the separate substances were essentially forms. Yet they were

<sup>15</sup> Cf.: "Et ad hoc dicendum quod via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse est ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus eidetur esse manifestum quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum: quia omne quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem; cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum, vel de non esse in esse." *CG*, I, 13. "Si enim mundo et motu existente sempiterno, necesse est ponere unum primum principium; multo magis sempiternitate eorum sublata; quia manifestum est quod omne novum indiget aliquo principio innovante." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, Leonine no. 6. "Ex hoc igitur processu manifestum est quod Aristoteles hic firmiter opinatus est et credidit necessarium fore, quod motus sit sempiternus et similiter tempus. Aliter enim non fundasset super hoc intentionem suam de inquisitione substantiarum immaterialium. ...tamen ea quae hic probantur de sempiternitate et immaterialitate primae substantiae, ex necessitate sequuntur. ...necesse est ponere aliquam substantiam sempiternam, in cuius substantia non sit potentia, et per consequens immateriale." *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, nos. 2496-2499.

<sup>16</sup> References, supra, n. 14.

finite and multiple, unlike the Christian God. For St Thomas himself an angelic substance is essentially a form. But the angelic substance is not pure actuality, since it is in potency to its existence, its accidents, and its operation. A finite separate substance would have for St Thomas the status of angel. It lacked all potentiality for Aristotle, yet it could not be considered pure actuality in the Thomistic setting. What is causing this crucial difference in the two ways of viewing the primary movent?<sup>17</sup>

In the following article (*ST*, I, 3, 3), nothing occurs that would help elucidate this situation. Then in the next article, the fourth, the problem whether God's essence and being are identical, is presented. The *Sed contra* of the article quotes St Hilary's well-known dictum that in God being is not an accident but is subsistent truth, and interprets this as meaning that what subsists in God is his existence: "Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse" (*ST*, I, 3, 4). Since *esse* is being used in this setting in express contrast with *essentia*, there need be no hesitation in translating it as "existence." At this point, then, one may urge, is the notion of subsistent existence first introduced into the reasoning, and presented as a conclusion from what has already been established.

Is the situation, however, really that simple? To show that in God essence and existence are the same is a conclusion that well may follow, in the order of theological presentation, from the notion of a primary movent already understood as pure existential actuality. The preceding reasoning had established the primary movent as pure actuality. Could not this be understood as pure actuality in the line of existence, and still allow in orderly fashion the further conclusion that it requires identity of essence and existence? In the theological order that is being followed, the

<sup>17</sup> St Thomas refers to God as a "form" in the same way that he speaks of the divine "nature" or "essence" — namely, as something identical with the divine existence: "Et ideo cum omnium quae dicuntur de Deo natura vel forma sit ipsum esse, quia suum esse est sua natura, propter quod dicitur a quibusdam philosophis, quod est ens non in essentia,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 819-820. Yet he can also speak as though the existence and the quiddity were two distinct "forms": "... forma a qua imponitur, scilicet esse, non multiplicatur in eis. ... Sed quidditas sive forma, a qua sumitur nomen rei in divinis, consideratur dupliciter." *Ibid.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; I, 612. The reason, of course, is that human intelligence has to represent existence and nature under two different concepts, each of which has its own formal aspect. With existence, this formal aspect is that of perfection or actuality, or more vaguely, of "something." Even though existence has to be expressed in this way, however, it is kept clearly apart by St Thomas from any quidditative element, whether genus or differentia: "Quod additur alicui ad designationem alicuius designatione essentiali, non constituit eius rationem, sed solum esse in actu: rationale enim additum *animali* acquirit animali esse in actu, non autem constituit rationem animalis in quantum est animal; ... hoc autem, scilicet esse in actu, est ipsa divina essentia, ut supra ostensum est." *CG*, I, 24, Item quod.

present articles all fall under the general heading of the simplicity of God.<sup>18</sup> After God has been shown to be identical with his essence or nature (*ST*, I, 3, 3), a still further simplicity is now being established in the identity of essence and existence. Even though pure actuality is being understood all along as existence only, the order of presentation still calls for the question of its identity with essence in God. The purpose is to treat from all angles the thoroughgoing simplicity of the Godhead.

But does the demonstration of the identity of essence and existence in God, as given in this article, *in fact* presuppose that the primary movent is understood as existential actuality? The first argument in the body of the article follows the strict line of existence and the causing of existence, without reference to the *prima via*. The second argument, however, proceeds in terms of actuality and potentiality. It refers back to the already established conclusion that in God there is nothing potential:

Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam *esse*. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non est aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse (*ST*, I, 3, 4c).

The opening sentence of this passage reiterates the fundamental metaphysical doctrine of St Thomas that existence is the actuality of every form or nature. This is not referred back to any previous proof in the *Summa Theologiae*. It is mentioned as if it is something that has to be everywhere understood. It seems regarded as a factor that always has to be kept in mind. Nothing can be actual unless it is made actual by existence. This holds everywhere. It is accordingly taken for granted whenever actuality is in question. All that is needed is a reminder when actuality is made to bear upon an existential problem. So understood, actuality in its pure state will be incompatible with an essence distinct from existence. The conclusion then follows that God's essence is his existence.

The order in which the conclusions are drawn from the nature of the immobile movent established in the *prima via* is consequently clear enough. First, the immobile movent is found to have no potentiality at all, and accordingly is designated as pure actuality. Secondly, this absence of

<sup>18</sup> "Primo ergo inquiratur de simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio." *ST*, I, 3, init. The procedure, accordingly, is to take what has already been established, and "remove" composition, in the sense of showing that none of the composition found in creatures is present in God. The procedure can hardly be conceived as allowing the insertion of existence into the nature of a primary movent that had been known only in terms of a quidditative concept. Yet that is what the requirement of a "prolonging" for the *prima via* would seem to demand.

potentiality requires that the essence of the primary movent be its existence. The latter conclusion was drawn with the presupposition that existence is the actuality of every form or nature.

What does this general picture of the situation in the *Summa Theologiae* indicate? Does it not show pointedly enough that the primary movent in the conclusion of the *prima via* has in fact been understood as actuality that is not being made actual by anything else? This, as has been seen,<sup>19</sup> is what the structure of the *prima via* required. But is any reason given to justify the next conclusion that the primary movent has no potentiality whatsoever? No ground is expressly offered. If the actuality of the primary movent were being understood in the Aristotelian sense of finite form, the conclusion would not follow without the supposition of the world's eternity. If, however, pure actuality is being understood in the framework of a metaphysics in which nothing is actual except through existence, the conclusion follows without difficulty. With the next conclusion, that in God essence and existence are identical, this metaphysical framework is expressly mentioned, and mentioned in a way that implies its presence wherever actuality is concerned. Has it not, then, the aspect of a general doctrine that has to be taken into account wherever actuality is used in a reasoning processs? Could anything be considered actual in this context unless it is understood as actual through existence?

If the argument were located in a strictly philosophical context, it could be expected to stress the existential requirement for actuality from the start. As it is, it occurs in a theological setting. The order of presentation is to assemble traditionally recognized ways of proving the existence of God, for the purpose of establishing the theological proposition that God's existence is rationally demonstrable. The proof from motion, as handed down traditionally,<sup>20</sup> made no mention of existence. The proof is according-

<sup>19</sup> See supra, opening paragraph of the present article. Gilson, while allowing that this interpretation is philosophically unobjectionable, urges an historical difficulty: "Assurément on peut interpréter la première voie comme la preuve d'une première cause efficiente du mouvement. C'est ce que presque tout le monde fait. La première voie devient simplement alors un cas particulier de la seconde, celui où l'effet dont on cherche la cause efficiente est le plus manifeste de tous. Il n'y a à cela aucun inconvénient philosophique, mais il y en a un historique, car il ne semble pas que telle ait été l'intention de saint Thomas lui-même. En effet, si la *prima via* est un cas particulier de la *secunda via*, il n'y a pas cinq voies, mais quatre..." E. Gilson, "Prolégomènes à la *Prima via*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 30 (1963), 56. Cf.: "On peut prouver l'existence d'un Premier Moteur et refuser d'admettre qu'il soit un Premier Efficient; s'il n'a pas créé le monde, par exemple, et si la matière est, comme lui, une cause première incrée, le cosmos peut lui devoir l'ordre sans lui devoir l'être." Gilson, "Trois leçons sur le problème de l'existence de Dieu," *Divinitas*, 1 (1961), 43.

<sup>20</sup> See texts in R. Arnou, *De Quinque Viis Sancti Thomae ad Demonstrandam Dei Existentiam* (Rome, 1932). However, as St Thomas first approaches the traditional ways of proving God's existence,

ly reproduced in a skeleton form that shows nothing not already contained in the Aristotelian source. In concluding to a movent that has no potentiality whatsoever, the skeleton is vivified in Aristotle by the eternity of cosmic motion and the animate nature of the heavenly bodies. While rejecting these two tenets,<sup>21</sup> St Thomas is able to retain the conclusion of a primary movent that is pure actuality, and then, treating next in order the divine simplicity, to show that in this pure actuality essence and existence are identical. What is vivifying the skeleton form of the argument in this process of reasoning? Can it be anything else than the ever present understanding that nothing is actual except through existence?

In the theological order of presentation, then, the mention of existence is not required until the explanation of the divine simplicity reaches the question of the identity of essence and existence in God. For the metaphysical understanding of the *prima via*, however, the tenet that existence is the actuality of every form or nature (*ST*, I, 3, 4c) has to be seen in the argument from the beginning. It cannot be eliminated from the requirements for the actuality of the movement going on in the sensible world, without thereby stepping outside the metaphysical universe of St Thomas. For him a form or nature that is not made actual by existence lacks all actuality, and could not function as the starting point for a proof of God's existence. If in following the theological order, then, you stop at any

he shows no hesitation in interpreting them from the common viewpoint of the reception of existence in creatures: "Harum autem diversitas sumitur secundum vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum, quas Dionysius ponit,... Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Unde secundum hoc ducimur in causam a qua est." *In I Sent.*, d. 3, div. lae partis textus; ed. Mandonnet, I, 88. For St Thomas it seems perfectly legitimate to retain the skeletal structure of an Aristotelian argument and read into it his own existential meaning; e.g.: "Unde sicut est idem mobile secundum substantiam in toto motu, variatur tamen secundum esse, sicut dicitur quod Socrates in foro est alter a seipso in domo; ita nunc est etiam idem secundum substantiam in tota successione temporis, variatum tantum secundum esse, scilicet secundum rationem quam accepit prioris et posterioris. Sicut autem motus est actus ipsius mobilis in quantum mobile est; ita esse est actus existentis, in quantum ens est." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470. In Aristotle the meaning was that a thing remains the same in substance while changing in accidents: "This is an identical *substratum*... but it has different *attributes* — as the sophists assume that Coriscus' being in the Lyceum is a different thing from Coriscus' being in the market-place." *Ph.* IV 11,219b18-21; Oxford tr. "In the Lyceum" and "in the market" were the examples of the category of place used in the *Categories* (4,2a1-2), and the Boethian usage allowed "esse aliquid" to signify an accident (see St Thomas, *In Boeth. De Hebd.*, lect. II, Calcaterra nos. 26-28). Yet into what originally meant accidental change of place, St Thomas can unhesitatingly read the meaning of change in existential actuality. The skeleton remains the same, but it now supports different flesh.

<sup>21</sup> See *CG*, I, 13, § Praedictos autem.

crucial point in the reasoning and inquire into the metaphysical cogency of the deduction, you will find that actuation through existence is in each case the ground that makes the argument valid. The requirements of a movent other than the thing moved, of pure actuality in the primary movent, of identity of essence with existence, of infinity and of unicity, are all based upon the understanding that actuality is brought about by existence, even though existence is not mentioned till it comes to the fore in a question about the divine simplicity.

This does not at all mean that the whole of Thomism has to be read into any one of its main positions. Far from it. There is a definite order from principles to conclusions, and that order has always to be respected. One is by no means justified in reading into the starting point of the *prima via* doctrines like the real distinction between essence and existence or between essence and operative powers in creatures. These are conclusions that presuppose the existence of God, and accordingly cannot be used in a proof of his existence. But there are other teachings of St Thomas that pertain to the primal notion of being that is operative in the starting point of any metaphysical argument. One of these is that a thing's nature is what is grasped through the first operation of the intellect, namely through conceptualization, while the thing's being is what is apprehended through the second operation, namely through judgment.<sup>22</sup> Unless a thing has the actuality that is known through judgment, it is non-existent, it is nothing. In noting at the commencement of the *prima via*, then, that some things are being moved in this world, the text of the *Summa Theologiae* definitely contains a judgment of the existence of this motion, even though existence

<sup>22</sup> "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. ...Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 903. There is still a tendency to take rather lightly this basic doctrine of St Thomas; e.g.: "One interpretation, quite widespread among Neo-Thomists, tries to resolve the question with a good deal of elegance: just as in simple apprehension essence is grasped, so too in the judgment *esse* is grasped. ...But let it be said for the peace of all of us: these and other similar texts do not treat at all of our precise question: they deal with the characteristic function of the two operations of the mind which divide the two-fold content of the notion of *ens*, essence and *actus essendi*. Therefore, the *notio entis* precedes them both, just as, in fact, *ens* precedes *res* and *verum* in the grounding of the transcendentals." C. Fabro, "The Transcendentality of *Ens-Esse* and the Ground of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (1966), 425-426. It is perfectly true that the human intellect has to conceive both existence and essence in terms of a composite *ens*. In that sense the *notio entis*, as the notion of a composite, is prior to both. But this does not at all mean that in the thing itself existence is denied priority to thing and to everything else in the thing. Through one's immediate judgments existence is grasped in sensible things in the priority it exercises over all it actuates. It does not follow as a transcendental upon the composite *ens*.

is not expressly mentioned. St Thomas is proving one thing at a time, in careful order. But in that order the actualization of natures by existence is not a step that follows as a conclusion from a previous tenet. It is a consideration that is present from the start, and needs but to be alluded to when the theological sequence of problems encounters a question in which existence is expressly mentioned, as in the case of the divine simplicity.

It is hardly correct, therefore, to say that existence is conspicuously absent from the starting point of the *prima via*. The statement that some things are being moved in this world means that motion exists here and now in the sensible universe. The existence of the motion is grasped through one's judgment, just as the nature of the motion is known through conceptualization. Both are apprehended in the knowledge that some things are being moved in the world. The starting point of the *prima via* is the fact of sensible movement as grasped integrally, in regard to both the nature and existence of the motion, with the nature seen as actual through its existence. No matter how limited and precise this starting point may be, it has to include these two factors if it is to ground metaphysical conclusions in the characteristic thought of St Thomas. So understood it is credited with, and not denied, the meaning that it had in its own historical setting.

### III

Thirdly, is there any reason for thinking that this metaphysical view of the *prima via* will make it an ontological argument for the existence of God ? Is it true that every purely metaphysical demonstration of God's existence is but another version of the ontological argument ? Can this claim be at all substantiated ?

Naturally, one has to be careful of words. "Ontological," in the Wolffian framework in which its traditional meaning became fixed, referred to a general notion of being that did not coincide with the nature of any particular being. The recent existentialist conceptions of "ontological" as opposed to "ontic" likewise take "ontological" as referring to being that is not a being. The term "ontological," accordingly, applies readily enough to a nature conceived as abstracting from real existence. The problem, then, whether real existence can be demonstrated with such a nature as a starting point, may be raised. The term "metaphysical," on the other hand, does not have these connotations. Etymologically it means beyond or after the physical. In its historical context it meant by "physical" the sensibly observable world, the universe of things composed of matter and form, or else the treatises dealing with these things. In

Aristotelian tradition the preposition "meta" made the term "metaphysical" bear on the separate substances that were beyond or were studied after the world of nature. The history and etymology of the term, consequently, will allow it to bear upon existence that is beyond the natures of things as these are grasped through conceptualization, and that is apprehended only through judgment. The term does not have to be considered synonymous with "ontological."

With this verbal consideration set aside, the ontological arguments themselves may be approached. Historically, they may be ranged under one or the other of two different types. The first is that of reasoning from thought to things. The second is that of reasoning from real natures, found in really existent things, to another existence. It may not always be easy to distinguish sharply between the two ways of reasoning, since the nature that really exists is the nature that is grasped in the concept of a thing. But the two ways may be studied separately in versions that emphasize the one or the other respectively.

The first way of proceeding may be seen clearly enough in the version of the argument given by Descartes. His fundamental norm in this respect is: "When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a thing, it is the same as if we said that it is true of the thing, or that it can be affirmed of it."<sup>23</sup> Existence, however, is contained in the notion of God. Therefore the mind is obliged to conclude that God exists: "So from the sole fact that it perceives that necessary and eternal existence is contained in the idea of the all-perfect being, it must obviously conclude that the all-perfect being exists."<sup>24</sup> From what is perceived in the idea of God, accordingly, one argues to the real existence of God.

Can there be any question of this way of reasoning in the *prima via*? When the actuality of motion and of its term is understood as existence, it is emphatically not regarded as something that could be contained in the concept or idea of motion. Rather, it is something that can be originally grasped only through judgment. It never enters the idea or concept. That "some things are being moved in this world" cannot be known through any concept of motion. It has to be apprehended each time through a different activity of the mind. It can be seen only in the real world, and not in any concept of it. There is accordingly no question of arguing from

<sup>23</sup> "Cum quid dicimus in alicujus rei natura, sive conceptu, contineri, idem est ac si diceremus id de ea re verum esse, sive de ipsa posse affirmari." *2ae Resp.*, Def. IX; A-T, VII, 162.8-10.

<sup>24</sup> "...ita ex eo solo quod percipiat existentiam necessariam et aeternam in entis summe perfecti idea contineri, plane concludere debet ens summe perfectum existere." *Principia*, I, 14; A-T, VIII, 10.15-18.

the content of an idea to the real existence of what is represented by the idea. The reasoning in the *prima via* is from the existence by which motion is made actual here and now in the sensible world, to something that is not being actuated by anything else. There is definitely no passage from the content of thought to real existence.

The second type of ontological reasoning may perhaps be best seen in Duns Scotus. Whether or not one cares to apply the term "ontological" to his procedure, at least he himself considered it to be a coloring of the Anselmian argument.<sup>25</sup> From the natures or quiddities of things, known in the real sensible world, he shows the possibility of a first cause. From that possibility, he establishes the existence of this cause on the ground that if the first cause did not exist it would not even be possible, since there would then be no prior cause to make it exist.<sup>26</sup> — This way of arguing is from real nature to existence. With real quidditative perfection as its starting point it argues to real existence.<sup>27</sup> It makes perfections known through conceptualization the basis for reasoning to a nature that contains perfection without limit. In that nature — so it deduces — existence, because a perfection, will be included.

This way of arguing requires a philosophical framework in which all human intellection comes originally through conceptualization. Perfection grasped through conceptualization will when raised to the infinite include accordingly all perfections, not excepting existence. But in a setting in which existence is not grasped originally through conceptualization, this reasoning cannot take place. No matter how far the quidditative perfection is extended, it will never encompass existence. All knowledge of existence comes from a different source, judgment. Only by going back to something known through judgment to exist, can one develop an argument that concludes to the existence of something else. On the basis of quidditative perfection one can never reach existence. Conversely, an argument starting from the existence of something, for instance of motion in the judgment that some things are being moved in this world, is not reasoning from quidditative perfection of things and is definitely not an ontological argument in this second sense of the notion.

<sup>25</sup> *Ord. I*, d. 2, pars 1, q. 1-2, no. 137; ed. Vaticana, II, 208.16. Cf.: "Hoc probatur primo de esse quiditativo... Et tunc arguitur ultro quod sit, loquendo de esse existentiae:..." *Ibid.*, no. 138; pp. 209.8-210.3.

<sup>26</sup> "...quo prius aliud esse includit contradictionem, sic in quantum primum existit." *Ibid.*, no. 59; p. 165.9-10. Cf. no. 138; p. 210.5-8.

<sup>27</sup> On perfection as the ground for concluding to actual existence, see Scotus, *ibid.*, nos. 53 (pp. 158.3-159.6) and 131-135 (pp. 206.6-208.7). A discussion on this point may be found in my article "The Special Characteristic of the Scotistic Proof that God Exists," *Analecta Gregoriana*, 67 (1954), 321-322.

A proof that starts from the existence of motion, as grasped through judgment, cannot then be brought under either type of ontological argument. Understood in this existential way, the *prima via* commences with the existence here and now of movement in the sensible world. It centers on the actuality involved in the motion that is taking place, and traces that actuality to its ultimate source. It proceeds from the real existence of motion to something that is of itself actual in respect of the perfection required by the starting point. That perfection is existence. The actuality of the primary movent, accordingly, is existence itself. In the reasoning there is no passage to existence either from quiddity or from thought.

#### IV

Finally, does not this understanding of the *prima via* run the risk of merging all five ways into a common process of reasoning from observed existence to subsistent existence? Does it not do away with all relevant distinction between the different *viae*?

That in all five ways there is the same basic kind of demonstration, namely from real sensible existence to its immediate cause and then to its ultimate cause, need not occasion any difficulty. If the nature of God is existence, one may well expect that the only perfection in creatures to open the way philosophically to God is existence.<sup>28</sup> Basically, then, only the one demonstration will be contained under all five ways, or under whatever number of ways that are selected for its development. But need that prevent the existence of motion from giving rise to a distinctive *via*? The motion involved is accidental motion, the kind of motion that is immediately observable. The examples make that clear enough — the hand moving a stick that moves a stone, wood being warmed to a higher degree of temperature. These are the kinds of motion that are immediately perceived in the sensible world. They accordingly provide the starting point for the “first and more manifest” way, for the most obvious way to develop the basic demonstration. New locations for hand and stick and stone, new degrees of heat in the wood, are observed to come into existence. That the man or the stick or the stone has substantial existence, does not enter into the starting point of the argument.

Only the fact that something is here and now being moved — in other

<sup>28</sup> *Esse*, according to the repeated assertions of St Thomas, is the characteristic effect (*effectus proprius*) of God in creatures. It should therefore be the one effect that in virtue of itself points in the direction of God.

words, the existence of movement in the sensible world — forms, then, the starting point of the *prima via*. Whether or not the stone and the wood are created or uncreated, generated or ungenerated, the starting point of the *prima via* will not be affected. The starting point is restricted to the existence of accidental motion in the sensible world. In this *via*, at least as it is presented in the *Summa Theologiae*, there is no allusion to substances coming into existence. The *via* is concerned only with their accidental motion here and now. The actuality involved in their motion, not the actuality that makes them exist as substances, is what is operative in the *prima via*. From the standpoint of a *via* it is not looking for something that makes substances exist, but only for a movent that is moving them in accidental fashion. The difference corresponds to that of making a car in the factory and making it go on the road. Surely this is enough to distinguish the *prima via* sharply from the second, third, and fourth ways of the *Summa Theologiae*, ways that concentrate on the substantial being of things. From the fifth way it is distinguished clearly enough by the manner in which it remains within the analysis of motion into actuality and potentiality, instead of starting from the way in which the activities of creatures are guided towards a definite goal.

There is no danger, consequently, to the distinctive status of the *prima via* when it is interpreted in existential terms. It remains a definite way of presenting the demonstration of God's existence from the starting point of existence known in the sensible world. Any sensible existence will serve as the starting point for the demonstration. But only the existence of accidental motion serves as the starting point for the *prima via*. As long as a real distinction between accidental existence and substantial existence is admitted, the *prima via* will remain distinct from the ways that are concerned with the substantial existence of things.

## V

The actuality to which the stone or the wood is being brought in the *prima via* is accordingly the existence of an accidental perfection. In the two examples given in the text, it is the existence of an accident in the categories of quality and place respectively. To say that accidents of this kind are being brought into existence is from a metaphysical standpoint the same as saying that things are being moved in the sensible world. Nothing more is presumed in reading the argument from the viewpoint of existence as the actuality of every form or nature. In particular, no real distinction between essence and existence is being read here into the argument. Merely the fact that motion exists, understood in the sense that

it is actual through its existence, enters into the starting point. That is a fact that is immediately known through judgment, in which the existence is grasped as actualizing the nature. The existence, so apprehended, is spontaneously conceptualized and under philosophical scrutiny is ranged under the general notion of actuality or perfection. In this guise it is seen to be the actuality towards which every motion is ultimately tending.

One may easily, it is true, neglect this existential feature that is dominant in the fact that some things are being moved in the sensible universe. One may concentrate only on what is grasped through conceptualization. In that case the existential side will not become operative in the reasoning. The starting point will be the nature of motion, and the conclusion will remain within the realm of finite form. The primary movent reached will not be a movent from which infinite perfection, unicity, and subsistent existence will follow. One will have the Aristotelian argument from motion, but what internal resemblance will it have with the *prima via* of St Thomas? If the existential side is made operative, on the other hand, the procedure will be to a movent that is already actual in respect of the perfection towards which the movement is tending. This perfection is ultimately real existence. The actuality of the movent that is not being moved by anything will accordingly be existence, existence that is there in virtue of itself and not through motion imparted by something else. From this kind of actuality the further conclusions drawn in the *Summa Theologiae*, conclusions namely of pure actuality, identity of essence and existence in the sense that the existence subsists, infinity of all perfections, and unicity, follow with all due rigor. Motion's actuality as grasped originally through judgment enables the *prima via* to arrive at a conclusion readily recognizable as the *Ego sum qui sum* in the Vulgate translation of *Exodus*.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

# The Three Enemies of Man

SIEGFRIED WENZEL

IT is probably because of its ubiquity and obvious meaning that the medieval commonplace "Man has three spiritual enemies: the world, the flesh, and the devil," has never merited more than incidental treatment. Editors and critics of medieval texts usually content themselves with adducing a number of passages or analogues<sup>1</sup> and a vague remark about the apparent Cistercian origin of the *topos*. In the absence of a good survey, I wish to present systematically what material I have been able to collect in the course of reading pertinent texts and discuss some earlier documents as well as outline the variety of literary genres in which the *topos* appeared.<sup>2</sup> I should stress that I am not concerned with the general notion that world,<sup>3</sup> flesh, and devil *separately* were considered hostile to man's spiritual progress (and why), but rather with expressions that *link all three* as man's enemies.

The origin of the *topos* still is a moot question. Clearly, it is not found in Scripture; although several biblical books frequently speak of the devil, the flesh, and the world *separately* as hostile to the just man, the three are not combined into a triad.<sup>4</sup> P. Bourguignon and F. Wenner, in the *Dic-*

<sup>1</sup> Especially rich collections are: W. Stammller, *Spälese des Mittelalters. II. Religiöses Schrifttum* ("Texte des späten Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit," 19. Berlin, 1965), 73-75; D. R. Howard, *The Three Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World* (Princeton, 1966), 61-62; P. Meyer, in *Romania*, 16 (1887), 1 ff., with additions by A. Tobler in *Zeitschr. für roman. Philologie*, 11 (1887), 429; cf. *ibid.*, 4 (1880), 163. Several appearances in texts after 1500 are listed by Stammller and by S. C. Chew, *The Pilgrimage of Life* (New Haven, 1962), 70-78. Both authors also refer to several pictorial representations, as does R. Köhler, *Kleinere Schriften zur erzählenden Dichtung des Mittelalters* (i.e., *Kleinere Schriften*, vol. 2; Berlin, 1900), 143, n. 3. I have not attempted to include this material here.

<sup>2</sup> The material was collected as part of a larger project made possible by a fellowship grant from the American Council of Learned Societies, which I gratefully acknowledge.

<sup>3</sup> For the enmity of the world in particular, see R. Bultot, *Christianisme et valeurs humaines. A. La doctrine du mépris du monde* (Louvain and Paris, 1963 ff., in progress); D. R. Howard, *op. cit.*; and the very interesting study by W. Stammller, *Frau Welt. Eine mittelalterliche Allegorie* (Fribourg, 1959).

<sup>4</sup> The devil is considered man's spiritual enemy *par excellence* in both testaments. The flesh and the world, too, are looked upon as hostile, especially in the Gospels and in various Epistles. Thus, the spirit is willing (to wake with Christ), but the flesh (*caro*) is weak (Matt. 26:41; Mark 14:38); flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God (I Cor. 15:50); the spirit gives life,

*tionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique*, have recorded the fairly common opinion of “a Cistercian origin” of the triad but have added: “One may perhaps find it already in St. Augustine; for example, in *De agone Christiano*, ch. 6.”<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the suggested paragraph furnishes a combination of world, flesh, and devil. It is entitled, “How the body must be chastened so that the devil and the world may be conquered,” and St. Augustine writes:

Let us chasten our body and reduce it to subjection, if we want to overcome the world. For by its unlawful delights, its pomps, and its deadly curiosity this world is able to have rule over us — that is, those things which in this world bind the lovers of temporal goods by their destructive delight and compel them to serve the devil and his angels. Since we have renounced all these, let us reduce our body to subjection.<sup>6</sup>

Even if this passage speaks of the three enemies, however, unlike the later *topos* it does not consider them powers which assault man as independent and equal foes, nor does it express this conception with the lapidary briefness of the formula whose history we are tracing. In other words, I would not consider *De agone Christiano* an early witness to the *topos* of the Three Enemies. However, there is another Augustinian text, not mentioned in the *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, which approaches the later commonplace much more closely. In Sermon 158, directed against the Pelagians, Augustine explains that even after man’s sins are forgiven he will have to engage in spiritual battle:

but the flesh avails nothing (John 6:64); the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal. 5:17); the wisdom of the flesh is enemy to God (Rom. 8:7 and the whole chapter); the followers of Christ must crucify their flesh (Gal. 5:24). Similarly, the world (*mundus* or *saeculum*) hates Christ (John 7:7, 15:18, 17:14; I John 3:13); His disciples are not of the world (John 15:19, 8:23, 17:14; cf. I Cor. 2:12), their faith has overcome it (I John 5:4; cf. John 16:33); St. Paul is crucified to the world (Gal. 6:14); the wisdom of the world is folly before God (I Cor. 3:19; cf. 2:6), and the friend of this world is enemy to God (James 4:4); finally, the whole world lies in wickedness (I John 5:19); we have been delivered from the evil world (Gal. 1:4) and must keep ourselves unspotted from it (James 1:27). Notice that I John 2:16 (“Quoniam omne, quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae”) is obviously not the source of the *topos*. It may have contributed to its popularity and certainly was connected with the Three Enemies in the later middle ages (see below), but it did not furnish the terms of the commonplace. — All biblical references are to the Vulgate version.

<sup>5</sup> DSAM, 2 (1953), 1138 (“La trilogie malfaisante”). The authors refer to V. A. Combes’ remark in *Arch. d’histoire doctr. et litt. du moyen âge*, 8 (1933), 222 (“qui paraît d’inspiration cistercienne”), but such passing remarks can be found in many places.

<sup>6</sup> *De agone Christiano*, 6 (PL 40:294); the translation is taken from *Seventeen Short Treatises of St. Augustine* (“A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church,” Oxford, 1847), 165, with some changes.

For see, men have been baptized, all their sins have been forgiven them, they have been justified from sins; we cannot deny it; yet a wrestling with the flesh remains, a wrestling with the world remains, a wrestling with the devil remains.<sup>7</sup>

These two texts seem to be rather isolated witnesses. In Latin Patristic literature and in theological and monastic writings before 1000, the Three Enemies do definitely not appear as a commonplace.<sup>8</sup> Any two of them are often found in combination, but the entire triad is extremely rare. It would be interesting to investigate the use later authors made of Augustine's Sermon 158. In the absence of more specific information, I would at least suggest the following hypothetical connection between it and Benedictine monasticism before 1000. The relevant passage in Sermon 158 dealt with the fact that a Christian had to struggle with these enemies even after baptism. Now, it is well known that by the year 1000 a tradition had been established of calling entrance into the monastic life a "second baptism" and of considering it so effective as to delete former sins.<sup>9</sup> Several prayers recited at the profession of a monk allude to the renunciation of the devil and the world or even link the two. But one prayer

<sup>7</sup> "Ecce enim baptizati sunt homines, omnia illis peccata dimissa sunt, justificati sunt a peccatis; negare non possumus: restat tamen lucta cum carne, restat lucta cum mundo, restat lucta cum diabolo." *Sermo CLVIII*, 4 (PL 38: 864). The same idea occurs in *Sermo LVII*, 9 (PL 38: 391). The translation in my text is from *Sermons on Selected Lessons of the New Testament by St. Augustine ("A Library of Fathers...")*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1845), 780.

<sup>8</sup> It may be suggested that after Augustine the post-baptismal moral struggle is conceived of as a fight against the *vices*, especially in monastic literature. See Cassian, *Collationes*, V (PL 49: 609 ff.) and *Instituta*, V-XII (201 ff.); Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, XXXI, 45 (PL 76: 620-622); Defensor, *Liber scintillarum*, XXVII, 21 ("vicia enim nostra hostes nostri sunt," CCSL 117: 113; from Faustus Reiensis, *Sermo I*, 1; PL 58: 869); Smaragdus, *Comment. in Reg. Benedicti*, I (PL 102: 696); etc.

<sup>9</sup> Pertinent texts from this period: *Canones Theodori Cantuariensis*: "... quia secundum baptismum est iuxta iudicium patrum in quo omnia peccata dimittuntur sicut in baptismo"; and Paulus Diaconus, *Expositio*, 58: "...quia secundum sanctorum patrum catholicorum dicta vice baptismi est hoc [i.e., monastic profession].". Both texts in H. Frank, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der benediktinischen Professlitrurgie im frühen Mittelalter," *Studien und Mitteilungen zur Gesch. des Benediktinerordens u. seiner Zweige*, 63 (1951), 122. There is a rich literature on this subject. Besides Frank's article, see esp. E. Dekkers, in *Vom christlichen Mysterium. Gesammelte Arbeiten zum Gedächtnis von O. Casel* (ed. A. Mayer, J. Quasten, B. Neunheuser; Düsseldorf, 1951), 109-110, and "Profession — Second Baptême. Qu'a voulu dire saint Jérôme?" *Hist. Jahrbuch*, 77 (1958), 91-97; various authors, in *Théologie de la vie monastique* (Paris, 1961), 198; 326, n. 8; 431; 470; 516. Professor Howard, *op. cit.*, 62-63, n. 49, quotes the (irrelevant) *abrenuntiatio* formula from the Gallican baptismal rite but fails to see the connection with monastic profession. Similarly, his reference to Cyprian lacks relevancy, as he himself realizes ("not precisely as a formula"; as a matter of fact, in the cited passage Cyprian speaks of *pugna adversus diabolum* and mentions "carnal vices" and "worldly lures" parallel with avarice, uncleanness, wrath, and ambition).

actually combines the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is the *Secreta* of a Mass for the profession of monks, whose earliest known occurrence is in a manuscript from the late ninth century:

Deign to receive the gifts of your servants, we beg, o Lord; and whom you have set apart from the intention of a *worldly* life, also rescue with your might from *fleshy* lust and from all snares of the *ancient fiend*.<sup>10</sup>

A second text concerned with the monastic life similarly links the three enemies. It is from the *Regula communis* of St. Fructuosus of Braga and was included in the *Concordia regularum* made by Benedict of Aniane:

And after [the monk] has put off the burden of his *flesh* and has seen his *enemy* decapitated, then may he deem to have overcome the *world* and to have achieved victory with the holy martyrs<sup>11</sup>.

The allusion to “the holy martyrs” in this context again suggests the conception of the monastic life as second baptism, which originally had meant martyrdom.<sup>12</sup>

It appears, then, that it is the monasticism of the ninth and tenth centuries in which one must seek the immediate source for the *topos*. It contained, as it were, the solution from which certain influential writers crystallized the Three Enemies into a clear, concise formula. This was done first by two monastic authors of the early eleventh century: Jean de Fécamp<sup>13</sup> and Jean l’Homme de Dieu.<sup>14</sup> Both were abbots (of Fécamp and Fruttuaria, respectively) and disciples of the great reforming abbot Williard of

<sup>10</sup> “Munera quaesumus Domine famulorum tuorum dignanter suscipe, et quos desiderio aeternae beatitudinis a mundano segregasti proposito etiam a delectatione carnali et ab omnibus antiqui hostis insidiis potenter eripe. Per.” Ed. H. Frank, *loc. cit.*, 123; from MS Rheims 213, a sacramentary written during the second half of the ninth century at the abbey of Saint-Thierry, diocese of Rheims. See also J. Leclercq, “Messes pour la profession et l’oblation monastiques,” *Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft*, IV.1 (1955), 95, who prints the same prayer from a MS written during the last third of the eleventh century at the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Arnoul at Metz (MS Metz 245). This MS contains a large number of works by Jean de Fécamp (see the following discussion). The prayer is further found in a Benedictine pontifical of the end of the eleventh century (MS Bamberg Lit. 59) and in a twelfth-century MS (Engelberg 54). It has been in official use again since 1921.

<sup>11</sup> “Et postquam deposuerit corporis sarcinam, et hostem viderit trucidatum, tunc se putet devicisse mundum, et cum sanctis martyribus aequiparasse triumphum.” Fructuosus, *Regula communis*, 1 (PL 87: 1112); and Benedict of Aniane, *Conc. regularum*, III, 5 (PL 103: 745).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E. E. Malone, *The Monk and the Martyr. The Monk as the Successor of the Martyr* (Washington, D. C. 1950), 102 ff.; also in *Vom christlichen Mysterium*, 115-134.

<sup>13</sup> On Jean de Fécamp: A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932), 126 ff.; J. Leclercq and J.-P. Bonnes, *Un maître de la vie spirituelle au XI<sup>e</sup> siècle, Jean de Fécamp* (Paris, 1946).

<sup>14</sup> On Jean l’Homme de Dieu: A. Wilmart, *op. cit.*, 64-100.

Volpiano (died 1031). In his *Confessio theologica*, written before 1018, Jean de Fécamp speaks of "the sea of this life" in which there is no rest, no peace, but only wars and enemies all around, and goes on to specify:

The world fights (*pugnat*) against us with its aspirations; the flesh with its desires; and the devil constantly with his temptations.<sup>15</sup>

In another work, the letter "Tuae quidem" of uncertain date, Jean uses the *topos* again, with almost the same words but applying it to the saints who have fought against the world and its aspirations, etc.<sup>16</sup> The *topos* appears a third time in a spiritual treatise from exactly the same period, the *Tractatus de ordine vitae*. This work was attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux, but has been shown to come from Jean l'Homme de Dieu, who was abbot of Fruttaria until the 1040's.<sup>17</sup> Jean uses the *topos* with the same words as Jean de Fécamp in his second passage.<sup>18</sup> It should be stressed that none of these texts is clearly dependent on Augustine's Sermon 158, especially since his wording *lucta cum...* is not found here. Likewise, different formulas used by authors after the eleventh century are not reminiscent of Augustine's phrasing.<sup>19</sup>

The suggestion that Jean de Fécamp or Jean l'Homme de Dieu established the Three Enemies as a *topos* current from the twelfth century onward may, at first sight, sound improbable since neither writer was a St. Augustine, a St. Gregory, or a St. Bernard in his influence as theologian or model of expression. Indeed, both authors claimed that their works

<sup>15</sup> "Sed quia in hoc magno huius uitae diluvio, ubi circumflantibus agitamus procellis, non innuenitur fida statio et locus eminentior ubi pes columbae aliquatenus ualeat requiescere, nusquam tuta pax, nusquam secura quies, ubique bella, undique hostes, foris pugnae intus timores: pugnat contra nos mundus cum suis concupiscentiis, caro cum suis desideriis, diabolus cum suis iugiter temptationibus. Requiescat in te, Deus meus, anima mea..." *Confessio theologica*, III, 2 ; ed. Leclercq, *Un maître*, 143.

<sup>16</sup> "Viriliter pugnantes contra mundum et eius concupiscentiis, contra carnem et eius desideria, contra diabolum et eius multiplicita tentamenta." Letter "Tuae quidem," IV; ed. Leclercq, *Un maître*, 201. The triad may have been in the back of Jean's mind also when he wrote his *Confessio fidei*, II, 7 and 8 (PL 101: 1051-52).

<sup>17</sup> A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels*, 64 ff.

<sup>18</sup> "Nisi ut fortis in bello facti [cf. Hebr. 11:34], contra mundum et ejus concupiscentias [cf. I John 2:17], contra carnem et ejus desideria [cf. Gal. 5 :16], contra diabolum et ejus multiplicita tentamenta viriliter pugnant?" *Tract. de ordine vitae*, I, 2 (PL 184: 561 f.).

<sup>19</sup> The only exceptions known to me are: (a) "Luctamur contra carnem, contra saeculum uel falsos fratres, contra diabolum, contra Deum," in a twelfth-century manuscript containing notes for sermons by St. Bernard; ed. J. Leclercq, *Analecta monastica*, 1 (Rome, 1948), 154. (b) "Habemus igitur luctam cum carne, luctam cum daemone, luctam cum mundo, cum Deo." Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo XIV de oneribus* (PL 195: 417). In both cases a reference to Jacob is implied.

relied on “the words of our fathers,”<sup>20</sup> which is quite true. Yet Jean de Fécamp — certainly the greater of the two — has been called “le plus remarquable auteur spirituel du moyen âge avant saint Bernard.”<sup>21</sup> He has been compared to Augustine and Bernard in his influence on disciples and imitators<sup>22</sup> and seemingly was read by Bernard himself and by Aelred of Rievaulx.<sup>23</sup> In addition, Jean did use images for which his learned editor could find no sources.<sup>24</sup> It is thus entirely possible to see him as the creator of the commonplace.

Yet it is not until the following century that the *topos* appeared frequently. Beyond doubt, the important place which the Three Enemies held in religious and other literature until the Renaissance and beyond was given them by St. Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor. A paragraph in Hugh’s Homilies on Ecclesiastes is close in its idiom to the eleventh-century passages mentioned above. It shows well the biblical basis of the triad and develops the *topos* in some detail:

There are three who war (*bellum suscitant*) against us: the devil, the world, and the flesh. St. Paul knew that he had these enemies when he declared he had taken up battle (*pugnam*) against all. For he witnessed that he, together with all the faithful, was engaged in constant battle when he said, “We do not fight against flesh and blood, but against powers... (Eph. 6:12).” Further, he declared he was fighting against the world, that is, against perverse men who love the world, when he told of his fighting with [wild] beasts at Ephesus (I Cor. 15:32). And he testifies that he fights unendingly against his own flesh, saying, “Thus I fight, not as one threshing the air, but I chastize my body... (I Cor. 9:27).” For there are three tyrants who lead their armies in battle (*proelium*) against us, and they each have their armies drawn up to war upon our soul. The devil arrays his troops of evil suggestions against the faithful soul. The world leads forth good and bad fortune (*prospera et adversa*) to overcome us. And the flesh rises in battle against us by rousing the hosts of carnal desires.<sup>25</sup>

The same battle imagery recurs in other writings that were attributed to Hugh in medieval manuscripts,<sup>26</sup> where one can find more occurrences of the triad itself.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Jean de Fécamp: “Dicta mea dicta sunt patrum,” *Conf. theol.*, II, line 6; cf. Leclercq, *Un maître*, 56-68. Jean l’Homme de Dieu: “Desideravi... ex opusculis Patrum pauca quaedam deflorando colligere,” I, 2 (PL 184: 561).

<sup>21</sup> A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels*, 127.

<sup>22</sup> J. Leclercq, “Écrits spirituels de l’école de Jean de Fécamp,” in *Analecta monastica*, 1 (Rome, 1948), 91.

<sup>23</sup> Leclercq, *ibid.*, 92, n. 4.

<sup>24</sup> For example, the comparison of the saints to strong and beautiful *portae* built high, *Conf. theol.*, III, 24 (p. 168), and “Tuae quidem,” IV (p. 201).

<sup>25</sup> Hugh of St. Victor, *In Ecclesiasten, homilia* 16 (PL 175: 235 and f.).

<sup>26</sup> *Miscellanea*, I, 79; I, 195; IV, 30; V, 12. 64. 80 (PL 177: 513. 585. 712. 756. 792. 800).

<sup>27</sup> *Misc.*, II, 72; III, 50; V, 60; VI, 115 (PL 177: 629. 669. 786. 860). — *Expos. in Abdiam*,

St. Bernard of Clairvaux, too, used the triad many times in his works, though with that freedom in terminology which seems so characteristic of him. In the first of his *Sermons on Canticles* he remarks to his monks that they must daily renew their spiritual songs because, “in daily exercises and battles, which never fail to come from the flesh, the world, and the devil upon those who live piously in Christ, you unceasingly experience that man’s life on earth is warfare [*militia*; Job 7:1].”<sup>28</sup> A little later, commenting on I Cor. 15:28, “And God will be all in all things,” he shows how the Blessed Trinity will take possession of the trinity of man’s soul (reason, will, memory) and draws several theologically interesting parallels. In the end he adds: “Also observe what similar things the children of this world experience from the lures of the flesh, the shows of the world, and the pomps of Satan. This, however, is all by which the present life deceives its miserable lovers — as St. John says, ‘Whatever is in the world, is lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and ambition of the world [*sic !*].’”<sup>29</sup> Another passage, in *Sermo 23 de diversis*, which deals with “the discernment of spirits,” is equally important to be quoted at length:

The spirit of the flesh always speaks to me of soft things; the spirit of the world of vain ones; and the spirit of malice of bitter ones. For whenever a carnal thought assails the mind with its customary importunity — when we, thinking of food, drink, sleep, or similar things that pertain to the care of our flesh, begin to burn with desire in human fashion —, we may be certain that it is the spirit of the flesh that speaks... But when vain thought in our hearts dwells upon, not fleshly lures but worldly ambition, boasting, arrogance, and such things, it is the spirit of the world that speaks... Sometimes, however, these satellites turn their backs on us. Then their prince himself rises against us with great wrath, like a roaring lion. At that time we are not tempted to fleshly lust or worldly vanity, but to anger, impatience, envy, and bitterness of heart.<sup>30</sup>

The beginning of this quotation became a favorite formula — *caro suggerit mihi mollia, mundus vana, diabolus amara*<sup>31</sup> — which can be found in many spiritual treatises of the following centuries.<sup>32</sup> Bernard himself used the

passim (PL 175: 376. 381. 387. 393. 395). — *Quaest. in Epist. ad Hebreos* (not by Hugh), 38 (PL 175: 618). — Cf. *De arca Noe morali*, III, 10 (four evils, including *ira Dei* ; PL 176: 658).

<sup>28</sup> *In Cant.*, I, 9 (PL 183: 788).

<sup>29</sup> *In Cant.*, XI, 6 (826-827).

<sup>30</sup> *Sermones de diversis*, 23 (601).

<sup>31</sup> Thus in the Pseudo-Bernardian *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis*, 12 (PL 184: 504); see also ch. 13. The treatise has also been attributed to Hugh of St. Victor.

<sup>32</sup> E.g., Bromyard, *Summa praedicantium*, “Temptatio,” T. I, ii. Differently worded (“*caro suadet suavia, mundus inania, diabolus iniqua*”) in Petrus Comestor, *Sermo 8* (PL 198: 1743); Odo of Cheriton (see note 57, below); Jacques de Vitry, *Sermones in Ep. et Ev. dominicalia* (Antwerp, 1575), 90 and 560.

triad of flesh (*caro*, occasionally *homo*), world (*saeculum* or *mundus*), and devil (*diabolus*, *princeps tenebrarum*) several other times<sup>33</sup> and gives the impression that to him it had become a pattern which suggested itself naturally whenever he was thinking of man's temptations.

The pattern was eagerly snatched up by St. Bernard's followers and appears with regularity in the spiritual writings of twelfth-century Cistercians. Nicholas of Clairvaux, for example, says, "we have three principal enemies (*hostes*) who try to make us fall: the flesh, the devil, and the world."<sup>34</sup> Aelred of Rievaulx speaks of our struggle (*lucta*; cf. Jacob's struggle with the angel, Gen. 32:24 ff.) with the flesh, the devil, the world and God,<sup>35</sup> and relates these to the stages of spiritual perfection.<sup>36</sup> Elsewhere he holds up St. Benedict, who "was tempted by the flesh, the world, and the devil."<sup>37</sup> Isaac of L'Étoile similarly employs the triad *caro-mundus-diabolus* on several occasions.<sup>38</sup>

From the second half of the twelfth century on, the *topos* is met nearly everywhere in religious literature. It would be easy to compile long lists of occurrences, to which undoubtedly any reader of medieval documents could add further items. In the following I shall be content with indicating the variety of literary genres where the Three Enemies can be found.

The tradition of Cistercian and Victorine writers is carried on in treatises on the spiritual life. It stretches from Richard of St. Victor to Hilton, the *Imitatio Christi*, and beyond.<sup>39</sup> "Now the flesh tempts you, the world

<sup>33</sup> *In Vigilia Nativitatis Domini*, sermo II (PL 183: 91) and sermo III (97); *Sermo III pro dominica VI post Pentecosten* (343 f.); *In Purificatione beatae Mariae*, sermo I (368); *In festo sanctorum Petri et Pauli apostolorum*, sermo I (408); *De diversis*, sermo CXI (737); *In Cant.*, sermons 39 (979), 61 (1072), and 85 (1189); *Epistola 237*, "ad totam Curiam Romanam" (PL 182: 426); the passage quoted above, n. 19; and the *Liber Sententiarum*, of unknown authorship (PL 184: 1135).

<sup>34</sup> *Sermo de sancto Martino* (PL 144: 820 ff., with further development).

<sup>35</sup> For the inclusion of God as the fourth tempter, see the discussion below.

<sup>36</sup> The *incipientes* (flesh), *proficientes* (daemon), and *perficientes* (God); against the world fight those who are being tried; *Sermones de oneribus*, XIV (PL 195: 417).

<sup>37</sup> *Sermo in festo sancti Benedicti*, in *Sermones inediti*, ed. C. H. Talbot, "Series scriptorum sacri ordinis Cisterciensium," 1 (Rome, 1952), 63. Other occurrences of the *topos*: *Sermo X, in Ramis Palmarum* (PL 195: 271); *Sermo XXIII, in festo Omnitum Sanctorum* (343).

<sup>38</sup> *Sermo VI, in festo Omnitum Sanctorum* (PL 194: 1710); *Sermo XXX, in dom. I Quadragesimae* (1788).

<sup>39</sup> Richard of St. Victor (PL 196: 318 f.; cf. 862, with *vitium* instead of *caro*; PL 177: 969, 1015); Hugh of Folieto (PL 176: 1062, 1102, PL 177: 24); the anonymous *De triplici habitaculo* (PL 40: 993 f.); Elmer of Canterbury, *Epist. VIII*, "De fuga sanctorum" (ed. J. Leclercq, *Studia Anselmiana*, 31 [1953], 91); Petrus Compostellanus, *De cons. rationis* (ed. B. Soto, "Beiträge Baumer," VIII.4 [Münster, 1912], 92); John Godard, *Epistola ad sororem suam Margaretam abbatissam de Tarente* (ed. C. H. Talbot, *Anal. sacri ord. Cist.*, 10 [1954], 230); Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum* (ed. J. Strange, pp. 3, 173, 175); Innocent III, *De miseria conditionis hominis*, I, 20 (PL 217: 712; with man as a fourth tempter); Conrad of Saxony, *Speculum beatae Mariae Virginis*

tempts you, and the ancient fiend himself temps you. The flesh strives to draw you to sensual pleasures, the world to vanity, and the devil to that horror of which he himself is full: pride and swelling, envy and spite, wrath, hatred, and other similar spiritual vices," says Adam Scot, the twelfth-century Carthusian, and gives counsel on how to meditate against these enemies.<sup>40</sup> And Petrarch, in his book written for the Carthusians of Montrieux, begins a very long discussion of man's spiritual foes with, "You know your enemies and do not ignore what they do and plan. Rush upon the wicked ones who stand ready and avoid above all three kinds of enemies and their arms: the snares of the world, the lure of the flesh, and the stratagems of the demons... The world deceives, the flesh delights, and demons push against us."<sup>41</sup>

Many of the treatises covered in the preceding paragraph belong formally to another genre in which the triad is just as frequently found: the sermon. Again, from the monastic sermons of St. Bernard to the popular ones of friars like Jacques de Vitry and to later collections of homilies on the Epistles and Gospels, mention of *triplex hostis*, *tres hostes*, or *tres inimici* occurs with a fair degree of regularity. Suffice it to name such famous preachers as Peter Comestor, Radulphus Ardens, and Alanus of Lille of the twelfth; Innocent III, Jacques de Vitry, and William Peraldus of the thirteenth; and Thomas Brinton, Fitzralph, Wyclif, and John Felton (fl. 1403) of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.<sup>42</sup>

("Bibliotheca franciscana ascetica medii aevi," vol. 2 [Quaracchi, 1904], 58-59, 160); Meister Eckhart, *Paradisus anime intelligentis* (ed. Ph. Strauch, "Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters," 30; Berlin, 1919), 110; and *Von der sèle werdigkeit und eigenschaft* (ed. F. Pfeiffer, *Meister Eckhart*, fourth ed., Göttingen, 1924), 414; *Ancrene Riwle* (ed. M. Day, EETS, 225, p. 87); Richard Rolle, "Ego dormio" (ed. C. Horstmann, *Yorkshire Writers* [London, 1895-96], I, 56; cf. II, 356 f., 363, 421); Walter Hilton, *The Scale of Perfection*, II, 23 (ed. E. Underhill [London, 1923], 316); Étienne de Tournai, *Epist.* 159 (PL 211: 447); *Imitatio Christi*, III, 26, 3.

<sup>40</sup> *De quadripartito exercitio cellae*, 23 (PL 153: 840); cf. 10 and 13 (818 and 824).

<sup>41</sup> *De otio religioso*, ed. G. Rotondi, "Studi e testi," 195 (Città del Vaticano, 1958), 15. The section on the devil begins p. 16, on the world p. 55, on the flesh p. 64.

<sup>42</sup> Radulphus Ardens (PL 155: 1331, 1364, 1547, 1583, 1741, 1794, 2099); Geoffrey of Admont (PL 174: 156, 257, 292, 338, 399, 617); Petrus Comestor (PL 198: 1743, 1840); Alanus of Lille (PL 210: 202, 205); Hildebert (PL 171: 655, 833, 899, 907); Hélinand of Froidmont (PL 212: 503, 525, 615); Absalom of Sprinckirsbach (PL 211: 207 and ff.); Innocent III (PL 217: 374); Jacques de Vitry (*Sermones in Epistolae et Evangelia dominicalia* [Antwerp, 1575], pp. 90, 192 f., 217, 246, 257, 560, 626, 707, 723, 728); Odo of Cheriton (*Flores sermonum* [Paris, 1520], fol. xxiiii); Nicholas of Aquavilla (Brit. Mus. MS Royal 8.F.iv, fol. 11v-12r, "Sermo de IV dom. Adventus"); Thomas Brinton (*Sermones, 1373-89*, ed. Sister Mary Aquinas Devlin [London, 1954], I, 7, 12, 55, 57, 78, 83, 106-108, 118, 140, 148, 151, 156, 172, 190, 201, 237; II, 257, 278, 308, 313, 331-332, 337, 367, 370, 376, 385, 391, 402, 429-433, 461, 490); Fitzralph (Brit. Mus. MS Lansdowne 393, fol. 55v; sermon given on the Third Sunday after the Octave of Easter, 1348);

Although the earlier sermons were written for monastic audiences, and the triad thus made its first appearance in works addressed to religious (*monachi* and *claustrales* in the two sermons by Peter Comestor, for example), one may expect that eventually the *topos* entered sermons given before a lay audience. It is, of course, very difficult to know anything precise about what audience an extant sermon was written down for unless the sermon itself gives us clear information by its rubric or by specific references in its text. Yet we can assume that sermons in the vernacular were ultimately directed to the layfolk. Moreover, one of Wyclif's Latin sermons in which the triad appears is said, by Wyclif himself, to have been composed at the request "of a certain pious layman."<sup>43</sup> And among the Latin sermons by Bishop Brinton (who was himself a Benedictine and frequently preached before the clergy or monks), there are at least two containing the *topos* which were apparently held before a lay congregation.<sup>44</sup>

Further evidence that the Three Enemies must have been a very popular *topos* derives from the frequency with which it appears in the great alphabetical handbook for preachers by John Bromyard. I have found the triad in seven different articles, and very probably it occurs elsewhere in addition. In the article on "Temptation" Bromyard quotes St. Bernard and uses standard images in comparing the world to the sea, the devil to a lion, and the flesh to a poisonous serpent. Similar treatments are given under "Adversity," "Avarice," "Infirmity," and other entries.<sup>45</sup>

After the Fourth Lateran Council (1215/16) the triad also entered the literature dealing with the two major means by which the reform of Christendom envisioned and decreed by the council was to be carried out: the sacrament of Penance, and catechetical preaching. A good early witness is Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1235-53), who wrote a rather long treatise on what questions the confessor ought to ask his

Wyclif, Latin *Sermones* (ed. J. Loserth [London, 1887-90], I, 91; III, 34; IV, 259, 285, 470); English sermons (ed. Th. Arnold, *Select English Works* [Oxford, 1869-71], I, 104, 112, 193, 231, 321; II, 169, 248, 276, 289, 367 f.); John Gregory (Sermon "Per proprium sanguinem," ed. H. G. Pfander, *The Popular Sermon of the Medieval Friar in England* [New York, 1937], 59); Middle English Sermons, nos. 7, 18, 42 (ed. W. O. Ross, EETS, 209, 31 f., 108, 270); another homily, ed. C. Horstmann, *Archiv f. d. Stud. d. neueren Sprachen u. Lit.*, 81 (1888), 88, line 61; Felton, *Sermones dominicales* (Brit. Mus. MS Addit. 22572, fol. 28v, 56r, 195v-198r, 216r); Nicholas Denyse, *Sermones* (Rouen, 1507, fol. 310r); Meffreth, *Hortulus regine* (ed. 1487, C.n.).

<sup>43</sup> Latin sermons, I, 13 (ed. Loserth, I, 89). Cf. Introduction to vol. I, pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>44</sup> Sermons 39 and 45.

<sup>45</sup> Bromyard, *Summa praedicantium*, ed. Basel, 1484: "Temptatio," T. I, art. i, ii, v; "Adversitas," A.XVIII, art. i; "Avaritia," A.XXVII, art. xiv; "Infirmitas," I.III, art. v; "Bellum," B. II, art. i and ff.; "Servire," S. VIII; "Via," V.III, art. i.

penitents. The fascinating work,<sup>46</sup> really a kind of pastoral morals, deals not only with the seven deadly sins and the virtues, but also with the articles of faith, the seven sacraments, the faculties of the soul — all directly related to confession. Here the Three Enemies are mentioned just before Grosseteste treats of the seven vices: "According to this division [of the soul] we distinguish three kinds of enemies: demons, the world, and the flesh. The demons fight against the soul's rationality by pride... The world against its sensible part by cupidity... The flesh against its vegetative part by lechery."<sup>47</sup> Another treatise usually ascribed to Grosseteste and certainly containing several schemata that can also be found in Grosseteste's genuine works — the *Templum domini* — also speaks of the *tres inimici*: "The demons fight against us, the flesh coaxes, and the world, as if it stood in the middle, sometimes coaxes with the flesh and sometimes fights with the devil. Hence threese three enemies assault our trinity [of the soul?] without cease and have their natural helpers [i.e., the seven planets.]"<sup>48</sup>

The triad occupies a similar place in the *Antidotarium animae* by the Franciscan Servasanctus of Faenza, a sort of *summa* of Christian doctrine written for doctors, preachers, and all Christians;<sup>49</sup> in the *Speculum morale*, an encyclopedia on Christian morals compiled early in the fourteenth century;<sup>50</sup> and in a host of catechetical handbooks written for priests or laymen, of which William of Pagula's *Oculus sacerdotis*,<sup>51</sup> Waldeby's *Expositio super orationem dominicam*,<sup>52</sup> the *Fasciculus morum*,<sup>53</sup> Ranulph Higden's *Speculum curatorum*,<sup>54</sup> and the vernacular prose *Mirror to Lewed Men*<sup>55</sup> are good representatives from fourteenth-century England.

<sup>46</sup> Inc. "Deus est quo nihil melius cogitari potest." See S. H. Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253* (Cambridge, 1940), 176. I am preparing an edition of this treatise.

<sup>47</sup> Brit. Mus. MS Royal 7.F.ii, fol. 89r-v.

<sup>48</sup> Brit. Mus. MS Burney 356, fol. 22v. See also M. W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins* ([East Lansing,] 1952), 140 ff. and the table reproduced on p. 437.

<sup>49</sup> Also known as *Summa de poenitentia*. Ed. Louvain, [1485 ?], Tract. 14, cap. iv (fol. 207v). Chapter 15 begins the discussion of temptations of the flesh, ch. 27 of the world, ch. 33 of the devil. On the work and its author, see B. Kruitwagen, "Das *Antidotarium animae* von Fr. Servasanctus O.F.M.," in *Wiegendrucke und Handschriften. Festgabe Konrad Haebler* (Leipzig, 1919), 80-106; and Livario Oliger, "Servasanto da Faenza O.F.M. e il suo *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*," in *Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle*, 1 ("Studi e testi," 37; Rome, 1924), 148-189.

<sup>50</sup> *Speculum morale*, III, i, 6; in Vincent of Beauvais, *Bibliotheca mundi* (Douai, 1624), vol. III, cols. 883 ff., an extensive treatment of temptation.

<sup>51</sup> Brit. Mus. MS Royal 6.E.i, fol. 46r.

<sup>52</sup> Brit. Mus. MS Royal 7.E.ii, fol. 27v.

<sup>53</sup> MS Bodl. 332; see further discussion in n. 107, below.

<sup>54</sup> Ch. XXII, "De temptatione et eius validitate," Brit. Mus. MS Harley 1004, fol. 40-41.

<sup>55</sup> Brit. Mus. MS Harley 45, fol. xxii, verso (in the section on the beginning of the Lord's

Given the popularity of the triad, one would expect it also to be expressed in metrical form (in order to be memorized more easily) and eventually to appear in hymns and didactic poetry. A favorite seems to have been the following stanza:

Mundus, caro, demonia  
 Diversa movent proelia.  
 Incursu tot phantasmatum  
 Turbatur cordis sabatum.

The earliest occurrence of these lines which I have been able to find is in the *Microcosmus* by Geoffrey of St. Victor (died 1194).<sup>56</sup> They also appear in sermons by Odo of Cheriton and by William Peraldus<sup>57</sup> and form the opening of a French poem *Des sept Vices et des sept Vertus*.<sup>58</sup> A different poem, *De triplici inimico nos infestante*, extant in manuscripts from as early as the thirteenth century is reproduced in the *Analecta hymnica*.<sup>59</sup> About the year 1207 the Cistercian monk Itier de Vassy at Clairvaux wrote a poem in Latin distichs, in which the Three Enemies are treated at some length:

Tres hostes monachos impugnant: gloria mundi  
 Fallax, demonium, luxuriosa caro. (lines 5-6)<sup>60</sup>

The *Visio Philiberti* (or, *Fulberti*), a thirteenth-century(?) debate between body and soul, has *Caro* defend itself against the accusations of the soul by affirming that it had been drawn into the evil fellowship of *mundus et daemonium*.<sup>61</sup> In vernacular poems, too, the triad is mentioned or treated in

Prayer). This work has been edited in an unpublished dissertation by Edna V. Stover, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1952. One should also mention the catechetical handbook contained in Morgan MS 861, fol. 4r (see J. H. Fisher in *Speculum*, 28 [1953], 864); and Nicholas Hereford's treatise "On the Seven Deadly Sins," ed. Th. Arnold, *Select English Works of John Wyclif*, 3 (Oxford, 1871), 121.

<sup>56</sup> Ed. Ph. Delhaye ("Mémoires et travaux publiés par les professeurs des Facultés catholiques de Lille," 56; Lille, 1951), 52.

<sup>57</sup> Odo, *Flores sermonum* (Paris, 1520), fol. xxiiii; cf. P. Meyer, *Romania*, 16 (1887), 4-5; Peraldus, Sermon on Beatus Petrus Martyr, in the *Opera of Guillaume d'Auvergne*, vol. 2 (Paris and Orléans, 1674), 418.

<sup>58</sup> *Histoire littéraire de la France*, 23 (1895), 253.

<sup>59</sup> Dreves and Blume, *Analecta hymnica*, vol. 21, No. 167. The *Analecta* contain a number of sequences and hymns that have references to the Three Enemies; for example: Vol. 37, Nos. 72, 99, 144, 195, 234, 326; Vol. 49, Nos. 503, 655; Vol. 54, Nos. 31, 59, 70, 246 ("O Maria, stella maris," ascribed to Adam of St. Victor), 251, 282, 285.

<sup>60</sup> Ed. J. Leclercq, *Analecta sacri ord. Cist.*, 12 (1956), 296 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Ed. Th. Wright, *The Latin Poems of Walter Mapes* (Camden Soc., London, 1841), 99. The lines in question (105 ff.) appear in various forms. See the other editions listed by F. J. E. Raby, *A Hist. of Sec. Lat. Poetry in the Middle Ages* (second ed., Oxford, 1957), II, 302 f.; and also H. Walther, *Das Streitgespräch in der lat. Dichtung des Mittelalters* (München, 1920), 63 ff. and 211 ff. Cf.

detail. Paul Meyer has indicated a French "Romanz des trois anemis, ce est la chars, li mondes, [li] deables" from the thirteenth century;<sup>62</sup> the Provençal trovador Guillem d'Olivier (end of the thirteenth century) wrote a *coba* on the "tres enemicx principals;"<sup>63</sup> and similar references to the flesh, the world, and the devil can be found in several Middle English lyrics.<sup>64</sup>

But the triad lived not only in the words of preachers and poets; it also penetrated into biblical commentaries<sup>65</sup> and into the sober distinctions of scholastic theologians. Here the *topos* is usually mentioned in sections on temptation, as in the *Distinctiones Abel* by Petrus Cantor, the very popular *Compendium theologicae veritatis* by Hugh Ripelin of Strassburg, and Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the *Sentences*.<sup>66</sup> Hugh of Strassburg explains, "We must know that temptation is threefold. The first is from the devil, either by means of suggestion or of affliction. The second is from the world, who either lures us with pleasure or vanity or crushes us with persecution. The third is that of the flesh, which drives us to sin through sensuality and the stimulus of sin." Hugh then speaks of "two species of temptation," external and internal. This ancient distinction, of Patristic origin, was taken up in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*,<sup>67</sup> whence its discussion became of

Peter of Blois, *De lucta carnis et spiritus*, st. 5 (PL 207: 1127 ff.). The Middle English "Debate of the Body and the Soul," printed by Wright, *op. cit.*, contains the same idea: p. 337 (cf. Brown-Robbins, *Index*, No. 351).

<sup>62</sup> "Le Roman des Trois Ennemis de l'Homme par Simon," *Romania*, 16 (1887), 1-24.

<sup>63</sup> Ed. K. F. Bartsch, *Denkmäler der provenzalischen Litteratur*, "Bibl. d. litter. Vereins," 39 (Stuttgart, 1856), 38.

<sup>64</sup> C. Brown (ed.), *Religious Lyrics of the Fourteenth Century* (second ed., Oxford, 1957), Nos. 27 (with Death as the fourth foe), 125; *Relig. Lyr. of the Fifteenth Cent.* (Oxford, 1939), Nos. 51, 55, 107, 135, 144, 145, 154, 173; "God, that all this word has wroghth," ed. M. R. James and G. C. Macaulay, *MLR*, 8 (1913), 81; "Cayphas," ed. C. Brown, in *Kittredge Anniversary Papers* (Boston, 1913), 108; *Sayings of St. Bernard*, ed. F. J. Furnivall, EETS, 117, pp. 516 and 757 ff.; William of Shoreham, *De vii sacramentis* (EETS, es, 86, lines 347 ff.). See also C. Brown and R. H. Robbins, *The Index to Middle English Verse* (New York, 1943), No. 2137; and R. H. Robbins and J. L. Cutler, *Supplement to the Index of Middle English Verse* (Lexington, Ky., 1966), No. 3339.5.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, the commentary of Hugh of St. Cher (*Opera omnia*, Venice, 1732) on Ps. 1: 1 (vol. II, p. 3, cols. 2-3), Ps. 30: 9 (II, 73, 1-2), Ps. 34: 1 (II, 85, 4), Ps. 40: 6 (II, 107, 4), Amos 9:13 (V, 190, 2-3), Ephes. 2:3 (VII, 170, 3).

<sup>66</sup> Petrus Cantor, *Distinctiones Abel*, Brit. Mus. MS Royal 10.A.xvi, fol. 103v; Hugh, *Comp. theol. verit.*, II, 66 (in Albertus Magnus, *Opera omnia*, ed. Borgnet, vol. 34 [Paris, 1895], 88); Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententias*, II, dist. 21, qu. 1, a. 1 (ed. Parma, 1856, vol. 6, p. 570); Thomas mentions the triad also in *Summa theologiae*, I, qu. 114, a.1, 3, and III, qu. 41, a. 1, 3. One should add John of Wales, *Summa iustitiae*, I, 11-15 (Brit. Mus. MS Harley 632, fol. 174-176v), where the Three Enemies are called "motiva ad peccatum."

<sup>67</sup> *Sententiae*, II, 21, 5 (PL 217a: 186). See also sermon 31 by Isaac of L'Étoile, where three origins of temptation are distinguished: internal, external, and internal-external (PL 194: 1791).

course *de rigueur* for scholastic theologians. In Thomas' commentary the two schemes are thus harmonized:

Temptation stems either from an internal principle, that is, from the corruption of the flesh, and thus is called "temptation from the flesh"; or it stems from an external principle, and this may occur in two ways: What is external may affect us in the mode of the object — and this is the "temptation from the world," whose objects persuade the hearts of men to sin; or it may affect us in the mode of the agent who draws us to sin by persuasion, fear, flattery, and so on — and this is called "temptation from the fiend," that is, the devil, and from those who are his members.<sup>68</sup>

It should be noted that in discussions of temptations the Three Enemies were often joined by a fourth "tempter" — God, who "tempts so that He may try and approve of man, and that man himself may recognize what he is and become an example to others."<sup>69</sup>

In the quoted passage by St. Thomas the three enemies are of equal standing, whereas in earlier texts the flesh or the world or both together were frequently considered subordinate to the devil as his instruments or helpers.<sup>70</sup> This question of the relative dependence or independence of the three enemies became rather problematic when an author related them to the three temptations of Christ, which in the biblical account (Matt. 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13), of course, were all three instigated by Satan. Nevertheless, Isaac of L'Étoile lets Jesus fight against all three:

Therefore He withdrew from the Jordan, where He had come on His first journey after assuming the dignity of prelacy and the authority of preaching, and He went by Himself into the desert. There He, who was to preach to others, wanted to prove Himself, so that He might first accomplish what He was about to teach them. The flesh, the world, and the devil — against whom He was to admonish His disciples to fight — He wanted to fight Himself first.<sup>71</sup>

A little later in the twelfth century, Radulphus Ardens indicated clearly why Christ's temptations could be related to the Three Enemies:

Our Lord wanted to fast and to be tempted for the sake of triumph, that is, that He might triumph for us over the flesh, the devil, and the world. For the

<sup>68</sup> *In Sent.*, loc. cit. (note 66).

<sup>69</sup> *Spec. morale*, III, i, 6 (col. 883). Other examples: Petrus Cantor, *Dist. Abel* (see above, note 66); Hugh of Folieto, *De claustrō animae*, II, 13 (PL 176: 1062); Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dial. miraculorum*, Prologus (ed. Strange, I, 3); Servas sanctus, *Antidotarium*, XIV, 4 (ed. Louvain, 1485, fol. 207v); MS. Stadtbibl. Kolmar 268, fol. 262 (see Stammler, *Frau Welt*, 39-40). Notice that frequently four evil tempters are mentioned, viz., the traditional Three Enemies and *proximus*, *mens*, *homo*, *cor*, etc.

<sup>70</sup> For example, Petrus Cantor calls them *coadiutores*, loc. cit. Thomas himself, in the article just quoted, says "the devil uses the goods of the world and the flesh as instruments to tempt man" (*ad 5*).

<sup>71</sup> *Sermo XXX, in I Quadragesimae*, 1 (PL 194: 1788).

devil had overcome the first man, our forefather, by tempting him in three things: gluttony, cupidity, and vainglory... In these three, beloved brethren, lies all the wickedness of the world, of which John warns us when he says "All that is in the world..." (I John 2:16). Defeated by these three, man became subject to all wickedness, the flesh, the world, and the devil. Therefore, Christ wanted to fast and be tempted, that He might triumph for us over the devil, the flesh, and the world together.<sup>72</sup>

The idea that Adam was tempted by three sins — gluttony, cupidity, and vainglory — and that Christ, in redeeming mankind, had to undergo the same three temptations, was an old one and can easily be traced back to the Fathers. The further connection of these three temptations with I John 2:16f. was also made early by Christian theologians and remained a commonplace in the middle ages.<sup>73</sup> No wonder that eventually the Three Enemies, too, became integrated into this complex of schemes: thus, the flesh was held responsible for gluttony or — more often — lechery (i.e., the lust of the flesh), the world for avarice, and the devil for vainglory or pride.<sup>74</sup>

The tendency to correlate schemes of more or less closely related matter went even further in the later middle ages. Sometimes one finds the three tempters connected with the three parts of the soul, as in the passages from Grosseteste quoted earlier.<sup>75</sup> In contrast, the three persons of the Holy Trinity aid man against the infernal triad: "By the Father we overcome the devil; by the Son, the world; and by the Holy Spirit, our flesh."<sup>76</sup> In similar fashion, the *Fasciculus morum* links the triad with the three theological and three cardinal virtues: we must fight against the world with faith and prudence, against the flesh with hope and moderation, and

<sup>72</sup> *Homilia XXXVI, in dom. I Quadragesimae* (PL 155: 1794).

<sup>73</sup> See the detailed treatment by D. R. Howard, *The Three Temptations*, Ch. II, where one can find relevant documentation and important scholarship listed.

<sup>74</sup> Richard of St. Victor relates the devil to the serpent, the flesh to Eve, and the "delight of earthly goods" to the apple; *Sermo XLIII* (PL 177: 1015). Petrus Comestor relates *caro-luxuria, mundus-avaritia, diabolus-superbia*: *Sermo VIII* (PL 198: 1743); similarly Thomas Brinton in sermons 106, 6, 43, 53, 88 (pp. 490, 12, 190, 237, 402). Wyclif connects the *avari* with the world, the *carnales, gulosi* and *luxuriosi* with the flesh, and the *superbi* with the devil (Latin Sermon 13, ed. Loserth, I, 91). — Notice also the possible connection with the three monastic vows: "Caro deliciis castitatem meam impugnat; mundus, divitiae paupertatem; diabolus, honoribus humilitatem." Hugh of St. Cher on Ps. 34: 1 (*Opera omnia*, II, 85, 4). A (loose) connection with I John 2: 16 was already made by Bernard; see above, p. 53 and n. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Grosseteste actually uses the Aristotelian conception of *rationalitas* (the devil), *sensibilitas* (the world), and *vegetabilitas* (the flesh); see above, p. 57 and note 47. But William Peraldus relates the three temptations to the Platonic parts; in Guillaume d'Auvergne, *Opera* (Paris and Orléans, 1674), II, 219.

<sup>76</sup> Petrus Comestor, *Sermo VIII* (PL 198: 1743). See also *Piers Plowman*, B.XVI, 27 ff.

against the devil with charity and fortitude.<sup>77</sup> Among various other helps recommended against the three tempters should be mentioned prayer (against the devil), fasting and almsgiving, which of course are the standard penitential aids against the main sins of pride, gluttony, and avarice.<sup>78</sup> Finally, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, too, are said to be given to man in his fight against the Three Enemies.<sup>79</sup>

Another septenary is likewise very frequently divided up among the Three Enemies: the seven deadly sins. Sufficient evidence for the connection of these two schemes has been presented by Professor Bloomfield in his study of the Seven Deadly Sins and need not be repeated here.<sup>80</sup> The position of all seven sins in the scheme of the Three Enemies was never definitely fixed, yet as a rule avarice (and covetousness) pertains to the world, gluttony and lechery to the flesh, and pride to the devil.<sup>81</sup> Wrath and envy most commonly appear as sins of the devil, but occasionally are attributed to the world.<sup>82</sup> The shift of sloth from the sins of the devil to those of the flesh I have dealt with elsewhere.<sup>83</sup>

If medieval preachers were intent upon combining the Three Enemies with other standard schemes, they were equally bent on visualizing the evil triad by means of simile, metaphor, and allegory. St. Bernard had com-

<sup>77</sup> *Fasc. morum*, V, 24-35 (MS Bodl. 332, fol. 166r-172v). — Grosseteste's *Templum domini* distributes all four cardinal virtues: "Unde gladio fortitudinis dyabolus est percuiendus, gladio temperacie caro, gladio iusticie mundus dans prospera, gladio prudencie mundus dans adversa." Brit. Mus. MS Burney 356, fol. 23r.

<sup>78</sup> Jean de Journi, *La Dîme de Penitance*, ed. H. Breymann ("Bibl. des litt. Vereins in Stuttgart," 120; Tübingen, 1874), lines 2054 ff.; the poem is dated 1288. — With reference to Tit. 2:12, Hugh of St. Cher comments on Ps. 30: 9: "Sobrie [vivamus] contra carnem; juste contra mundum; pie contra diabolum" (*Opera omnia*, II, 73, 2). Other helps: Hildebert recommends the Eucharist, *lectio*, and reason (PL 171: 655); Hugh Ripelin of Strassburg the help of the angels, the example of the saints, and right use of the gifts of nature and of grace (*Compend. theol. verit.*, II, 66).

<sup>79</sup> William Peraldus, in a sermon on Mark 8: 5 — "How many loaves of bread do you have with you?" They answered, 'Seven,' " loc.cit., p.307. A different series of virtues is recommended by *A Talking of the Love of God* (ed. M. S. Westra, The Hague, 1950), 38.

<sup>80</sup> M. W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins* ([East Lansing], 1952); see Index under "World," "Flesh," "Devil."

<sup>81</sup> However, pride is a sin of the world in Jacques de Vitry, *Sermones in Ep. et Ev. dominicalia* (Antwerp, 1575), 193, 217 (but see p. 375), and in the morality play *Mary Magdalen* (ed. F. J. Furnivall, EETS, es, 70, p. 66).

<sup>82</sup> Thus in *Templum domini*, attributed to Grosseteste (see Bloomfield, pp. 140 and 437), and Jean de Journi, *La Dîme*, ed. cit., lines 2402 f. Envy is a sin of the world in Grosseteste's *Château d'amour* and its Middle English version in the Vernon MS (see Bloomfield, p. 141). Wrath is a sin of the world in the *Cursor mundi*, Wyclif's *Trialogus*, and Nicholas Hereford's "On the Seven Deadly Sins" (Bloomfield, pp. 175, 188, and 190).

<sup>83</sup> In my recent book, *The Sin of Sloth. Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, 1967), Chapter VII.

pared the triad to three very evil and strong winds that try to blow out the light of man's good conscience.<sup>84</sup> Jacques de Vitry used the same image and compared the tempters further to evil physicians who promise to heal but only leave the sick man worse;<sup>85</sup> to yokes which weigh man down;<sup>86</sup> and to armies which fight against our soul.

The world leads the first army as his [the devil's] standard bearer. It has two captains in its command: pride and avarice. The flesh leads the second army, with two captains: gluttony and lechery. The devil himself leads the third army, with three captains: envy, wrath, and *acedia*.<sup>87</sup>

Other preachers likened the enemies to nets<sup>88</sup> or to ropes which hold man captive,<sup>89</sup> while the *Gesta Romanorum*, in whose moralizations the *topos* appears many times,<sup>90</sup> found the evil triad in Ovid's three sirens.<sup>91</sup>

The battle image, of course, is inherent in the very conception of flesh-world-devil as *enemies* which assault man and must be fought off. This image was developed into longer allegories, seemingly first in several Anglo-Norman poems. Guillaume le Clerc's *Le Besant de Dieu* (finished before 1227), a moralizing lament against the evils of the world, describes the Three Enemies briefly and gives the Flesh and the World short speeches in which they solicit man to their appropriate vices.<sup>92</sup> In Robert Grosseteste's *Chasteau d'Amour*, which tells the spiritual history of mankind from Creation and Fall to Doomsday, there is a longer allegory of the castle which Jesus entered, that is, the body of the Blessed Virgin. The castle comprises all virtues and is attacked by the Three Enemies who lead, as their hosts, the seven deadly sins.<sup>93</sup> A similar battle occurs in *La Dime de Pénitance* by Jean de Journi (1288), a didactic poem on how to do penance. The section about man's struggle with his foes presents the Flesh as a spy within our "ostel," while the World surrounds and besieges us and the Devil with the rearguard leads the most violent attack.<sup>94</sup> In contrast to these three poems, the Three Enemies occupy a much larger space in the

<sup>84</sup> *Sermo III in Vigilia Nativitatis Domini*, 5 (PL 183: 97). Similarly in Petrus Comestor, *Sermo XLIX* (PL 198: 1840), and Jacques de Vitry, *Sermones*, p. 626.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193; cf. Bernard, *Sermo 111 de diversis* (PL 183: 737).

<sup>87</sup> P. 217.

<sup>88</sup> Bromyard, *Summa praedicantium*, "Temptatio," T. I, ii.

<sup>89</sup> Grosseteste, sermon "Egedere de terra tua," Brit. Mus. MS Royal 7.F.ii, fol. 105v-106r.

<sup>90</sup> Ed. H. Oesterley (Berlin, 1872), pp. 274, 288, 310, 312, 317, 322, 331, 335 f., 344, 346, 367, 371, 377, 380, 392, 424, 451, 461, 463, 486, 501, 536, 554, 555, 576, 591, 611, 632, 637, 671.

<sup>91</sup> No. 237, p. 637.

<sup>92</sup> Ed. E. Martin (Halle, 1869), lines 405 ff.; cf. line 85.

<sup>93</sup> Ed. J. Murray (Paris, 1918), lines 799-811.

<sup>94</sup> Ed. cit., lines 642 ff.

allegorical *Songe de Pestilence* (finished between 1374 and 1376-77), the second part of *Les livres du Roy Modus et de la Royne Ratio*.<sup>95</sup> The *Songe* is an allegorical dream vision that, like *Piers Plowman*, contains a good deal of social satire in occasionally rather witty and amusing scenes. Its framework is a lawsuit which Ratio and Modus lead before God against the Flesh, the World, and the Devil, who are accused of corrupting the world and — after many speeches, extensive investigations, and a battle between Vices and Virtues — are condemned, though they fail to appear at the verdict.

In connection with allegories, two more works should be mentioned which demonstrate how the *topos* was used even by authors whom we would rank among poets rather than moral allegorists. Chaucer made only passing mention of the triad, in a tale directly translated from a French moral treatise.<sup>96</sup> William Langland, however, included the triad at least twice in *Piers Plowman*, and in both cases used it within a larger image that carries great importance in the action of his poem. In B.VIII, 43, the Three Enemies are named as the causes of sin, in the exemplum ("forbisne," line 28) which likens man's life to a sea voyage. The metaphor of the *mare vitae* is a very ancient one and was connected with the Three Enemies at an early stage.<sup>97</sup> A second passage in *Piers Plowman* utilizes another commonplace image for the three tempters and incorporates it into a larger symbol — the Tree of Charity — whose combination of details shows much originality on the part of the poet. Here the three foes are likened to evil winds<sup>98</sup> that shake the Tree of Charity to destroy its fruit. Against them Piers wields three stakes, the persons of the Holy Trinity (B.XVI, 25-52).<sup>99</sup>

In the last mentioned episode the three enemies form only one in a series of triads which combine into an image whose major functions are to visualize the role of Piers as God's gardener in man's soul (thus in the B-text), to show the different degrees of love, and to start off the dramatization of *Heilsgeschichte* with the fall of apples from Piers' tree into the eager hands of the devil. The poetic function of the *topos* of man's three enemies

<sup>95</sup> Ed. G. Tillander. 2 vols., "Soc. d'anciens textes français" (Paris, 1932). The *Roy Modus* is actually a book on hunting. It has some moral allegory, however; thus, the hart has three enemies, which signifies the Three Enemies of Man (ch. 63; I, 118).

<sup>96</sup> *Canterbury Tales*, "The Tale of Melibee," B.2610. For the French, see the edition by J. B. Severs in Bryan and Dempster, *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Cant. Tales* (New York, 1941), 593.

<sup>97</sup> See the first passage by Jean de Fécamp, quoted above. The "sea of life" image in classical antiquity and the patristic age has been discussed in the excellent analysis by H. Rahner, "Antenna Crucis. II. Das Meer der Welt," *Zeitschr. f. kath. Theologie*, 66 (1942), 89-118.

<sup>98</sup> For the "wind of temptation" image and its use for the three foes, see above, p. 63 and n. 84.

<sup>99</sup> In *Piers*: Father-World. Son-Flesh, Holy Spirit-Devil. See above, p. 61 and n. 76.

itself is in this vision — as in the other allegories named — very minor indeed. It is only the drama which could realize the literary potentialities of the *topos* somewhat more fully. The late fifteenth-century *Moralité nouvelle de Mundus, Caro, Demonia* shows the three foes approaching Le Chevalier Chrestien and his Esprit. The temptation is presented by rather static and insipid speechmaking of the conventional kind found in the *Conflictus virtutum et vitiorum*.<sup>100</sup> La Chair, for example, says:

Vous vivez trop en desconfort.  
Je vous pry vivez sans soucy.  
Vous avez este trop icy.  
Il faut bien vous reposer,  
Se ie scauois bien ccomposer.<sup>101</sup>

Dramatically more interesting is the English morality *The Castle of Perseverance*, which has a much richer plot and genuine stage action. The battle for man's soul begins as soon as he enters the world, and reaches its climax when, after his conversion to a virtuous life, he is attacked by an imposing array of evil forces. These include not only the seven chief vices but the Three Enemies as well, under whose command the vices battle.<sup>102</sup> The same process of dividing up the deadly sins among the three foes and having the latter "kings" plan or lead the moral attack is followed in *Mary Magdalene*.<sup>103</sup> This process may even be stipulated as a standard convention for the early English morality plays, for *Mankind* (c. 1475), which no longer uses a cast of personified deadly sins (or personifications of World, Flesh, and Devil, for that matter), still explains in no uncertain terms that the assault on Mankind was made by his three "ghostly enemies." This explanation of the meaning of past events and figures is given to the protagonist (and the audience) at the end of the play by Mercy, his divine mentor.<sup>104</sup>

Although the Three Enemies make their appearance in the imaginative literature of the middle ages, it is only fair to say that they were not utilized to perform any very important function. One can, of course, easily demonstrate that in the play *Mankind* falls because of the weakness

<sup>100</sup> A very popular work, perhaps by Ambrose Autpert, but attributed to Ambrose, Augustine, Isidore, Leo IX, and others; printed in PL 17: 1158 ff., 40: 1091 ff., 83: 1131 ff., and 143: 539 ff.

<sup>101</sup> Ed. D. de L. (Paris, 1827), pages unnumbered.

<sup>102</sup> Ed. Furnivall and Pollard, *The Macro Plays*, EETS, es, 91 (London, 1904), *passim*. The distribution is as follows: World—Covetousness; Flesh—Lechery, Gluttony, Sloth; Devil—Pride, Wrath, Envy.

<sup>103</sup> Ed. F. J. Furnivall, EETS, es, 70. The distribution is: World—Pride, Covetousness; Flesh—Lechery, Gluttony, Sloth; Devil—Wrath, Envy; lines 305 ff. (pp. 66-68).

<sup>104</sup> Ed. J. Q. Adams, *Chief Pre-Shakespearean Dramas* (Boston, 1924), 324, lines 876-883.

of his flesh, through the deceit of the devil, and into the evil company of the world, whereupon he abandons Mercy and God. Yet in the temptation scenes the playwright's attention focuses not on the three foes but on the gradual fall of the hero through the machinations of the devil Titivillus.<sup>105</sup> The theological scheme and idea of the three tempters obviously lies behind the drama, but its dramatic function is minimal. Even *The Castle of Perseverance*, where the Three Enemies so neatly appear, speak, and act, demonstrates how small their role really is: the hero falls, not under their combined impact but through the persuasive power of World with Avarice alone.<sup>106</sup> If this is true of late medieval imaginative literature, it applies equally to religious writings, from sermons to mystical treatises: the triad does not provide any profound insight into the realities of spiritual life or of human psychology. In contrast to the seven chief vices, which were interpreted as successive stages in man's moral degeneration (and, conversely, in his rise to perfection), or were often linked to the faculties of the soul and genuinely integrated with the mechanism of volition, or were used to picture forth the pilgrim's progress through the realm of purgation (Dante) or to provide a guideline in the confrontation with one's moral self (Petrarch's *Secretum*) — the Three Enemies of Man provided nothing more than a formula which may originally have been very convenient, in meditation and exhortation, to sum up with conciseness the sources which threatened with disaster the Christian's — and especially the monk's — quest for perfection, but which by the fourteenth century had become at best a structural device<sup>107</sup> and at worst one of those commonplaces which just had to be cited whenever moral matter was being discussed.

*University of North Carolina.*

<sup>105</sup> Cf. *The Sin of Sloth*, Ch. VI.

<sup>106</sup> See J. W. McCutchan, "Covetousness in *The Castle of Perseverance*," in *English Studies in Honor of James Southall Wilson*," Univ. of Virginia Studies," 4 (Charlottesville, 1951), 175-191. It is interesting to notice that Professor Howard in his book on the Three Temptations arrives (indirectly) at a similar conclusion about the importance of "the world" in late fourteenth-century English literature. Although his study deals thematically with the *three* evils of I John 2: 16, he closes it with a chapter on the medieval "Search for the World" which he finds in the poems analyzed. I suspect that this shift from the three temptations to the concern with the world is due to a very real preoccupation with "the world" that one can find in late Middle English literature.

<sup>107</sup> For example, the *Fasciculus morum*, written before 1340, is really a vast handbook of pastoral and canonical knowledge, spiced with many edifying tales and verses. The material is organized along the series of the seven sins, but these in turn follow the division of sins of the devil (parts 1-3), the world (part 4), and the flesh (parts 5-7). This division is remembered throughout the entire treatise. MS Bodl. 332, fol. 107v-192v.

# The Episcopacy as an *Ordo* according to the Medieval Canonists

ROBERT P. STENGER, O.P.

THE description of the episcopacy in the dogmatic constitution *Lumen gentium* of Vatican II is presently stimulating research into the nature of this complex ecclesiastical institution. One way of approaching the episcopacy is via its history and understanding by successive generations.

The present study is an attempt to focus attention upon the episcopal office as this found expression in the writings of Gratian and the canonists from 1140 to 1270. Such a perspective is, of course, limited, and one could not attain a complete understanding of the episcopacy, even for this period, without including the study of the episcopacy in the general sacramentology and ecclesiology of the times.

A study of the opinions of the canonists is important, however, because of the role which they played in the formulation of later theories about the episcopacy. Because the writings of many early commentators remain in manuscript form, rather lengthy citations will frequently be necessary in these pages. What emerges is a growing understanding of the episcopacy as an *ordo*. Present understanding of the episcopacy by canonists and by many theologians has its roots in the speculations of these early commentators.

The importance of the period from the mid-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth century is unquestionable for both Canon Law and Theology. Both disciplines developed during this period from collections of texts handed down from the past to the state of reflexive, scientific analysis. Canonists and theologians both struggled to encompass within a consistent synthesis the often conflicting statements and actions of their predecessors.

The interdependence of canonists and theologians is already to be found in the work of Gratian. His monumental *Concordia discordantium canonum*, which appeared about 1140 in Bologna, has won for this otherwise unknown Camaldinese monk the title "Father of the Science of Canon Law."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Stephan Kuttner, "The Father of the Science of Canon Law," *The Jurist*, 1, 1941, 1-19; for Gratian's work, cf. Alphonsus Van Hove, *Prolegomena ad Codicem Iuris Canonici*, Editio altera auctior et emendatior (Rome, 1945), 339; Alphonsus Stickler, *Historia Iuris Canonici Latini* (Turin, 1950), 202-204.

As his title announced, Gratian was no mere compiler of *auctoritates*. He was the heir of the methodological advances begun by the canonists Bernold of Constance, Ivo of Chartres and Alger of Liége and perfected by the theologian, Peter Abelard.<sup>2</sup> Through his own statements (called *dicta*) Gratian sought to harmonize the statements of councils, popes, and Fathers of the Church which he used to support his positions.<sup>3</sup>

The writings of Gratian and his successors are of particular value because of the close contact these men had with the daily realities of ecclesiastical life. They wrote about existing institutions, as these were outlined and reflected in the common law of the Church. At the same time the writings of the canonists were formative in the development and modification of institutions. Gratian's *Decretum*, as his work came to be called,<sup>4</sup> was not only a textbook in the schools; it was also a handbook in papal and episcopal chanceries, where much of it served as the law of the Church until the present Code was promulgated in 1917.<sup>5</sup>

Gratian's work initiated a "Golden Age" of canonical literature. The young *studium* at Bologna soon became a center for the study of Canon Law, as it was already for the revival of Roman Law. In the short space of four decades, a dozen commentaries on the *Decretum* laid the foundations for a tradition of canonical thought.<sup>6</sup>

Now Gratian and his commentators (called Decretists) spoke frequently of the episcopacy. Yet none of them was formulating a speculative treatise "de episcopatu" or "de sacramento ordinis." In order to gain a complete and adequate idea of any author's understanding of the episcopacy, one must turn to several sections of his works.

Before considering the various medieval canonical writings on the episcopacy, however, one note is essential. The medieval canonists saw in the episcopacy and the presbyterate two distinct offices. The precise difference between them, however, was not immediately evident. The reason for the difficulty in explaining the difference was due in large part to a lack of precise terminology.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Fournier and Gabriel LeBras. *Histoire des Collections Canoniques en Occident*, (Paris, 1931), 2, 334-350; cf. Van Hove, *ibid.*, 420-421; Kuttner, *ibid.*, 4-11.

<sup>3</sup> Kuttner, *ibid.*, 15-16; Van Hove, *ibid.*, 341.

<sup>4</sup> Kuttner, *ibid.*, 15; Van Hove, *ibid.*, 340. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was usually referred to in the plural, *Decreta*, by commentators.

<sup>5</sup> J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement Théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 2<sup>e</sup> ed. (Paris, 1948), 205; Van Hove, *ibid.*, 345-346; Stickler, *ibid.*, 210-212.

<sup>6</sup> For the development of canonical literature during the period after Gratian, cf. Stephan Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* (1140-1234): *Prodromus Corporis Glossarum*, 1 (Studi e testi 71, Città del Vaticano, 1937); "Bernardus Compostellanus Antiquus: A Study in the Glossators of the Canon Law," *Traditio* 1, 1943, 279-282.

Today one takes for granted a distinction between "potestas ordinis" and "potestas iurisdictionis." Now this distinction was not clearly formulated until the thirteenth century, as Father Van de Kerckhove has shown.<sup>7</sup> During the period from Gratian to Huguccio (1140-1190), the term "iurisdiction" is seldom used; many synonyms were employed to express some general administrative power, e.g. "administrationis potestas," "auctoritas," "dignitatis potestas," "potestas dispensationis," "executio officii," "gubernatio," "ius episcopale," "lex dioecesana," "ordinatio," "potestas regiminis," "potestas regendi."<sup>8</sup> Huguccio introduced the distinction between "lex dioecesana" and "lex iurisdictionis" and defined the latter as spiritual administrative power.<sup>9</sup> Because of the close connection during the Middle Ages between the bishop's office and his benefice, temporal administrative power was included with the other episcopal powers.<sup>10</sup> Only gradually were the various aspects of the bishop's office separated from one another and clearly defined.

It is possible, however, to trace in the writings of Gratian and his commentators a developing understanding of those aspects of the bishop's office which would today be assigned to his *potestas ordinis* rather than to his *potestas iurisdictionis*.<sup>11</sup> Emphasis here will be given to the episcopacy insofar as the canonists saw in it an *ordo*. Their opinions will be grouped around three general questions concerning the episcopacy: its institution, the powers which the bishop has with respect to the administration of the sacraments and the sanctification of the faithful committed to his care, and the subject of episcopal consecration. These three questions will be considered first in the writings of Gratian and the Decretists and then in the writings of the Decretalists.

<sup>7</sup> P. Martinien Van de Kerckhove, *La Notion de Juridiction dans la doctrine des Décrétistes et des premiers Décretalistes de Gratien (1140) à Bernard de Bottone (1250)*, (Assisi, 1937), 35. Even to the present day, the distinction abounds in ambiguity, as can be seen in the effort to define "instrumental jurisdiction," for example; cf. Charles Journet, *The Church of the Word Incarnate*, I (New York, 1955), 170-177.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>10</sup> Donald Edward Heintschel, *The Mediaeval Concept of an Ecclesiastical Office*, (Washington, 1956), 5; cf. also Jean-François Lemarignier, Jean Gaudemet, et Guillaume Mollat, *Histoire des Institutions Françaises au Moyen Age*, Vol. 3, *Institutions Ecclésiastiques* (Paris, 1962), 164-185.

<sup>11</sup> The terms "ordo" and "potestas ordinis" may be understood to mean a position of ecclesiastical superiority whose occupant can exercise certain ministerial functions, especially with respect to the administration of the sacraments; this is what one author calls the "pura ratio ordinis, abstrahendo pro nunc ab eius sacramentalitate, quae involvit ulteriorem conceptum impressionis characteris et collationis gratiae." Emmanuel Doronzo, *Tractatus Dogmaticus De Ordine*, (Milwaukee, 1957-1962), 2, 2.

## I

## THE EPISCOPACY IN THE WRITINGS OF GRATIAN AND THE DECRETISTS

## 1. The Institution of the Episcopacy

Gratian wrote frequently in the *Decretum* about the bishop and his office, for both of which he used various terms. Thus he spoke of the episcopacy as "ordo," "ordo sacer," "officium," "officium sacrum," "officium ecclesiasticae dignitatis," "gradus pontificalis," "gradus." He referred to the bishop as "summus pontifex," "summus sacerdos," "pontifex," "sacerdos apicem pontificatus habens," "sacerdos maior," "prelatus," "antistes," "presul."<sup>12</sup> It is not possible from these terms alone to discern a precise definition of the episcopacy. One must turn to the various places where Gratian discussed bishops.

His treatment begins with his introduction to *distinctio* 21: "Ministri vero sacrorum canonum et decretorum Pontificum sunt Summi Pontifices et infra presules atque reliqui sacerdotes, quorum institutio in veteri testamento est inchoata et in novo plenius consummata."<sup>13</sup> The Old Testament priesthood had begun through divine intervention, when God ordered Moses to anoint Aaron as high priest and his sons as lesser priests; when the ministry expanded, David introduced "ianitores" and "cantores" while Solomon added "exorcistae."<sup>14</sup>

With respect to the New Testament priesthood, Gratian wrote:

Pro filiis vero Aaron, omnes infra summum pontificem sacerdotium administrantes sunt consecrati. Inter eos quedam discretio servata est, ut alii appellentur simpliciter "sacerdotes," alii "archi-presbyteri," alii "corepiscopi," alii "episcopi," alii "archi-episcopi," seu "metropolitae," alii "primates," alii "patriarchae," alii "summi pontifices." Horum discretio a gentilibus maxime introducta est, qui suos flamines, alias simpliciter flamines, alias archiflamines, alias protoflamines, appellabant. Simpliciter vero maiorum et minorum sacerdotum discretio in novo testamento ab ipso Christo sumpsit exordium, qui XII apostolos tamquam maiores sacerdotes et LXXII discipulos quasi minores sacerdotes instituit.<sup>15</sup>

Two points should be noted in these introductory remarks of Gratian. First, he was not determining a theology of the priesthood but only listing

<sup>12</sup> Ladislaus Örsy, S. J., *The Difference Between the Order of Episcopate and Presbyterate in Gratian's Decree* (Rome, 1962), Part I, Chapter One.

<sup>13</sup> Aemilius Friedberg, ed., *Corpus Iuris Canonici* (Leipzig, 1879-1881), Vol. I: *Decretum Gratiani*, Dictum ante c. 1. dist. 21.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*; cf. Exodus 28: 1ff.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 1, *in fine*, paragraphs 2 and 3.

those who would administer the laws of the Church.<sup>16</sup> Second, he did understand the distinction between “major” and “minor” priests as of immediate institution by Christ, even though there had been Old Testament precedents and there were examples from the pagan Roman priesthood. Gratian found no instances in the life of Christ for the exercise of each of the ecclesiastical orders, as Peter Lombard would do, following Ivo of Chartres.<sup>17</sup>

Gratian began his treatment of priestly functions with a quotation from Isidore of Seville, who derived the names for various offices from their functions:

Generaliter autem clerici nuncupantur omnes, qui in ecclesia Christi deser-  
viunt, quorum gradus et nomina sunt hec: Hostiarius, psalmista, lector, exor-  
cista, acolitus, subdiaconus, diaconus, presbiter, episcopus. Ordo episco-  
porum quadripartitus est, id est in patriarchis, archiepiscopis, metropolitanis  
atque episcopis... Omnes autem superius designati ordines uno eodemque  
vocabulo episcopi nominantur; set ideo privato nomine quidam utuntur,  
propter distinctionem potestatum, quam singulariter acceperunt... Episco-  
patus autem vocabulum inde dictum est, quod ille qui episcopus efficitur,  
superintendebat, curam scilicet gerens subditorum... Presbyter grece, latine  
senior interpretatur; non modo pro etate vel decrepita senectute, sed propter  
honorem et dignitatem, quam acceperunt, presbiteri nominantur: ideo autem  
et presbiteri sacerdotes vocantur quia sacrum dant, sicut episcopi; qui, licet  
sint sacerdotes, tamen pontificatus apicem non habent, quia nec chrismate  
frontem signant, nec paraclitum spiritum dant, quod solis deberi episcopis  
lectio Actuum Apostolorum demonstrat. Unde et apud veteres idem episcopi  
et presbiteri fuerunt: quia illud nomen dignitatis est et non etatis.<sup>18</sup>

These etymological observations of Isidore provided Gratian with a sufficient outline of the various ecclesiastical offices. Several of the Decretists, however, took this text as an opportunity to determine more precisely the nature of *ordo* and the number of *ordines*.

Rufinus, whose *Summa decretorum* was written between 1157 and 1159, was the first of the Bolognese masters to write an extensive commentary on the *Decretum*.<sup>19</sup> He attempted to define *ordo*: “Est autem ordo signa-

<sup>16</sup> This is indicated in the *Summa Parisiensis*: “et inde sumpta occasione, ostendit unde initium habuerunt ordines ecclesiastici.” Terence P. McLaughlin, ed., *The Summa Parisiensis on the Decretum Gratiani*, (Toronto, 1952), dist. 21, *in prin.*, p. 20; also in Rufinus, *Summa Decretorum*, Heinrich Singer, ed., *Die Summa Decretorum des Magister Rufinus* (Paderborn, 1902), dist. 21, p. 44; and Joannes Faventinus, *Summa*, dist. 21, Reims Ms 684, f. 8<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. J. de Ghellinck, “Le traité de Pierre Lombard sur les sept ordines ecclésiastiques: ses sources, ses copistes,” *Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique* 10 (1909), 296-301.

<sup>18</sup> Dist. 21, c. 1, from St. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologias*, Lib. 7, c. 12, Luis Cortés Y Cóngora, ed., (Madrid, 1951), 183-185.

<sup>19</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 132; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 434; Robert Benson, “Rufin,” *Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique* (Paris, 1961), cols. 779-784. Rufinus was highly educated in Theology, Roman Law, Liturgy and Canon Law; he was influenced by Hugh of St. Victor.

culum, i.e. quoddam secretum, quo spiritualis potestas et officium ei traditur qui ordinatur.”<sup>20</sup> This definition is taken from Peter Lombard’s *Libri sententiarum*, and thus represents an influence of the theologians at Paris upon the canonists at Bologna.<sup>21</sup>

Sicardus of Cremona, who wrote about twenty years after Rufinus,<sup>22</sup> followed Hugh of St. Victor in basing the number of *ordines* upon the gifts of the Holy Spirit: “Sunt igitur vii ordines sicut vii dona spiritus sancti.”<sup>23</sup> The author of the anonymous *Summa Parisiensis*, from the French school about 1160,<sup>24</sup> completely adopted the opinion of the contemporary theologians: “Septem sunt ordines clericorum. Episcopus enim potius dignitatis quam ordinis nomen est. Eiusdem enim episcopi et omnes supra sunt ordinis cuius et sacerdotes, sed Isidorus de omnibus his inducit quia potius intendit vocabula exponere quam ordines assignare.”<sup>25</sup> By limiting his understanding of the *Decretum* in these texts from Isidore to an explanation of names, the author of this *Summa* found no reason to build a theory of ecclesiastical *ordines* upon them.

Huguccio, on the other hand, took the opposite approach. His *Summa*

<sup>20</sup> Rufinus, *Summa*, dist. 21, p. 44; Sicardus of Cremona quotes the same definition: “Ordo est karakter quo spiritualis potestas et officium traditur ei qui ordinatur.” *Summa*, C.I.q.1, Vatican Bibl. Apost. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 76<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Peter Lombard had written: “Si autem quaeritur quid sit quod hic vocatur ordo, sane dici potest, signaculum quoddam esse, id est sacrum quoddam, quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato et officium.” *Libri sententiarum*, Lib. IV, distinctio 24, cap. 13 (Quaracchi, 1916). It should be noted that the *Libri sententiarum* was composed by Peter Lombard about 1150, i.e. about a decade after the appearance of the *Decretum*; cf. de Ghellinck, *op. cit.*, 222. While Peter Lombard had written “sacrum quoddam,” Rufinus had “quoddam secretum”; this is based upon Isidore of Seville, who had derived the meaning of “sacramentum” from “mysterium.” Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etimologias*, Lib. 6, c. 19, *op. cit.*, p. 154; Nicholas M. Haring, “A Study in the Sacramentology of Alger of Liège,” *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), p. 56; Emmanuel Doronzo, *Tractatus Dogmaticus De Sacramentis in Genere* (Milwaukee, 1946), 5.

<sup>22</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 151; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 435; Ch. Lefebvre, “Sicard de Cremona,” *Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique*, cols. 1008-1011; Stephan Kuttner, “Réflexions sur les Brocards des Glossateurs,” *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck*, (Gembloux, 1951), 2, 767-792.

<sup>23</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, d. 21, Vat. Ms Pal. Lat. 653, f. 67<sup>b</sup>; Hugonis de S. Victore, *De sacramentis christiana fidei*, lib. II, pars 3, cap. 5: “Septem ergo spiritualium officiorum gradus proinde in sancta ecclesia secundum septifirmem gratiam distributi sunt.” (PL 176: 423).

<sup>24</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 177-178; McLaughlin, *ibid.*, xvii ff, xxxi ff; Van Hove, *ibid.*, 437.

<sup>25</sup> *Summa Parisiensis*, dist. 21, c. 1, McLaughlin, p. 21; the theory that the episcopacy is a “dignitas” and not an “ordo” was maintained at Paris by both Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis christiana fidei*: “Sacerdos et pontifex sive summus sacerdos unus gradus est in sacramento, diversa tamen potestas in ministerio... Sic alia est differentia graduum in sacris ordinibus, alia est in eodem gradu differentia dignitatum.” (PL 176: 428; cf. also PL 176: 419), and Peter Lombard: “Sunt et alia quaedam, non ordinum, sed dignitatum vel officiorum nomina. Dignitatis simul et officii nomen est episcopatus.” (*Libri Sententiarum*, Lib. 4, Dist. 24, c. 14).

*Decretorum*, which appeared at Bologna in 1188, was the greatest of the Bolognese commentaries on Gratian.<sup>26</sup> He emphatically rejects the seven-fold division of *ordines*: “Set dicit quis, si prima tonsura est ordo, ergo plures sunt ordines quam vii. Responsio: non set dubium, sunt enim viiiii, ut hic aperte computantur.”<sup>27</sup>

The *glossa ordinaria* to the *Decretum*, which was written by Joannes Teutonicus after the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and revised by Bartholomaeus Brixiensis about 1245, presents the ideas prevailing in the schools at the time of its composition.<sup>28</sup> With respect to the number of *ordines*, it is evident that this question was by no means settled by the mid-thirteenth century:

Psalmista. Hic patet quod psalmista et ostiarius et lector sunt clerici... Et per primam tonsuram fit aliquis psalmista, vel clericus; et illa tonsura est sacramentale signum... Set si hoc dicatur, tunc erunt novem ordines. Veruntamen videtur quod non sit ordo, quia ubi tractatur quod clericus alii obedientiam praestabit, nihil agitur de istis ordinibus... Sed dic quod tantum septem sunt ordines qui conferuntur cum solemnitate, sed tamen novem sunt. Io. [Joannes Teutonicus]. Sed certe omnes conferuntur cum solemnitate hodie preter Psalmistatum, qui a solo sacerdote confertur. Bar. [Bartholomaeus Brixiensis.]<sup>29</sup>

Thus, some canonists thought that the tonsure (or *psalmista*, identified with tonsure as the entry to the clerical state) was an *ordo*, as well as the episcopacy, thereby creating a total of nine. The *glossa* reflected Huguccio in finding Isidore’s statement sufficient warrant for calling the episcopacy an *ordo*: “Episcopus: argumentum quod episcopatus est ordo.”<sup>30</sup>

The canonists passed beyond these nominal considerations of *ordo* when they came to discuss the actual role of bishops and priests in the Church. The first opportunities for these precisions came in discussions of the office which Christ granted to Peter (cf. Matthew 16:17-19) and of the establishment of James as bishop of Jerusalem (cf. Acts 12:17, 15:13, 21:18).

Gratian quoted a letter of “Pope Anacletus”<sup>31</sup> to establish Peter’s primacy:

<sup>26</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 157-158; Van Hove, *ibid.*, 435-436.

<sup>27</sup> Huguccio, *Summa Decretorum*, d. 21, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 25<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Van Hove, *ibid.*, 430-432; Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 93-95.

<sup>29</sup> *Decretum Gratiani* emendatum et notationibus illustratum, una cum glossis, Venice, 1591, d. 21, c. 1, s.v. Psalmista.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, s.v. Episcopus.

<sup>31</sup> Dist. 21, c. 2; Gratian’s inscription reads: “Item Anacletus ad episcopos Italiae, epist. 2.” Cf. Paul Hinschius, *Decretales Pseudo-Isidoriana et Capitula Angilramni*, (Leipzig, 1863), Ep. Pseudocisid., Ep. II Anacleti, c. 24, p. 79. For the Isidorian forgeries and their influence, cf. also Stickler, *ibid.*, 117-142.

In novo testamento post Christum Dominum a Petro sacerdotalis cepit ordo: quia ipsi primo Pontificatus in ecclesia Christi datus est... Ceteri vero apostoli cum eodem pari consortio honorem et potestatem acceperunt; ipsumque principem eorum esse voluerunt... Ipsis quoque decedentibus in locus eorum surrexerunt episcopi.<sup>32</sup>

In commenting upon this text, Rufinus provides an extensive analysis of the criteria for superiority in the Church and the various ways in which one office may be considered superior to another.

Prelatura in clericis provenit aliquando ex dignitate consecrationis, aliquando ex dignitate ordinis, aliquando ex dignitate dispensationis vel amministrationis; hec autem amministratio aliquando est spiritualium, aliquando secularium rerum. Et quidem ex dignitate consecrationis prelatura illa est, qua episcopus ceteris sacerdotibus preminet; ex dignitate ordinis prefertur subdiacono diaconus; ex dignitate amministrationis rerum secularium prestat archidiaconus, non tantum aliis, sed etiam ipsi archipresbytero... Amministrationis rerum secularium ideo diximus quia in spiritualium rerum amministratio non archidiaconus archipresbytero, potius econtrario archipresbyter archidiacono preficitur. Petrus igitur ex prerogativa consecrationis apostolorum primorum neminem excellebat, quia omnes in pontificatus apicem consecrati sunt. Itidem propter dignitatem minoris ordinis non submittebantur ei: omnes enim sacerdotes erant, extra quem ordinem nullus superior reperitur; episcopatus enim et huiusmodi non proprie sunt ordines sed dignitates. Ex dispensationis autem dignitate apostolos ceteros anteibat, quia ipse aliis predicandi officium et alia huiuscmodi dispensabat; in duobus itaque prioribus ceteri apostoli cum eo pari consortio honorem et potestatem acceperunt, sed in hoc ultimo ei impares fuerunt.<sup>33</sup>

One can discover here once again the influence of Peter Lombard upon Rufinus, for it was Peter Lombard who had handed on the opinion that the episcopacy was a *dignitas* and not an *ordo*.<sup>34</sup> The primacy of Peter, however, was neither by consecration nor order; it consisted in administration, i.e. power to assign the other apostles to their work in preaching the gospel. Rufinus thus found several bases for distinguishing clerics: consecration, order and administration. He noted that while bishops don't surpass other priests in order (and therefore all bishops are priests, as shall be seen below), they do surpass them in virtue of their (episcopal) consecration.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Rufinus, *Summa*, d. 21, c. 2, Singer, p. 45; this same division of *prelatura* may also be found at d.25, c. 1, *ibid.*, pp. 58-59; it is likewise to be found in Stephan of Tournai, *Die Summa des Stephanus Tornacensis über das Decretum Gratiani*, Joh. Friedrich von Schulte, ed., (Giessen, 1891), d. 21, c. 2, p. 31; (for Stephen's life, cf. Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 133-136, and Van Hove, *ibid.*, 434;) and in Sicardus, *Summa* d. 93, s.v. ad devotionem, Vat. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 74<sup>va</sup>; it is reflected in the *glossa ordinaria*, d. 21, c. 2, s.v. pari.

<sup>34</sup> Cf above, note 25.

It was the subject of James the Less' "ordination" by Peter, James the Great and John which occasioned further discussion of episcopal consecration.<sup>35</sup> If Christ had created all the apostles bishops, what could James have received in his "ordination"? Simon of Bisignano, whose *Summa* appeared between 1177 and 1179, had been Gratian's pupil;<sup>36</sup> he offered three possibilities:

Cum omnes apostoli essent episcopi... quid est quod hic dicitur, quod Jacobus est ordinatus episcopus ab illis tribus? Quidam dicunt quod fuit ordinatus, i.e. in sedem locatus; vel ordinatus non in episcopum set in archiepiscopum per pallii dationem; vel ab illis fuit ordinatus, i.e. consecratus visibili unctione, quam non habebat, licet esset episcopus quoad officia exercenda et intrinsecam gratiam.<sup>37</sup>

For one who admitted that Christ created all the apostles bishops, there was no alternative other than to modify seriously the term "ordination"; Simon did this by referring it to James' installation or reception of the pallium or to a purely formal visible anointing.

Sicardus of Cremona records the opinion of some who taught that the apostles were priests, not bishops, and that the episcopal consecration was instituted to counteract the confusions arising from equality of offices.

Queritur quid sit collatum Iacobo in sua ordinatione? Respondent quidam quod apostoli erant simplices sacerdotes, non episcopi, ratione consecrationis. Tunc episcopi dici possunt propter amministrationem et officium, quia ea faciebant quae nunc soli episcopi. Postea vero ad tollenda scismata quae erant, causa parilitatis eorum, institutum est ut unus ceteris preferetur et maior a minoribus consecraretur... Alii dicunt omnes fuisse presbyteros et episcopos, non consecratione olei materialis sed spiritualis... Ergo secundum primos dignitas episcopalis est Iacobo collata; secundum secundos est ei tantum amministratio limitata. Nam cum essent constituti principes super omnem terram, indifferenter omnes omnibus ministrabant ecclesiis. Sed Iacobo assignata [est] ierosolima, ut eius curam pre ceteris gereret et nullus, eo inscio vel invito, aliquid ibi presumeret.<sup>38</sup>

Sicardus specifically applied the relationship between the apostles and the disciples to that between bishops and priests of later times:

Et attende quod episcopi dicuntur tenere locum apostolorum, presbyteri lxxii discipulorum, quia sicut apostoli preerant discipulis in amministratione, sic episcopi sacerdotibus in amministratione et officiorum executione. Olim namque in amministratione dispare, in officiis erant pares, quia quodcumque sacramentum dabat Petrus, quilibet sacerdos conferre poterat. Hodie vero dispare sunt in utroque cum solis episcopis liceat confirmare et simila.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Decretum*, d. 66, c. 2; for this letter of "Pope Anacletus"; cf. Hinschius, *ibid.*, c. 18, p. 75.

<sup>36</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 149; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 435.

<sup>37</sup> Simon of Bisignano, *Summa Decretorum*, d. 66, c. 2, Augsburg, Kreis- und Stadtbibl. I, f. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, d. 66, c. 2, Vat. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 73<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

The opinion recounted here by Sicardus would trouble future authors as they attempted to explain the difference in the functions of the bishop and the priest. If one admitted an original equality between them, he was then pressed to explain how a subsequent inequality came to exist.

Huguccio, in commenting upon the ordination of James, maintained that all the apostles were bishops from the beginning. For if they were not bishops, how could it be said that the present bishops succeeded to the place of the apostles? Likewise, if they were not bishops, how could Peter, James and John consecrate James to the episcopacy?<sup>40</sup> He explained the ordination of James as a model for future episcopal consecrations:

Cum inunixerunt ad hoc tantum ut formam pastoris darent: neminem a paucioribus quam a tribus episcopis debere ordinari episcopum; et tunc in veritate iam episcopus erat et interius invisibiliter inunctus a spiritu sancto, et ipsi et omnes alii apostoli erant episcopi, quia omnes habebant sacramentum illius ordinis. Signum ergo accepti sacramenti ei contulerunt ut darent exemplum aliis in futurum.<sup>41</sup>

Huguccio teaches, as always, that the bishops had received the "sacrament of the episcopal order." To explain the first ordination of a bishop or a priest, he posits the necessity of divine inspiration. In discussing the possibility of ordination by a layman or cleric (not a priest), he writes:

Quid si nullus esset episcopus, nullus presbyter, posset ecclesia statuere ut clericus vel laicus ordinaret episcopum vel presbyterum? Respondeo: tunc necessaria esset divina inspiratio qualiter hoc deberet fieri et qualiter presbyter vel episcopus debet tunc ordinari, sicut factum credo quando primus episcopus vel primus sacerdos fuit ordinatus.<sup>42</sup>

Huguccio here chose to appeal to divine intervention rather than hazard some opinion of his own concerning the origin of episcopal and presbyteral ordination. As other authors who have searched the New Testament for an answer to this problem have discovered, the scriptural evidence is neither extensive nor unambiguous.<sup>43</sup>

In fact, several statements of Saint Paul about bishops, priests and deacons had presented problems to commentators ever since Patristic times. In Philippians 1:1 and I Timothy 3:1-7 Paul referred to bishops and deacons without mentioning priests. In Acts 20:17, 28 and Titus 1:6-7 Paul seemed to use "bishops" (*episkopoi*) and "priests" (*presbyteroi*)

<sup>40</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 66, c. 2, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 95<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 95<sup>rb</sup>-95<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 95<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Fernand Prat, *The Theology of St. Paul* (Westminster, Md., 1958), 1, 341-349; Pierre Benoit, "Les origines de l'épiscopat dans le Nouveau Testament," *Exégèse et Théologie* (Paris, 1961), 2, 232-246.

as synonymous terms. In commenting upon the epistle to Titus, Jerome had written: “*Idem est presbyter qui et episcopus.*”<sup>44</sup> This statement would provide the impetus for a whole tradition of theological and canonical discussion of the supposed equality.<sup>45</sup>

This tradition entered the medieval canonical literature via two citations from Jerome which Gratian incorporated into the *Decretum*: in *distinctio* 93, c. 24, he quoted Jerome’s letter to Evangelus, and in *distinctio* 95, c. 5, he quoted his commentary upon the Epistle to Titus. Gratian did not utilize these texts to prove a theoretical point; such was never his purpose. His aim was to establish disciplinary regulations, here concerning the proper subordination of deacons to priests. Such was the context of Jerome’s letter to Evangelus:

...Nam cum Apostolus perspicue doceat eosdem esse episcopos, quos presbyteros: quid patitur mensarum et viduarum minister [cf. Acts 6:1-3], ut supra eos se tumidis efferat, ad quorum preces Christi corpus sanguisque conficitur?... Quod autem postea unus electus est, qui ceteris preponeretur, in scismatis remedium factum est; ne unusquisque ad se trahens Christi ecclesiam rumperet... Quid enim facit excepta ordinatione episcopus quod non facit presbiter?... Presbiter et episcopus, aliud etatis, aliud dignitatis est nomen. Unde et ad Titum et Timotheum de ordinatione episcopi et diaconi dicitur; de presbiteris omnino reticetur, quia in episcopo et presbiter continetur.<sup>46</sup>

Jerome here argued for the superiority of priests over deacons by appealing to the priest’s power to consecrate the Eucharist and to the intimate relationship between the priest and the bishop. It is worthy of note that Jerome did not simply identify priests with bishops; rather, he included the priesthood in the episcopacy.

Gratian appealed to Jerome again when he wanted to show that bishops must respect priests and not refuse them the exercise of their powers. As Jerome had written:

Olim idem presbiter, qui et episcopus, et antequam diaboli instinctu studia in religione fierent et diceretur in populis: “Ego sum Pauli,” “Ego sum Apollo,” “Ego sum Cephas,” communi presbiterorum consilio ecclesie gubernabantur. Postquam autem unusquisque eos, quos baptizaverat, suos esse putabat, non Christi, in toto orbe decretum est ut unus de presbiteris superponeretur ceteris,

<sup>44</sup> Jerome, *Comment. in Titum* 1: 5, PL 26, 596.

<sup>45</sup> The history of the interpretation of this text of Jerome has been studied by Arthur Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Früscholastik* (Regensburg, 1955), Dritter Teil, Band 2, 280-283; J. Lécuyer, “Aux origines de la théologie thomiste de l’épiscopat,” *Gregorianum* 35 (1954), 56-89; and Emmanuel Doronzo, *De Ordine* 2, 49-92.

<sup>46</sup> *Decretum* d. 93, c. 24; Jerome, *Epist. 146 ad Evangelum presbyterum, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* (Leipzig, 1918), 56, 308-311.

ad quem omnis ecclesie cura pertineret et scismatum semina tollerentur. *et paulo post.* Sicut ergo presbiteri sciunt se ex ecclesiae consuetudine ei, qui sibi prepositus fuerit, esse subiectos; ita episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine quam dispensationis Dominicæ veritate presbiteris esse maiores et in communi debere ecclesiam regere.<sup>47</sup>

Jerome thus admitted that some identity had existed at one time between a bishop and a priest and that this situation had been changed because it had provided an occasion for disputes. The canonists in commenting upon these texts from Jerome attempted to specify the type of change which occurred. The canonical opinions may be divided into three interpretations.

One opinion may be found in the *Summa "Omnis qui iuste"* of the Anglo-Norman school. This anonymous work, written at Paris about 1186, showed the influence of the Bolognese masters Joannes Faventinus and Simon of Bisignano.<sup>48</sup> The author here maintained that custom had brought about the subordination of priests to bishops, while Christ had instituted merely a difference in dignity:

quasi minores — Christus instituit XII apostolos quasi maiores, LXX (=LXXII) discipulos quasi minores, non tamen ut illi XII subessent, nisi forte ipsi Petro, qui omnibus prefuit. Ex consuetudine, autem, postea quidam aliis subditi sunt.<sup>49</sup>

The author was willing to see an example of this change in the appointment of James as bishop of Jerusalem. The authority of others was limited by the fact that James had become superior in this place.

With respect to other possible areas of identity between priests and bishops, there is no clear answer to be found in this work.

Potest dici quod olim idem erat presbyter qui et episcopus quoad invisibilem unctionem et quoad sedes et quoad ordines, secundum quosdam; quod tamen ab aliis negatur, quia in primitiva ecclesia non erat solemnitas ordinatio que hodie est. Postea facta est sedium mutatio, ut lxvi, porro [D.66c.2].<sup>50</sup>

By restricting his understanding of *ordo* to the external rite ("solemnitas ordinatio") the author did not find in the subsequent differences between bishops and priests any cause for discussion.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 95. c. 5; Jerome, *Comment. in Titum* 1: 5, PL 26, 596-598. This text is quoted at length for the commentators would return to it frequently; they devoted special attention to the fact that the bishops's supremacy was said to derive from a decree or from custom.

<sup>48</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 197-198; Stephan Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, "Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth Century," *Traditio* 7 (1949-1951), 284-290. This work is also called the *Summa Lipsiensis* after the library where the manuscript was first found.

<sup>49</sup> *Summa "Omnis qui iuste,"* d. 21, s.v. quasi minores, Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 986, f. 14<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, d. 95. c. 5, s.v. olim idem, Rouen Ms Lat. 743, f. 43<sup>rb</sup>.

A second interpretation of Jerome, directly contrary to that of the *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste," admits the administrative superiority of bishops over priests from the origins of the two offices; the differences which came about were in the line of functions other than administrative functions. This view was that of the *Summa* "Imperatorie maiestati" and Sicardus of Cremona.

The *Summa* "Imperatorie maiestati" was a product of the French school, between 1175 and 1178. Its author is very explicit about the changes which had been introduced between bishops and priests:

Dicendum ergo quod, cum hodie in ecclesia Christi inter episcopos et minores presbiteros duplex sit differentia, videlicet in amministracione, quantum alii aliis presunt iudicij potestate, et institutionis et precepti; item in officii executione — multa enim faciunt episcopi que ceteris presbiteris illicita sunt... Olim non in officio, sed in administratione sola differebant. Quodcumque enim sacramentum conferre poterat Petrus, poterat et minimus sacerdos, sicut hodie videmus in episcopis... Quod autem dicuntur episcopi locum apostolorum et minores presbiteri locum LXXIIorum discipulorum tenere, ita intelligendum est, nam sicut apostoli preerant discipulis aliis in amministracione, sic episcopi presunt aliis presbiteris. Postea vero ad tollendum scisma, quod propter officiorum parilitatem exortum erat, institutum est, ut de cetero non solum in amministracione, verum etiam in officii executione different.<sup>51</sup>

Sicardus was obviously influenced by the author of the *Summa* "Imperatorie maiestati." After repeating much of the section just quoted, Sicardus concludes: "Olim namque in amministracione dispares, in officiis erant pares:... hodie vero dispares sunt in utroque, cum solis episcopis liceat confirmare et similia."<sup>52</sup>

Two points may be noticed in the writings of these two authors. First, there is no distinction between *ordo* and *officium*; the term "officium" is used to include all the powers of the bishop except his purely administrative powers. Second, the authors were not hesitant in admitting an original equality between bishops and priests with respect to the administration of all the sacraments. For them, the limitation of certain sacraments to the bishop as sole minister was a matter of custom or ecclesiastical institution.

The third interpretation given to the texts from Jerome may be found in Huguccio, its most explicit proponent. He argues precisely from the difference in the power to administer various sacraments to a denial of any original equality between bishops and priests. In a very lengthy commentary upon the text from Jerome's letter to Evangelus, Huguccio proceeds to set forth the problem, to present the opinions of others and their reasons for them, and to offer his own conclusions with his own proofs for them.

<sup>51</sup> *Summa* "Imperatorie maiestati," d.66. c. 2, Munich, Staatsbibl. 16084, f. 9<sup>v</sup>, 11<sup>r</sup> (f. 10<sup>rv</sup> is an interpolation); for this *Summa*, cf. Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 179-180; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 437.

<sup>52</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, d. 66. c. 2, Vat. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 73<sup>ra</sup>.

He begins with the question: why was there a change from the original situation when bishops and priests were called by the same names? Before replying, Huguccio sets down an important principle: he understands the episcopacy as embracing the presbyterate.

Respondendum est ad tacitam obiectionem, sc. quare hoc fuit immutatum, et nota quod non negat quin etiam hodie omnis episcopus sit presbyter, set loquitur secundum antiqua tempora quando communiter et indifferenter presbyteri et episcopi appellebantur episcopi et presbyteri, quod postea immutatum est et non est hodie. Verum est quidem quod omnis episcopus est presbyter, et non e contrario.<sup>53</sup>

The direction of study, then, moves from the episcopacy to the presbyterate, from the whole to the part. This approach will yield different conclusions from one which begins with the presbyterate as a whole by itself and then moves to explain the episcopacy in relation to this whole.<sup>54</sup>

Huguccio does not discuss the possibility of an original equality in administration between bishops and priests; he assumes that from the very beginning there was a difference of administrative power. Thus does he reject without further comment or proof the opinion of the author of the *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste."

He then outlines the opinion of the *Summa* "Imperatorie maiestati" and Sicardus at some length. That opinion is rejected because it is contrary to the canons which give to bishops alone, from the time of the apostles, the consecration and conferring of chrism. The conclusion is: "Et sic non solum in administratione vel prelatione set etiam in officiorum executione et in sacramentorum celebratione episcopi et presbyteri different."<sup>55</sup>

Huguccio offers another answer to the opinion which would maintain equality:

Respondetur aliter: utrumque obtinuit tempore apostolorum, sc. communitas sacramentorum et differentia. Primo enim omnes omnia sacramenta conficiebant, sed hoc modicum duravit. Postea, similiter tempore apostolorum, facta est inter eos diversitas, sc. ut quedam sacramenta solis episcopis concederentur... et ita hoc obtinuit a tempore apostolorum.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 93.c.24, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 119r.

<sup>54</sup> The position of Huguccio had been adopted already by Paucapalea, Gratian's own pupil and first commentator (cf. Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 125-127; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 433-434): "...episcoporum officia, quorum potestas quantum ad sacerdotalem attinet dignitatem cum presbyteris est communis," *Summa*, C. 26, *in prin.*, *Die Summa des Paucapalea über das Decretum Gratiani*, John Friedrich von Schulte, ed., (Giessen, 1890), 107. For a survey of the view of the theologians, cf. Doronzo, *De Ordine* 2, 121-184.

<sup>55</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 93. c. 24, Admont Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 119r.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

Unfortunately, there is no further development of this answer. The answer which is given, however, seems to be based upon a principle of basic ecclesiological importance, namely: what occurred during apostolic times is normative for subsequent ecclesiastical developments. While some authors traced the reason for the change to custom or ecclesiastical institution, Huguccio wished to be more precise. Even admitting an original equality in all things between priests and bishops, this equality was changed during apostolic times. For Huguccio it is the time of the change which is important if one adopts the hypothesis that there was a change.

His own opinion, however, is emphatic: “Ego autem credo quod ab initio differentia fuit inter episcopos et simplices presbyteros, sicut et modo est, et in administratione, et in prelatione, et in officio, et in sacramentis.”<sup>57</sup> In this carefully worded conclusion, Huguccio returns to the point from which he had begun. He speaks of the difference between bishops and *simple* priests, i.e. those who are only priests. He admits an original identity in name, for the terms “bishop” and “priest” were used indiscriminately of both bishops and simple priests. But even here, Huguccio admits this original nominal identity only during the earliest times and maintains that it was ended during the apostolic era.

Tempore apostolorum fuit hec communitas nominum, set parum duravit, sc. usque ad Marcum, sc. quem Petrus in Alexandria episcopum constituit, qui Clementis fuit contemporaneus, et ita tempore apostolorum et hoc et illud obtinuit. Sed primum communitas nominum, usque ad tempus Marci, deinde diversitas.<sup>58</sup>

The contribution of Huguccio to the conclusion that the episcopacy is an *ordo* which enables its recipient to perform certain functions in the Church is not to be denied. He elaborates his conclusion thus:

quid enim excepta ordinatione — immo et multa alia sunt que facit episcopus et non presbyter, sc. virginum, altarium, ecclesiarum consecratio, crismatis confectio, puerorum in fronte consignatio, et similia... Ad hoc

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* The opinion of Huguccio is quoted by Alanus Anglicus in the *Apparatus* “Ius naturale.” Alanus admits a change in name: the name “bishop” was no longer used by (simple) priests; in jurisdiction: priests no longer had the same jurisdiction as bishops; in the administration of things: this was no longer held in common by bishops and priests; and in the dispensation of the sacraments. Of this last item, Alanus writes: “In sacramentorum nichil dispensatione est immutatum, quum semper quedam sacramenta tribuebant que presbyteri non conferebant... Quidam etiam dicunt quod in omnibus pares fuerunt episcopi et presbyteri. Error iste sequitur ex illo quod episcopatus non est ordo sed tantum dignitas vel prelatio.” (d.93.c.24, Paris BN Ms Lat. 3909, f. 13v). Thus, Alanus rejects the opinion that the episcopacy is a “dignitas” and not an “ordo” as an error and the source of errors concerning the bishop’s power in the administration of the sacraments.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

dicunt quidam quod nomine ordinationis intelliguntur omnia ea que solis episcopis licita sunt; alii dicunt quod insufficienter exceptit. Ego autem dico quod sufficienter et caute exceptit. Non enim nomine ordinationis intelligitur ordinatio clericorum, sed potius ordo episcopalis: per que intelliguntur omnia ea que ex illo ordine proveniunt, etc.; excepta ordine episcopali, i.e. ordine episcopalii, i.e. exceptis eis que competit episcopo ratione ordinis episcopalii, nec altera.<sup>59</sup>

Other authors before him, for example Stephen of Tournai,<sup>60</sup> had attempted to list the functions which bishops alone could perform. In answering Jerome's question: "Quid facit excepta ordinatione episcopus quod non facit presbyter?",<sup>61</sup> one could understand "ordinatio" as including all the functions reserved to the bishop. Ordaining to the priesthood, as the most excellent of the bishop's sacramental functions, would stand for all the others. Huguccio, however, chose to interpret "ordinatio" of the bishop's own *ordo*. The superiority of the bishop over the simple priest was understood by Huguccio to lie especially in those functions reserved to the episcopal *ordo*.

There is evident in the work of Huguccio a considerable progress beyond the authors who had preceded him. While Isidore and Gratian had used the terms "officium" and "ordo" only in a general sense of some rank among ecclesiastical personnel, the terms acquired a much more precise signification. The term "ordo" had with Huguccio a meaning much closer to that given to it by the theologians who attempted to attach specific functions to each of the ecclesiastical *ordines*.<sup>62</sup>

The *glossa ordinaria* to the *Decretum* included a list of these three opinions given by the canonists concerning the change recounted by Jerome. The opinion which is supported is that of Sicardus and the *Summa "Imperatorie maiestati"*; the reason for the selection of this opinion is that it seems closest to the statement of Jerome.<sup>63</sup> Thus, there was no clear consensus among the Decretists concerning the institution of the episcopacy.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Stephen, *Summa*, d. 93. c. 24, Schulte, p. 115. "Immo si bene attendisset Hieronymus, multa sunt quae episcopus et non aliis presbyter facere potest: ordinatio clericorum, consecratio virginum, dedicatio ecclesiarum, confectio crismatis, confirmatoria manus impositio, quae tamen omnia large ordinationis nomine continentur."

<sup>61</sup> *Decretum*, d. 93. c. 24; Jerome, Epist. 146, CSEL 56, 308.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Doronzo, *De Ordine* 2, 121-184, *passim*. For the significance of Huguccio (whose influence "on the later canonical commentators can hardly be overestimated"), cf. Nicholas M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions of *Sacramentum* and their Influence on Mediaeval Sacramentology," *Mediaeval Studies* 10 (1948), 135.

<sup>63</sup> *Decretum, glossa ordinaria*, d. 93, c. 24, s.v. postea: "In schismatis ergo remedium, ut hic dicitur, facta est prelatio, et unus precesset et quoad nomen et quoad administrationem et quoad quedam sacramenta, que modo appropriantur episcopis."

## 2. The Minister of the Sacraments

Further insight into the canonists' understanding of the episcopacy can be found in their analysis of the bishop's power to confer the sacraments. The question which initiated discussion in this area was that of the minister of Confirmation. The Decretists had to reconcile the conflicting *auctoritates* which Gratian had cited.

In discussing the privileges of priests, Gratian quoted a letter of Pope Gregory the Great in which the pope allowed for Confirmation by priests.

Pervenit quoque ad nos, quosdam scandalizatos fuisse, quod presbiteris crismate tangere eos, qui baptizati sunt, prohibuimus. Et nos quidem secundum veterem usum nostre ecclesie fecimus. Sed si omnino hac de re aliqui contristantur, ubi episcopi desunt, ut presbiteri etiam in frontibus baptizatos crismate tangere debeant, concedimus<sup>64</sup>.

Later, when he came to treat expressly of the sacraments in the final section of the *Decretum* (the *De consecratione*), Gratian cited authorities which limited Confirmation to bishops. In writing of Baptism Gratian quoted letters of Pope Innocent I and Pope Gregory the Great in which they taught that bishops should anoint the foreheads of the baptized with oil; priests could baptize and within Baptism anoint the breast with oil previously consecrated by the bishop.<sup>65</sup>

The treatment of Confirmation is the first subject in the fifth *distinctio* of the *De consecratione*. The first text is ascribed to Pope Urban, who wrote of the reception of the Holy Spirit "per manus impositiones episcoporum."<sup>66</sup> The following text, ascribed to Pope Melchiades, clearly restricts Confirmation "maioribus, id est summis pontificibus;... a minoribus perfici non potest."<sup>67</sup> The most explicit text, however, is that ascribed to Pope Eusebius, and it is this passage which occasioned the analysis of the commentators.

Manus quoque impositionis sacramentum magna veneratione tenendum est, quod ab aliis perfici non potest nisi a summis sacerdotibus, nec tempore apostolorum ab aliis quam ab ipsis apostolis legitur aut scitur peractum esse; nec ab aliis quam qui eorum tenent locum unquam perfici potest aut fieri debet. Nam si aliter presumptum fuerit, irritum habeatur et vacuum nec inter ecclesiastica umquam reputabitur sacramenta.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>64</sup> *Decretum*, d. 95, c. 1. This is a letter of Gregory I; cf. Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII*, eds. S. Loewenfeld, F. Kaltenbrunner, P. Ewald (Leipzig, 1885-1888), 1298.

<sup>65</sup> *Decretum*, De con. d. 4. c. 119, Innocent I, Epist. 1, c. 3, Jaffé 311; De con. d. 4. c. 120, Ex registro Gregorii, Jaffé 1079.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, De con. d. 5. c. 1, Urban I, Jaffé 87, Hinschius, *op. cit.*, 146.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, De con. d. 5. c. 3, Melchiades, Jaffé 171, Hinschius, *op. cit.*, 245.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, De con. d. 5. c. 4, Eusebius, Jaffé 165, Hinschius, *op. cit.*, 242.

The conflict between the first text, in which Gregory permitted priests to confirm, and these other texts is apparent. The authors introduced a variety of distinctions to bridge the gap between the conflicting *auctoritates*.

Stephen of Tournai in his *Summa* offered two possible solutions: "Ibi speciale fuit quando pro scandalo ecclesie sedando Gregorius id ad tempus concessit; vel dicimus quod in primitiva ecclesia minores sacerdotes cris-mabant, quod postea abolitum est."<sup>69</sup> Stephen did not raise the question of theoretical foundations for the historical hypotheses he suggests. He didn't ask whether the administration of the sacraments was a function which could belong to different types of ministers.

Simon of Bisignano was more cautious in discussing history, although he also presumes (obviously on the basis of Gregory's own remarks) that at some time in the early church Confirmation was administered by simple priests.

Si autem queratur an eis hoc concedere potuerit, dici potest eum concedere potuisse. Hoc enim in primitiva ecclesia poterant episcopi facere, qui nichil pre ceteris sacerdotibus unctionis habebant. Eadem ratione, forte, posset concedi quod eis ipsum chrisma confidere concedere potuisset; quod, tamen, quibusdam displicet, quia ab ipsis apostolis institutum legitur ut non nisi ab episcopis posset confici crisma... contra quorum instituta summo pontifici venire non licet.<sup>70</sup>

There is here again an indication that apostolic institution was considered by some to be normative: the Church could not later change what the Apostles had determined.

Sicardus of Cremona raised the fundamental issue of the form of the sacrament and how it was instituted. For him, these were the determining factors.

Set queritur utrum sit de substantia sacramenti quod hoc sacramentum a solis episcopis celebretur? Si enim est de substantia, quomodo concessit Gregorius simplicibus sacerdotibus? Nam sacramenta extra formam celebrata, irrita sunt. Si de sollempnitate, ergo si hodie fieret a simplici sacerdote, rata esset. Responsio: quod est forma alia a Domino instituta, alia ab homine. A Domino instituta non potest mutari ab homine, ut in baptismo et eucaristia; ab homine instituta licite mutari potest ex causa, ut in confirmatione et matrimonio. Unde non liceat sacerdotibus habere uxores nec liceat usque ad septimum gradum contrahere matrimonium. Fuit igitur tunc et nunc de forma sacramenti vel de substantia: vel, ut quibusdam placet, tunc de sollempnitate, nunc de forma.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Stephen, *Summa*, d. 21, c. 1, s.v. nec chrismate, Schulte, 30-31.

<sup>70</sup> Simon, *Summa*, d. 95. c. 1, Augsburg, Kreis- und Stadtbibl. I, f. 11

<sup>71</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, d.95. c. 1, Vat. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 75<sup>ra</sup>.

Sicardus offered as a foundation for the concession which Gregory had made to priests that they might confirm: Confirmation is a sacrament whose form (or substance) was instituted by the Church, rather than by Christ Himself. Therefore, the Church retains power over the form of Confirmation. Thus, even if one maintained that the minister were part of the form of the sacrament, it remained possible to explain how there could be different types of ministers. Sicardus seemed to believe that the institution by the Church was a historical fact:

De confirmatione videamus quando fuit instituta; queritur qua forma quave reverentia debeat celebrari. Instituta fuit tempore apostolorum ab ipsis apostolis per quorum manus impositionem paraclitus conferebatur... Forma consistit in personis, verbis et rebus. In personis quia sicut a solis apostolis legitur confirmatum, sic a solis eorum successoribus, sc. episcopis, dicimus confirmandum... Queritur autem utrum forma hec in personis sit de substantia sacramenti. Videtur quod si hodie simplex sacerdos confirmaret, iterum ab episcopo confirmaretur. Contra, quia Gregorius olim sacerdotibus confirmare permisit... Responso: forte quod olim fuit de sollempnitate, nunc est de substantia.<sup>72</sup>

Thus, the authority of the Church reached beyond the solemnities with which the celebration of the sacraments was surrounded. The Church could determine the substance itself, that is, the minister, the words and the actions (rite).

The author of the *Summa* “Omnis qui iuste” approached the question of Confirmation by priests from the form of the sacrament of orders rather than from the form of Confirmation. He phrased the question most precisely:

Sed ut presbyter possit confirmare aut fuit de substantia sacramenti aut non. Si de substantia sacramenti fuit, ergo olim omnes sacerdotes id recipiebant in ordinatione sua et nunc non recipiunt. Ergo mutata est substantia sacramenti, quod videtur inconveniens: quod aliquid fuit de substantia sacramenti et non sit. Si non fuit de substantia sacramenti, qualiter potuit eis concedere Gregorius? Pari censura, videtur quod possit concedere subdiacono ut legeret evangelium et diacono ut missam cantaret.<sup>73</sup>

Two solutions are proposed to this dilemma: one could say that the substance of the sacrament is not changed, but restricted (as the laws concerning consanguinity have restricted the power to marry), or one could admit, as Sicardus had, that the substance had changed.

The author then moves on to a discussion of the power to confirm:

Sed difficilier opponitur si concedis quod depositus consecret; sicut enim dicas quod ordinatus numquam characterem amittit, sic et aptitudinem conse-

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, De con. d. 5, *in prin.*, f. 111<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>73</sup> *Summa* “Omnis qui iuste,” d. 95. c. 1, Rouen, Lat. 743 (E. 74), f. 43<sup>ra</sup>.

crandi retinet... Ideoque si consecraverit de facto, erit de iure consecratum. Sic videtur dicendum quod si sacerdos hodie confirmet, quod sit confirmatus et post eum non confirmabitur.<sup>74</sup>

He replies with a distinction of various types of priestly power:

Presbyter enim non habet hanc potestatem [sc. confirmandi] in aptitudinem, sicut de priori diximus. Set tamen diversa sunt hec. Prima [prius] enim ordini inheret, sc. potestas consecrandi, que numquam amittitur, quia numquam ordo potest amitti. Secunda vero ordini non adheret, sc. confirmare; immo semel propter scandalum erat concessum.<sup>75</sup>

There is here an extremely close association of "ordo," "character," and "potestas consecrandi." Once one is ordained, he never thereafter loses his character or his order or his power to consecrate the Eucharist. Now the power to confirm is not such a power which inheres so closely to one's *ordo*. Note here the methodology of the canonist: he argues from fact to reason for the fact and not from theory to practice. Because priests could at one time confirm and now cannot, it is obvious that the power to confirm is not indissolubly linked with their priesthood.

Finally, the author approaches the question of Confirmation by a bishop who has been deposed; to this question, he proposes two opinions:

Sed quid dicis de episcopo deposito tantum, si confirmet de facto puerum, dicetur confirmatus; et dicunt quidam quod sic; alii dicunt quod ex dignitate provenit confirmare potius quam ex ordine — unde amissa dignitate, et potestas confirmandi amittitur.<sup>76</sup>

There were some authors, then, who were attempting to explain the power to confer a sacrament in terms of the minister's office rather than in terms of any special power of order he had from his ordination (or consecration).

For Huguccio the delegation of the power to confirm presented a particular difficulty. He had most emphatically maintained that the bishop had special prerogatives in the celebration of the sacraments; he had also insisted that this had been the situation from the beginning. In explaining the concession made by Pope Gregory, Huguccio first points to the historical situation. Because the permission was granted in order to avoid scandal, it is obvious that priests are not allowed to confirm by the com-

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* The *Summa "Imperatorie maiestati"* has a somewhat similar distinction. The *Summa "Omnis qui iuste"* distinguishes "potestas que ordini inheret" from "potestas que non adheret," while the *Summa "Imperatorie maiestati"* contains a distinction between "potestas mera" (which pertains to binding and loosing) and "potestas mixta ordini" (which pertains to consecrating the Eucharist and ordaining). *Summa "Imperatorie maiestati,"* C.1.q.1, Munich, Staatsbibl. 16084, f. 34v.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

mon law of the Church. Only special papal permission can allow to priests the conferring of Confirmation. He draws a parallel with matrimony, which can be contracted in the third degree of consanguinity with the permission of the pope.<sup>77</sup> Huguccio then goes on to consider a number of problems in the same area and in proposing solutions to them he elaborates his theory of the Church's power over the sacraments. At the same time he indicates his idea of the priestly and episcopal *ordo*.

Set numquid papa posset hodie hoc idem (sc. confirmare) permettere ? sic. Numquid alias episcopus ? credo quod non, quia hec dispensatio soli papae convenit. Set numquid papa posset similiter presbyteris permettere ut conficeret crisma ? credo quod sic, licet ab apostolis fuerit institutum ut a solis episcopis conficeretur... In multis enim statutis apostolorum licita est dispensatio. Item posset similiter papa concedere simplicibus presbyteris ut conferrent ordines omnes ? credo quod sic, preter episcopalem. Nam ordinem quem non habet, nullus potest conferre: set quem habet, potest. Cum ergo presbyter non habet ordinem episcopalem, qualiter posset eum conferre ? qualiter ergo posset ordinare episcopum, nisi velis dicere quod ultra sacerdotium non sit ordo. Similiter credo quod posset diacono concedere quod conferret diaconatum et minores ordines, et sic de aliis. Quid de consecratione ecclesiarum vel virginum ? dico quod ex permissione papae simplex presbyter potest consecrare eas. Set numquid posset papa idem concedere diacono vel alii inferiori clero vel etiam laico ? credo quod sic, si talis consecratio potest fieri sine Missa, aliter non.<sup>78</sup>

In explaining the concession made by Gregory, Huguccio goes far beyond the case at hand and extends the principle operative in Confirmation to many other cases. It is worthy of note that Huguccio grants broad powers of dispensation with respect to the administration of the sacraments, but he grants such far-reaching power only to the pope. The pope, then, can permit those who are not bishops to perform functions usually proper to a bishop. He has this power even in areas which have been determined by apostolic institution.

The position which Huguccio takes with respect to ordination is consistent with his explanation of the episcopal *ordo*. He adopts as a general rule that the pope can permit any cleric to confer the *ordo* which he himself possesses. Thus, since a priest has not the episcopal *ordo*, he cannot confer it on another. In line with Huguccio's principle, though, a priest could be permitted by the pope to ordain another to the priestly *ordo*. Ordination to the priesthood by someone who did not possess the episcopacy was only a hypothetical question for Huguccio; only later would it become one of the major problems in the understanding of the episcopacy.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 95. c. 1, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 120<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 120<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Doronzo, *De Ordine*, 2, 115-117; Marie-Joseph Gerlaud, "Le ministre extraordinaire du

The only limitation which Huguccio placed upon the papal power to give permissions regarding the administration of the sacraments was with respect to the Eucharist. Like the author of the *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste" he understood the celebration of the Eucharist to be indissolubly linked to the priesthood.

Item posset papa concedere diacono vel subdiacono vel etiam laico ut conficeret eucharistiam? non, quia hic exigitur ordo sacerdotalis... Tantum enim sacerdotibus hoc concessit Dominus cum dixit apostolis: Hoc facite in meam commemorationem [Lk. 22:19]. Set ab ecclesia prohibitum est presbyteris ne crismant, et si de facto crismarent, nichil facerent, et hoc propter prohibitionem ecclesie. Set pone <quod> ecclesia prohibet isti cantare missam, confidere corpus Domini; si de facto conficeret et cantaret, nonne conficeret et cantaret? utique. Que est ergo ratio diversitatis? responsio: ecclesia non tantum illud prohiberet, set etiam statuit ut si aliter presumeretur, nichil ageretur; set hoc simpliciter prohibuit. Set numquid potest hoc sic prohibere sicut illud, sc. ut si aliter fiat, nichil agatur? credo quod non, quia ex institutione Domini forma verborum quibus confidetur corpus fuit instituta et ei talis efficacia attributa et ordini sacerdotali deputata. Et ideo ex quo illa verba proferuntur a presbytero ut debent, propter prohibitionem humanam non debent carere effectum. Item in forma baptismi. Set in aliis que ab homine statuta sunt, non ita contingit — immo prohibitio ecclesie plus in eis operatur. Item de sola permissione ecclesie presbyter crismat; set conficit potius ordinis ratione; et ideo plus ibi operatur prohibitio ecclesie quam hic. Item confidere plus est facti quam iuris in presbytero; crismare vero plus iuris quam facti. Nam in confiendo corpore potius exigitur ordo quam aliud; set in conferendo illo sacramento potius dignitas et reverentia persone. Nam propter excellentiam sacramenti et dignitatem persone attributum est solis episcopis.<sup>80</sup>

In this series of questions the priest's power to consecrate the Eucharist is compared to his power to confirm. Via this comparison Huguccio is able to reiterate a principle which had become generally accepted: what had been established by Christ concerning the sacraments could not be changed. It was Christ who had instituted the form of the Eucharist (the words of consecration), had given efficacy to them, and had attached them to the priestly *ordo*. Hence the question of power to consecrate the Eucharist is one of fact, not of law: has a person the priestly *ordo*? If he has, he can consecrate; if he has not, no one can give him permission to consecrate. Confirmation, however, is a different type of sacrament from the Eucharist insofar as Confirmation was instituted by the Apostles. Because of this origin, the pope has powers over the conferring of Confirmation which he

sacrement de l'ordre," *Revue Thomiste*, 36 (1931), 874-885; John de Reeper, "The Relation of the Priesthood to the Episcopate," *The Jurist*, 16 (1956), 345-358; Yves Congar, "Faits, problèmes et réflexions à propos du pouvoir de l'ordre et des rapports entre le presbyterat et l'épiscopat", *la Maison-Dieu*, 14 (1948), 107-128.

<sup>80</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 95, c. 1, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 120v.

does not have with respect to the Eucharist or to Baptism. Note that Huguccio does not explicitly state here that the bishop's power to confirm flows from his episcopal *ordo*, even though such a conclusion would follow from what he had written previously about the episcopacy.

A more cautious approach was taken a quarter century after Huguccio by Alanus Anglicus, also of the Bologna school. In his *Apparatus 'Ius naturale'*, written just before the Fourth Lateran Council,<sup>81</sup> Alanus inquired about the concession of the power to confirm to those who were not priests:

Set obicitur: sicut ergo papa hoc potuit concedere presbytero, ita et diacono, item etiam laico — quod absurdum est. Forte in primitiva ecclesia presbyteri crismabant... et hoc tunc ad illum ordinem pertinebat, set per constitutionem ecclesie desiit pertinere; et si numquam pertinuisse, potuit papa hoc facere, ut hinc colligitur. Set non concedo quod diacono... quia hoc factum non reperio. Numquid similiter posset papa presbyteris concedere ordinare clericos, consecrare altaria, vel diacono vel laico corpus Christi confidere? In hiis veritatem ignoramus, nec ex humano sensu coniectando procedimus, quia de sacramentis agitur. Quia ergo nullum predecessorum in iure reperio, nullum eorum concedo. Si autem ficeret, ex spiritu sancto eum facere dicerem et opinionem mutarem. Hoc tamen rationabile videtur, quod omnium ordinum officia possint ampliare et restringere constitutione ecclesiastica, que officia distinguit, in quantum tamen non diffinio set arbitrio boni viri relinquo.<sup>82</sup>

Thus, Alanus would admit the reasonableness of Huguccio's theory about the Church's power to extend or restrict the powers attached to any office. He would demand caution, however, since it was a question of the sacraments. Caution is required where there is no ecclesiastical precedent to guide an author in forming an opinion. In the absence of any known precedent, Alanus chooses to withhold judgment.

### 3. The Subject of Episcopal Consecration

The final question around which the Decretists built their theory of the episcopacy was the subject of episcopal consecration. Gratian had included in the *Decretum* many qualifications to be sought in one who would be consecrated a bishop.<sup>83</sup> The qualification which was of particular importance for an understanding of the episcopacy was that the one to be consecrated should have received the lower *ordines*.

<sup>81</sup> Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 430; Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 67-74.

<sup>82</sup> Alanus Anglicus, *Apparatus Ius naturale*, d. 95, c. 1, Paris Mazarine Ms 1318, f. 95<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>83</sup> *Decretum*, beginning with the dictum ante c. 4, d. 25: "Qualem oporteat eum esse qui in episcopum est ordinandus, diligenter investigemus," the section on qualifications for the bishop takes up most of the first part of the work.

One reason for this requirement was disciplinary: “Qui ecclesiasticis disciplinis imbuti et temporum approbatione discussi non sunt, ad sumnum sacerdotium non aspirent.”<sup>84</sup> A second reason was the connection which the canonists posited between the *ordines*. Gratian had introduced this idea in a disciplinary context: if, through negligence and not through pride, a person should have received a higher order before one of the lower orders, he should not exercise the higher order until he had received the order (or orders) he had missed.<sup>85</sup>

The Decretists took this opportunity to discuss whether one could receive a higher *ordo* if he had not received the lower *ordines*. Several authors inquired whether the prescribed sequence of *ordines* was part of the *substantia* of the sacrament of Order; they found a negative answer in the example of the apostles.

Per hoc potest haberi quod non est de substantia ordinis quod quis debeat ordines prius accipere. Nam apostoli nullum ordinem acceperant cum fuerant episcopi facti.<sup>86</sup>

Ex hoc nota quod ordinis prepostero vel turbatio est in iure prohibita; ...non tamen quod fit, ordine prepostero vel turbato, irritatur... Qui ante diaconatum accepit sacerdotium in veritate est sacerdos; idem dico si exorcista sacerdos fiat. Nam hec non esse de substantia ordinis patet ex eo quod in primitiva ecclesia apostolos legimus sacerdotalem et episcopalem dignitatem ante alios ordines accepisse.<sup>87</sup>

Simon of Bisignano was the first to distinguish clearly the disciplinary effects of this law (one should not exercise the higher order until he had received all the lower orders) from the sacramental effect (the actual reception of the higher order in the absence of the lower):

Hic habes quod ordinis prepostero quod factum est non immutat... Item hic videtur posse colligi quod qui accipit sacerdotium, diaconatu vel subdiaconatu preposito, in veritate sacerdos est; non quoad ordinis suceptionem referre credimus si scienter vel ignoranter hoc fiat, set quoad hoc ut promotus possit vel non valeat ministrare.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup> *Decretum*, dictum ante c. 1, d. 59.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, dictum ante c. un., d. 52; this text is taken from a letter of Alexander II, Jaffé 3441. Rufinus had already pointed to the disciplinary import of this letter: “Dictum supra fuerat... quod non possunt esse sacerdotes qui per ecclesiasticos gradus non ascenderunt... Ne autem istud indistincte verum esse putaretur, determinat in presenti distinctione illud locum tunc habere, quando ex industria gradus aliquis horum preterponitur.” *Summa*, d. 52, c. un., Singer, 135-136.

<sup>86</sup> Simon, *Summa*, d. 66, Augsburg, Kreis- und Stadtbibl. I, f. 8.

<sup>87</sup> *Summa* “Et est sciendum,” d. 52, Stuttgart, Landesbibl. hist., fol. 419, f. 44vb. This *Summa*, by a French author between 1181 and 1185, is described by Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 195-196; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 438.

<sup>88</sup> Simon, *Summa*, d. 52. c. un., Augsburg, Kreis- und Stadtbibl. I, f. 6.

Sicardus of Cremona brought the attention of commentators directly to the episcopacy: could one who wasn't a priest be consecrated bishop? He replied in the negative: "Respondent quidam, non, quia sacerdotalis ordo et episcopalis dignitas coniuncta sunt — unde aliis postpositis excepto sacerdotio episcopus esset."<sup>89</sup>

The author of the *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste" likewise admitted sacerdotal ordination, even in the absence of one or all of the lesser orders, and denied episcopal consecration in the absence of the priesthood. He based his reasoning on the fact that the apostles had not received any minor orders; thus, the step-wise progression from one order to the next could not be of the form or substance of the sacrament of Order.<sup>90</sup> His argument is of special importance for an understanding of his concept of the episcopacy:

Quid si prius factus esset episcopus quam sacerdos, essetne episcopus?  
Item quid si prius factus esset sacerdos quam baptizatus? Dici potest quod non est episcopus in primo casu, quia ordo sacerdotalis fundamentum est episcopalis consecrationis; sic et in secundo, baptismus fundamentum ordinis cuiuslibet.<sup>91</sup>

For this author, then, there is not the same relationship between all of the *ordines*. The priestly *ordo* can be received by anyone who is baptized, whether or not any of the minor orders has been received; episcopal consecration can be conferred only upon a priest. There does not appear in these authors the theory which would subsequently become common, namely, that the higher order contains the lower; in this theory, one would actually receive the lower order (which had been omitted) in the reception of a higher order.

The conclusion of the *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste" was also reached by Huguccio, whose reasoning, however, proceeded along different lines:

Per hoc videtur quod esset sacerdos et quod pretermissio inferiori possit quis suscipere superiorem ordinem, quod verum est... Set numquid pretermissis omnibus inferioribus ordinibus potest quis recipere sacrum ordinem? non, set quecumque de illis habet, potest; ad hoc enim ut aliquis accipiat aliquem de sacris ordinibus oporteat eum prius esse clericum aut aliquo de minoribus ordinibus ordinatum; in aliquo dico qualicumque. Unde laicus, si de facto ordinetur subdiaconus vel diaconus vel sacerdos, nullum ordinem accipit... Item, potest quis recipere ordinem episcopalem pretermissio sacerdotio? non

<sup>89</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, d. 52. c. un., Rouen, MS Lat. 710, f. 10<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> *Summa* "Omnis qui iuste," d. 52. c. un., Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 986, f. 51<sup>v</sup>b.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.* This conclusion was repeated by Raymond of Pennafort: "Ordo sacerdotalis est quasi fundamentum substantiale ordinis episcopalium," *Summa*, (Verona, 1744), Lib. III, tit. 22, p. 297. Raymond's *Summa* appeared before his compilation of the decretals for Gregory IX; cf. R. Naz, "Raymond de Pennafort," *Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique*, cols. 461-464.

credo. Nisi enim quis sit sacerdos, missam cantare non potest... Ergo, non est episcopus, cum ille ordo officium et potestatem cantandi missam habet sibi annexam. Ex premissis ergo tria in summa notabis: pretermisso baptismo, nullus ordo potest recipi; pretermissis omnibus minoribus ordinibus, sacer ordo non confertur; pretermisso sacerdotio, episcopalis ordo non datur.<sup>92</sup>

Huguccio demanded Baptism before the reception of any *ordo* and the priesthood before the reception of the episcopacy. In addition he demands the reception of some minor order before a major order (subdiaconate, diaconate, priesthood). His reasoning is based upon a text of Isidore of Seville quoted by Gratian:

Sicut viri et mulieris digna coniunctio unum facit matrimonium, et sicut duorum copulatio unum perficit corpus, ita clericatus et sacerdotium unum faciunt presbiterum, et electio et consecratio unum faciunt episcopum.<sup>93</sup>

Huguccio took this comparison strictly: just as it takes two people for a marriage, so the priest depends upon the priesthood and the clerical state; he admitted, however, that other authors refused to see in this example of Isidore a comparison binding in every respect.<sup>94</sup>

The author of the *Summa* “Et est sciendum” also wrote that only a cleric could be ordained a priest; he based his opinion upon the Church, which had so determined the priesthood.<sup>95</sup> He went on to find in the episcopacy the four elements mentioned by Isidore: “clericatus, sacerdotium, electio et consecratio”;<sup>96</sup> all four are necessary since the bishop must be a priest. This raised the question: what precisely is conferred in episcopal consecration?

Huguccio replied with a distinction which gives evidence of the growing awareness of the difference between jurisdiction and order:

Si interveniat sola consecratio, erit episcopus set nullius loci; si sola electio, esset prelatus illius loci set non episcopus, nisi primo esset consecratus... Electio ergo dat prelationem loci, consecratio ordinem episcopalem.<sup>97</sup>

Rufinus had formulated a similar distinction in terms of “amministratio” and “auctoritas”: a man elected to a bishopric received fully the “dignitas

<sup>92</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 52. c. un., Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 76<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>93</sup> *Decretum*, d. 40, c. 8; Isidore of Seville is listed as the author, but Friedberg in his note to this text remarks: “fragmentum omnino incertum.”

<sup>94</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 40. c. 8, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 57<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>95</sup> *Summa* “Et est sciendum,” d. 21, c. 2, Stuttgart, Landesbibl. hist. fol. 419, f. 36<sup>va</sup>: “...non posse sacerdotium accipere qui non est clericus, cum etiam sic ecclesia instituit.” The author reveals the hypothetical context of his remarks, however, as he continues: “Set numquid omnino ydiota sacerdotium acciperet, vel puer septennis?... Potius enim est in talibus pie et humiliter dubitare quam precipitare sententiam.”

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, d. 40. c. 8, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 57<sup>v</sup>.

amministrandi" at his election; however only at his consecration did he receive "auctoritas" or "plena potestas."<sup>98</sup> The different effects of episcopal election, confirmation of the election, and consecration would be elaborated in detail by the Decretalists in the thirteenth century.

The discussion of ordination and consecration in terms of the prescribed sequence of orders was but one aspect of this question. Another and more difficult problem arose concerning simoniacal ordinations, a major concern of the canonists ever since the time of the Gregorian reform. Because the crime of simony was subject to various penalties, the authors went on to discuss the effects of suspension, deposition and degradation on priestly powers.

Gratian himself proposed as a solution to the problem of priestly power exercised outside the unity of the Church a distinction between a power and its use:

Intelligamus aliud esse potestatem distribuendi sacros ordines, aliud esse executionem illius potestatis. Qui intra unitatem catholice ecclesie constituti sacerdotalem vel episcopalem unctionem accipiunt, officium et executionem sui officii ex consecratione adipiscuntur. Recedentes vero ab integritate fidei, potestatem acceptam sacramento tenus retinent, effectu sue potestatis penitus privantur.<sup>99</sup>

This distinction was the basis upon which subsequent authors founded their more detailed explanations of the related problems of ecclesiastical penalties. Gratian had affirmed that one who left the unity of the Church or the integrity of the faith retained the power conferred upon him by the sacrament of Orders; such persons lost the effect of their powers, i.e. their exercise. There remained the question of those who, remaining within the Church, were penalized by suspension, deposition or degradation. What was the effect of these penalties upon their sacramentally-received powers?

Rufinus developed Gratian's two-fold distinction of power and its exercise with a three-fold distinction of power:

<sup>98</sup> Rufinus, *Summa*, d. 60, *in prin.*, Singer, p. 152: "Ecclesiastica dignitas alia est amministracionis, alia auctoritatis; ...dignitas auctoritatis est episcopi. Dignitas vero amministrandi in ipsa electione plene traditur... Cum autem quis in episcopum eligitur, non continuo plenam potestatem adipiscitur, sed usque in consecrationem differtur." Cf. also, *ibid.*, d. 23, c. 1, Singer, p. 52.

<sup>99</sup> *Decretum*, dictum ante c. 98, C. 1. q. 1. The subject of simoniacal ordinations was treated in the lengthy (130 capitula) first question of *Causa I*. For the medieval controversy on this subject, cf. Louis Saltet, *Les réordinations*; (Paris, 1907); A. Michel, "Ordre," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Tome 11, cols. 1275-1315; John Gilchrist, "'Simoniaca haeresis' and the Problem of Orders from Leo IX to Gratian," *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law* (Vatican City, 1965), 209-235; A. Schebler, *Die Reordinationen* (Bonn, 1936); E. Amann, "Réordinations," *DTC*, Tome 13, cols. 2385-2431.

In officio sacerdotali duo sunt: usus et potestas. Iterum potestas triplex est: aptitudinis, habilitatis, et regularitatis; vel potestas alia sacramentalis, secunda dignitatis, tertia regularitatis. Potestas aptitudinis est qua sacerdos ex sacramento ordinis quod accepit habet aptitudinem cantandi missam. Potestas habilitatis est qua ex dignitate officii quam adhuc habet habilis est ad cantandam missam. Potestas regularitatis est qua ex vite merito, ex integritate persone, ex sufficienti eruditione, dignus est missam cantare. Sacerdos itaque aliquando in crimen labitur, sed tamen ab officio non suspenditur; aliquando labitur et suspenditur; aliquando labitur et non tantum suspenditur sed etiam deponitur. Quando labitur et non suspenditur, non quidem usum officii amittit sed sola illa tertia potestas abiudicatur ei: non enim potest cantare missam ex merito vite. Cum vero labitur et suspenditur, usum quidem officii perdit, sed habilitatis potestatem non amittit: de levi, sc. simplici iussione episcopi, usum officii recuperare potest, qui non perdit dignitatem. Si vero labitur et suspenditur et deponitur, usum utique officii cum potestate habilitatis et regularitatis amittit, sed potestate aptitudinis eatenus nunquam carere potest, quatenus illud sacramentum ei, dum vixit, deesse non potest.<sup>100</sup>

Note that in this place Rufinus is speaking of the priestly office; the distinctions which he makes, however, are important for an understanding of the episcopacy. Although Rufinus himself had written that the episcopacy is a *dignitas* and not an *ordo*,<sup>101</sup> later authors, and especially Huguccio, had taught that the episcopacy is an *ordo*.<sup>102</sup> For these authors the distinctions applicable to the powers the simple priest received at ordination would be applicable also to the powers the bishop received at his consecration. Also, an understanding of the precise effects of ecclesiastical penalties showed what power a bishop retained over the powers he conferred upon priests at their ordination.

Rufinus spoke of the “potestas aptitudinis” as identified with the sacrament of Order; this power was the aptitude to offer the Eucharist.<sup>103</sup> He spoke of the “potestas regularitatis” as worthiness of life; one who had gravely offended God was not worthy to act as His minister. The distinction between “usus potestatis” and “potestas habilitatis” is more difficult to understand. The difference pointed out by Rufinus is that after its loss, the former may be restored by a simple injunction of the

<sup>100</sup> Rufinus, *Summa*, C. 1. 1. c. 30, Singer pp. 210-211; these same distinctions are to be found in the *Summa* “Conditio ecclesiastice,” Vat. Pal. Lat. 678, f. 6<sup>v</sup>; Joannes Faventinus, *Summa*, C.1.q.1.c.17, Reims MS 684, f. 44<sup>ra</sup>; *Summa* “Omnis qui iuste,” C. 1. q. 1. c. 30, Rouen MS 743, f. 47<sup>ra</sup>; *Summa* “Imperatorie maiestati,” C. 1. q. 1, Munich, Staatsbibl. 16084, f. 14<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> Above, p. 74.

<sup>102</sup> Above, p. 82.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. *glossa ordinaria*, C. 1. q. 1. dict. ante c. 98, s. v. potestas: “potestas sacrificandi, i.e. ordo sacerdotalis, in eo remanet.” Cf. for the relationship of priestly power to the Eucharist, above, p. 86, in the *Summa* “Omnis qui iuste,” and p. 88, in Huguccio.

bishop, whereas the restoration of the latter required something more.<sup>104</sup>

Sicardus attempted to elucidate the differences between these various powers by the use of a comparison:

Nota quam differentiam assignamus inter habilitatem, consecutionem [usum] et aptitudinem. Habilitatem habet qui habet in se actui sufficientiam, ut lux in tenebris; executionem vero qui habet etiam exterius cooperantia, ut lux in luce; aptitudinem habet cui etiam actus convenit ex natura, ut cecus. Non tamen dicimus sacramentum esse nature, set ideo aptitudinis quia tanquam natura nequit absorberi.<sup>105</sup>

His example is that of sight: the power of sight may exist in the person who is in darkness (he has within himself all he needs to see); or in the person who is in the light (he has the external complement necessary for the exercise of his power of sight); or even in the blind man (for the radical power of sight yet pertains to him as part of the integrity of his humanity). Thus, as it is meaningful to speak of the power of sight in a blind man, so is it meaningful to speak of the “potestas aptitudinis” of ordination in one who is suspended and deposed from office.

Sicardus evidences his awareness of the ambiguities of terminology when he approaches the questions: is the one who is deposed a priest? has he the priestly *ordo*?

Ordo est caracter quo spiritualis potestas et officium traditur ei qui ordinatur. Set hic [sc. degradatus] officium amisit... Aiunt quidam degradatum esse sacerdotem et habere potestatem conficiendi, ligandi et solvendi, baptizandi et ordinandi et similia faciendi set non executionem. Alii e contra, quorum magis opinio mihi placere consuevit. Dico tamen degradatum habere in se sacramentum sacerdotii, quia absorberi non potest. Non tamen esse sacerdotem, quia sacerdos nomen est officii, quod amisit... Nota tamen quod ordo equivoce dicitur ad illum characterem vel ad collegium sacerdotum, sicut ordo anglorum monachorum sacerdotum. (Quod ergo concluditur) itaque ordinabitur, i.e. characterem assumet, falsum est, set (ordinabitur), i.e. ad collegium restituetur. Set dicetur habere ordinem sacerdotii, ergo est sacerdos.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>104</sup> The *Summa* “Omnis qui iuste,” in addition to a repetition of Rufinus’ distinctions, offers the same conclusion in other words in which the difference between suspension and deposition is clearer: “Alii dicunt idem fere set aliis verbis; nam dicunt quod innocens tria recipit in ordinatione: potestatem aptitudinis, et executionem iure ex officio, sc. consequendi officium suum, et executionem de vite merito, sc. exequendi officium suum. Hanc ultimam perdit cum in crimen labitur. Media duplex, vel temporalis vel perpetua. Temporalis autem amittitur cum suspenditur, perpetua cum deponitur, potestate aptitudinis semper retenta.” C. 1. q. 1. c. 30, Rouen MS 743, f. 47<sup>ra</sup>-47<sup>rb</sup>, completed from Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 986, f. 89<sup>va</sup>. The distinction between the commission of sin and the imposition of an ecclesiastical penalty, as understood by the canonists, is discussed by Peter Huizing, “The Earliest Development of Excommunication Latae Sententiae by Gratian and the Earliest Decretists,” *Studia Gratiana* 3 (Bologna, 1955), 277-320.

<sup>105</sup> Sicardus, *Summa*, C. 1. q. 1., Vat. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 76<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, Rouen, MS Lat. 710, f. 15<sup>ra</sup>-b; Sicardus here quotes Peter Lombard’s definition of *ordo*, cf. above, p. 72.

Distinctions are here made on the words “sacerdotium” and “ordo.” With respect to “sacerdotium,” Sicardus writes that one may take it to mean either the priestly *ordo* or the priestly office. He prefers to understand priesthood to refer to office and thus, because the deposed priest is deposed from his office, Sicardus would conclude that such a person cannot exercise priestly functions.<sup>107</sup> The word “ordo” may mean either the *carakter* conferred in the sacrament of Order (and this is the meaning attached to it by the theologians after Peter Lombard) or a college of priests (and this was the original use of the term in Roman Law).<sup>108</sup> Thus, Sicardus would conclude that a deposed priest (or bishop) was no longer a priest (for he had lost his office), could not perform priestly functions, and had to be reordained (readmitted to the priestly *collegium*): he always retained, however, his *carakter*.

Although this conclusion would be admitted by other authors, once Sicardus’ distinctions had been granted, subsequent canonists did not give to these terms the meanings which Sicardus had chosen. Huguccio flatly denied Gratian’s distinction between *potestas* and *usus* which had given rise to the further distinctions of Rufinus and Sicardus; for him the power conferred at ordination carried with it the right to exercise that power:

Non dicit verum quia potestas illa et ius illum unum et idem est, sc. ordo sacerdotalis vel episcopalis, et sic Gratianus non recte procedit opponendo... Si intelligit potestas, i.e. executio licita et de iure, verum dicit, aliter mentitur. Nam potestas sacrificandi, i.e. ordo sacerdotalis, in eo remanet.<sup>109</sup>

Huguccio here implies that the power of exercise is inseparably linked with the priestly *ordo*. This conclusion is more explicitly stated by the author of the *Summa* “Induent sancti pro torace,” which is probably of French origin about 1200:<sup>110</sup>

In ordinis vero collatione preter substantiam sacramenti attenditur et executio officii et collatio gratie vel augmentum ex virtute sacramenti. Executio autem tripliciter consideratur, aut in facto aut in iure divino aut in iure canonico. Executio que tantum in facto consistit inseparabiliter adheret sub-

<sup>107</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Cum ergo queritur utrum possit quis agere hoc vel hoc, pro officio respondendum est. Est enim officium congruus actus uniuscuiusque persone. Cum itaque degradatus officium perdidit, non enim congrue convenit ei actus illud vel illud faciendi. Respondendum est quod nequeat conficere et similia.” Val. Pal. Lat. 653, f. 76<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Adolf Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*, (Philadelphia, 1953), “Ordo,” pp. 612-613; P. Fransen, “Ordo,” *Lexicon für Theologie und Kirche*, ed. 2, (Freiburg, 1962), Vol. 7, cols. 1212-1213.

<sup>109</sup> Huguccio, *Summa*, C. 1. q. 1. dict. post c. 97, Admont, Stiftsbibl. 7, f. 140<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Brian Tierney, “Two Anglo-Norman Summae,” *Traditio* 15, (1959), 486.

stantie ordinis; ubicumque enim est ordinis substantia sive in deposito sive in ordinato ab heretico, ibi est executio facti. Si enim exequatur, executum est hoc, et si consecrat, consecratum est. Executio autem que consistit in iure naturali vel divino comes est caritatis simul et substantie ordinis, nec altera sine altera comitatatur. Hec tamquam accidens et adest et abest sicut caritas. Sepe advenit et recedit. Hanc executionem ergo non habet quicunque est in mortali peccato, quia iure divino excommunicatus est... Executio autem que iuris canonici est, ea semper adheret substantie ordinis nisi cum ab ea separatur a canone, ut cum quis ab heretico vel symoniaco ordinatur... Hec aufertur clero cum deponitur; ligatur cum excommunicatur vel suspenditur a canone vel a iudice.<sup>111</sup>

This text shows the development of canonical thought from the three-fold division of *potestas* of Rufinus to a three-fold division of *executio*. One who has received the sacrament of Order always has *executio in facto*, i.e. if he exercises his powers, his action is effective. He exercises his power according to divine (or natural) law if he is not in mortal sin. The only *executio* which can be lost is that which falls under canon law; this power can be taken away by deposition or restricted by excommunication or suspension. Although the author does not draw the conclusion of Huguccio, his words lead to the conclusion that a deposed or suspended priest exercises his powers really but not licitly.

A conclusion similar to that of Huguccio and the author of the *Summa "Induent sancti pro torace"* is to be found in the *Summa questionum* of Magister Honorius. This "most successful piece of English canonistic writing in the twelfth century" was written between 1185 and 1195.<sup>112</sup> In this work Honorius refers to the celebrated controversy between Gandulphus of Bologna<sup>113</sup> and Joannes Faventinus concerning orders conferred by heretics. This controversy was also reported at length in the *Summa "Omnis qui iuste,"* whose author sided with the conclusion of Joannes.<sup>114</sup> Honorius agrees with Gandulphus: anyone who has received the sacrament of Order may confer the sacrament upon others. It is wrong to maintain that the *executio* of one's powers can be taken away through an ecclesiastical penalty in such a way that the person cannot exercise his powers; if he exercises them, his action has its effect (even though, because of the penalty, his action may be illicit).

<sup>111</sup> *Summa "Induent sancti pro torace,"* C. 1. q. 1., Douai MS 649 (582) F. 105<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>112</sup> Stephan Kuttner and Eleanor Rathbone, *art. cit.*, 296.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 309, note 41, where the authors point out that nowhere in the manuscripts is Gandulphus' name given in full; thus, the attribution to him of the opinion of "Magister G" is not certain and "remains but an attractive conjecture."

<sup>114</sup> *Summa "Omnis qui iuste,"* C. 1. q. 7. c. 24, Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 986, f. 104<sup>ra</sup>.

Secundum Ioannem male distinguentem inter potestatem aptitudinis et potestatem generaliter execundi, cum eadem sit potestas, prima non amittitur; unde secundum eum non est mirum si catholicus ordinatus, in heresim lapsus, et [ita] suspensus, aliis possit conferre ordines. Set ille alii nequaquam, quia primus habuit potestatem faciendi, [unde] et ordinem bene potuit conferre; ceterum illam potestatem conferre non potuit, quia de iure exercere non poterat; etenim licet potestas faciendi ex post facto in aliquo esse possit sine potestate iuris, non tamen sine ea incipere esse potest in aliquo. In primo ergo erat potestas faciendi, [unde] contulit tantum ordinem et non illam potestatem que sine potestate iuris in eo incipere esse non potuit. Unde et [secundus], qui nullam prorsus habuit potestatem, nil prorsus conferre potuit. Quod totum secundum G. [Gandulphum] est falsum, dicentem quod potestas aptitudinis vel potestas faciendi, que eadem est, numquam amitti potest, et ideo ordo usque in infinitum est ambulatorius.<sup>115</sup>

The development which had occurred in the *Summa* "Induent sancti pro torace," in Huguccio and Honorius was the effective elimination of the idea of office from the concept of the priesthood or the episcopacy. Earlier authors had stressed three elements in the integral notion of priesthood: order, office, and exercise. These later authors identified the office (called by earlier authors the "potestas habitatis" or "executio iure ex officio" or "potestas iuris ex officio faciendi") with the *ordo* itself.

The concept of the power to exercise one's orders was what Gratian had used to explain the priestly ministry of both monks ad other clerics. Both categories of priests required episcopal permission for the exercise of their priestly powers:

Sicut ergo in benedictione [=ordinatione], utrique communem nanciscuntur potestatem, ita in institutione communiter assecuntur potestatis executionem. Ceterum absque episcoporum licentia non solum monachis set etiam omnibus generaliter clericis potestatis executio interdicitur.<sup>116</sup>

The "potestas executionis" was, then, the permission which the local ordinary must give for any (licit) exercise of priestly powers (in a public way) within his territory.

Gratian's own pupil and early commentator, Roland Bandinelli, had understood such episcopal permission to be the granting of subjects to the priest:

<sup>115</sup> Honorius, *Summa questionum*, Bamberg, MS Can. 45, f. 28 v<sup>b</sup>; corrections taken from Paris, BN MS Lat. 14591, f. 61v<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>116</sup> *Decretum*, C. 16. q. 1. dict. post c. 40; cf. also C. 16. q. 1. dict. post c. 19, dict. post c. 25, dict. post c. 40. The question of the exercise of priestly powers by monks was raised when Gratian included in the *Decretum* certain texts, especially some by Jerome, which seemed to prohibit such exercise, cf. C. 16, q. 1, c. 4, 5, 6.

Item notandum est quod monachorum sacerdotum quidam habent populum sibi commissum, quidam non. Nulli ergo monachorum licebit missas publicas celebrare, populis predicare, baptizare atque alia sacerdotalia populis ministrare, nisi constiterit eum populum sibi subiectum habere.<sup>117</sup>

The bishop's permission gave the priest, whether he be a member of a religious community or not, the right to exercise his priesthood in public.

### Conclusion: The Decretists on the Episcopacy.

The consideration of the episcopacy in the writings of Gratian and the Decretists may be concluded with a summary of the conclusions to which they came. These conclusions would provide the framework for subsequent speculation by the Decretalists. The Decretists, following Gratian, taught that the distinction between the episcopacy and the (simple) priesthood was instituted by Christ. The precise limits of each, however, must be determined by the Church through the pope. He could permit priests to exercise functions previously limited to bishops. The episcopacy was understood to include the (simple) priesthood and only priests could become bishops. The *ordo*, which was received at ordination (and, by parallel, in episcopal consecration), was inadmissible, as was the power attached to it. The precise powers attached to the priestly and episcopal *ordines* were not determined, although it was commonly agreed that power to consecrate the Eucharist pertained to the very substance of the priestly *ordo*. Even though the priest possessed powers via his ordination, he needed the permission of the local ordinary for the licit exercise of them within his territory.

## II

### THE EPISCOPACY IN THE WRITINGS OF THE DECRETALISTS

The *Decretum* of Gratian contained ecclesiastical legislation up to the Second Lateran Council, 1139. During the following century, legislative activity within the Church and judicial decisions of popes produced a wealth of new material. This was collected into books which were used along with the *Decretum*; five major collections of new material appeared during the century after Gratian. These *Compilationes antiquae*, as they were called, were supplanted by the official collection promulgated by Pope

<sup>117</sup> Roland Bandinelli, *Stroma Rolandi*, C. 16. q. 1, *Die Summa Magistri Rolandi*, Friedrich Thaner, ed., (Innsbruck, 1874), p. 37; for Roland, cf. Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 128; Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 434.

Gregory IX in 1234. This work, which came to be called the *Decretales Gregorii IX*, contained reflections of the canonical progress of the previous century and, in its own turn, spurred further speculation. The Decretalists, as they commented upon these post-Gratian collections, further developed the canonical understanding of the episcopacy.

One cannot determine from an analysis of the terms used in the various decretals what theory of the episcopacy was espoused by the authors. As in the *Decretum*, the episcopacy was referred to by various terms, for example: "ordo pontificalis," "ordo sacer," "sacramentum ordinis episcopal," "coniugium spirituale," "officium pontificale," "officium pastorale," "dignitas pontificalis," "praesulatus," "praelatura."<sup>118</sup> Once again, one must turn to the texts of the commentators upon the decretals to discover the opinion of the canonists.

One major difference may be noted in the commentaries of the Decretalists from those of the Decretists. The Decretists' writings contain many more discussions of questions which might be termed theoretical than do the commentaries of the Decretalists. There is not reflected in the work of these later authors the influence of the theologians, as had been so marked in the early Decretists. The Decretalists limited themselves to discussions of law and fact, refraining from theological speculation on such questions as the nature of a sacrament, the substance of the sacrament of Order, etc.

### 1. The Reception of the Episcopacy: Election-Confirmation-Consecration

While the first question regarding the episcopacy which is encountered in the Decretists is the institution of the episcopacy, no such question is discussed by the Decretalists. These writers were not commenting upon texts in which the origin of the episcopacy was discussed, as it had been in many texts cited by Gratian.

The first question which occurs when one considers the Decretalists' idea of the episcopal *ordo* is the reception of the episcopacy. The growing awareness of the distinction between power of order and power of jurisdiction is evident in the distinction made between the election of a bishop (and the confirmation of the election) and his consecration. The bishop-elect received administrative and jurisdictional powers at the confirmation of his election, while he received power of order at his consecration.

The Third Lateran Council (1179) had decreed that once a bishop-elect received confirmation of his election, he had full administration of the temporal goods of his diocese.<sup>119</sup> In his gloss to this text, Laurentius His-

<sup>118</sup> Eliseus Viegas E Vales, *Bishop and Presbyter in Medieval Papal Legislation*, (Lisbon, 1962), 10.

<sup>119</sup> *Decretales Gregorii IX*, Aemilius Friedberg, ed., *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, (Leipzig, 1879), 1.6.7; this text is also contained in the *Compilatio Prima*, 1.4.16, Aemilius Friedberg, ed., *Quinque Com-*

panus wrote: "confirmationem electionis: quia iam est prelatus illius ecclesie nec sine licentia domini pape dimittere eam potest."<sup>120</sup> Bernardus Parmensis, the author of the *glossa ordinaria* to the *Decretales*, pointed out that the bishop-elect had no powers before the confirmation of the election: "Bene dicit confirmationem, quia ante confirmationem nihil debet attingere in administratione, alioquin repelleretur."<sup>121</sup> Until his consecration, however, he did not possess his church *pleno iure*, for his election could yet be appealed.<sup>122</sup>

In commenting upon a letter in which Pope Celestine III had stated that one whose election had been confirmed could impose ecclesiastical penalties, Vincentius Hispanus elaborated the different powers received:

confirmationem: confirmatus ergo excommunicare potest, non solum in episcopum electus sed etiam in abbatem... Unde patet quod excommunicare iurisdictionis, non ordinis, est.

statuendi: ad iurisdictionem pertinentibus, puta iudicare, sacramenta fidelitatis a vassallis accipere, investitures et prebendas dare, electiones confirmare... Hec ei in electione feruntur. In consecratione ea vero que sunt ordinis, ut clericos ordinare, ecclesias consecrare, etc.<sup>123</sup>

In a commentary which he wrote as a private doctor, Pope Innocent IV pointed out that the power of jurisdiction was immediately had upon confirmation of the election; no formal investiture or installation was required for its reception.<sup>124</sup>

Innocent III had written of the marriage-like bond contracted between the bishop and his diocese: "ut per mutuum consensum eligentium et electi quasi coniugale vinculum spiritualiter sit contractum."<sup>125</sup> The *glossa ordinaria* attributed this bond to the confirmation of the election:

*Pilationes Antiquae necnon Collectio Canonum Lipsiensis* (Leipzig, 1882); *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, ed. J. D. Mansi (Venice, 1778), 22: 218.

<sup>120</sup> Laurentius Hispanus in *Compilatio I*, 1.4.16, Vat. Lat. 1377, f. 9. For Laurentius, cf. Antonio García García, *Laurentius Hispanus: Datos biográficos y estudio crítico de sus obras*, No. 6 in *Cuadernos del Instituto Jurídico Español* (Rome-Madrid, 1956).

<sup>121</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 1.6.7. s.v. confirmationem, *Decretales Gregorii IX una cum glossis* (Venice, 1591); for the *glossa ordinaria*, cf. Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 473.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ante enim consecrationem non dicitur pleno iure habere ecclesiam cum adhuc tempore consecrationis possit excipi contra ipsum." Before the confirmation of the election, he had only a "tenue ius" (1.7.2, s.v. *confirmatus*); in case of a postulation, no "ius" was acquired at all, for postulation was a favor and not a right (1.6.21, s.v. *resilire*).

<sup>123</sup> Vincentius Hispanus in X 1.6.15, Vat. Lat. 1378, f. 17<sup>va</sup>. For Vincentius, cf. Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 444. Vincentius was here commenting on a letter of Pope Celestine III, Jaffé 16572, *Compilatio II*, 1.3.7.

<sup>124</sup> Innocent IV, *In Libros Decretalium Commentaria*, (Venice: 1570), p. 57.

<sup>125</sup> X 1.6.21; *Compilatio III* 1.6.6; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV*, Augustus Potthast, ed., (Graz, 1957), 942.

“non est vinculum coniugale per consensum eligentium et electi ante confirmationem.”<sup>126</sup>

Hostiensis, whose writings earned him the title “Iuris utriusque monarcha,”<sup>127</sup> described this bond as existing between the bishop-elect and the whole church:

quasi coniugale: sc. carnale, quasi dicat sicut carnale matrimonium per mutuum consensum contrahitur, sic et spirituale ad exemplum ipsius; vel sic, quasi vinculum, quasi dicat non est vere vinculum inter electum et eligentes sive administrationem ecclesie ad quam vocatur, quamvis verum sit inter electum et ecclesiam generalem. Unde primum dissolvitur, sed secundum numquam.<sup>128</sup>

In this opinion, however, Hostiensis was departing from the intention of Innocent III, for the Pope had explained his comparison very clearly. He had concluded that just as God reserved the dissolution of carnal marriage to Himself, so by divine institution the bond between a bishop and his diocese could be broken only by the pope.<sup>129</sup> The spiritual bond between bishop and diocese paralleled the marriage bond, and the Pope used the same terminology in describing the spiritual bond as was used for marriage: “sic et spirituale foedus coniugii, quod est inter episcopum et ecclesiam, quod in electione initiatum, ratum in confirmatione, et in consecratione intelligitur consummatum.”<sup>130</sup>

The question then arose: how could the spiritual bond be stronger than the marriage bond, for the former could be broken by the pope, while the latter was indissoluble?<sup>131</sup> According to the explanation of Innocent III himself, it would be difficult to see how the spiritual bond was stronger, at least with respect to indissolubility. Hostiensis, however, who had taught that the bond was contracted between the bishop and the universal church, could explain how the spiritual bond was stronger than the marriage bond: “quia fortius imprimitur et fortius operatur, cum character imprimatur in anima per consecrationem ipsius, qui numquam delebitur, et gratia datur et multiplicatur, quod non est in corporali.”<sup>132</sup>

<sup>126</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 1.6.21. s.v. *quasi conjugale*.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 476-479.

<sup>128</sup> Henricus de Segusio, Cardinalis Hostiensis, *In Libros Decretalium Commentaria*, (Venice, 1581), I, 48v.

<sup>129</sup> X 1.7.2: *Compilatio III*, 1.5.2: Potthast 575: “Non enim humana sed potius divina potestate coniugium spirituale dissolvitur... et ideo tria hec que premisimus [translatio, depositio, cessione episcopi] non tam constitutione canonica quam institutione divina soli sunt Romano Pontifici reservata.” Innocent makes the same point in X 1.7.4; *Compilatio III*, 1.5.4; Potthast 942.

<sup>130</sup> X 1.7.4.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. *glossa ordinaria*, X 1.7.2, s.v. *fortius*: “cum carnale in veritate fortius est, quia dissolvi non potest.”

<sup>132</sup> Hostiensis, *op. cit.*, X 1.7.2, I, p. 82.

In these words the author indicates his understanding of the consecration of a bishop: it conferred an indelible character and grace. Thus does Hostiensis reveal his emphasis on the power of order in the bishop rather than his jurisdiction, for it is with consecration that one receives power of order.

## 2. Delegation of Episcopal Power

The Decretalists, like the Decretists, discussed the bishop's powers more precisely when they approached the question of the delegation of episcopal power. Their conclusions are summarized in the *glossa ordinaria*:

Archiepiscopus potest committere ea que sunt iurisdictionis etiam illis qui eam non habent... sed ea que sunt ordinis vel consecrationis committere non potest his qui eam non habent, puta illis qui non sunt episcopi vel archiepiscopi vel maiores... Nec etiam talia dicuntur committi, sed cum mandat archiepiscopus suffraganeis ut hoc faciant, sola auctoritate eis deest et nihil committit eis archiepiscopus nisi quia dat auctoritatem propter prelationem quam habet super illis.<sup>133</sup>

What pertained to the power of order (or consecration) could not be delegated; what pertained to jurisdiction could be delegated. One with jurisdiction could entrust actions which required the power of order to any minister who possessed the requisite order. Thus, for example, a bishop-elect (whose election had been confirmed) could entrust the ordination of his own clerics to any consecrated bishop. As Hostiensis remarks, in this case he is merely transferring subjects to the consecrated bishop; he is not transferring any power of order.<sup>134</sup>

The question of the delegation of episcopal power for the administration of the sacrament of Confirmation was a question for the Decretalists, as it had been for their predecessors. During the pontificate of Innocent III the question was raised in Constantinople, where Latin priests confirmed and alleged custom as a justification for their actions. The pope's decision left many questions still unanswered:

Discretioni tue mandamus, quatenus omnibus presbyteris districte prohibeas, ne talia de cetero sua temeritate presumant, que licet non sint a fidelibus contemnenda, tutius tamen est ea sine periculo ex necessitate, que legem non habet, omittere, quam ut ab his, quibus ea conferre non licet, ex temeritate, que lege damnatur, non sine gravi periculo inaniter conferantur, cum umbra quedam ostendatur in opere, veritas autem non subeat in effectu.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>133</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 1.31.10, s.v. *committere*.

<sup>134</sup> Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea*, (Lyons, 1568), I, p. 30.

<sup>135</sup> X 1.4.4; *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3; Potthast 868.

The pope forbade confirmation by priests who presumptuously exercised the power to confirm. He did not reply to the hypothetical question: if priests did presume to confirm, or, if they confirmed in a case of necessity, was such a confirmation to be recognized?

The commentators took this opportunity to discuss delegation of episcopal power made by the pope to a simple priest. Laurentius wrote:

Quoniam tunc effectum habuit huiusmodi crismatio vel deceptor fuisset Gregorius in sua concessione [Dist. 95.c.1]. Quid igitur est quod modo etiam conferre non possunt, licet prohibiti, cum videtur quod episcopus etiam prohibitus excommunicatus ordinem conferat?... Nota quod ubi quis habet aliquid ex officio habitu ordinis, confert licet prohibitus; si enim ex demandatione et adminiculo ordinis, tunc prohibitus non confert, sicut sacerdos confirmationem in fronte. Credo etiam quod ex demandatione pape et adminiculo habitu sacramenti potest conferre quilibet quod ipse percepit.<sup>136</sup>

Laurentius felt obliged to recognize papal delegation of the power to confirm to a simple priest; the alternative would have been to maintain that Pope Gregory I had deceived priests in apparently granting them this power. Yet his insistence upon the possession of the episcopal power of order in the minister of Confirmation later led him to deny that a priest could confirm:

Simplex ergo sacerdos confirmando in fronte nichil agit... nisi hoc faceret ex concessione domini pape... Set nec credo papam hoc delegare posse presbytero, cum ordinis episcopalis sit.<sup>137</sup>

Vincentius reports the opinion of Laurentius but rejects it. He is inconsistent, however, that only the pope can delegate a priest to confirm: "quia ille habet solus plenitudinem potestatis."<sup>138</sup> He thus requires in the one delegating not only the possession of the power of order and/or jurisdiction, but the fulness of power.<sup>139</sup>

Tancred, the compiler of the *glossa ordinaria* to the *Compilatio III*, treated the question at length and reports the various opinions. He also rejects the view of Laurentius, who had been his teacher.

Numquid sacerdotes ipsi conferebant caracterem sacramenti? Respondeo minime, sicut expresse dicit littera... quia pro non dato habetur quod [h]ab eo datur qui non potest dare de iure... Numquid hodie ex delegatione possent sacerdotes in fronte crismare?... Tenendum est quod ex delegatione alicuius

<sup>136</sup> Laurentius Hispanus, *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3., Kassel MS Jur. 11, f. 4<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, Admont MS 55, f. 105<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>138</sup> Vincentius Hispanus in X 1.4.4, Paris, BN Lat. 3967, f. 13<sup>va</sup>; the same commentary may be found in *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3, Vat. Lat. Ms. 1378, f. 4.

<sup>139</sup> For this important concept, cf. John Watt, *The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century*, (New York, 1965), 75-92, 97-105.

episcopi non licet nec unquam licuit hoc presbyteris, et in hoc omnes doctores consensunt. De domino papa, an non possit delegare, diverse sunt opiniones: notavit hic magister Laurentius quod papa non potest hoc officium delegare simplici sacerdoti; Sylvester scripsit hic quod ex delegatione domini pape et aminiculo habiti sacramenti quilibet, tam clericus quam laicus, potest conferre quicquid ipse habet; que non habet, minime... Set si papa primo concederet alicui presbytero quod crismaret in fronte et postea prohiberet, si contra faceret, nichil conferret; sed si prohiberet episcopo confirmare, si contra faceret, caracterem conferret... Ratio diversitatis est quia episcopus potest hoc facere ex officio et ordine, presbyter ex delegatione et aminiculo sacramenti.<sup>140</sup>

Innocent IV closely followed the teaching of Tancred. After mentioning that Alanus also denied that the pope could delegate a priest to confirm (“de papali auctoritate dixit Ala. [Alanus] quod non potest”), Innocent concluded: “Episcopus potest confirmare ex officio et ordine, sacerdos alius ex delegatione et aminiculo habiti sacramenti.”<sup>141</sup>

In these conclusions, Vincentius, Tancred and Innocent IV, as well as the author of the *glossa ordinaria*<sup>142</sup> and Hostiensis,<sup>143</sup> followed the reasoning of the Decretists. With delegation from the pope, a priest could confirm; if the delegation were withdrawn, the priest could no longer confirm. The reason for this was the very nature of delegated power: one whose sole title for acting was delegation had no proper foundation for acting outside the delegation he had received.<sup>144</sup> The Decretalists taught that a priest delegated to confirm did not act *ex ordine et officio*; he acted *ex delegatione et aminiculo habiti sacramenti*. The sacrament which served as a “prop” in the priest was, for Hostiensis, the sacrament of Confirmation; this was in line with the usual canonical teaching that one could not confer a sacrament which he himself had not received.<sup>145</sup> For Laurentius, however, it appears that the sacrament required in the reception of delegation is Order, for he speaks of the “adminiculum ordinis.”<sup>146</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Tancred, *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3, Vat. Lat. MS 1377, f. 10; for Tancred, cf. Kuttner, *Repertorium*, 358-359, Van Hove, *op. cit.*, 444.

<sup>141</sup> Innocent IV, *op. cit.*, X 1.4.4., p. 40.

<sup>142</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 1.4.4., s.v. reservata.

<sup>143</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X 1.4.4., I, p. 29v.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*: “Et est ratio, quia episcopo competit ex officio, sed presbytero ex delegatione, unde proprium nihil habet ad quod accedit id.”

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*: “sacramento maxime baptismi sed et confirmationis recepte adminiculum prestante.” Cf. above, p. 87, Huguccio on the opinion that one could be delegated to confer what he himself had already received. Tancred (*glossa ordinaria*, *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3, Vat. Lat. MS 1377, f. 10) and Innocent IV (*op. cit.*, X 1.4.4., p. 40) speak only of “adminiculum habiti sacramenti.”

<sup>146</sup> Laurentius Hispanus, *Compilatio III*, 1.3.3., Kassel MS Jur. 11, f. 4<sup>v</sup>b; the expression “adminiculo ordinum” may be found in Roman Law, C.1.3.10, where it refers to the assistance of troops in quelling a riot: cf. *glossa ordinaria*, C.1.3.10, s.v. ordinum: “id est militum iustitiae illius castri vel loci.” *Corpus Iuris Civilis Iustiniani*, (Geneva, 1625), Tom. 4.

The Decretists were concerned with the priest who received the commission to confirm from the pope. The Decretalists also turned their attention to the action of the pope in giving such a commission. They attempted to determine the grounds for the papal action.

Innocent IV gave a broad interpretation to papal power. After teaching that a simple priest could confirm if the pope delegated him to do so, but could not confirm if his delegation were revoked, Innocent went on to explain how the pope could circumscribe a bishop's power to confirm. He quoted his contemporaries who would permit the pope to prevent a bishop from confirming.

Alii dicunt quod si papa prohiberet episcopum crismare, quod postea crismando non confert characterem. Licet enim papa non possit tollere sacramentum confirmationis, potest tamen contra illud et in forma et in personis et in diebus a quibus et in quibus conferri debeat, suas constitutiones facere... et si potest circa personas conferentes aliquid statuere, ergo certe persone vel etiam episcopo potest potestatem auferre crismandi. Idem dicunt in baptismo. Tamen si papa talia faceret sine causa magna et aliis nota, non debet sustineri tamquam faciens contra generalem statum ecclesie.<sup>147</sup>

Innocent found the basis for this far-reaching papal power over the administration of the sacraments in the privilege divinely-given to the pope by Christ in the commission to Peter (Matthew 16:19). The papal power was limited, however, both by the "generalis status ecclesie" and by other factors: "Ei [sc. pape] tamen in omnibus obediendum est in spiritualibus et in his que ad animam spectant, nisi contra fidem vel hec specialiter prohibita sunt."<sup>148</sup>

Bernardus Parmensis in the *glossa ordinaria* appealed not to a special privilege but to a statement taken from Roman Law to justify the papal action: "Videtur quod papa non possit hoc delegare simplici sacerdoti; sed papa non subiicitur legibus."<sup>149</sup> Hostiensis maintained a cautious

<sup>147</sup> Innocent IV, *op. cit.*, X 1.4.4, p. 40. The expression "contra generalem statum ecclesie" was a technical term used by the Decretalists to express the limits of papal power. Cf. Stephen Kuttner, "Pope Lucius III and the Bigamous Archbishop of Palermo," *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J.*, (Dublin, 1961), 417.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 1.4.4, s.v. reservata; the principle "Princeps legibus solitus" is found in the *Digest*, 1.3.31, (Paulus Krueger, ed., *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, Berlin, 1915). The development of the theory here suggested is brought to its logical conclusion in the writings of Panormitanus, who died in 1453. In commenting upon X 1.4.4, he said that the pope had power over the bishop's power to administer the sacraments if he used his fullness of power by making a law, not if he merely issued a prohibition. Abbas Panormitanus (Nicholas de Tudeschi), *Commentaria in Primum Decretalium Librum*, (Venice, 1617), I.4.4, p. 83v-85r.

reserve as he commented upon the decretal of Innocent: "Nolo disputare de plenitudine potestatis."<sup>150</sup>

Further precision was given to these considerations of the papal power in the commentaries upon a text of Gregory IX. In denying to a priest the power to reconsecrate a church, even if he used water blessed by a bishop, the pope had written:

...licet episcopus committere valeat que iurisdictionis existunt, que ordinis tamen episcopalium sunt, non potest inferioris gradus clericis demandare. Quod autem mandantibus episcopis super reconciliatione factum est hactenus per eosdem, misericorditer toleramus.<sup>151</sup>

The last words of the pope presented the greatest difficulty: if those actions require in their minister the power of (episcopal) order, how can the pope "tolerate" such an act performed by one without the requisite power?

The *glossa ordinaria* presented a reply based upon a legal rather than a theological or scriptural principle:

Sed dic, quod per talem tolerantiam ratam habet talem reconciliationem et incipit valere ex nunc, cum prima nulla fuisset, et ita de nihilo facit aliquid... quia potest princeps mutare naturam rei.<sup>152</sup>

The author affirms that the pope can ratify an action whose minister had lacked the power required to perform it. The act is ratified at the moment of the papal action; there is no suggestion that by any fiction the act is to be considered as true from its beginning. The proofs for the assertion of such papal power are drawn from canon and civil law. From the *Decretum* there is taken a text of Saint Ambrose concerning the Eucharist, in which he defends the Eucharistic mystery by drawing upon miraculous occurrences in the Old Testament; Ambrose concludes: "maiores vim esse benedictionis, quam nature, quia benedictione etiam natura ipsa mutatur."<sup>153</sup> From the Civil Law there is a text in which Justinian prescribes

<sup>150</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X 1.4.4, I, p. 29v.

<sup>151</sup> X 3.40.9, Potthast 9203. In the *Decretum Gratian* had prescribed reconsecration in the case of doubtfully consecrated persons and things, dict. post c.2.d.68.

<sup>152</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 3.40.9, s.v. toleramus.

<sup>153</sup> *Decretum*, De con. d.2.c.69, from Ambrose, *De mysteriis*, c. 9, PL 16: 405. For the principle "princeps potest mutare naturam rei," cf. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "The Sovereignty of the Artist: A Note on Legal Maxims and Renaissance Theories of Art," *De Artibus Opuscula XL: Essays in Honor of Erwin Panofsky*, Millard Meiss, ed., (New York, 1961), 271-276. The attribution of this supreme power to the pope was closely linked with the title "Vicarius Dei, Vicarius Christi," which was used by the popes during the thirteenth century. Cf., e.g., Innocent III, X 1.7.4: "...qui successor est Petri et vicarius Iesu Christi," and X 1.7.2: "...quem constat esse vicarium Iesu Christi."

a *fictio iuris* lest the ignorant suffer from their inexperience in property matters.<sup>154</sup>

Hostiensis quoted the conclusion of the *glossa ordinaria*, for which he sought foundation in five texts. One of these was the text of Saint Ambrose cited by the *glossa ordinaria*; the other four treat of papal power as this is exercised in matters which do not require the power of order in the minister.<sup>155</sup> He added one qualification, however: "Talia non ex constitutione ecclesie firma vel irrita iudicantur et ideo circa talia potest dicere et facere papa quidquid placet."<sup>156</sup> He does not elaborate which matters are to be judged by the "constitution of the Church" and which fall under the papal judgment. What he does affirm is that for certain actions which require the power of order in the minister, the pope may give this power by his commission.<sup>157</sup> Hostiensis here goes beyond the text upon which he is commenting, for he is no longer speaking of subsequent ratification by the pope but of commission beforehand.

In admitting that at least in certain instances the pope could delegate the episcopal power of order by commission, Hostiensis (like Huguccio before him<sup>158</sup>) was forced to temper his strict interpretation of the episcopal *ordo*. He had taught that the character (of the episcopacy) is transmitted only by the imposition of hands (i.e. episcopal consecration): "Characterem enim dignitatis non posset transferre (episcopus) nisi per manus impositionem";<sup>159</sup> "character autem non per delegationem sed per manus impositionem imprimitur."<sup>160</sup>

The episcopal *ordo* and its accompanying power was similarly transmitted:

Si est igitur episcopalis consecratio summus ordo, ut hic, ad quem et summa pertinent, que per inferiores expediri non possunt, sicut est reconciliare ecclesiam et coemeterium... multiformius consecrare, chrismare in fronte puerum,

<sup>154</sup> C.5.13.un.: "Est enim consentaneum nobis, qui censemus et ubi supposita stipulatio non est, intelligi eam fuisse adhibitam, multo magis etiam, si inutilis est, validam eam effici."

<sup>155</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X 3.40.9, s.v. per quod, per sacerdotes, III, p. 160. The four texts are: (i) C.3.q.6.c.10; Nicolaus Papa, Jaffé 2789; (ii) X 1.36.1, Gregorius I, *Compilatio I* 1.27.1, Jaffé 1607; cf. *glossa ordinaria*, X 1.36.1: "Nota quod si transactio vel pactum ab initio invalidum sit, per confirmationem pape sumit vigorem... et sententia que non tenet, per confirmationem pape efficitur valida." (iii) X 1.36.8, Alexander III, *Compilatio II* 1.16.3, Jaffé 14102; cf. *glossa ordinaria*, X 1.36.8: "...quia potest facere quod illa que nulla est, sit aliqua... et plus est de nihilo facere aliquid quam de aliquo." (iv) X 3.8.4, Innocent III, *Compilatio III* 3.8.1, Potthast 126, where Innocent writes of himself: "...qui secundum plenitudinem potestatis de iure possumus supra ius dispensare."

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, s.v. ac misericorditer toleramus.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> Cf. above, p. 87.

<sup>159</sup> Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea*, I, p. 30.

<sup>160</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X, 1.6.11, p. 43.

et similia. Nec enim possunt hec vel similia dari vel perfici nisi ab his qui hanc potestatem per huius ordinis collationem receperunt, et sic episcopi sunt... Si igitur talia minori episcopo committuntur, nihil agitur, quia ordo non per commissionem sed per manus impositionem transfertur.<sup>161</sup>

The *glossa ordinaria* contained the distinction between jurisdiction and order: jurisdiction may be transmitted “sola voluntate et verbo” but not order: “collatio sacramentorum non confertur sola voluntate vel verbo, immo facta est opus, quia necessaria est visibilis unctione et exterior, que est signum interioris unctionis in corde... que perpetua est et amitti non potest.”<sup>162</sup>

The thirteenth century Decretalists thus distinguish episcopal consecration, in which the recipient receives the *character*, *ordo episcopalis* and *potestas ordinis episcopalis*, from the transmission of power by the pope to a simple priest. Through such transmission the priest does not become a bishop; he can, however, because of the delegation by the pope and from the pope’s *plenitudo potestatis*, perform certain functions normally proper to bishops alone. These conclusions led Hostiensis to see in the episcopacy an *ordo* and in episcopal consecration a true ordination, i.e. an exercise of the sacrament of Order.<sup>163</sup>

### 3. The Subject of Episcopal Consecration

The Decretalists followed the Decretists in teaching that episcopal consecration could only be conferred upon a priest. In commenting upon a letter of Innocent III, the author of the *glossa ordinaria* referred to the opinion of Huguccio that only one who had received a minor order could receive the priesthood; he then quotes Vincentius: “bene recipit quis sacrum ordinem etiam si nullum habeat de minoribus, preter episcopalem, quem nemo recipere potest nisi sit saltem sacerdos... Et istud verius videtur.”<sup>164</sup>

A similar conclusion is to be found in the gloss on a letter in which Innocent III taught: “pontificale officium sine altaris ministerio non valeat adimpleri.”<sup>165</sup> Hostiensis offered a different interpretation of this text. He admitted that one could not be a bishop unless he is a priest; he then

<sup>161</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X 3.40.9, s.v. *ordinis episcopalis*, III, p. 160.

<sup>162</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 3.40.9, s.v. *jurisdictionis*.

<sup>163</sup> Hostiensis, *loc. cit.*

<sup>164</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, X 5.29.un.; Innocent III, *Compilatio III*, 5.13.un., Potthast 2381. Vincentius had written: “Ego tamen credo quod sive habeat minores sive non potest recipere quoslibet alios preter episcopalem ordinem, quem non accipit nisi sacerdos.” in X 5.29.un., Paris BN Lat. 3967, f. 193<sup>vb</sup>, and in *Comp. III*, 5.13.un., Vat. Lat. MS 1378, f. 99<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>165</sup> X 5.31.10; *Compilatio III* 5.14.3; Potthast 3064; *glossa ordinaria*, *ibid.*, s.v. *ministerio*, “Arg. quod non potest quis esse episcopus nisi primo fuerit sacerdos.”

interpreted this in terms of execution and not of the reception of the character: "Non negamus quin recipiat characterem si quis in episcopum consecratur, licet sacerdos non fuerit, nec negamus quin characterem remaneat si ordinatus fuerit quamvis suspensus. Hoc tamen dicimus quod executionem non habebit."<sup>166</sup> He denied the "executio ordinis" to those ordained "per saltum" because their ordination was contrary to the form of the Church.<sup>167</sup> It would seem that Hostiensis saw little difference between the episcopacy and the other orders with respect to ordination "per saltum." Although previous authors had not arrived at this conclusion, it did follow logically from the premise that the episcopacy was a true *ordo* like the others.

### Conclusion: The Decretalists on the Episcopacy

With respect to the episcopacy as an *ordo*, the Decretalists continued the line of thought initiated by the Decretists. The advance made by the Decretalists was to be found in their clearer understanding of the distinction between power of order and power of jurisdiction. The episcopacy was accepted without question as an *ordo* with its proper power of order. Because of the practice of the Church, however, the Decretalists, like the Decretists, usually admitted that the episcopal powers could at least in certain instance be committed to simple priests by the pope. The Decretalists, finally, sought an explanation for these papal commissions in the papal "plenitudo potestatis."

### Conclusion:

#### The Episcopacy as an *Ordo* According to the Medieval Canonists

It has long been recognized that the medieval canonists championed the opinion that the episcopacy is an *ordo*. In this view they opposed the opinion of the theologians who quite generally considered the episcopacy to be a *dignitas* added to the presbyteral *ordo*.<sup>168</sup>

This study has traced the evolution of the opinion which came to be the common opinion among the medieval canonists. Their investigation of the episcopacy began with the texts cited in Gratian's *Decretum*. Here

<sup>166</sup> Hostiensis, *Commentaria*, X 5.31.10, s.v. *adimpleri*, V, p. 73v.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, X 5.29.un., V, p. 70v

<sup>168</sup> The development of a theology of the episcopacy by the theologians is intimately bound up with their whole sacramental theology and especially with their understanding of the sacramental character. For the ideas of the theologians, cf. Arthur Landgraf, *op. cit.*, Part III, Book II, 289-302; Doronzo, *De ordine* 2, 121-184; Ferdinand Brommer, *Die Lehre vom sakramentalen charakter in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin inklusive* (Paderborn, 1908); Jean Galot, *La nature du caractère sacramentel: étude de théologie médiévale* (Bruges, 1956).

they found no clearly articulated answer to the question: what is the episcopacy? On the contrary, they found texts which would support either of two conclusions. Certain statements of Isidore of Seville and Jerome emphasized the centrality of the priestly office and power; there was little development of any properly episcopal power in the line of order. Yet other texts, especially concerning the administration of the sacraments, delineated a properly episcopal power in the areas of sacramental administration and various benedictions and consecrations. Finally, there were the difficult passages which contained the commission of this normally episcopal power to simple priests.

The early commentators upon Gratian, such as Rufinus and Stephen of Tournai, interpreted Gratian in terms of the opinions of the theologians, especially Peter Lombard. They saw in the episcopacy a *dignitas*, not an *ordo*. A second canonical opinion may be found in the writings of Sicardus of Cremona and the author of the *Summa "Imperatorie maiestati."* These authors admitted that there was a difference in office and in power to administer the sacraments between bishops and simple priests, but this difference derives from ecclesiastical institution. Originally no such distinction had existed; it was introduced for disciplinary reasons.

Finally, the opinion which came to predominate among the canonists was introduced by Huguccio. The difference between bishops and simple priests was one of name, administration, office, and power over the sacraments. This difference had existed in the Church from the beginning. Therefore, Huguccio concluded, the episcopacy is properly to be considered an *ordo*.

The Decretists did admit two distinctive features concerning the episcopacy. First, the episcopacy could be conferred only upon a priest, while the other *ordines* were not thought to depend upon previously-received *ordines*. Second, the powers associated with the episcopal *ordo* could be commissioned by the pope to one who had not received the episcopal *ordo*. The basis for these two conclusions was the *praxis ecclesiae*, which for the canonists was normative.

It is important for an understanding of the conclusions of the canonists to realize their point of departure. They began their considerations with the complex totality of the episcopacy as they found this described in the *Decretum*. The theologians of the time, on the other hand, began with the Eucharist and defined priesthood in terms of power to consecrate the bread and wine. The canonists viewed the priesthood as the whole; the bishop possessed the fulness of the priesthood, while the simple priest did not. The theologians viewed the power over the Eucharist as the whole; because the simple priest possessed this power in its entirety, the bishop's power was thought to be other than priestly power.

The Decretalists added precision to two ideas which had already begun to appear in the Decretists. They elaborated the distinction between power of order and power of jurisdiction. With the help of this distinction they explained what the bishop-elect received at the confirmation of his election (jurisdiction) and what he received at his consecration (order). They also examined the foundation for papal commission of episcopal functions to simple priests. They placed this foundation in the pope's *plenitudo potestatis*. A complete treatment of this development would move far beyond the scope of the present study.<sup>169</sup> It is sufficient to note here that the canonists between the time of Gratian and Hostiensis (1140-1270) elaborated a theory of the episcopacy which was consistent with the relevant historical facts, the practice of the Church, and ecclesiastical legislation. They discovered a principle of permanence in the episcopal *ordo* and *potestas ordinis*; they discovered a principle of flexibility in the papal power by which the pope could modify but not take away the bishop's power of order.

*Aquinas Institute School of Theology  
Dubuque, Iowa.*

<sup>169</sup> In the thirteenth century and throughout the writings of the Decretists and publicists involved in the conciliarist struggles, there is a complex relationship developing between the pope's "plenitudo potestatis" and the jurisdiction which he possessed both within and without the Church; the pope's power must, in turn, be related to the jurisdiction possessed by each local bishop; finally, the jurisdictional powers of pope and bishops must be related to their sacramental powers. For the development of these ideas in the later Middle Ages, cf. Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism*, (Cambridge, 1955); John Watt, *op. cit.*; Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists*, (Cambridge, 1963).

# The Structure of Vision in “Apocalypsis Goliae”

F. X. NEWMAN

**I**F the number of extant manuscripts is a dependable index, the satirical *Apocalypse* of the irreverent “Bishop Golias” was a very popular poem in its day.<sup>1</sup> Modern estimates, however, have been somewhat less enthusiastic. Although scholars have occasionally commented favorably on the wit of the piece — which is certainly ingenious and biting, if somewhat strained — they have at the same time found it very badly constructed. Witness the exasperation of one of the poem’s editors:

Cette longue satire n’est pas, au point de vue littéraire, vraiment digne de remarque. Il y a sans doute quelques traits d’esprit; mais il n’est pas du tout certain qu’ils soient originaux. Ce qui appartient plus sûrement à l’auteur, ce sont les défauts de son œuvre. Elle est d’abord très mal composée; la première partie ne tient au reste par aucun lien. Il ne suffit pas de donner à une pièce le titre d’Apocalypse pour avoir le droit d’y mêler toutes sortes de choses incohérentes.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of the present essay is to suggest that such accusations of formlessness are mistaken. If the *Apocalypsis Goliae* is placed in its proper intellectual context, it will be recognized as a much more carefully shaped (and, perhaps for that reason, a better) poem than its critics have hitherto allowed.

First, however, we should understand exactly what it is that has given rise to the view that the poem is incoherent, “très mal composée.” Golias opens with a setting of the scene: it is noon on a warm spring day and the narrator has taken refuge from the heat under the shade of a large oak. As he lies there, he is suddenly confronted by the rather bizarre shade of Pythagoras, who leads him into a “terram alteram.” This land is not described, but is said to be peopled by a “plebem innumeram” composed of *auctores* like Priscian, Aristotle, Virgil, and Hippocrates. The poet provides a lengthy list of such ancients and with the conclusion of the list

<sup>1</sup> See the census of MSS printed in Karl Strecker’s edition, *Die Apokalypse des Golias, Texte zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters*, 5 (Rome, 1928), 1-7. All quotations are from this edition.

<sup>2</sup> J. B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale et autres bibliothèques*, 29, 2 (1880), 291-292.

the first section of the poem (strophes 1-13) ends. As we have seen, Hauréau finds this part of the poem unrelated to what follows, and F. J. E. Raby agrees, describing the opening section as "not very well related to the rest of the narrative" and "irrelevant."<sup>3</sup>

The transition to the second section of the poem is abrupt:

Dum vulgi censeo gestus innumeri,  
accessit angelus prefulgens sideri,  
qui dixit, 'Suspice ! Oculos aperi  
et vide, cito que oportet fieri !' (strophe 14)

Obedient to the angel's command, Golias looks upward and is thereupon drawn into the heavens "in spiritu." This last phrase is quoted from Apoc. 1:10 and marks the beginning of the direct Apocalyptic parody in the work. The vision that subsequently unfolds constitutes the bulk of the poem (strophes 14-104). The essential action of this second of Golias' visions is the progressive unbinding of the Book of the Seven Seals, a satirical parody of Apoc. 5-8. In the Apocalypse according to Golias each chapter of the mystic Book is a fresh revelation of clerical corruption, beginning with the avarice of the Pope and descending to the sluttish gluttony of monks. Although this ferocious anatomy of the clergy is clearly the main satiric burden of the poem, Golias does not stop there, but adds six more strophes, which relate yet a third vision and form a comic coda to the poem. The final vision derives, not from the Biblical Apocalypse, but from St. Paul's famous narrative of heavenly rapture in II Corin. 12:2-4: Golias is carried into the third heaven, where he, as Paul did before him, witnesses mysteries unutterable by man. This section of the poem is brief, and for good reason. Golias tells us regretfully that while in the third heaven he made the mistake of eating some poppy bread and washing it down with a draught of Lethe water, a dinner that caused him to forget everything he had seen in the third heaven. Karl Strecker, the most recent editor of the poem, is skeptical of the relevance of this third vision: "Mit [strophe] 104 schliesst die Vision, die Versetzung in den dritten Himmel und die Erlebnisse daselbst sind ohne Motieverung daran geklebt und verlaufen völlig im Sande."<sup>4</sup>

The *Apocalypsis Goliae*, then, is very clearly divided into a series of three separate visions: a preliminary confrontation with a vast crowd of ancient wise men; the central parody of John's Apocalypse (or, specifically, of its earlier chapters); and a brief burlesque of the Pauline *raptus*. The structural

<sup>3</sup> *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 1957), 2, 216.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Apokalypse des Golias*, p. 36 n.

problem is not one of clarity, but of relevance: why does Golias surround his pseudo-Apocalyptic satire of the clergy with two other visions of doubtful appropriateness? If we propose to find formal coherence in the poem we must show that there is a reason for *three* visions, rather than one; that there is a reason for *these* three visions; and that there is a reason for arranging them in *this* particular order.

Such reasons are to be found just where we might expect to find them: in contemporary comments on the nature of the Apocalyptic vision. Golias's poem is a work of the late twelfth century, appearing at a time when the Johannine Apocalypse was receiving a great deal of attention from exegetes and spiritual writers. One focus of such attention was the nature of vision experience itself. What does it mean to say that the Apocalypse was a "vision"? The following (from Honorius of Autun) is typical of the way this question was answered:

Significative quoque tres coeli leguntur; quia tres visiones, scilicet sensualis, spiritualis, intellectualis a sapientibus non nesciuntur. Sensualis quippe visio est, cum colores et formas rerum exterius cernimus, sed interius aliquid celari, ut in litteris significantiam intelligimus. Haec ergo visio primum et sensuale coelum nominatur, quia in scripturis intelligentia celatur. Coelum etenim a celando denominatur. Secunda visio spiritualis est, qua non res, sed imagines rebus similes spiritualiter videmus, sicut in somniis solemus, et sicut Joannem in Apocalypsi, et Prophetas multa vidiisse novimus: et haec visio secundum coelum nuncupatur, quia vere res in his similitudinibus celantur. Tertia visio est intellectualis, cum neque res exterius, neque imagines rerum interius, sed ipsas substantias prout vere sunt, abstractis coloribus intellectu conspicimus, et uniuscujusque qualitatem inter se differentem ratione discernimus: et haec visio tertium coelum vocatur, quia veritas rerum in hac, quasi in coelo, a stultis celatur. Igitur si Apostolus in corpore est raptus, tunc ad corporeum coelum, scilicet firmamentum, est perductus: si autem extra corpus, quod magis videtur, tunc utique ad intellectuale coelum raptus creditur, in quo essentiam deitatis sicuti est, et angelicas substantias prout sunt, non sensualiter, quod nequit fieri nisi per corpus, nec spiritualiter, quod non fit nisi per imagines rebus similes; sed veraciter, quod non fit nisi ipso intellectu, vidiisse cognoscitur.<sup>5</sup>

This analysis of vision into three distinct kinds is by no means original with Honorius, but derives, directly or indirectly, from St. Augustine, particularly from the very influential final book of his *De Genesi ad litteram*.<sup>6</sup> In order to see how relevant the Augustinian scheme of vision is to a reading of *Apocalypsis Goliae*, it will be useful to summarize Augustine's theory and sketch its influence on the exegesis of the canonical Apocalypse.

<sup>5</sup> *De cognitione verae vitae*, xlivi (PL, 40:1028-1029). On Honorius's authorship, see *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 7, 148-149.

<sup>6</sup> Ed. Iosephus Zycha, CSEL, 28 (1):379-435.

In Books I-XI of the *De Genesi ad litteram* Augustine covers only the first three chapters of Genesis, concluding with a commentary on man's expulsion from Eden. In the twelfth and final book he turns from consecutive exegesis of the text to an expansive meditation on what he calls "the question of paradise." Since the text Augustine chooses as the touchstone of this meditation is II Corin. 12:2-4 (the Pauline *raptus*), the conclusion of *De Genesi ad litteram* becomes a discussion of man's return to paradise, the completion of the cycle whose beginning is narrated in the opening chapters of Genesis. The specific reason for the choice of the Pauline text is the problem raised by the saint's allusion to the "third heaven." Is the third heaven synonymous with *paradisus*? If so, what are the other two "heavens"? Eventually (faithful to his promise to handle the question "liberius et prolixius") Augustine answers that the three Pauline "heavens" are a figure for the three modes of human vision, that is, the three fundamental modes of knowledge available to man. The first of these is the *visio corporalis*, that is, the literal sight of the eye, the perception of physical objects. In a wider sense corporeal vision signifies sensation in general, not simply that of the eye. The second "heaven" is equivalent to the *visio spiritualis*, the exercise of the imaginative faculty. In spiritual vision we perceive *imagines*, *similitudines*, *ficta*, etc.: corporeal objects which are not present to the senses. The third "heaven" is the *visio intellectualis*, the direct intellectual perception of realities, such as God, the angels, or charity, which have neither corporeal form nor corporeal substance. Sensation, imagination, and intellection are thus the three ways by which man knows whatever he knows, but Augustine insists that they are most importantly the ways by which man knows God. Thus Moses looking at the burning bush, or Balthasar watching the divine hand, saw (or knew) God by means of corporeal vision. St. John, in the Apocalyptic vision, saw God by means of figures and images, and Augustine repeatedly cites the Apocalypse as a prime example of the *visio spiritualis*. Paul, of course, was uniquely privileged to see God directly, without the intervention of images, and his rapture is for Augustine the great model of the *visio intellectualis*. In citing Biblical examples of the three visions Augustine is at pains to distinguish the modes from each other, but he also emphasizes that "vision" is essentially a continuum. The three visions are related in a hierarchical sequence: in normal experience sensation is primary, but its images are soon translated into the phantasms of imagination, and these in turn are the material from which are drawn the imageless ideas of the intellect.

There is nothing in all this that is not a commonplace of classical philosophy. Nevertheless, Augustine's schema was widely influential. The characterization of the modes of knowledge as "visions," as well as the

examples Augustine used, made his formulation a useful exegetical tool for the discussion of Biblical visions and dreams. This is particularly true of the tradition of commentary on the Apocalypse. By Carolingian times the connection between Augustine's three visions and the vision of St. John appears to have become conventional. Thus Alcuin in the preface to his commentary asks about the "qualitas" of John's vision and answers: "Tres itaque visionum modos patres nostri intelligendos docuerunt: corporalem... spiritalem... intellectualis...."<sup>7</sup> Aimoin of Auxerre, writing not long after, copies Alcuin almost verbatim: "Tria namque genera visionum patres nostri intelligenda dixerunt: primum scilicet corporale.... Secundum spiritale.... Tertium genus est intellectuale...."<sup>8</sup> Though neither names Augustine, the description of the three visions each gives is a straightforward condensation of the *De Genesi ad litteram*, XII. In another context, however, Aimoin specifically praises Augustine's theory of vision as a "more profound and loftier" explanation of Paul's rapture than that given by any other Father.<sup>9</sup>

In the twelfth century, the period of the *Apocalypsis Goliae*, the Augustinian doctrine of vision was especially influential. It was a tool of many uses, as the following examples will suggest. Hugh of St. Victor uses the formula in order to effect a schematic comparison of the three kinds of visions, of dreams, and of prophecies,<sup>10</sup> while Alanus de Insulis uses it to characterize the three kinds of sleep.<sup>11</sup> William of St. Thierry finds it a convenient means of specifying the nature of the beatific vision,<sup>12</sup> John of Salisbury uses it to explain the three varieties of "supreme contemplation,"<sup>13</sup> and Clarembaldus of Arras makes it a paradigm of the three modes of prophecy.<sup>14</sup> We even find the sequence of three visions used as the structural principle of extended works, a fact relevant to our immediate concern with Golias's poem. One example is Honorius of Autun's *Scala Coeli Major*.<sup>15</sup> Subtitled "De ordine cognoscendi Deum in creaturis," the organizing metaphor of this treatise is the ladder which leads the

<sup>7</sup> *Commentarius in Apocalypsin*, praefatio (PL, 100:1089).

<sup>8</sup> *Expositio in Apocalypsin*, praefatio (PL, 117:938-40).

<sup>9</sup> *In divi Pauli Epistolas expositio*, in II Cor. 12 (PL, 117:661).

<sup>10</sup> *Adnotatiunculae elucidatoria in Joelem prophetam* (PL, 175:355-356). On the disputed authorship of this work see Roger Bacon, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1957), pp. xxxi-xxxii, n.

<sup>11</sup> *Summa de arte praedicatoria*, vii, xlviii (PL, 210:126, 195-196).

<sup>12</sup> *Aenigma fidei* (PL, 180:399-405).

<sup>13</sup> *De septem septenis*, vi (PL, 199:959-960).

<sup>14</sup> *Tractatulus*, 7, ed. N. Haring, *AHDLM*A, 22 (1955), 202.

<sup>15</sup> PL, 172:1229-1240.

Christian to the third heaven by means of three “ordines graduum”: corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual vision. A similar structure appears in the *De discretione animae, spiritus, et mentis*, a short work variously attributed to Achard of St. Victor and Gilbert of Poitiers.<sup>16</sup> The treatise is an analysis of the powers of the soul, and the author divides them into three: *anima*, *spiritus*, and *mens*. In characterizing these powers Gilbert (or Achard), emphasizing epistemology, uses Augustine’s formula for vision (and even some of his language): *anima* is the faculty “quae per instrumenta corporis ad ultimas rerum species... pertendit;” *spiritus* is the “potentia corporalium rerum imagines non corporales iuxta sensus similitudinem percipiendi;” and *mens* is “ratio,” “intelligentia.”<sup>17</sup> These examples suggest something of the range of influence that the Augustinian vision formula had in the twelfth century,<sup>18</sup> but perhaps its commonest single use was in exegeses of the Apocalypse. As in the Carolingian commentaries cited earlier, the three visions were used to “place” John’s experience. The *Glossa Ordinaria*, for example, raises the problem of the visionary character of the Apocalypse almost at the outset:

Sed quia constat hanc revelationem factam esse visione videndum est sub quo genere visionis est. Visio enim alia corporalis est alia spiritualis: alia intellectualis.<sup>19</sup>

The gloss then goes on to give a conventionally condensed summary of the three visions and concludes that John saw images by means of spiritual vision, but understood their significance intellectually. If we examine the opening pages of other twelfth-century Apocalypse commentaries — such

<sup>16</sup> Ed. Germain Morin, *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, suppl. III, 251-262). See also Nicholas M. Haring, “Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the ‘De Discretione animae, spiritus et mentis’ commonly attributed to Achard of Saint Victor,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 148-191. Haring’s discussion of the sources of the treatise does not mention Augustine. Jean Chatillon restores the treatise to Achard in *AHDLMA*, 31 (1964), 7-35.

<sup>17</sup> Morin, 256, 258, 259.

<sup>18</sup> For further instances see the Gilbertian treatise *Sententiae divinitatis*, ed. Bernhard Geyer (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, VII [2-3], 1\*-3\*); Alanus de Insulis, *Distinctiones dictiorum theologiae*, sc. *visio* (PL, 210:1007); Hugh of St. Victor, *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli*, II Cor., xxxv (PL, 175:552); *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolas Pauli e Schola Petri Abelardi*, ed. Artur Landgraf (Notre Dame, 1937-45), 2, 330; Herveus of Bourg-Dieu, *Commentaria in Isaiam*, prologus, and *Commentaria in Epistolas Pauli*, II Cor., 12 (PL, 181: 19-20, 1113-1114); Garnerius of Clairvaux, *Sermones*, III (PL, 205:583-586); Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae in festa totius anni*, lxxiii (PL, 174: 998-999); and Innocent III, *Sermones*, ii, xxxii (PL, 217:319-324, 592-593).

<sup>19</sup> *Biblia latina...* (Basel, Johann Froben and Johann Petri, 1498), VI, sig. M2v.

as those of Gilbert of Poitiers,<sup>20</sup> Rupert of Deutz,<sup>21</sup> Richard of St. Victor,<sup>22</sup> and St. Martin of Leon<sup>23</sup> — we find a similar pattern.

All of this evidence suggests that it would have been difficult for a literate author of the late twelfth century to be unaware either of the Augustinian analysis of vision or of its relevance to the last book of the Bible. When, therefore, we are confronted, as we are in the case of *Apocalypsis Goliae*, with a late twelfth century poem by an obviously learned and sophisticated poet, cast in the form of a mock Apocalypse, and arranged in a series of three distinct visions, we may suspect the influence of Augustine's schema. Examination of the text confirms this suspicion.

The most difficult problem in making such a connection arises at the outset: how can Augustine's category of corporeal vision be related to Golias' opening vision of the *auctores*? In the second and third sections of the poem Golias and Augustine both use the same examples: Apocalypse for the second vision and Paul's rapture for the third. But Augustine's Biblical examples of corporeal vision (Balthasar's vision of the writing hand, for instance) are nothing like the crowd of sages whom Golias first confronts. There are, I think, two points to be made in this connection. First, we should note that the figures of the first vision are not selected randomly, but comprise a conspectus of the *artes*. Priscian, Aristotle, Cicero, Ptolemy, Boethius, Euclid, and Pythagoras are the first seven named and represent the traditional seven arts; Virgil, Ovid, Persius, and Statius are next, and stand for the varieties of poetic art; and Hippocrates, the last figure named, represents the practical art of medicine. With the possible exception of Boethius, this is a roster of pagan authorities, each embodying a branch of natural knowledge. In other words, the crowd of *auctores* is in effect a synopsis of the arts and thus a summation of the varieties of knowledge based upon sense perception. As John of Salisbury puts it, "Sic itaque sensus corporis, qui prima vis aut primum exercitum anime est, omnium artium preiacit fundamenta..."<sup>24</sup> John's "sensus corporis" and Augustine's "visio corporalis" are both names for the same mode of knowledge. In using the *artes* as his embodiment of corporeal vision,

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, VI, sig. M2. Gilbert's prologue to his commentary was commonly used as a preface to the *Gloss* on the Apocalypse: see Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1952), 61.

<sup>21</sup> *Commentaria in Apocalypsim*, I, i (PL, 169:851-852).

<sup>22</sup> *In Apocalypsim*, I, i (PL, 196:686-687). Richard's gloss is, to my knowledge, unique in that he increases the number of visions to four. He does so by dividing corporeal vision into two kinds, significant and non-significant.

<sup>23</sup> *Expositio libri Apocalypsis*, preface (PL, 209:300).

<sup>24</sup> *Metalogicon* IV, i, ed. Clemens C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), 174.

rather than one of the conventional Augustinian examples, "Golias" only reveals his contemporaneity. The procedure can be compared to that of Godfrey of St. Victor's *Fons Philosophiae*, in which the arts, liberal and practical, form the propaedeutic to the knowledge based on revelation.

Golias' initial vision corresponds to Augustine's corporeal vision in still another way. Pythagoras, who is the visionary's guide through the first vision, appears in a peculiar shape, that of a man-book, "totum explicans corpus pro codice."<sup>25</sup> Golias, in fact, "reads" Pythagoras, or at least, the dark characters engraved in his *corpus-codex*. This odd procedure corresponds to an aspect of Augustine's explanation of corporeal vision. One illustration used in the *De Genesi ad litteram* to explain the nature of the three visions is the process of grasping the meaning of a text such as the precept "Love thy neighbor as thyself." In understanding this, or any text, says Augustine, one begins with the exercise of corporeal vision, that is, with the physical reading of the letters. Spiritual vision comes next as we try to create a phantasm of the absent "neighbor" and intellectual vision as we contemplate the meaning of "love."<sup>26</sup> This identification of corporeal vision with the act of reading the *litterae* of a text recurs in later versions of Augustine's doctrine; as we saw above, Honorius of Autun characterizes the first kind of vision as that "cum colores et formas rerum exterius cernimus, sed interius aliquid celari, ut in litteris significantiam intelligimus."<sup>27</sup>

In its emphasis, then, on the liberal and practical arts and its picture of a man-book as guide, the first of Golias' visions corresponds to Augustine's first level of vision, knowledge by means of sense perception. The connections between the remaining two sections of the poem and Augustine's schema are more manifest. As we have seen, Augustine and many later writers use the Apocalypse as an instance of the *visio spiritualis*, and Golias' second vision is a pseudo-Apocalypse. But the correspondence extends beyond the parallel of subject matter. Spiritual vision, in Augustine's scheme, is knowledge by means of images, that is, by means of shapes

<sup>25</sup> Strophe 6 (ed. Strecker, p. 17). Pythagoras is a "man transformed into a book," in the words of E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, tr. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1953), 317. The motif of the body as book in the poem is extended to the antique sages of the first vision: "per frontes singulas traducens lumina,/ vidi quorumlibet inscripta nomina" (Strophe 9, p. 17).

<sup>26</sup> *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, 11 (CSEL, 28 [1]:392-393)

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Herveus of Bourg-Dieu, PL, 181:1113. Godfrey of Admont draws a parallel between corporeal vision and the *sensus litteralis* of Scripture: "...sicut triplex est visio, corporis, spiritus, et mentis, ita triplex etiam sensus est in Scripturis sanctis, litteralis, spiritualis, intellectualis," *Hymniae*, lxxiii (PL, 174:999).

which have corporeal form, but lack corporeal substance. It is just such figurative insight that Golias is promised in his second vision. Once again a book is central, but a different kind of book:

Post hec apposuit cum septem titulis  
signatum codicem septem signaculis  
dicens: 'Respicias intentis oculis,  
que nota facies terrarum circulis.

Est vite presulum codex hic conscious,  
quod per signacula videtur clarius,  
nam intus clauditur detestabilius,  
et laudabilia pendent exterius.'<sup>28</sup>

The angel who has replaced Pythagoras as guide for this section of the poem describes the book of the seven seals as a vehicle of figurative revelation: Golias sees, in this case, "per signacula." The word *signacula* could be, in twelfth-century usage, synonymous with *imagines*,<sup>29</sup> and Golias here uses it in this sense, but with a witty reversal of the meaning: since the topic is the lives of the bishops, the manifest image (the external *integumentum*) is fair, while the significance of the image (the internal truth) is foul. Perhaps the joke is a deliberate inversion of the sense of the Dionysian theory of *dissimilia symbola* (sublime truth conveyed by ignoble images), an idea that appears occasionally in discussions of the imagery of the Apocalypse.<sup>30</sup> Whatever the degree of sophistication, however, the point to notice is that Golias, in accord with a long tradition of commentary, announces his pseudo-Apocalypse as a vision of images (*signacula*), the same kind of vision Augustine called *spiritualis* or *imaginativa*.

Golias and Augustine agree, finally, in making Paul's rapture the exemplar of their third visions. Augustine's *visio intellectualis* is the unmediated confrontation of immaterial reality, knowledge involved in no way with corporeality. Golias' vision is likewise unmediated: there is no guide for this part of the poem, just as there is none in St. Paul's account of his experience, and it is of immaterial reality:

Ad summi indicis tractus concilia  
inter tot milies centena milia  
profunda didici dei consilia  
humanis mentibus inscrutabilia.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Strophes 21-22 (ed. Strecker, p. 20).

<sup>29</sup> See Theodore Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris," MP, 46 (1948-49), 113.

<sup>30</sup> For example, in Richard of St. Victor's commentary, PL, 196: 687-690.

<sup>31</sup> Strophe 106 (ed. Strecker, p. 36).

But Golias has his joke here, too. At this moment of supremely incorporeal experience, his stomach growls and he eats a most inopportune meal:

Que postquam noveram, statim esurii  
michique proceres magni consilii  
panem papaveris proponunt, alii  
Lethei laticem propinant fluvii.<sup>32</sup>

The poem ends with a sigh of regret from the visionary over what he *might* have reported had he not eaten unwisely. Even in the third heaven Golias cannot ignore the claims of the flesh, and we should notice the deliberate wit of the device. Several times in the course of the poem Golias puts into his own mouth the famous disclaimer of St. Paul: "whether in the body or out of the body, I know not. God knows." Augustine was also struck by the phrase and eventually resolved Paul's uncertainty by reasoning that the Apostle must certainly have been "out" of the body in the third heaven of incorporeal vision. Golias, while echoing Paul's phrase, leaves us in no doubt that *he* was very much "in" the body when in the third heaven. Being Golias, how could he ever be anything but in — and of — the body? As with his play on *signacula* in the second vision, Golias again comically inverts the conventional sense of his source material. Neither Paul nor Golias can report on his vision of the third heaven, Paul because he utterly overcame the senses, Golias because the senses overcame him.

The *Apocalypsis Goliae*, then, does have a coherent structure, one based squarely on a contemporarily popular method of glossing the Johannine Apocalypse. But, once we have recognized this unifying pattern, we can also see the structure of the poem is more than a response to current exegetical fashion; it is rather an act of significant wit. Whoever wrote the *Apocalypsis Goliae* could very easily have limited the poem to the central section of clerical satire and avoided any potential confusion, but he did not. Rather he chose to complicate his form in order to gain poetic ends that the simpler structure could not attain. As we now have it, the main interest of the poem still lies in the central vision, but by expanding the poem briefly at either end the author has converted a mock Apocalypse into something more, a mocking act of *total* vision. By tacitly alluding to the conventional Augustinian schema, the form of the poem implies that Golias is not merely a witness to contemporary ecclesiastical rot, but a visionary who has seen all. On the level of natural knowledge he is acquainted with the ancient masters of the various arts; on the level of imaginative insight, he has pierced the *integumentum* under which the clergy conceals its vice; on the level of intellectual vision, he has soared to the direct confrontation

<sup>32</sup> Strophe 107 (ed. Strecker, p. 36).

of divinity. Dante said he was not Aeneas, nor Paul; Golias will have nothing to do with such modesty. He is Aeneas and Paul, and John as well. As master of the three visions, he is master of the three ways man has of knowing. In thus laying implicit claim to unparalleled knowledge, Golias solves a problem common to poems of vision, that of rhetorical authority. The structure of the poem provides him automatically with the right to expose clerical corruption, because he, in effect, knows everything.

But what the poem implicitly claims with one hand, it throws away with the other. *Apocalypsis Goliae* is, after all, parody and, while it sweeps its seer to the summit of vision, it disperses that vision with the pang of an empty stomach. The concluding device of transferring focus from the mysteries of the heavenly court to the workings of the narrator's digestive system recalls that Augustine's theory was not the only way to explain the vision experience. The Middle Ages knew that dreams and visions came from below as well as above: "ex inanitate ventris" is Gregory's phrase for one of the frequent causes of dreams.<sup>33</sup> By concluding his vision with a rumble in the belly, Golias reminds us that there are less than glorious reasons for vision and he also reminds us that he is Golias, a poetic *persona* who never takes himself with utter seriousness.

The complex form of *Apocalypsis Goliae* is a deliberate artistic device and in recognizing it we can perceive something of the special tone that marks the poems of Golias — that "charming literary phantom," as Raby calls him. The Goliardic spirit at its most sophisticated combines a genuine moral vehemence with a sly self-mockery. The open eye of the satirist is trained inwardly as well as outwardly. It is this complexity of attitude that is appropriately reflected, in the Goliardic Apocalypse, by a meaningful complexity of form.<sup>34</sup>

*State University of New York, Harpur College*

<sup>33</sup> *Moralia*, VIII, xxiv, 42 (PL, 75:827).

<sup>34</sup> For a further, and more complex, instance of the influence of Augustine's doctrine of vision on medieval poetry, see my article, "St. Augustine's Three Visions and the Structure of the *Commedia*," *MLN*, 82 (1967), 56-78.

## Dante's Notion of a Shade: Purgatorio xxv

ETIENNE GILSON

THE art of Dante is so imperious and compelling that, as with Michael Angelo's and Beethoven's, when its spell has taken hold of us, the artist can make us believe what he pleases. I know from personal experience that one can read the *Divine Comedy* for many years without wondering about the nature and origin of the beings called by Dante *ombre* and by us *shades*. Yet the Sacred Poem is full of such beings. Shades make up the bulk of the population in hell and purgatory and we take them for granted; but as soon as we begin to ask questions about their nature, difficulties make themselves felt.

A poet highly conscious of his own art, Dante wondered about the nature of these poetic beings; and speaking as a poet with intense speculative interests, he asked himself how such beings could be conceived.

The question offered itself to his mind (at least, according to his own poetic convention, and perhaps too in historical reality) in the *Purgatorio* III, 16-45. Dante and Virgil are walking with the setting sun behind them. Suddenly Dante realizes that while his body casts a shadow before him, Virgil's shade does not. For one moment Dante wonders whether Virgil has deserted him. But no, the shade of Virgil is still with him; but a shade is not a body. Virgil's true body, the one that used to cast a shadow, is not in Purgatory; it now lies buried in Naples. "That no shadow falls in front of me," says Virgil, "is in no wise more surprising than that light beams do not interfere with one another in the skies." Virgil is here replying to a question which Dante had not asked, and which might well have been let pass. But Virgil went on: "The Power who does not intend to unveil to us his doings, makes such bodies susceptible to sufferings caused by heat and cold. That man is insane who hopes by reason to follow to its end the infinite road taken by one substance in three persons.<sup>1</sup> O men, content yourselves with knowing *that* it is so, for if you were able to know all, there would have been no need for Mary to conceive. You have seen, vainly thirsting for knowledge like this, men for whom such knowledge would have satisfied the very longing now given them as their eternal sorrow. I speak of Aristotle and of Plato, and of many others." Whereupon, bending his brow, Virgil ceased to speak and remained troubled.

Dante could just as well have asked the question in his *Inferno*, but he did not. Moreover, it is remarkable that, having first asked it in the third

book of the *Purgatorio*, he seems to have lost sight of it for over twenty cantos, for he does not take it up again until the twenty fifth canto of the *Purgatorio*, on the occasion of the sixth Beatitude: *Beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt justitiam*.<sup>1</sup> After submitting it to a rather bold reinterpretation, with which we are not now concerned, the poet divides it into two parts *esuriunt* and *sitiunt*; furthermore, he places those who thirst for justice before those who hunger for it; in fine he understands by those who thirst for justice, those who desire what it is fitting to desire and who desire it as it should be desired. The best way to understand who these men are, is to look at their opposites in purgatory, to wit, the avaricious, whom God punishes for their unruly love of gold, and also the prodigals who, on the contrary, squander away riches of which the right use could be beneficial to others.<sup>2</sup> The second half of the Beatitude concerns the men who hunger for justice. Their opposites in purgatory are the gluttons and, generally speaking, those guilty of intemperance. To conclude: "Those are blest, in whom grace so abounds, that the love of the pleasures of taste does not burn too fiercely in their breasts and that they always hunger just as much as is right." (*Purg.* XXIV, 151-154).

The punishment of the intemperates is appropriate. The population of the twenty fourth canto of the *Purgatorio* consists of shades so exceedingly lean that, for one who has seen them in life, they now are past recognition. They are doubly shadowy shades. What has reduced them to this pitiful condition is the very torture to which many of our own contemporaries submit themselves, if not with pleasure, at least of their own accord; namely *la dieta*, diet, the abstention from food.<sup>3</sup> As is the rule in the *Divine Comedy*, Virgil is at that moment aware that Dante is eager to ask a question, and as he encourages him to speak his mind, Dante naturally asks

<sup>1</sup> Matt. 5: 6: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after justice." On the subject of this article, see my *Trois études dantesques pour le VII<sup>e</sup> centenaire de la naissance de Dante*, in AHDLMA, 32 (1965) 71-126. The present essay is a recasting of the first of those three studies: "Qu'est-ce qu'une ombre?" 71-93. I shall take the liberty of making cross references to the documentation found in the French article which the present article completes in a number of ways but especially by taking into account the survival of the popular belief in ghosts found in the writings of the Fathers of the Church such as Augustine and Gregory the Great. The two articles are complementary and should be read in relation to each other.

<sup>2</sup> "And those whose longing is after justice he [the Angel] had called *beati*, but his words said it with *sitiunt*, without adding anything." *Purgatorio*, XXII, 4-7. So, in Dante's own version of the sixth beatitude, the first men to be mentioned are those who thirst after righteousness. Hunger is introduced, as a second part of the same beatitude, in canto XXIV, 151-154: "And I heard him say: *Beati...*", etc.

<sup>3</sup> A shadow here observes that, in what follows, there is no harm in mentioning the proper names, for they have been so changed by fasting that they now are unrecognizable: "da ch'è si muta / nostra sembienza via per la dieta." *Purg.*, XXIV, 17-18.

the question present to the minds of all his readers: How can one lose weight by dieting in a place where there is no need to eat?<sup>4</sup>

And indeed that is a good question. Whatever their nature, the shades of Hades are mere images of their former bodies; they are some sort of spooks, merely spectral beings; how to make spectres become still leaner than they naturally are, is indeed quite a proposition. Fully aware of the difficulty, the poet will proceed to a precise description of their nature: What kind of being is a shade?

The shades, *le ombre*, are not real bodies. The shadow projected by a body is not itself a body, yet it is at least visible and it more or less resembles its body. The shades too are sorts of shadows, so they are not nothing, but they are something for the sight only: *O ombre vane fuor che nell' aspetto!* At the moment he is saying these words Virgil has just experienced their truth, for indeed, as a shade had approached him with the manifest intention of embracing him with great affection, Virgil had obeyed the urge to reciprocate, but in vain, for he had had to realize that the shade was for him something to see, nothing to touch: "Thrice did I clasp my hands behind him, and thrice did I clasp them on my own breast."<sup>5</sup> In other words, if one attempts to embrace a shade, his arms and hands go through it. And the shades themselves are painfully aware of their condition. In another passage of the *Purgatorio*, the poet Statius suddenly realizes that his interlocutor is Virgil, the same poet for whom he has just expressed feelings of warm admiration; deeply moved, he wants to kneel before the master and to kiss his feet, but Virgil stops him: "No, brother, don't, for you are a shade and what you see is a shade." Whereupon, rising to its feet, the shade of Statius exclaims: "Now at least you can see the extent of my love for you, since it causes me to forget our emptiness and treat a shade as if it were a substantial reality."<sup>6</sup>

We all resemble Statius in this respect. Were we wise enough to read Dante for our pleasure, we would let well enough alone and ask no questions. Only, this time, Dante himself is asking the question. We know it is a characteristic feature of Dante's poetry that, in it, beauty and truth, *bellezza* and *bontà*, should always be both distinguished and united. Moreover, Dante was of the opinion that the pleasure of enjoying the substantial truth of the poem was greater than that of feeling its beauty.<sup>7</sup> Hence the belated scruple he seems to have felt when, reaching about the middle of

<sup>4</sup> *Purg.*, XXV, 20-21.

<sup>5</sup> *Purg.*, II, 79-81.

<sup>6</sup> *Purg.*, XXI, 130-136.

<sup>7</sup> *Convivio*, II, 12.

the Sacred Poem, he realized that, ever since the beginning of the *Inferno*, he had been talking of shades, and to shades, without pausing one moment to consider their nature. What is a shade of Hades? How are such beings born? Why do these unsubstantial images resemble their former bodies? How do the souls of the shades manage to move them at will, to make them talk and cry as they formerly used to do when they animated their bodies before death?

In order to answer these questions, Dante resorts to the scientific embryogeny of Aristotle as perfected by the theology of Thomas Aquinas. The production of the shades in the netherworld will be conceived after the pattern of the production of the body by the soul in this present life. How it is that that which is produced in the other world is but a shade, not a real living body, is what Dante will attempt to make clear for us.

The origin of the formation of the body is the blood of the father. That blood is not completely absorbed by the veins through which it flows; what of it is left is saved for future use. In the heart, that blood acquires a formative virtue (or formative power) that will enable it to shape all the limbs of the future body. It will turn itself into these limbs, just as it turns itself into the veins in which it is contained. After undergoing a second digestion in the heart, the blood flows down into certain organs it is better to leave unnamed and, thence again, it trickles into a natural vessel of another human being (i.e. the female), so that it falls upon somebody else's blood. There the two bloods blend together, one of them (the female blood) being passive by natural disposition, while the other one is active in virtue of the perfection of the form in which it originates. As soon as it is in the female organ, the active blood begins to operate; first it coagulates, next it vivifies the clot to which it has conferred a consistency fitting the nature of such matter. That active virtue in the blood thus becomes a soul, such as that of a plant (i.e. a vegetative soul), with this difference however, that the vegetative soul of a plant has already reached in it the term of its development, whereas the soul of a man, which is the one we are now describing, is still on its way to a further goal; the vegetative soul of a man is a future intellectual soul, that of a plant is incapable of further progress: *quest'è in via e quella è già a riva*.

The active virtue of the blood then exerts itself so strongly that the clot begins to feel and to move, like a sea fungus, and it sets about shaping up the organs of which itself is the seed. Thus born of the heart of the begetter, the plastic virtue dilates and extends itself to all the parts where nature intends to produce members. Up to this point, Dante has simply followed the embryogeny of Aristotle and of scholastic medicine, but we are here reaching the point where, after living as a sort of plant, then an animal, the embryo will become a human body animated by a rational

soul. Dante here seems to remember the controversies still active in the schools of the time, particularly at the universities of Paris and Padua, on the origin of the rational soul and its relationship with the body. The theology of Thomas Aquinas now replaces the biology of Aristotle. The first thought of Dante is of the celebrated doctrine of Averroes on the separation of the intellective power of man, and he rejects it: "Still you do not yet see how, from being an animal, the embryo becomes a child. This is a point on which a wiser man than you are has been mislead. According to his doctrine the possible intellect must needs be separated from the soul, because no organ seems to be used by that intellect." But Averroes was wrong. In fact, as soon as the structure of the brain has been perfected by the plastic force at work in the embryo, "the Prime Mover turns toward it and, rejoicing in the wonderful art of nature, He breathes into it a new spirit full of force. Gathering into its own substance whatever active virtue there is to be found, that spirit grows into one single soul that lives, feels and is able to know itself."<sup>8</sup>

So much philosophical and theological material is heaped up by Dante in these few lines that the better informed his reader is, the more discouraged he feels if he has to restate their meaning. Within the narrow space of two tercets, the poet has managed to recall (and reject) the doctrine of Averroes according to which the possible intellect is a Separate Substance; by the same token, he has taken sides with Thomas Aquinas in the then famous discussion on the unity of the substantial form in the composite, including man. Dante has done all that, in verse, and yet in a language technically so perfect that to retranslate it into the original school latin would be very easy. For instance, what is that intellective soul, in verse 75, which *sè in sè rigira*, if not the very same of which Thomas often says that it is able to reflect upon itself *reditione completa*? But the main point here seems to be the touch of Christian naturalism which represents God proudly rejoicing at the sight of the natural beauty He himself has created. The middle ages at their best here are speaking through the mouth of Dante, and their voice is one on this point with that of Thomas Aquinas.

Everything here is Thomistic: the Christian doctrine that rational souls are immediately created by God is being maintained by Dante in the same spirit, and often in the same terms, as it was in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. The sensitive soul, Thomas says, is transmitted by the begetter along with the seed; it is not immediately created by God;<sup>9</sup> on the contrary, the rational soul, which is the sole substantial form there

<sup>8</sup> *Purg.*, XXV, 70-75.

<sup>9</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 119, 1.

is in man,<sup>10</sup> cannot be caused by way of animal generation, but by way of direct creation only.<sup>11</sup> Just as he follows Thomas in theology, Dante follows Aristotle in biology and embryogeny, at least on general lines. What else could he do? Himself a theologian, he had learned biology in the schools, and to reform it was none of his business. So, according to Dante, to Thomas and to Aristotle, the seed is not borrowed from the very substance of the full grown begetter, otherwise, being itself fully formed, it would have no aptitude left to inform the different parts of the body still to be born. If it is to perform these various functions the seed must originate in some element still in potency to all the limbs and organs of the future animal it is going to animate. Now there is only one such element, blood. Only blood is in potency with respect to the whole body, because it is generated from the food before being turned into the very substance of each particular organ.<sup>12</sup> We still are following Aristotle: *semen est superfluum alimenti.*

What has all this to do with the origin and nature of the shades of Hades? Everything. I have just been following the explanation given by Statius to Dante, and the main feature of the doctrine is that, in it, the embryogeny of the shades is one particular case of the embryogeny of human beings in general. Dante himself realizes that his own poetic exposition of it makes it still more difficult to understand in verse than it would be in plain scholastic latin prose. Hoping to make things easier for the reader, he resorts to some simple comparisons. Before inviting Statius to answer Dante's question, Virgil has told the poet, banteringly, that with a little attention he could solve the problem by himself. If only, Virgil tells Dante, you did remember how the poet Meleager was destroyed by a wasted brand, the question would not look to you so hard to answer. To which he adds that if we noticed how our own images in mirrors seem to follow our movements, the answer would be at hand. Now, surely, among modern readers, few if any still remember Meleager,<sup>13</sup> and we do not see at once how images reflected in mirrors by real bodies are related to visible forms produced in empty space by bodies that do not exist.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, 1, 86, 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.*, I, 90, 2. Cf. 118,2: "non potest (anima intellectiva) causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo."

<sup>12</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 119, 2. Only blood can acquire in the heart "a tutte membra umane virtu informativa." *Purg.*, XXV, 40-41. This is what Thomas Aquinas calls to be "in potentia ad totum." — For the Aristotelian background of the doctrine, see Aristotle, *De Generatione animalium*, lib. I, cap. 17-18, cap. 21 and cap. 22. Cf. the articles of Bruno Nardi listed in AHDLMA, 32 (1965), 74, note 4.

<sup>13</sup> Ovid, *Metamorph.*, 260-546. On the meaning of that allusion, see art. cit., AHDLMA, 32 (1965), 76.

Since there is no short cut, we must fall back on our previous biological considerations.

We stopped at the moment when the blood and its active plastic virtue have brought the human body to completion. If the story looks incredible to us, Dante says, let us only consider how, when united to the juice of the grape, the heat of the sun becomes wine. At present, however, the thing is done and the body pursues the course of its life until the moment comes when Lachesis has no more thread left for it. The soul then separates itself from the body and carries away with itself the human and the divine elements it contains. All the other powers, of which the operations require the cooperation of the body, cease at once to operate while, on the contrary, memory, intelligence and will grow keener in their operations than ever before. All this expresses traditional views on the condition of the soul after death, but, thus far, the shades have no place in it. Where are the separated souls going to go between the time of the death of their bodies and the resurrection?

There are two ways of access to the netherworld, or, rather, there is only one, that which leads to hell, for the other one, which leads to purgatory, does not really lead to the netherworld, but to heaven.

As soon as it has left its body, without stopping (*senz' arrestarsi*), of its own accord (*per se stessa*) and in a wondrous way (*mirabilmente*) the soul falls on either one of two shores, thereby getting the first intimation of its final destination. Dante does not mention any particular judgment of the soul by God but, rather, he presents the whole process as an almost natural one. Not quite, however, for there is something astounding in the very way the soul directs itself towards its appointed goal, and does so without any special intervention of God.

Once it has found its place, the soul initiates a new cycle of operations, of which the result will be the constitution of its shade. Why that new cycle? Normally speaking, death is for man the end of the line. In the philosophy of Aristotle death means the separation of the soul from the matter of the body of which it is the form. The material body is corrupted while the soul returns to the potency of matter; another man can now be born, but the history of the former is finished. In the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the separated soul survives and preserves its individuality, but the body is corrupted and its soul will survive it, bodiless, until its body will be resurrected by God on the last day. There are no shades of Hades in the world of Aristotle or in that of Thomas Aquinas. The new cycle of operations imagined by Dante has for its object to account for the existence of such shades in his own poetic universe. On this precise point, Dante is entirely on his own; he will make Aristotle answer a question which the Philosopher had never asked.

The death of the body has not deprived the soul of its *virtute formativa*, or plastic power. As soon as it finds itself in a new place and in a new environment, the soul begins to irradiate it, simply because it is of its very nature to emit such radiations. In this sense, one could say that there never is anything like a 'separated soul' in the world of Dante, for right after the death of its body, it continues to exercise on its new environment the formative energy by which it first produced the limbs and the organs of the living body; only, because the new material at its disposal is no longer blood, the product of its new activity cannot be a real body made up of flesh, as the living body is. What then happens is this. "Just as, when it is saturated with rain and moisture, the air adorns itself with various colors due to the refraction of the sunbeams, even thus the surrounding air assumes the shape impressed on it by the (formative) power of the surviving soul; and as a tiny flame follows a fire wherever it goes, so too the spirit of the dead is everywhere accompanied by that new aerial shape. Because it has thus been rendered visible, the spirit is called a shade; it then fashions the organs of each sense, including even that of sight." All this, which sounds to modern ears like a tall story, is said by Dante in all seriousness: *Perocchè quindi ha poscia paruta, / è chiamata ombra.* Whereupon Dante makes Statius add: "And this is how we shades laugh, how we fashion the tears and the sighs you may have heard on the mount. According as certain desires and other affections arise in it, a shade shapes itself differently, and that is the cause of what occasions thy surprise."<sup>14</sup>

In this passage, Dante has given us a complete scientific explanation of the origin, growth and functioning of a class of beings of which the very existence is, to say the least, doubtful. It deserves to be called scientific because it follows the pattern of the biological description of the formation of the human body given by Aristotle in *De Generatione animalium*, I, 21-22. The very same plastic power that has shaped the solid living body of man continues to operate after the latter's death and it operates in the same way. The reason it then causes a shade rather than a body is that the matter on which it now operates is no longer the same; it is not blood and flesh, but, rather, air thickened by moisture. Still, between death and the resurrection, the soul provides itself with a pseudo-body capable of imitating the appearance of a living body and, by its attitudes as well as its language, of expressing its sentiments and even the thoughts of the soul that animates it. The continuity of the biological process is unbroken and it follows from one and the same cause, the plastic power of the soul.

Did Dante himself believe in the reality of those poetic beings? The belief in the reality of ghosts, spooks and phantoms of every denomination

<sup>14</sup> *Purg.*, XXV, 103-108.

is far from extinct in our own days; it was almost universally held in the time of Dante. He himself could hardly believe in the reality of his own shadowy people, since he must have been aware of inventing it as he went along, but he certainly believed in the actual existence of such men and women subsisting in hell and purgatory. That he took seriously his explanation of their origin and nature is even more certain. If there are shades, their origin and nature must needs be such as he himself describes them. He shows himself too careful to follow in the wake of Aristotle not to convey to the reader the irresistible impression that what he says is to be taken seriously.

Two orders of considerations suggest that Dante really believed in the existence of such beings, the one related to the theological conception of the angels, the other related to the condition of the soul between the death and the resurrection of its body.

The angels are pure spirits; hence they are naturally invisible. That they sometimes are seen is always the effect of a special grace of God. In fact, the apparition of an angel is always a miracle, but even a miracle should at least be possible. Like a shade in hell, a visible angel is an incorporeal spirit that causes itself to be seen under the appearance of a body. There were various theological explanations of what was considered an indubitable fact. According to Thomas Aquinas, whom Dante usually follows in such matters, angels merely assume the appearance of a body. It is not a real body because, not being a living soul (that is, the substantial form of a body) an angel does not animate his visible appearance from within so as to cause in it the operations of life. What we call the body of an angel is not an animal body; it does not *live*. In the *Summa Theologiae* the Angelic Doctor asks: "Whether the angels assume bodies", then "Whether the angels exercise the operations of life in the bodies assumed by them."<sup>15</sup> The answer to the first question is yes, to the second question is no. In such pseudo-bodies angels appeared to Abraham and to his family, them to Lot and to the inhabitants of Sodom, and again to Tobias

<sup>15</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 51, 1; I, 51, 2 ad 2m, ad 3m. In his answer to the second objection Thomas stipulates that the body assumed by an angel is not united to it as a physical body is united to its soul; it is not a truly 'animated' body. On the other hand, it would not suffice to say that the body of an angel is united with him as with a mover. The body assumed by an angel is united with him as "with a mover represented by the moved body which it assumes." The notion of a union consisting of a representation agrees with Dante's conception of the shades; they 'represent' their movers. — On the moist air used by the appearing angel in assuming its pseudo-body, "Dicendum quod licet aer, in sua raritate manens, non retineat figuram, neque colorem; quando tamen condensatur, et figurari et colorari potest, sicut patet in nubibus. Et sic angeli assumunt corpora ex aere, condensando ipsum virtute divina, quantum necesse est ad corporis assumendi formationem." *Summa Theol.*, I, 51, 2, ad 3m.

and his friends. Such beings are not truly living bodies, yet they are not mere visions or products of the imagination either. They are true objects actually seen by the eyes; the angels are said to assume such bodies, because they do not animate them as though they were their souls.

How do angels assume bodies? Thomas Aquinas has offered a tentative answer to the question. The angels cannot assume earthly bodies, otherwise they could not instantaneously vanish, as they do, at any moment they may wish to disappear. Neither can they make themselves such bodies out of thin air, for indeed air cannot be given shape and color, whereas appearing angels are visible and colored beings. But here is a possibility which closely resembles that imagined by Dante: "Although air, taken in its natural condition of thinness, can receive neither shape nor color, it can receive both when it is in a state of condensation, as is the case with clouds. Even so do angels assume bodies made up out of air, by condensing it, through the power of God, as much as is necessary for giving it the shape of a body." The proximate cause of that condensation is not conceived by Thomas Aquinas in the same way as Dante: in Dante the cause is the moisture of air in an obscure subterranean place; in Thomas Aquinas, it is a sort of air reduction miraculously caused by God; yet there is a common element: in both cases, a spiritual being, angel or intellective soul, manages to fabricate unto itself a mock body. In both cases the bodily appearances are but *ombre vane fuorchè nell' aspetto*, but they can be seen.

Even within that resemblance, however, there is an important difference, for the angels fabricate their pseudo-bodies at will, with the miraculous assistance of God who enables them to condense the surrounding air, whereas the Dantean shade secretes, so to speak, its apparent body by the natural exercise of its own plastic power. The separated soul does not assume a body in the proper acceptation of the verb; its operation much more resembles that of a true soul making up a body with the material at its disposal. Hence, an important difference between the angel and the shade, for in a way that shade can be said to be animated from within by its soul, of which it spontaneously assumes all the attitudes required for the expression of its feelings, thoughts and acts of will. An easy way to realize the difference is to go back to the question asked by Thomas Aquinas: Whether the angels and the devils have bodies naturally united to them. Thomas answers it in the negative.<sup>16</sup> In Dante's netherworld, the question should receive an affirmative answer. As the poet describes it, the formation of the shade by the separated soul is an entirely natural operation. True, the shades have no real organs, no blood, no true animal

<sup>16</sup> *De Potentia*, q. VI, art. 6.

life, yet their cause is the very same formative or plastic power by which the living corporeal body of man is progressively brought to completion. The Most High Poet has adapted to the needs of his own universe the data provided by the theology of his time. Having to describe beings similar to the angels of the theologians, he has borrowed from the Angelic Doctor some usable material and submitted it to a thorough reinterpretation.

Another theological problem could help Dante orientate himself in his own poetic universe. The theologians themselves found it difficult to account for the condition of the soul between the death of man and the resurrection of his body. Souls are judged right after death and it was the firm conviction of Thomas Aquinas that they began to be punished as soon as they were judged. Moreover the souls of the damned began at once to suffer corporeal punishments, especially fire. How can that be, since the souls of the dead remain deprived of their bodies until the day of the resurrection? Now during that long stretch of time the souls of the dead find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Dantean shades; they are without bodies, yet they are suffering bodily punishments.

Thomas Aquinas freely acknowledges that the thing is naturally impossible. In the natural order, the soul suffers from its body only because it is united with it as its form: how can it suffer bodily pain while it is bodiless? Thomas answers that what is not naturally possible then becomes possible by the allpowerfulness of God. It is natural for souls to be united with bodies because it has pleased God that things should be that way, but souls can be conjoined with matter in any number of other ways. With the help of devils, the necromancers can magically bind the spirits of other men to small statues and other images; why cannot the spirits of the damned be subjected to the power of fire by the mere will of God? It is even for these unfortunate spirits a superadded affliction to find themselves subjected to the power of such a low thing as material fire in punishment for their sins.

This curious doctrine opened for Dante speculative possibilities but it left the poet's imagination entirely resourceless. Let us not forget that, as a poet, Dante was not in charge of teaching theology, but he had to imagine it, to express it under the form of plastic images and, so to speak, to make us see it. Now, following the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, between death and the resurrection, since there are no bodies left, there is nothing left to be seen. The souls of the damned suffer from eternal fire, but this is being achieved without bodies, without shades and even, if it so pleases God, without fire. Thomas himself admits that certain expressions used by Scripture in speaking of the corporeal punishment of the damned should be understood allegorically. The notorious "gnawing worm" of Isaias (66:24) can be interpreted as meaning the remorse torturing con-

sciences. Albert the Great had already observed that, were it a real animal in real fire, the worm would have been consumed a long time ago. Thomas contents himself with observing that, just now, a material worm cannot well bite an immaterial substance and that, in the future, it will not be able to do so either, since after their resurrection all the bodies will enjoy the privilege of being incorruptible. For the same reason tears and the grinding of teeth do not make sense in the case of separated souls and of resurrected bodies. Incorruptible bodies are impassible; they can neither dissolve into tears nor be ground away. Such tropes mean only that the souls of the damned can experience deep sorrow and that such disturbances in the head and eyes usually attend the shedding of tears.<sup>17</sup> All this can be achieved by God even without real heads, eyes and tears.

This leaves us far from the poetic hell of Dante, a visible and tangible place somewhere below the surface of the earth and full of its impressive array of tortured sinners. Now the point was not unimportant for Dante. On the contrary, as a poet, he had to make us see, at least in imagination, the truth of the theological doctrine: it was therefore necessary for him to show us, by inventing an appropriate imagery, the literal truth of Scripture rather than to elaborate on its allegorical meaning. The body here becomes all-important as being the first victim of the punishment and the first plastic figuration of the tortures it suffers; thus it comes first in the intentions of the poet. But Dante is well equipped to solve the difficulty, since, without being bodies in the full sense of the word, his shades have bodies of a sort, which the separated souls of the theologians have not. Moreover, these bodies are related to their souls by positive bonds, which the apparitions of angels are not. Being produced out of dense air by the very same plastic force that shapes living bodies, the shades naturally resemble the living bodies to which they succeed. That is the reason Dante recognizes the shades of many men and women he used to know before their death. He can read their feelings on their faces and carry on normal conversations with them. Why should not such souls be able to act upon their shades as they used to act upon their bodies? Just as their former bodies, their shades are their own work. Obviously, the shades of Dante's *Inferno* are specifically different from the separated souls of Thomas Aquinas.

On the contrary, they closely resemble the ghosts of popular belief, as exemplified, for instance, by the treatise of Saint Augustine *De Cura pro mortuis gerenda ad Paulinum*. For indeed, although he is a theologian, Augustine does not ask any precise questions about the nature of those curious

<sup>17</sup> *Contra Gentiles*, bk IV, cap. 90.

beings and he takes their very reality for granted. It is interesting to note that Augustine does not believe that what Virgil pretends to have seen in hell is true; on the contrary, he thinks that, to Virgil himself, the narrative of the *Aeneid* was but a poetic lie: "Velut si quisquam videat in somnis, quod Aeneas vidiisse apud inferos poetica falsitate narratur." What we today call telepathy was to Augustine a clear proof that such visions are possible. In such cases, what is seen is neither the soul nor the body of a man, but his image. By this word, Augustine probably signifies the equivalent of the Greek word *eidolon*:<sup>18</sup> "Sic autem infirmitas sese habet, ut cum in somnis quisque viderit mortuum, ipsius animam se videre arbitretur; cum autem vivum similiter somniaverit, non ejus animam, neque corpus, sed hominis similitudinem sibi apparuisse non dubitet." The man whose image is thus seen at a distance may well be unaware of the fact. While Augustine himself was in Milan, he appeared (at least his *similitudo* did) to one of his ancient students then teaching rhetoric in Carthage, and finding himself embarrassed by a passage in Cicero which he was to explain the next day to his own pupils: "Qua nocte somnianti ego illi quod non intelligebat exposui: imo non ego, sed imago mea, nesciente me, et tam longe trans mare aliquid aliud sive agente, sive somniante et nihil de illius curis omnino curante." A more complicated anecdote is that of a certain Curma, mistakenly called to the netherworld in place of another Curma, going there and, once out of his lethargy, telling what he had seen. What made him realize that he was dreaming was that, "inter eos defunctos, quos videbat pro meritorum diversitate tractari, agnovit etiam nonnullos quod neverat vivos."<sup>19</sup> That was exactly what Dante himself was going to do with Brunetto Latini and the others, men and women, whom he had known still living on earth.

In his *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. XII, ch. 33, § 62, Augustine has a question *De Inferis*, in which, after maintaining that hell itself (not what Virgil said of it) is not a poetic fiction but a reality, he confesses himself embarrassed on how to understand the celebrated passage of the gospel of Luke on the wicked rich. The beggar Lazarus died, he was carried by angels into Abraham's bosom (Luke, 16:22-26), "and then the rich man also died: and he was buried in hell." Now Abraham recognizes both Lazarus and the rich man: how can one recognize souls? Augustine answers that the nature and place of hell is uncertain, for indeed why should the place be called *inferi*, if it is not located below the surface of the

<sup>18</sup> On the notion of *eidolon*, see "Ombre e luci dans la Divine Comédie," AHDLMA, 32, 97-101.

<sup>19</sup> Saint Augustine, *De Cura pro mortuis gerenda ad Paulinum*, x, Migne PL 40, 601; xi, 601 and 602; xii, 603.

earth? On the contrary, Augustine does not merely believe that the soul is incorporeal, he knows it. But then the question arises: if it is incorporeal, how is it that, in dreams, one sees souls bearing the resemblance of bodies, standing, sitting, walking, and even flying? The notion of *eidolon* once more helps him out of trouble: similitudes of bodies are in hell as in similitudes of places, but, of course, Augustine realizes how weak the answer is and that, finally, he does not know how:

Quanquam possimus ostendere illorum quoque sapientes de inferorum substantia minime dubitasse, quae post hanc vitam excipit animas mortuorum. Unde autem sub terris esse dicantur inferi, si corporalia loca non sunt, aut unde inferi appellantur, si sub terris non sunt, merito quaeritur. Animam vero non esse corpoream, non me putare, sed plane scire, audeo profiteri; tamen habere posse similitudinem corporis et corporalium omnino membrorum quisquis negat, potest negare animam esse, quae in somnis videt vel se ambulare, vel sedere, vel hac atque illac gressu aut etiam volatu ferri ac referri, quod sine quadam similitudine corporis non fit. Proinde si hanc similitudinem etiam apud inferos gerit, non corporalem, sed corpori similem, ita etiam in locis videtur esse non corporalibus, sed corporalium similibus, sive in requie, sive in doloribus.”<sup>20</sup>

That no technical explanation of the nature and origin of the shades seems to have been attempted before Dante, does not mean that the popular belief in such beings had not been shared by many theologians. In his *Dialogues*, IV, 25-58, pope Gregory the Great has a mine of anecdotes and indications concerning the way he himself conceived, or imagined, the condition of souls after death, but he does not seem to have attempted to explain how spiritual souls can suffer from corporeal fire; they do so suffer, and that is all we know about it. The angels gather together the sinners that are destined to suffer the same kind of torments, “luxuriosi cum luxuriosis, avari cum avaris,” etc. In short, “similes in culpa ad tormenta similia deducuntur, quia eos in locis paenitibus angeli deputant.” So we have here a weak foreshadowing of the ‘circles’ in Dante’s *Inferno*. Like Dante, Gregory thinks that those who have visited the netherworld can tell about what they have seen there; the meeting with the soul of the deacon Paschasius could have easily found its place in the *Divine Comedy*. Like Augustine, Gregory is not sure where hell is located, but he does know that one and the same fire can torment different souls according to the diversity of their sins, and that of such torments there is no end.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Saint Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, xii, 33, PL 34, 481.

<sup>21</sup> Saint Gregory the Great, *Dialogi*, iv, 28-29, PL 77, 365; iv, 35, 380-381; iv, 36, 384-385; iv, 40, 396-397; iv, 42, 401.

Saint Julian, bishop of Toledo (d. 690) has left us a curious *Prognostikon futuri saeculi*<sup>22</sup> as interesting for what he says as for the authorities he quotes. For instance, Julian reproduces the passage of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* quoted above. He offers no explanation for the fact that incorporeal souls can suffer from corporeal fire, but he devotes four chapters to the problem raised by the fire of purgatory (cap. 19-22) and another one (cap. 24) to the possibility there is, for the souls of the dead, to recognize one another, even, as Gregory had already stipulated, souls of persons they have never seen in life. The gospel of the wicked rich man and of Lazarus is here again exploited in full. The passage likewise borrowed from Augustine, *De Cura pro mortuis*, cap. 15, stipulates that while the dead do not know what the living do at the time they are doing it, they nevertheless can receive information about it afterwards. Particularly interesting is the remark that the dead can receive news from the earth through men who, dying after them, can go and carry to them pieces of news in which they may be interested (cap. 29; PL 96, 492). Naturally, the dead can appear to the eyes of the living (cap. 30) but only the souls of the blessed can know what the living are doing (cap. 31), as, in fact, Beatrice knows what Dante is doing on earth. Another interesting chapter (cap. 39) establishes the reality of the pleasures and pains experienced by the souls separated from their bodies by comparing them with those we experience in dreams; however, those of the afterlife are more vivid than those experienced in dreams.

Recently published texts of Eric of Auxerre bear testimony to the survival of those notions in the early middle ages.<sup>23</sup> Eric borrows freely from Saint Julian's *Prognostikon futuri saeculi*: at present the souls of the deceased are kept in certain receptacles; the souls that are saved, but still imperfect, do not directly go to heaven; how the souls pass from the body to heaven or to hell; the soul resembles its body; the souls of the dead can recognize one another after the death of the flesh; the dead can visibly appear to the eyes of the living. These notions, and similar ones, integrate the picture of a future life of which the reality seems to have been widely accepted, at least under the form of popular belief, and which Dante himself probably never thought of questioning. The whole *Inferno* is such a nether-

<sup>22</sup> PL 96, 453-524.

<sup>23</sup> Eric of Auxerre, *Sententiae de libro prognosticorum*, c. 1, ed. Riccardo Quadri, *Collectanea di Eirico di Auxerre* (Spicilegium Friburgense, 11) Fribourg-Suisse, 1966. The excerpts from St. Julian of Toledo are found pp. 140-161. See particularly pp. 141-144 and 146-147: quod nunc animae defunctorum in quibusdam receptaculis teneantur; quod anima similitudinem corporis habeat; quod animae mortuorum se invicem post mortem carnis recognoscere possunt; utrum possint mortui viventium oculis apparere, etc.

world inhabited by visible and recognizable shades, naturally unaware of what is going on in our own world, but anxious to receive news brought to them by those who died after them or who, like Dante, are still living in it. Of course, this does not mean that Dante believed in the reality of the scenes in the *Comedy* which his poetic imagination invited him to describe. His own shades are poetic creations; their true antecedents are neither philosophical, nor theological; one should rather look for them in Virgil's poetry, particularly in the VIth book of the *Aeneid*.

Everything in the *Comedy* recalls to the reader's mind the presence of Virgil. The facts are so well known that I shall content myself with briefly listing some of them. Virgil is the guide of Dante during his journey to hell and part of the *Purgatorio*; as a writer and an artist Virgil is the poet Dante quotes as his model, his master: "You are my master and my model...", you are the only one to whom I am indebted for the beautiful style that has made me famous. Now there was one good reason why Dante should be particularly interested in what Virgil had said of the other world. Having to write a poem of which the setting would be hell, purgatory and paradise, the poet could not fail to realize that Scripture says practically nothing about these places. The few samples we have borrowed from the theologians suggest that there was no theological notion of their nature, apart, of course, from the notion of their general destination. As far as that aspect of his work was concerned, Dante found himself on his own. Now precisely Virgil was there to fill the gap. The medieval culture of the *grammatica*, wherein Virgil reigned supreme, did not permit anybody to ignore the *Aeneid*, especially that part of it which, presupposing the immortality of souls, attributed to each and every man a future life of misery or of happiness. To the extent that they attempted to imagine that kind of life, Christians found more help in Virgil than in the Old and the New Testaments.

The Fathers of the Latin Church could not forget that Virgil had been for them an eminently classical author during their school years.<sup>24</sup> The mere fact that the *Aeneid* confirmed the belief in the reality of a future life was enough to recommend it to their favorable attention. But Virgil had done more. Already Lactantius had been pleased to find in the words addressed by Anchises to his son Aeneas an answer to the objection: "If the soul is immortal, how can it be tortured?"<sup>25</sup> A pertinent question

<sup>24</sup> Pierre Courcelle, 'Les Pères de l'Église devant les enfers virgiliens,' AHDLMA, 22 (1955) 5-74, particularly 47-55.

<sup>25</sup> P. Courcelle, op. cit., 47. — On the answer of Saint Ambrose to the question, 49, notes 4 to 7. — Critical commentary of the speech of Anchises by saint Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, XXI, 13; in P. Courcelle, op. cit., 55, note 1. — A capital difference should be noted. In Dante, the

indeed, since to be tortured is passively to undergo an action, and passivity is a sure token of destructibility. But Virgil himself had wondered about the nature of the strange beings he called *vitae* (souls), or *umbrae* (shades): “*Di quibus imperium est animarum umbraeque silentes* (*Aen.* VI, 264). He had attributed to some of them a definite shape: *forma tricorporis umbrae*. Like those of Dante, the shades of the Virgilian netherworld were little more than shadows, but they could be very impressive ones. Dante never loses completely his sense of the comical. He can laugh at the personage he himself would have been in hell, had he really been there; when the devils become too frightening, he hides behind Virgil and clings to his garment; but Aeneas is a hero; on similar occasions, Aeneas draws his sword and gets ready to fight. The wise Sybil then holds him back and warns him that the beings he sees are but empty and unsubstantial souls (*vitas*), mere images flitting in empty shells. Did Virgil strike one of them, his sword would vainly cut through mere shadows: *frustra ferro diverberet umbras* (*Aen.* VI, 290-294). I have quoted above the case of Statius trying to embrace the shade of Virgil and thrice closing his arms on his own chest; now that was a reminiscence of *Aeneid*, VI, 700-702, where Aeneas encounters his father Anchises and three times attempts to embrace him, but in vain, for each time “the shade runs through his hands, like the light breath of a breeze or vanishing dream.”

To Virgil as to Dante the shades are a problem, but not exactly the same problem. Following the tradition of Plato’s school, Virgil considers the virtuous souls as destined to come back to life after undergoing in another world the necessary purification. Their reward will be to see again, in new bodies, the light of the sun. On that point the shade of Anchises delivers, for the benefit of his son Aeneas, a lecture that parallels the lengthy explanation of the origin and nature of the shades given by Statius to Dante in the *Comedy*. All remember the solemn beginning of the passage, VI, 724-751: *Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentes...* In the beginning heaven, seas, earth, everything is quickened from within by a spirit (*spiritus*); a kind of thought permeates that mass and animates it, running through its various parts and moving them. Such is the origin of life and of living beings. That primordial force never ceases to be present in matter. There still remains in every living germ, or seed, a kind of spark of energy of

poet really descends into Hades; his visit there occupies the whole first third of the *Divine Comedy*, of which the very subject is a voyage to the other world. Not so in the *Aeneid*, of which the whole subject is the foundation of Rome and in which Aeneas *does not* enter Tartarus, the properly infernal part of the netherworld. In other words, there is no personal journey of Aeneas to the pagan equivalent of Dante’s *Inferno*. And indeed, Aeneas is looking for his father Anchises, a noble soul not to be found in hell.

the same nature as fire. That *igneus vigor* of celestial origin subsists as long as unwholesome elements do not deaden bodies and their decaying organs. Thus imprisoned in perishing bodies, souls experience pleasures and pains, desires and fears, so much so that, during the course of their lives, they grow more and more blind to intellectual light. At the last moment of their lives, these unfortunate souls have not succeeded in completely ridding themselves of their blemishes of corporeal origin. On the contrary, these defects have grown amazingly deep roots into them, and such is the reason the souls are punished after the death of their bodies. They have to pay off in torments the price of their past wrongs: *ergo exercentur poenis veterumque malorum suppliciis expendunt...* Thus are some of them hanging in the air and shaken by the winds, while others are expiating their crimes at the bottom of some deep hole, or are burning in fire. In short, whoever we are, we all have to expiate for our own past: *quisque suos patimur manes...* Only the small number of the perfect will recover, purified, the spark of heavenly fire they were at the beginning, and that also is the moment when the shades of Virgil begin to desire to return to their body: *incipiunt in corpore velle reverti...*<sup>26</sup>

The similarity between the *umbrae* of Virgil and the *ombre* of Dante is striking to the point of being evident. Nobody has ever missed it. In both cases the shades have been imagined by two great poets as the natural inhabitants of their respective poetic worlds. As has been seen, great theologians have shared with Virgil and popular belief the certitude of the existence of such shades (ghosts, spooks, etc.), but none of them, among those I happen to know, has given them a theological status. If one goes beyond the level of the mere anecdote, there are no rationally justified shades in the universe of the Christian theologians; there are only angels and demons, who are pure spirits, and provisionally separated souls waiting for the time when they will recover their resurrected bodies. Like the souls of Virgil, those of Dante *incipiunt in corpore velle reverti...*, although while the Virgilian souls of the good desire to begin again living an earthly life, the Dantean souls aspire to recover their lost bodies, either for eternal blessedness or for eternal misery. The whole population of the *Aeneid*, book VI, consists of shades. The filiation is beyond doubt, so much so that, had we no other arguments, this sole fact would suffice to establish the intentionally poetic essence of the universe described by the *Divine Comedy*. All hypotheses on the non-expressed intentions of a writer are arbitrary; yet it is permitted to consider, at least as a possibility, that the attempt of Virgil

<sup>26</sup> The Christian souls desire to recover their own bodies, but in a new and immortal condition. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*. XXII, 26; in P. Courcelle, op. cit., 55, note 1.

to give a scientific explanation of the origin and nature of his shades invited Dante to imagine the theory of his own Aristotelian *ombre*. At any rate, the shades of Dante are incomparably more solidly established than those of Virgil; taking the word *science* in the meaning it had at the time of Dante, it is literally correct to say that, by connecting their explanation with the embryogeny of Aristotle, Dante has conferred on the *ombre* of the *Comedy*, a scientifically justified status. Furthermore, because they are engaged in a Christian universe which Dante conceives as swayed by the supreme law of Justice, the shades of Dante are fully conscious of their personal destinies. At each moment every one of them knows where it is and the reason it is there. Assuredly Dante has put himself, with all his loves and hates, in his poem, and that is what makes it to be a sort of personal confession at the same time as a profession of faith. The Sacred Poem is full of substance, yet, at the same time, it remains an art-created universe; itself a reality, its substance is to provide a shadowy picture of reality. Virgil is a shade, Statius is a shade, all the characters in the play whom Dante meets in hell, in purgatory and even, paradoxically enough, in the lower circles of paradise, are likewise shades, that is to say, poetic creatures of Dante rather than real creatures of God. They are grandchildren of God, by Dante, himself one of God's masterpieces.

To sum up, in the order of the poetic filiation, the proximate sources of the shades of Dante are those of Virgil. He may have been prompted by the example of his master to improve on the explanation of their nature sketched in the *Aeneid*, but there is a point on which I can find for him no predecessor at all, even among the theologians of his own time. It is his boldness in providing a scholastic and Aristotelian explanation of those creatures of his imagination. In explicitly asking himself the question, and in giving it a precise answer, Dante was leaving us a perfect illustration of the dual nature of his own genius, equally anxious to create beauty and to teach truth. We know that, to him, the *bellezza* of a poem was a lesser source of joy than its *bontà*, or intelligible meaning. In this sense, the *Divine Comedy* itself must have been less admirable to him for its beauty than for its teaching. This certainly comes to us as a surprise, but it is perhaps the most evident proof that Dante and his work belong in the scholastic culture of the medieval world, not in the predominantly literary culture, Ciceronian rather than Virgilian in its inspiration, of which Petrarch was soon to be the elegant exponent. To confer upon the poetic world of Virgil a substantial reality borrowed from the biology of Aristotle was an undertaking of which nobody but Dante seems to have conceived the possibility.

# “Cortaysye” in Middle English

W. O. EVANS

SCHOLARS and critics have long associated the word and concept of *cortaysye* with the literary convention of courtly love. A. C. Spearing, for example, bases his interpretation of *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* on this assumption.<sup>1</sup> An examination of the use of this word in thirteenth and fourteenth century English literature shows that such an association is dangerous; that unless the context is very explicit, it is safer to assume reference to virtue, often specifically Christian, and I intend here to show the semantic range of *cortaysye* and thereby the grounds for such a conclusion.<sup>2</sup>

The first recorded occurrence of *cortaysye* in English is in the *Ancrene Riwle* and already here we have the tone of the word's central import in English — action intended to please or help others, or the spirit from which it springs.<sup>3</sup> The anchorites are exhorted not to beg from some so as to enjoy the pleasure of entertaining others: ‘of ancre kurteisie and of ancre largesse. is ikumen ofte sunne & scheome: on ende.’<sup>4</sup> This is obviously entertainment intended to please both giver and receiver. In *Cursor Mundi* it is used to indicate the spirit of kindness or consideration which will not deny another's request. The Virgin Mary asks for the body of the dead Christ:

‘Sin i him mai noght have in lijf  
Gis me him ded, withouten strijf,  
Fre for your curtesi.’<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Criticism and Medieval Poetry*, Arnold, 1964. He sees the central purpose of the poem as ‘a moral test’ setting Gawain's ‘cortaysye against his chastity’ and suggests that the poem's effect is to undermine ‘the pious gaiety or gay piety of Camelot, by driving a wedge between courtliness and Christianity.’ (p. 36). On the other hand, J. F. Kiteley had already argued that Gawain's *cortaysye* had its roots in Christian virtue and the Lady's in the dicta of Andreas Capellanus (*Anglia* 1961, 7-16).

<sup>2</sup> A study such as this naturally depends on accumulation of evidence which is obviously impossible to quote in full, and more detailed documentation may be found in my unpublished thesis, *The Five Virtues of Gawain's Shield*, deposited in the Bodleian Library in 1959.

<sup>3</sup> N.E.D. does not record the sense ‘a courteous act’ before c. 1450 but, as we shall see, this usage was current in the fourteenth century.

<sup>4</sup> Ed. M. Day, E.E.T.S. 225 (p. 190, ll. 1-2).

<sup>5</sup> Ed. Rev. R. Morris, E.E.T.S. 57 etc. (Cott. MS. II. 24572 ff.).

Concern and consideration are central to the word right through the fourteenth century. Chaucer's Host, for example, reprimands the Friar for quarrelling with the Somnour:

‘...A ! sire, ye sholde be hende  
And curteys, as a man of youre estaat.’<sup>6</sup>

A *cortayse* disposition is expected to avoid contention; indeed, Lancelot in *Le Morte Arthure* sees in it hope of ending his war with Arthur:

‘My lord is so cortaise and hende  
That yit I hope A pees to make.’<sup>7</sup>

The kindness of *cortaysye* is very clearly manifest in the entertainment of strangers; and it is so called in *The Destruction of Troy* when King Actes welcomes Jason to his land,<sup>8</sup> whereas the porter in *Sir Gawain and the Carl of Carlisle* warns the knights that his master does not possess this *cortessye*,<sup>9</sup> that he does not know how to entertain strangers properly. Old people would, naturally enough, expect to receive pleasant and respectful treatment from one who possessed this quality, as the Old Man in the *Pardoners Tale* implies when he says to the Revellers:

‘But, sires, to yow it is no curteisye  
To speken to an old man vileynde,  
But he trespasses in word, or elles in dede.’ (ll. 739 ff.).

*Cortays* speech would also imply strict adherence to the truth: the Queen in *Le Morte Arthure* tells Gawain that his ‘curtessy was All be-hynde’ (l.1150) when, in his ‘gabbing’ he said that Lancelot had taken a lover — she claims that he has lied or, at least, spoken with insufficient evidence, thus not giving Lancelot the benefit of any doubt.<sup>10</sup> It is also important to avoid giving offence or displeasure by not returning a greeting and this *cortasè* is not neglected by the hero in *Sir Amadace*. Although distracted by great sorrow,

‘His cortasè forzete he noȝte,  
He saylут him anon ryȝte.’<sup>11</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, 2nd. ed., F. N. Robinson, O.U.P., 1957 (p. 89, ll. 1286-7).

<sup>7</sup> Ed. J. D. Bruce, E.E.T.S., E.S. 89 (ll. 2594-5).

<sup>8</sup> Ed. G. A. Panton and D. Donaldson, E.E.T.S. 39, 56 (l. 363). Cf. *The Laud Troy Book*, ed. J. E. Wülfing, E.E.T.S. 121, 2, where Lamedon threatens to send off or kill Jason: ‘For-sothe he nys not curtays’ (l. 451), while King Cetes welcomes the strangers ‘As curtais kyng’ (l. 562).

<sup>9</sup> Ed. Kurvinen, Helsinki, 1951, (l. 193).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the minstrel in *Sir Degrevant*, ed. L. F. Casson, E.E.T.S. 221, who did not tell tales but ‘helde his pesse’ about the hero’s secret visit to Melidor, from which the poet generalises: ‘Mynstrals are ay curtayse/ Als þay ere kende to be.’ (ll. 1587-8).

<sup>11</sup> Ed. J. Robson, in *Three Early English Metrical Romances*, Camden Society, Vol. 18 (st. xxxvii, ll.11-12).

In *William of Palerne* Meliors meets her father and William returning from the wars,

‘Kyndeliche clipping & kessing hire fader,  
& wiþ a curteise cuntenaunce william next after,  
for no seg þat it seye schuld schoche but gode.’<sup>12</sup>

The context here would suggest the sense pleasant, dutiful and even modest, since her ‘curteise cuntenaunce’ conceals her love for William. It is interesting to note that the adjective can be used in a situation involving romantic love, without reference to this love and without any apparent ambiguity.

In all these instances the word has contained some implication of conscious virtue or state of mind, that is, some reference to a spirit which moves one to please and help. It is of course true that the depth of significance depends on the writer’s quality of mind and his intention at any particular time, and as with any other word concerned with human behaviour, *cortaysye* can be found with purely conventional reference to acquired patterns — the right thing to do. Intended significance is often difficult to deduce but sometimes the context makes it clear enough; there is no doubt, for instance, in this occurrence from the *Ayenbite of Inwit*: the seventh kind of usurer is he who takes advantage of his neighbours in their need, ‘and uor þet hi happeþ ham y-lend a lyte zeluer. oper corn. oper ydo zome cortaysye,’ when they cannot pay him back he makes them do threepennyworth of work for a penny.<sup>13</sup> The word is obviously conventional here, definable as ‘action which benefits another’ but without reference to intention; the intention is, in fact, evil. Chaucer sometimes uses the word with purely conventional reference, as one may see by comparing these two examples from *Troilus and Criseyde*. When Criseyde was being escorted from Troy, Troilus went to see her off and,

‘... in wise of curteysie,  
With hauk on honde, and with an huge route  
Of knyghtes, rood and did hire compayne.’ (Bk. V, ll. 64 ff.)

Earlier, in Bk. II,

‘Deiphebus, of his owen curteisie,  
Com hire (Criseyde) to prey, in his propre persone’ (ll. 1485-6)

to visit him on the morrow. Now Deiphebus knew that the invitation would already have been made by Pandarus, but not content with this, he went to invite her personally. He is acting according to convention, no doubt,

<sup>12</sup> Ed. Rev. W. W. Skeat, E.E.T.S., E.S. 1 (ll. 1396 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> Ed. Rev. R. Morris, E.E.T.S. 23 (p. 36, ll. 32ff.).

but the convention is 'live' because 'of his owene curteisie' he wishes to make Criseyde happy. In the former example, Troilus is acting purely according to the dictates of convention, unwillingly and not to give pleasure, but 'in wise of curteysie.' It is sorrow for him, and he knows it must be so for Criseyde, that he is among the throng sending her off to the Greek camp.

There are various examples throughout Middle English of the use of *cortaysye* to indicate an acquired pattern of behaviour, *politesse recherchée*. In *Le Bone Florence of Rome*, for example,

"The emperowre set syr Mylys hym by  
Emere cowde more of curtesye,  
And he ete with the maye."<sup>14</sup>

One can imagine Emere always knowing the correct thing to do and say. And of the pilgrims at Canterbury in *The Tale of Beryn*:

"Then atte Chirche dorr the curtesy gan to ryse,  
Tyl þe knyȝt, of gentilnes, þat knewe riȝte wele þe guyse,  
Put forth þe prelatis, þe Person, and his fere."<sup>15</sup>

Here, if one had to translate the word, 'the question of precedence according to rank' would seem most suitable.<sup>16</sup> But the remarkable thing is that such occurrences are comparatively rare, particularly when compared with French usage. The usual implication is of conscious intention to act well, and even in such apparently arbitrary uses as that in our last illustration, as we shall see, the significance may be much deeper than is at first apparent.

We may now turn to a consideration of the sphere in which *cortaysye* is found most frequently with conventional significance — chivalry — with the reservation that some writers, at least, see the apparently arbitrary patterns of behaviour as part of a greater universal order; but this will be examined later. It may be well to remember that chivalry is a code of arms, not necessarily associated with courtly love. Since English chivalric literature is derived mainly from French, it is to be expected that the *cortaysye* of chivalry should carry more connotations of the word's etymology — behaviour appropriate to a king's court. Arthur's

<sup>14</sup> Ed. R. Ritson in Vol. III of *Ancient English Metrical Romances* (ll. 523 ff.).

<sup>15</sup> Ed. F. J. Furnivall and W. G. Stone, E.E.T.S., E.S. 105 (ll. 135 ff.)

<sup>16</sup> *Cortaysye* as a virtue would prompt generosity, but sometimes we see the word used for the act of making gifts, even though the obvious intention be to gain reputation thereby or because it is 'the thing to do.' Cf. *Sir Launfal*, ll. 67 ff. (Ed. W. H. French and C. B. Hale in *Middle English Metrical Romances*, New York, 1930) and *Guy of Warwick*, ll. 147 ff. (Ed. J. Zupitza, E.E.T.S., E.S. 42 etc.).

court is the literary centre of such *cortaysye*, but in English literature it acquires this position gradually and rather late. J. E. Wells' comment on Lazamon's *Brut* is appropriate for the thirteenth century generally:

‘Arthur is not much the king of chivalry, but is rather the Germanic chieftain with his *comitatus*. Yet, though sometimes the hero “gabs” after the fashion of the less courtly chieftain, he is never the boisterous and crude hero of the Welsh...’<sup>17</sup>

This process of ‘refinement’ continues under French influence so that in the fourteenth century romances and chronicles the Round Table is the literary centre of the *cortaysye* of graceful and studied behaviour. Robert of Brunne in his *Chronicle* says that many from distant lands ‘til pat court for worschyp camen, / to lere honour and courtesy.’<sup>18</sup> *Le Morte Arthure*, a very close version of a French original, contains several of these references; it is *corteise*, for instance, which constantly reminds Lancelot of his feudal allegiance, his position in respect of Arthur, his lord and master. In the First war, when the King strikes at him, Lancelot remembers this and is ‘so corteise’ (l. 2172) that he will not return the blow. Then, when the King is unhorsed, Lancelot, his enemy in battle, gives him his own horse and Arthur reflects ‘how corteise was in hym more’ (l. 2200) than in any other man. Later, Baurdemagew complains to Lancelot that it is this *cortessye* of his (l. 2566) which is bringing them so much trouble. In actual battle *cortaysye* ensures ‘playing the game,’ giving one’s opponent a fair chance. In *Sir Ferumbras*, Oliver knocks Ferumbras’s sword out of his hand, but since he is ‘a cortey kniȝt,’<sup>19</sup> he steps aside and lets him pick it up.<sup>20</sup> This *cortaysye* also ensures treating one’s opponent well when the battle is not actually in progress: in *The Anturs of Arthur at the Tarnewathelan* the King commands the Earl of Kent, because of ‘his meculle curtasy’<sup>21</sup> to look after an enemy who has come to fight Gawain, and to show him all possible hospitality.

*Cortaysye* can refer not only to polite and correct procedure in chivalric matters but also to skill in fighting: the hero in *Sir Beues of Hamtoun* escapes as a child from his wicked mother and he is then sent to someone who will teach him *corteisie*<sup>22</sup> so that he can return and fight for his heritage.

<sup>17</sup> A Manual of the Writings in Middle English 1050-1400, Oxford, 1916. (p. 34, ll. 6 ff.).

<sup>18</sup> Ed. F. J. Furnivall, 2 vols., Chronicles and Memorials, Lond. 1887 (10560-1).

<sup>19</sup> Ed. S. J. Herrtage, E.E.T.S., E.S. 34 (1.682).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *The Sege off Melayne*, ll. 1066 ff. (Ed. S. J. Herrtage, E.E.T.S., E.S. 35). Even a Saracen can be *curtays* in this respect: when Charles loses his sword, the Saracen throws his own away.

<sup>21</sup> Ed. J. Robson in *Three English Metrical Romances*, Camden Soc., Vol. 18 (St. xxxviii, l. 2).

<sup>22</sup> Ed. E. Kölbing, E.E.T.S., E.S. 46 etc. (l. 365).

*Cortaysye* would sometimes seem to imply valour, the spirit or quality of bravery which impels a knight to fight. In the alliterative *Morte Arthur*, for instance, Arthur gives his knights a message to be taken to Lucius:

‘Comande hym kenely wyth crewell wordez,  
Cayre owte of my kyngryke with his kydd knyghez;  
In caase that he wille noghte, þat cursede wreche  
Com for his curtaisie, and countere me ones.’<sup>23</sup>

It is difficult to be certain of the exact implications of the word here; its centre would certainly seem to be ‘spirit of valour,’ and even if reputation is involved, it will be reputation for valour. It is to test this same *cortaysye* that the Green Knight in *Sir Gawain* claims to visit Arthur’s court:

‘And here is kydde cortaysye, as I haf herd carp,  
And þat hatȝ wayned me hider, iwyis, at þis tyme.’<sup>24</sup>

He has come, ostensibly, to test the bravery of the court, to find if there is anyone bold enough to undertake the adventure of the beheading game.

Among the conventional and apparently arbitrary references of chivalric *cortaysye* one sometimes finds a hint of the quality of character which prompts charitable action; this is so in French and English. In the thirteenth century Leroux de Lincy, *Prov. t. II*, p. 278,<sup>25</sup> we are told that ‘Courtoisie est que l’on sequeure celi dont on est au desseure’ — that one should succour those whom one has conquered. And in *William of Palerne*, the King of Spain

‘...wiztly to william his wepun vp to-zelde,  
& forto wirche his wille & wilned his mercy.  
& william, as kinde kniȝt as kortesie it wold,  
Godli graunted him griþ & gruccched no more’ (ll. 3924 ff.).

It may be a convention of chivalry to give quarter to a defeated knight, but it is nevertheless an act of mercy.

Contrary to what would seem the popular view, *cortaysye* does not occur very frequently in courtly love contexts in English, at least with any specific or particular reference to the code. In *The Romant of the Rose*, for instance, the personified *Curtesye* represents the now familiar quality of sociability arising from concern for others’ pleasure and happiness, and she is said to be

‘Of fair speche, and of fair answere,  
Was never wight misseid of here’ (ll. 1259-60).

<sup>23</sup> Ed. E. Björkman, New York, 1915 (ll. 1271 ff.). So also ll. 1681-2.

<sup>24</sup> Ed. J. R. R. Tolkien and E. V. Gordon, Oxford, 1925 (ll. 263-4).

<sup>25</sup> Littré, s.v. *courtoisie*.

She would be in place without change of quality in any context. But, of course, the word *is* at times used with particular reference to lovemaking and the code of conduct associated with it. Pandarus, for instance, advises Troilus to ignore convention and abduct Criseyde, rather than allow her to be taken to the Greek camp. He says:

‘Devyne not in resoun ay so depe  
Ne corteisly, but help thiself anon’ (Bk. IV, ll. 589-90).

It is in concern for Criseyde’s honour, since the love must be kept secret, that Troilus would be acting *corteisly*, and this concern might seem all the more arbitrary since Criseyde’s husband is dead. The lover must be devoted to his lady alone, and all his actions be inspired by her, but he also has a duty to all other women; the God of Love instructs the Dreamer thus in *The Romant of the Rose* ll.2229 ff. Indeed, it is the duty of such a knight to do battle for a lady and risk his life for her in any way, whether she is his lover or not. Ywain in *Ywain and Gawain* is described as *curtayse* because he is prepared to do this.<sup>26</sup> This can hardly be described as a courtly love poem, but it is typical of many English romances in that it is strongly influenced by the code and uses many of its themes and conventions: the essentials are lacking, but the incidentals are present. To talk of essentials and incidentals in this way is perhaps misleading, because the ‘laws’ of the code were, in fact, ephemeral, while the general climate and atmosphere — that of increased respect for, and importance of, women, polite and studied manners, etc. — were profound in their effect. In general, we can say of English romances what C. B. West notes of Anglo-Norman works:

‘They (Anglo-Norman writers) move at ease among the conventions of courtoisie, but beneath their interest in courtois ideas and phraseology is a strong and almost prosaic sense of the realities of everyday life. Thus the idea of marriage separated from love remains foreign to them...’<sup>27</sup>

This is not strictly true, though, of all English versions. *Le Morte Arthure*, for example, follows the conventions, and it illustrates one of the difficulties which might arise in the practice of courtly love *cortaysye*. The Maid of Ascalot dies because Lancelot has been ‘churlysshe’ to her (l.1078), and it is worth quoting from her letter the explanation of how Lancelot had behaved:

‘For for no thinge bat I coude pray,  
Knelynge ne wepinge with Rewfull mone,  
To be my leman he sayd euyr nay  
And sayd shortely he wold haue none’ (ll. 1084 ff.).

<sup>26</sup> Ed. G. Schleich, Jena, 1887 (l. 1896 and l. 2407).

<sup>27</sup> *Courtoisie in Anglo-Norman Literature*, Oxford, 1938 (p. 168).

Rejecting her love was Lancelot's only offence; otherwise he was tender, considerate and polite to her. In fact, she behaves very much as the better known Lady Temptress in *Sir Gawain* does, and Lancelot very much as Gawain, though for a different reason.<sup>28</sup>

Surprisingly, perhaps, since it represents a rejection of courtly love adultery, *Sir Gawain* is the English poem in which *cortaysye* is found most frequently in a courtly love context, and which tells us most about it. In her second visit, the Lady tells Gawain of her surprise that one 'so cortayse, so knyȝtyly, as ȝe ar knownen oute' (l.1511) gives her no lessons in the art of 'trweluf' (l.1527), and in a long parenthesis (ll.1512-19) she explains what she would expect from a 'cortayse' knight — what she would find in a French courtly love romance. Just as the Maid of Ascalot does, she considers it a duty of *cortaysye* for a knight to accept love from a lady if it is offered. She has already expressed astonishment that it is the 'cortayse' Gawain she is entertaining, and yet he cannot understand 'of compayne ȝe costeȝ' (l.1483); when he asks in which way he has offended,

“ȝet I kende yow of kyssyng,” quoȝ þe clere þenne,  
“Quere-so countenaunce is couȝe quikly to clayme;  
Pat bicumes vche a knyȝt þat cortaysy vses.”” (ll. 1489 ff.)

And earlier:

‘So god as Gawayn gaynly is halden,  
And cortaysye is closed so clene in hymseluen,  
Couth not lyȝtly haf lenged so long wyth a lady,  
Bot he had craued a cosse, bi his cortaysye’ (ll. 1297 ff.).

Gawain's *cortaysye* can include the excessively polite and considerate behaviour to ladies, probably the code's greatest contribution to English literature, but it does not include adulterous love. The poet is careful to set the tone of the entertainment which Gawain is prepared to take with the Lady:

‘Such comfort of her compayne cayȝten togeder  
Purȝ her dere dalyaunce of her derne wordeȝ,  
Wyth clene cortays carp closed fro fylþe,  
Pat hor play watȝ passande vche prynce gomen,  
in vayres.’ (ll. 1011 ff.)

His ‘teccheles termes of talkyng noble’ (l.917) are free from any impurity. And this should not surprise us because, as Mr. Spearing seems to forget,<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Again we see that those who find Gawain's temptress strange, or even unique, in her activity, are judging by the theorists of courtly love rather than by the evidence of the romances.

<sup>29</sup> See above, p. 143.

Gawain's *cortaysye* is one of the Christian virtues symbolised by the pentangle on his shield. The Lady's idea of *cortaysye* is rejected as true *cortaysye*, just as it is in a lyric called *The Bird with Four Feathers* where the bird speaks of the loss of these feathers, one of which was 'bewte':

‘This fedir me bare ful ofte to synne,  
And principally to lecherye;  
Clipping and kessing cowth I not blynne,  
Me thought it craft of curteseye.’<sup>30</sup>

The Bird with Four Feathers rejects its mistaken notion of *cortaysye* and by implication replaces it with Christian virtue — replaces it with a sense very usual in English. Since its centre, when used with consideration of its implications as a quality, is in desire to help or please others, it is naturally used a great deal by religious writers. It has been suggested that this, and use of other such terms, with reference to the Court of Heaven was due to the influence of courtly love works; in particular, that religious lyrics copied the tone and parlance of secular love lyrics. There may be some truth, particularly in this latter statement, but the tendency has probably been to overstress such influence, or even to misstate it. It is, of course, very reasonable to assume that the literature of polite love-making, with its insistence on mannered behaviour, had its effect on literature of all kinds and also on life itself; we can observe a process of ‘refinement’ in manners going together with greater concern for women and an apparent rise in their social importance when we compare the later fourteenth century romances with earlier comparatively boorish works such as *Horn Childe and Maiden Rymild*. But the word with which we are concerned did not originate with courtly love, nor, in English at least, do we often find the word referring to the rules and conventions set out by such writers as Andreas Capellanus. On the contrary, such literature assimilated and modified the idea and the term as it did the ideas and terms of religion. If we find the word *cortaysye* in a religious lyric, for example, it is right to think that this is its more natural context — it is more easily referable to the virtue as we have already seen it than to any direct influence from courtly love works.

If *cortaysye* is a virtue it is natural that God as the source of all virtue should be *cortays*, and He is described so on many occasions. In the lyric *Think on Yesterday*, for instance, God's reminding man of the ephemeral nature of life is done because He is ‘so cortey and so kynde.’<sup>31</sup> The sense here is clear enough: it is the same quality in God which in man we described

<sup>30</sup> *Religious Lyrics of the Fourteenth Century*, Ed. Carleton Brown, Oxford, 1924 (p. 211, ll. 93 ff.).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* p. 144, l. 56.

as the desire to help and give pleasure to others. But attributing *cortaysye* to God because He has punished man can, at times, be somewhat puzzling. In *Cursor Mundi*, for instance, His vengeance on those who built the Tower of Babel is described as 'curteys' (Trin. MS, 1.2256) and again He is called 'curteis lord'<sup>32</sup> because of His 'reminder' in *Verses on the Earthquake of 1382*. The sense 'kindly' or 'mild' is not really satisfactory here, but we find a clue in the following quotation from *Perceforest*:

'Courtoisie et mesure est une mesme chose; beau filz, à tous tes faitz adjouste maniere et mesure, si auras en toy moult belle vertu' (t. II, p. 147).<sup>33</sup>

Père G. Paré<sup>34</sup> traces the development of the concept of *mesure* and its opposite, *demesure* or *outrage*, back through the Christian Aristotelians to the Greek concept of the *juste milieu* and he shows how important this idea was to Jean de Meun. But it is not only through de Meun that this influence came to English. The idea of *cortays* balance is present, for instance, in the description of the personified 'Curtesye' in the earlier part of the *Romant of the Rose*:

'She was not nyce, ne outrageous,  
But wys and war, and virtuous' (ll. 1257-8)<sup>35</sup>

And the following quotation from *Purity* shows that the concept was by no means foreign to English writers. God repents that He drowned the world:

'For quen be swemande sorze soȝt to his hert,  
He knyt a covenaunde cortaysly wyth monkynde þere,  
In þe mesure of his mode and mepe of his wylle,  
Pat he schulde never, for no syt, smyte al at onez.'<sup>36</sup>

Here, and in the instances in *Cursor Mundi* and *Verses on the Earthquake of 1382* referred to above, God is seen as *cortays* in that He achieves the right balance between virtues which otherwise might be carried to excess or *outrage*. In Him, the apparently irreconcilable virtues of justice and mercy find their fulcrum.

While we must be aware of the possible consciousness of this 'golden mean' in uses of the word *cortaysye*, we must also beware, because com-

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* (p. 186, l. 1).

<sup>33</sup> Littré, s.v., *courtoisie*.

<sup>34</sup> *Le Roman de la Rose et la Scolastique Courtoise* for Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales d'Ottawa, Paris and Ottawa, 1941.

<sup>35</sup> Translating Guillaume de Lorris' 'El ne fu ne nice n'umbrage,/ Mès sage auques, sans outrage' (ll. 1241-2).

<sup>36</sup> Ed. R. J. Menner, Oxford, 1920 (ll. 563 ff.).

promise or *mesure* cannot possibly be the controlling influence in charity or loving kindness, so often at the centre of *cortaysye* in English. The author of the *The Cloud of Unknowing*, for instance, approves of *mesure* in all ways of life except that with which he is most concerned, contemplation.<sup>37</sup> Nor is there any possible suggestion of moderation in Christ's act of redemption which, says Dan Michel, was a matter of ‘cortaysie’:

‘Nou loke þe greate cortaysie of oure zuete maystre Iesu crist godes zone  
þet com to þe wordle to zechē an to souy þet þet wes uorlore’ (pp. 97-8, ll.  
36 ff.).

In *Robert of Sicily* the Virgin Mary is said to possess this same quality of ‘cortesye’ — charity or loving-kindness:

‘Blisful Marie, to þe i crie,  
As þou art ful of cortesye;  
Preye þi Sone, þat dyed for me;  
On me, his fol, þow haue pité.’<sup>38</sup>

Mary's *cortaysye*, her concern for the well-being and salvation of man, reminds us of *Pearl* and gives us more confidence that her frequent title ‘Quen of cortaysye’<sup>39</sup> is not due solely to the requirements of concatenation. *Cortaysye* is an extremely important word for the *Pearl* poet. When the Maiden first explains that she is a queen in Heaven the Dreamer's reply shows that it is because of God's *cortaysye* she has become so: ‘That cortaysyé is to fre of dede’ (1.481) if it is true that she has been given so much and earned so little. *Cortaysye* here refers to God's liberality, which rewards, as the poet goes on to show in the parable, not according to merit, but according to its own dictates. In *Purity* ‘lazares’ and other sick people

‘Alle called on þat Cortaysye and claymed his grace,  
He heled hem wyth hynde speche of þat þay ask after’ (ll. 1097-8).

And in *Patience* Jonah complains to God because He has pardoned Nineveh; he says, accusingly: ‘Wel knew I þi cortaysye, þi quoyns soffraunce.’<sup>40</sup> God's *cortaysye* is such that He rewards man beyond his deserts, takes pity on his distress and alleviates it, and is ready at the least sign of repentance to forgive and withhold punishment.

*Cortaysye* can be used, not only for the quality which directs one to a certain mode of life, but also for the life itself, and it is natural that a religious writer should consider a *cortays* life one which accords with his

<sup>37</sup> Ed. P. Hodgson, E.E.T.S. 218 (Ch. 40, pp. 79-80).

<sup>38</sup> Ed. French and Hale in *Middle English Metrical Romances*, (ll. 365 ff.).

<sup>39</sup> Ed. E. V. Gordon, Oxford, 1953 (ll. 432, 444, 456, etc.).

<sup>40</sup> Ed. H. Bateson, Manchester, 1918 (l. 417).

religion — what, for him, is good must be good in a religious sense. The author of the *Ayenbite of Invit* indicates that 'corteysye' is the way of life in Heaven:

'guo out of þise wordle steruinde. guo in-to þe londe of þe libbynde per non ne sterfþ ne yealdeþ. þet is ine paradys. Per me lyerneþ wel to libbe and wyt an corteysye. uor þer ne may guo in: no uyleynye' (pp. 74-5, ll. 35 ff.).

Now E. V. Gordon says of the phrase 'Quen of cortaysye' in *Pearl* that it is 'the equivalent of the theologians' *Regina gratiae*<sup>41</sup> and, of course, it is obviously true that the Virgin Mary is often thought of as being an intermediary between God and man, one of the main channels through which His grace flows to the rest of creation. This grace is man's share of the gift which God possesses to an infinite degree; it is this which is infused into the whole of creation and makes of it a sensible unity:

'Of courtaysye, as saytz Saynt Poule,  
Al arm we membreȝ of Jesu Kryst:  
As heued and arme and legg and naule  
Temen to hys body ful trwe and tryste,  
Ryȝt so is vch a Krysten sawle  
A longande lym to þe Mayster of myste.' (ll. 457 ff.)

Gordon says of this:

'The words of St. Paul she has in mind are I Corinthians xii. 12-13, and she uses the term *cortaysye* to express the manifestations of this spirit of divine grace in Christian love and charity.'<sup>42</sup>

This is quite true of the poem, and of Christian *cortaysye* generally, but in the quotation to which Gordon refers it is used of the spirit and not of the manifestations. In v. 13 St. Paul says: 'For in one spirit were we all baptized into one body...' and in v. 11<sup>43</sup> that men's diverse gifts are from this same spirit of charity or liberality — God's grace or *cortaysye*. And this is the spirit which links men with God and Heaven and enables them to live with one another in charity.

*Cortaysye*, then, is used of the spirit which informs life in the Kingdom of Heaven and flows from God to men on earth — a spark of the Divine — so that men may act *cortaysly* to one another and also to God. The part of St. Paul's epistle which deals with the superiority of charity over other virtues gives a list of its manifestations<sup>44</sup> and this is very similar to a list of

<sup>41</sup> Ed. cit. Note to l. 432.

<sup>42</sup> Ed. cit., p. xxi.

<sup>43</sup> 'But all these things one and the same spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as he will.'

<sup>44</sup> xiii, vv. 4 ff.

the manifestations of *cortaysye* in the fourteenth century. The *Pearl* poet is by no means the only writer to link *cortaysye* with the *caritas* of this epistle. Robert of Brunne, for instance, in *Handling Synne* tells the story of Dives and Lazarus:

‘Pys ryche man, as þe gospel seys,  
Wat but to .o. man vncurteys,  
And hadde so mochë pyne þarfore’<sup>45</sup>

so rich men beware ! He continues with another warning to the rich: do not hurt the poor,

‘But ȝyue þat, þat ȝe mow ful weyl;  
And nat allonely largely,  
But with loue, þat ys, curtesy’ (ll. 6824 ff.)

And still on the same theme, he lists the attributes of ‘Charyte’ from I Cor. xiii, 4 ff. If we are charitable in this manner, he says, ‘Pan ys hyt curteys almës dede’ (l.7179). There is certainly nothing arbitrary or conventional about the generosity of this *cortaysye*. According to *Pearl*, this is the predominant spirit in the Kingdom of Heaven: there are no ‘supplantoreȝ’ where the Virgin Mary is ‘Quen of cortaysye’ (ll. 439 ff.). Where ‘cortaysye’ reigns supreme no-one wishes to possess what is another’s; rather, each is content with his lot and if possible would try to increase the others’ glory (ll. 445 ff.).

If practical charity in a religious context can be referred to as *cortaysye*, so can various other aspects of Christian religious life. In one of the Vernon MS lyrics, *Mercy Passes All Things*, ‘cortesye’ refers to good life in a religious sense:

‘And corteis knihthod and clergye,  
Pat wont were vices to forsake,  
Are nou so Rooted in Ribaudye  
Pat oþur merþes lust hem not make.  
A-wei is gentyl cortesye,  
And lustines his leue halþ take;  
We loue so sloupe and harlotrie,  
We slepe as swolle swyn in lake.’<sup>46</sup>

The particular reference here is to pleasure of a spiritual nature, free from sin, compared with fleshly excesses such as ‘sloupe and harlotrie.’ The adjective occurs in a very similar context in *Piers Plowman*, referring to speech free from such sin. ‘Reson’ will not have ‘reufe’

<sup>45</sup> Ed. F. J. Furnivall, E.E.T.S. 119, 123 (ll. 6797 ff.).

<sup>46</sup> *Religious Lyrics of the Fourteenth Century*, Ed. cit. (p. 130, ll. 157 ff.).

'Til clerkes and knihtes ben corteis of heore mouþes,  
And haten to don heor harlotrie and vsun hit no more.'<sup>47</sup>

The author of the *The Cloud of Unknowing* is concerned not to offend against 'cortesie' in a religious sense: a contemplative should have no care for other matters, even religious devotions, which might distract him from his main work, but he does not wish to speak disparagingly or lightly of holy things so he adds an apologetic parenthesis — 'zif it be cortesie and semely to sey' (Ch. 50, p. 93, l. 14). Again, in *Purity*, the poet says that priests who 'in clannes be clos' gain 'gret mede,' 'Bot if þay conterfete crafte, and cortaysye wont' (l. 13) they are hateful to God. And the *Pearl Maiden* says that she considers the Dreamer 'much to blame and vn-cortayse' (l. 303) in that he doubts Christ's promise of redemption and eternal life. We have already noted in secular contexts that *cortaysye* would be lacking if one doubted another's word, and here the application is extended: it is 'vn-cortayse' to doubt the word of God in Revelation therefore it is 'cartaysye' to believe fully. And the Dreamer's doubt involves another sin: to be 'vn-cortayse' in this way, to believe only what one sees, is 'a poynt o sorquydryze' (l. 309) — the deadly sin of pride.

The *cortaysye* which emanates from God is the spirit which enables men to live life as it is lived in Heaven, to live in such a way as to help and please others and also to practise all other aspects of Christian religion — to reciprocate God's *cortaysye*. One gains the sense of a great coherent pattern in life where even small mannerly acts, attention to order and precedence, correct behaviour at all times, are all made meaningful because they are informed by that *cortaysye* which is from God and which informs also life in Heaven. Such a mode of life is not arbitrary or purely conventional; it is not thought of as the product of a particular culture or evolution of a way of living by a section of humanity, local both in time and place, but as something ordained by God, permanent and right, a perfection towards which everyone should aim.

If we are aware of the range of implications the word can possess, although realising that much must depend on the author, we may hesitate before dismissing any particular occurrence as purely arbitrary. In *The Tale of Beryn*<sup>48</sup> the writer may well have felt that the *cortaysye* of correct precedence was a matter of real importance, correct or incorrect in some absolute sense. All the poems of the Cotton Nero A × MS demonstrate this firm acceptance and belief in the medieval social structure and all its implications, and although the *cortaysye* involved in this order would

<sup>47</sup> Ed. Rev. W. W. Skeat, 2 vols., Oxford, 1886 ('A' text, Pass. IV, ll. 105-6).

<sup>48</sup> See above, p. 146.

include much of what is associated with, and possibly derived from, courtly romance, the author (or authors) would accept it as the only right way to live, ordained by God. But it cannot include anything sinful; it cannot approve the adulterous centre of courtly love. The Lady's kind of *cortaysye* must necessarily be an aberration from Gawain's ‘true’ *cortaysye* and the choice as the hero of the poem of the traditional *cortays* knight, who is provided with ‘þe pentangel nwe’ (l.636) of explicitly Christian significance, must indicate one of the main intentions of the poem. No ‘wedge’ can be driven between Gawain's *cortaysye* and any other virtue, for it has its source in Heaven. For most English writers, *cortaysye* does not depend on devotion to women and it is by no means synonymous with courtly love.

*University College of South Wales  
and Monmouthshire.*

# Changes in an English Village after the Black Death

J. A. RAFTIS C.S.B.

BY uncovering basic changes in the manorial economy of mediaeval England as early as the late thirteenth century, recent scholarship has continued to modify considerably the sweeping classical thesis that the Black Death occasioned the break up of the manor.<sup>1</sup> But demographic history still impresses upon us the devastating dimensions of sheer human mortality from the Plague.<sup>2</sup> The historian must feel called to probe ever more deeply, therefore, into the intimate social aspects of that event. Perhaps more light will be thrown on the consequences of the Black Death through that analysis of the evolution of the village community itself yet awaiting intensive investigation.<sup>3</sup> The following brief study of the village of Upwood in Huntingdonshire is offered as a sample of some changes that can be observed in the local community when a good series of account rolls and court rolls are available.

## I

Among the Ramsey Abbey villages of north Huntingdonshire, Upwood seemed to be one of the most stable in the early fourteenth century. Fewer main family names disappeared, and fewer new names appeared in the court rolls of Upwood from the late thirteenth century to 1348 than in the neighbouring villages of Broughton, Abbots Ripton, Wistow and

<sup>1</sup> The best analysis of current scholarship upon this, as well as many other aspects of the manoria, history of England is now that of M. M. Postan in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, 11 2nd edition, 1966, 548-632.

<sup>2</sup> See Sylvia L. Thrupp, "The Problem of Replacement-Rates in Late Medieval English Population," *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1965, 101-119.

<sup>3</sup> Over the past generation the best studies of demesne history, such as Marjorie Morgan, *The English Lands of the Abbey of Bec* (Oxford, 1946), H. P. R. Finberg, *Tavistock Abbey* (Cambridge, 1951), Edward Miller, *The Abbey and Bishopric of Ely* (Cambridge, 1951), have been too broad for this purpose. On the other hand, important village monographs such as A. C. Chibnall, *Sherington, fiefs and fields of a Buckinghamshire village* (Cambridge, 1965), and P. D. A. Harvey, *A Medieval Oxfordshire Village, Cuxham: 1200 to 1400* (Oxford, 1965) did not have detailed account and court rolls for this period.

Warboys.<sup>4</sup> At first glance this main family group of Upwood does not seem to have been noticeably shaken by the Black Death in comparison with the turnover of such villagers in the same neighbourhood over the early fourteenth century. The following table (I) of old and new families from 1349 includes the names of all but ten<sup>5</sup> of those forty main families of obvious importance appearing prior to the Black Death.

TABLE I  
OLD (A) AND NEW (B) MAIN FAMILIES IN COURT ROLLS, 1349-1398<sup>6</sup>

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
Alkoc	A	54	4
Alston	B	8	1
Aspelon	A	17	4
Attewelle	A	76	5
Aibus (Aubes)	A	24	5
Austyn (Augustyn)	A	19	2
Baker	B	46	6
Balle	B	45	5
Baron	A	3	2
Bigge	A	45	3
Bonde	B	21	2
Bracer	A	49	8
Bray	B	14	1
Buckworth	A	43	6
Carter	A	8	4
Chamberleyn	B	16	1
Chirche (atte)	A	3	1
Cook	A	33	6

<sup>4</sup> Cf. my article, "The Concentration of Responsibility in Five Villages," *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 92-118. The percentage for new names at Broughton indicated in this study (p. 93) is smaller than for Upwood. But the Broughton period carries to 1340 only while that of Upwood was to 1353; for the same chronological period Upwood would appear more stable since the 1340-1353 period embraces one-third of the new Upwood names.

<sup>5</sup> That is, of families of category A in Table I (*op. cit.*, *Mediaeval Studies*, 1966, 94-6) the following disappeared: Aubyn, Brun, Curteys, Frere, Galyon, Godeson, Kyng, Man, Peretre, Wodestrake. Somewhat more of the 'lesser families' (those listed as D in the same table) disappeared: Ayse, Eliot, Elys, Fryth, Geffrey, Grenam, Heringmonger, Hilhayl, Lylly, Montern, Nedham, Sutbury, Tixtor, Tyler, Walter, William. The Nicholas, West and Weston families, never of great importance, had also disappeared by the early 1350's. Very frequently fewer persons were recorded for these lesser families (cf. column 4 of the above mentioned table), so that it is difficult to compare the total decimation in the two groups. But in any case there is no evidence to suggest less resistance by this group.

<sup>6</sup> There are 21 Upwood court rolls extant for this period. Some of the names 'evolved' over the fourteenth century, as Warboys to Wardebusc, but in general surnames have been normalized in these tables.

Names	Grouping	Total Entries	Persons
Couhyrdē	A	4	1
Couper	A	5	1
Crane	A	1	1
Dulay	B	7	1
Dykun	A	16	4
Edward	A	86	6
Fleming	A	50	5
Galopyn	B	31	2
Galyon	A	1	1
Gernoun	A	1	1
Gouler	A	6	3
Haukyn	A	72	8
Hawet	B	24	2
Hering	A	52	7
Herry (Hurre)	A	36	5
Hikkisson	E	31	3
Holy	A	21	4
Houghton	A	1	1
Hy	B	7	1
Kymbolton	B	12	1
Lone	B	59	5
Miles	A	60	5
Newman	A	106	6
Nicholas	A	1	1
Pappeworthe	A	20	4
Payn	A	27	4
Peny	A	60	6
Ponder	A	38	3
Pykeler	A	59	4
Richard (son of)	A	9	4
Robyn	A	68	4
Rolf	B	13	2
Sabyn	A	8	4
Skynner	B	30	4
Snape (atte)	A	6	4
Suel	A	18	1
Symond	A	56	6
Sywell	A	6	3
Thacher	A	5	5
Wadilond	A	4	2
Warboys	A	79	6
Warin	A	1	1
Wauk	A	36	6
Webster	A	15	3
Wennington	A	1	1
West	A	2	2
Weston	A	4	2
Wold (othe)	A	15	1

A closer investigation reveals, however, that many more main families were decimated by the Black Death in so far as the families declined rapidly in importance in the village. Some eighteen families that had been important prior to 1349 fall into this group. Of these the families of Baron, Attechirche, Couper, Galyon, Gernoun, Houghton, Sabyn, Wadilond, Warin, and Wennington have disappeared by the middle of the 1350's. The last entries for these families often indicate that older persons survived the Black Death. Matilda Barun (or Baron), who was an older person active in the village from the 1320's, is last fined for trespass over 1350; William Baron is fined for trespass in 1353; Stephen Attechirche was quite active over the whole year 1349-50; John Couper, the last of a quite important family, was ale taster and juror in 1350, and still a taster in his last court entry in 1353. The last representative of the Gernoun family, at one time supplying the reeves for Upwood, was attached for services in 1350; a woman, Christine Houghton, was fined for breaking the assize of ale in 1349 and is the last witness in our records to a once numerous family. Agnes Sabyn received a one-half virgate at the death of her husband in 1349, but that is the last evidence for Agnes. By 1350 a Richard Sabyn, perhaps their son, has inherited property responsibilities sufficient to be called as juror. The same Richard appears as juror in 1353, and was involved in the numerous trespasses of that year, but by 1360 his name no longer appears. Joan Wadilond received the one-half virgate left by the death of her husband in 1349; the same Joan appears as an ale brewer in 1350, but then the name disappears. Of the once important Wennington family only women remained after the Plague struck. Agnes Wennington received one-half virgate from her stricken husband in 1349; Joan of Wennington and her daughter Alice were fined for breaking the assize of ale in the same year; but then the name drops from sight.

The remainder of the above-mentioned eighteen families survived in isolated numbers, but these too seem to have gradually died out in the village. Of the Aspelon family, Thomas appeared prominently over 1350; John was less important at the same time, and his wife was fined for trespassing in 1350. Thomas Aspelon is found trespassing in 1360, and John is fined twice for neglecting work in the same year, but the family then seems to have disappeared.<sup>7</sup> The family of John the Carter had become significant at Upwood during the second quarter of the fourteenth century; John and his wife Mariota were still active in the village entries in 1350. But the family then falls from view, and the occasional trespass by a Carter a generation later seems to bear no relation to an established family.

<sup>7</sup> A Simon Aspelon, appearing for trespass in 1377-8, and a John Asplond appearing for trespass in 1390, are likely outsiders or occasional labour with this common occupational name.

The numerous Couhyrde family were represented only by women after 1349 when Alice and Christine were fined for breaking the assize of ale. Alice was fined for the same in 1360, but that is the last entry for the family. Robert Crane died in 1344 and his wife took their virgate of land as a result. Their son William received a cottage at the same time. William likely took over the virgate from his mother over the next few years since in 1347 he was charged for neglecting work owed on the lord's demesne. But neither William or his mother are mentioned after 1348. Of the Gouler family, only Joan was mentioned (for breaking assize) after the Black Death, and her name is not entered again over the 1350's and '60's. There is nothing to indicate that the Gouler name re-appearing at Upwood in the late fourteenth century is from the same family.

There is better information for the Holy family. Joan Holy received her husband Richard's virgate of land at his death in 1349, though Joan does not re-appear in our records. However, a John Holy, according to the 1353 roll the son of Richard, did survive the Black Death to become beadle of the village by 1360, and to have his name, and that of his servant, appear several times for that year. But there is no evidence for children of John, and the surname dies out in the 1360's. An outsider, John of Papeworthe, had appeared at Upwood as a major land holder in 1339, and this John survived 1348 to become juror several times over the 1350's and '60's. It may be a relative of this John whose name appears infrequently late in the century, but this is unlikely since the name is no longer associated with land after the 1360's, and only appears in the occasional trespass. By 1350 Elena is the only adult member of the once fairly important atte Snape family to be noted. Apparently Elena had some children, for a Matilda and Thomas atte Snape left the village without licence in 1360, and with them went the family name.

In addition to the above eighteen families, other old Upwood names disappeared more slowly from the village. As with the Aspelon and Carter families noted above, families with the common occupational names of Thacher and Webster are difficult to trace in the late fourteenth century. But at least one branch of each of the Thacher and Webesters had become landholders of some importance in the early fourteenth century and are no longer so a generation after the Black Death. Another family, the Wodecoks, survived the Plague and even assumed increasing importance as jurors over the next two decades; but the Wodecoks disappear by the 1370's. Much the same pattern may be found for the Wauk family, represented strongly in village government by Adam Wauk in the 1350's and 1360's, but by the 1370's only women survive with this family name. Finally, of course, some families just died out of natural causes after the Black Death as before, and of these the once important families of Cook,

Symond (Simon), and Suel, gradually disappearing over the late fourteenth century, may be taken as examples.

The very gradual transformation of the traditional tenant group of the village is corroborated by the evidence for the introduction of new tenants. Only slowly did new tenants enter from lesser families already resident in the village, and from beyond the village. The rise of local families in the tenurial ladder is not easy to calculate since there are no rent rolls for the early fourteenth century comparable to the detailed lists found for 1371-2 and later. But the large number of court rolls for the whole century for Upwood is a fairly certain guarantee that the names of important villagers have not been missed. From these sources it is possible to trace how some half-dozen families who did not emerge significantly in the village prior to 1348 came to hold substantial lands. Such were by 1371-2 the Alkoc family holding a full virgate, the Edward, one virgate, the Henry one and one-half virgate, Payn, one and one-half virgate, Peny, one virgate, and Robyn, one and one-half virgate. Equally significant for comparative reasons of course were the responsibilities of the families in the two periods. By the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the above families were involved for the first time in village government as jurors, reeves and beadle.

New names appearing in Upwood immediately after the Black Death were Balle, Baker, Bonde, Dulay, Lone, and Kimbolton. By the 1360's the names of Galopyn, Hikkisson, Rolf and Skinner were added to the tenants. Hawet and Hy were found by the 1370's as tenants for the first time; from 1386 Alston and Chamberleyn are noted as important land-holders, and from 1390 the Bray family is added to the list. The fortunes of the new families of course varied a great deal in those changing times. The Dulay family remained in the village for only a few years, and experienced continual problems in doing the work required by the lord. The John of Kimbolton who appeared at Upwood after the Black Death does not seem to have had a family, and no further mention is made of the name after 1360. But there is no evidence that outsiders were content to exhaust local opportunities and then move on, since the rest of these 'new names' became permanent residents.

Along with change in tenants, the 1360's also brought a period of high social tension and disturbance at Upwood. Court rolls of the 1350's had showed a rapid rise in neglect of work on the lord's demesne and trespass upon property of the lord or fellow villager as the village administration sought to recover from the impact of the Plague. But a lenient attitude towards debts for some ten years after the Black Death,<sup>8</sup> and the facility

<sup>8</sup> See my volume, *The Estates of Ramsey Abbey: a study in economic growth and organization* (Toronto, 1957), Chapter Nine, Section One.

with which tenants came and went, cushioned the burden of change. By the 1360's the lord's administration must have expected a return to normalcy, since accumulated debts had been wiped off the account roll and all properties were taken up. But a village community could not be so readily re-constituted after the large changes in personnel noted in the above pages. There is more evidence for quarrels, violence and bloodshed among villagers from the court rolls for a few years<sup>j</sup> of the 1360's than for a whole generation before the Black Death. Significantly, these quarrels involved a high proportion of main tenant families with a declining stake in the village, as well as involving newly arrived villagers. Among the former were the Cooks, Symonds and Suel; the latter were represented by the Baker, Bonde, Galopyn, Hikkisson, Rolf and Skynner families. Perhaps equally important are the many attacks on local officials who must have assumed heavier burdens with the clear decline of personal pledging. The increasing use of the constable as pledge did not resolve the problem of continual disturbance; indeed constables were frequently the object of assaults over the following decades.<sup>9</sup>

On the extant court rolls this tension first appears in 1360. Village officials seemed prone to attack in this year as John Bonde assaulted the beadle, John Holy, on one occasion, and at another time the same official was attacked by John Haukyn. Among themselves the hired servants were as restive, since William Daye, pigman, assaulted the hayward, Walter Baker, and Robert, a servant of the same Daye assaulted Thomas a servant of the beadle. John Bonde also drew blood in an attack on a Henry Squyer. Other less known persons, John Redheved and Alan de Weston, perhaps hired servants, were also charged with assault and blood drawing. A more domestic quarrel may be represented by Sarra Ponder's attack upon Christine Ponder to the degree of drawing blood. The next court roll<sup>10</sup> reports still more violence. A newcomer, William Rolf, is charged on five different counts with drawing blood from five different men, Adam Wauk, John Redheved, John Galopyn, Hugh Hamond and

<sup>9</sup> These tensions also affected village administration in many ways that cannot be described in the space available here. For example, there were many requests of the local court by villagers for a measure of the 'metes and bounds' between properties. Such requests were very rare a generation earlier. And there was much waste of property and dilapidation of buildings by all classes of villager that the administration seemed unable to correct. At the same time there was a decline in personal pledging, and large family grouping,<sup>j</sup> perhaps best indicated by the fewer persons in the courts in comparison to pre-1348 (contrast column 3 in Table I above, with the parallel column in the table of the 1966 article, *op. cit.*).

<sup>10</sup> This roll, Public Record Office, SC 2, Portfolio 179, no. 37, cannot be dated exactly, but would seem to come between the years 1363-6.

John Augustyn senior. Servants continued to quarrel, and John the Skynner drew blood from Simon the servant of John Hikkisson. A William Poup' and the Robert Bunting from whom he drew blood are otherwise unknown and likely hired labourers. Some members of older families are mentioned too: John Robyn and John Bigge having drawn blood from each other, William Haukynsson drawing blood from William Newman, John Attewell drawing blood from John Robyn, and John Miles from John Attewell. And Sarra Ponder was still not chastened, for she drew blood again from Christine Ponder in the year of this court.

The concentration of violence about certain men such as William Rolf and the readiness of servants to employ force may represent conditions encouraging 'bastard feudalism' on this humble level of society.<sup>11</sup> There is an inkling too that the old mutual spirit of the village has been reduced to revenge when men like John Attewell above are punished in turn by another neighbour. But evidence from Upwood is too clipped and changing to provide an adequate answer to such queries. The very good court rolls for 1371-2 and 1372-3 reveal many different persons involved in disturbance from those above. By 1382 the names differ again, and good documents in the early 1390's reveal a further group. In short, we do have ample evidence that a disturbed atmosphere hangs over the village throughout all these decades of the late fourteenth century.

## II

With the decline of old Upwood families, the entry of many new persons to village holdings, and the considerable turnover of properties, village officials would not be able to rely so readily upon memory. As a consequence the account rolls began to list the names of tenants from sometime about a generation after the Black Death. This 'rent roll' was appended to the regular account roll, and gave the amounts of property each held together with the conditions of tenure. Properties in these lists were either virgates (thirty acres), one-half or one-quarter virgates, or cotlands of one, two or three acres. The conditions of tenure were ordinary villein services (*ad opus*), 'official' village duties (the officials are noted usually as reeve, beadle, ploughmen), partial commutation (*ad censem*), or more complete commutation (*ad arentatum*).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> One is reminded, for example, of the spirit of the *Paston Letters* in the fifteenth century, not many miles from Upwood.

<sup>12</sup> In these pages and Table II the following shortened forms are employed: v. - virgate, cot. - cotland, and op. - *ad opus*, ad c. - *ad censem*, ad A. - *ad arentatum*, ak. - akerman (ploughman), bed. - beadle.

Very often a piece of parchment containing the rent roll was sewn to the end of the account roll, and since these were easily torn away, far fewer rent rolls than account rolls survive. For Upwood there are extant rent rolls for the years 1371-2, 1385-6, 1392-3, 1401-2, 1406-7, 1411-12, 1412-13.<sup>13</sup> This material has been presented below (Table II). The scattered nature of the rent roll survivals prevents a clear emergence of yearly or short run policy, such as has been gleaned from the more concentrated survivals of Broughton,<sup>14</sup> for example. Still it is clear that at Upwood, as had been the case at Broughton, those who were able to undertake special official tasks had a good opportunity to gain more land since they were allowed some land free of services for their special service, and had services commuted to money rent on their other holdings. In the following table such were the obvious arrangements for Walter Baker in 1385-6 and 1392-3, William Baker in 1401-2, Richard Buckworth in 1392-3, John Gouler in 1412-13, John Hikkisson in 1392-3, John Lone in 1371-2, John Miles in 1385-6, Thomas and Richard Wardebusc over several years.

However, after 1400 these special forms of commutation became less significant when there was a general movement to permanent commutation. Money salaries or subsidies began to be offered to officials in place of special commutation. *Subsidia* of five shillings were offered to John Wyse and of five shillings sixpence to John Wardebusc for ploughing in 1408-9. Thomas Michel first appears in the rent roll of 1412-13 holding one-quarter virgate *ad A.*, but in a receiver's roll<sup>15</sup> for the previous year he was paid twelve shillings for ploughing services.<sup>16</sup> Examples of tenants beginning to hold more permanently *ad A.* after 1400 without reference to services are William Attewelle, John Bigge, Peter Bray, William Chamberleyn, John Galopyn and John Miles. There is some evidence for more letting of land *ad c.* too, as with William Chamberleyn and John Galopyn. But on the whole the trend was to *arentatum* over *censum*. A good number of the tenants after 1400 had been listed for several decades so that age would also be a consideration in commutation. In the account roll of 1408-9 it was mentioned in explanation of some vacant demesne land that William

<sup>13</sup> Public Record Office, SC 2, Portfolio 885, no. 16; British Museum, Additional Rolls 34888, 34854, 34856, 34857, 34858, 34861.

<sup>14</sup> See my forthcoming article, "The Structure of Commutation in a Fourteenth-Century Village."

<sup>15</sup> British Museum, Additional Roll 34858.

<sup>16</sup> Some variations of the older service arrangement continued: over 1412-13 John Lone, carter for the lord, had the rent of five shillings for his cottage cancelled ('allowed'), and from William Fraunce, the lord's pigman, were cancelled the seven shillings, twopence for his cottage and other small dues.

Hering who formerly held the land could no longer do so (*propter impotentiam non potest diutius dictam terram occupare ut testatur*). When available, however, age and expertise no doubt had its price, for it is interesting that 'antiquus Willelmus' earned thirteen shillings, seven pence for ploughing over 1411-12, whereas the other ploughmen earned twelve shillings and five shillings respectively!

For reasons of convenience many smallholders have not been listed in the following table (II). These smallholders were usually not from old village families or from substantial newcomers. Although only a few are named in the demesne expense roll, it can be assumed that these were servants or labourers who held small properties as part of the attraction for their service, and for the quick exploitation of a few years owing to their shortage of capital. The smallholders who are not listed in the following table are the following:

William Bailesman	1 cot. ad c.	(1392-3)
Ralph Cademan	1 cot. ad op.	(1392-3)
William Clerk	½ cot. ad A.	(1371-2)
John Denyle	1 cot. ad op.	(1385-6 to 1392-3)
William Dycun	1 cot. ad A.	(1401-2f.)
	½ cot. ad A.	(1412-13)
John Erle	1 cot. ad op.	(1371-2, 1385-6)
William Erle, <sup>17</sup>	1 cot. ad A.	(1406-7f.)
William Fleming	1 cot. ad op.	(1371-2 to 1401-2)
John Fraunce	1 cot. ad c.	(1371-2 to 1392-3)
William Fraunce <sup>18</sup>	1 cot. ad c.	(1401-2 to 1412-13)
William Hacun	½ cot ad A.	(1371-2 to 1385-6)
Nicholas Hendesson <sup>19</sup>	½ cot ad A.	(1401-2f.)
William Jonesson <sup>20</sup>	1 cot. ad A.	(1411-12)
William Phelip	1 cot. ad op.	
	1 cot. ad c.	(1371-2)
John Ramsey	1 cot. ad A.	(1371-2 to 1392-3)
Thomas Rolf	1 cot. ad A.	(1401-2f.)
Simon Shepherd	1 cot. ad op.	(1385-6)
John Suel	1 cot. ad A.	(1371-2 to 1392-3)
Robert Thedwar	1 cot. ad op.	(1371-2)
William Thacher	½ cot. ad A.	(1406-7f.)
Peter Thresher	1 cot. ad c.	(1385-6)
John Vernon	½ cot. ad A.	(1401-2f.)
William Wylde	½ cot. ad A.	(1371-2 to 1385-6)
Christine Wylde	½ cot. ad A.	(1392-3)

<sup>17</sup> William Erl was occasionally shepherd, as during part of the year 1395-6 for two shillings, eight pence.

<sup>18</sup> William Fraunce was ploughman for part of the year 1395-6 for five shillings. A John Suter had held one-half cotland in 1371-2 as hayward.

<sup>19</sup> The Ramsey Court Book identifies Nicholas Hendesson as from Hemmingford Grey.

<sup>20</sup> The Court Book calls him William Jonesson of Holme.

TABLE II

## VILLEIN TENURE AT UPWOOD

	1371-2	1385-6	1392-3	1401-2	1406-7	1411-12	1412-13
Albyn, Richard <sup>21</sup>	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{3}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.
Alcock, William	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	—	—
Aleyn, John	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
—, William	—	—	—	1 cot. ad c.	—	—	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
—, Robert	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
Alston, Nicholas	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. as bed.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. as bed.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.
Andrew, John	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.
Attewelle, John	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad c.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad c.	—	—	—	—	—
—, Richard	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.
—, William	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad c.	—	—	1 v. ad A., 1 cot. ad op.	1 cot. ad op.	—	—
Baker, Walter	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as ak., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as ak., 1 cot. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	—	—	—	—
—, William	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as ak., 1 cot. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
—, William jr.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—, John	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Balle, Thomas	—	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad c.	—	—	—	—	—

21 The entry for the year 1401-2 stated as John Albyn is taken as a scribal error.

	1371-2	1385-6	1392-3	1401-2	1406-7	1411-12	1412-13
—, Margaret (widow of Thomas)	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	—	—	—	—
—, Andrew	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
Bigge, John <sup>22</sup>	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.
Bray, Peter	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad c.	—	1 v. ad A.	1 v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1 v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.
Buckworth, William	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad op.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as bed.	—	—	—
—, Richard	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	—
Chamberleyne, William	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c., 1 cot. ad op.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c., 1 cot. ad op.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	—
Cook, John	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c., 1 cot. ad op.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	—	—	—
Edward, Robert	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad op.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	—	—	—
—, William	—	—	—	—	1 v. ad op.	—	—
Fleming, John	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	—	—	—	—	—

<sup>22</sup> A John Bonde holding one-half virgate *ad opus* in 1371-2 is not listed here, since he seems to be the last member of a once important family. For the same reason, Walter Dae, holding one-half virgate and two cotlands in 1371-2, and John Horwode, holding one virgate in the same year, are not listed here. The Pykeler family was represented in 1371-2 by Matilda holding one virgate, but thereafter this important family seemed to lose interest in the village. A Stephen Pykeler held one-half virgate for a decade or two, but consistently refused to work his land properly and repair the buildings. Finally, a Richard Pykeler, no doubt the son of Stephen, left the village in 1391. The Bracer family are also not listed here since they were simply cotlanders, though they began to acquire property in the fifteenth century, and by 1412-13 a Richard Bracer held a one-half virgate and three cotlands, all *ad orientatum*.

					1411-12
					1412-13
Galopyn, John	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad c.	1406-7
Goulder, Richard	—	—	1 v. ad op.	1 v. ad op.	1401-2
—, John	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1401-2
Haukyn, John	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	—	—	1406-7
—, Thomas	—	—	1 v. ad op.	—	—
—, Joan	—	—	—	—	—
Hawet, Edward	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	—
Hering, William <sup>23</sup>	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1411-12
—, William jr.	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 cot. ad c., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 cot. ad c., 1 cot. ad A.	1406-7
—, Richard	—	—	—	1 v. ad op.	1412-13
Herry, John	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. as bed.	—	—	—
Hikkisson, John, sr. <sup>24</sup>	1 v. ad op., 1 v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as reeve	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. as reeve	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1406-7
—, John, jr.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad c.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op.	—	—	—

	1371-2	1385-6	1392-3	1401-2	1406-7	1411-12	1412-13
Hure, John	1 cot. ad op., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
Jerkyn, John	1 cot. ad c.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lone, John <sup>23</sup>	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. as bed, $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	—	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	—	—	—	—
—, Alice (widow of John)	—	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	—	—	—	—	—
Loneday, John	—	—	1 cot. ad op., 1 cot. ad A.	1 cot. ad op., 1 cot. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.
Miles, John	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., 1 v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. as reeve, $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad c., 1 v. ad A.	1 v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	—	—	—	—
—, Robert	—	—	—	1 v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	1 v. ad c., 1 v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 v. ad c., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.,	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.
Newman, William	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op. 1 v. ad A.	—	—	—	—	—	—
—, Thomas	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op., 1 v. ad A., 1 cot. ad A.	1 v. ad A.	1 v. ad A.	—	—	—
—, Richard	—	—	—	—	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.
—, Robert	—	—	—	—	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$ cot. ad A.
Parquay, William	—	—	—	1 v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.
Payn, William	1 v. ad op., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad c., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad c., $\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad A.	1 v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	1 v. ad op., 1 v. ad A.	2 $\frac{1}{4}$ v. ad A.	$\frac{1}{2}$ v. ad op.

<sup>23</sup> For this list, the William Hering jr. of 1371-2, and the William Hering sr. of 1392-3 and 1401-2, are assumed to be the same person. Since an older William Hering died during the year 1412-13 without goods, it is assumed that his property had passed to the junior member, although the rent roll only states a William Hering to be tenant.

<sup>24</sup> The John Hikkisson and the John Hikkisson sr. of the year 1371-2 are assumed to be the same person.

<sup>25</sup> A shadowy Richard Lone, alias Thacher, held one-quarter virgate over 1401-2 and perhaps later.



This is not to say that no smallholder prospered as tenant. Moderate smallholders like Nicholas Alston and John Jerkyn added to their holdings, at least for a time. More substantial and permanent increases were made by Peter Bray, William Chamberleyn, John Cook, Edward Hawet, John Hurre<sup>26</sup> and William Symond. It should be noted, however, that most of these men were initially one-quarter or one-half virgaters, that is more considerable tenants than the cotlanders of the above paragraph. Greatest increases in property were made by the already substantial tenants who were able to maintain themselves and relate other members of their family to property over the longer periods of time. Such were the Balle, Baker, Gouler, Hering, Hikkisson, Miles, Newman, Payn, Peny, Robyn, and Wardebusc families. Simply numbers were not a guarantee of prosperity, of course, as may be attested by the Attewelle family. But in any case the above patterns are most general and the decline in most families would be explained by mortality and movement from the village.<sup>27</sup> With the increasing movement and decline of villeinage, however, it becomes more difficult to discern the meaning of 'native' villager.<sup>28</sup>

Some one hundred and fifty acres of demesne had been rented out to various persons by a generation after the Black Death and for the most part were not brought back into demesne cultivation before the farming of the remainder of the demesne in the early fourteenth century. The offering of this land in many small parcels opened up a new market to a wide variety of persons. Groups of 'customary tenants' in the language of the account rolls, shared among themselves the larger units of land, that is fields of seventeen acres and three rods, sixteen acres and three rods, and of seven acres. Men whose names appeared nowhere else in the village documents and would appear to be outsiders also leased in groups: these were John Miller and 'parceners' holding one fifteen acre field, and John Onty and 'parceners' holding twelve acres, one rod by the 1380's. Villagers who appear only as smallholders among customary tenants also grouped together to acquire demesne, such as John Skynner and *socii* holding ten acres, and William Wylde and *socii* holding four acres. The remaining lands of the demesne rented out were scattered much more widely among native villagers and outsiders.

<sup>26</sup> Again, services were part of the pattern of success of many of these men: John Hurre had been a carter in 1395-6 for eight shillings, Nicholas Alston was a beadle by 1406-7, and William Chamberleyn was noted as a former beadle in the account roll for this same year.

<sup>27</sup> Table II presents an indicative picture of the break in tenure by important families from failure to provide heirs. On movement from the village, see below, note 32.

<sup>28</sup> A study now being conducted by one of my students, Edwin De Windt, on the parcelling up of the old intercommuning marsh at Holywell in the late fourteenth century, exemplifies this point very well.

It is not possible to obtain detailed information about the names of demesne tenants before the 1380's since *custumarii*, *parcenarii* and *socii* were not named. But from the 1380's account rolls complete detail may be obtained and may be tabulated as follows:

TABLE III  
LESSEES OF DEMESNE<sup>29</sup>

	1385-6	1386-7	1392-3	1408-9	1411-12	1412-13
Main Villagers	13	13	10	23	24	24
Smallholders	9	9	8	5	5	4
Outsiders	17	20	16	11	11	12

From the 1390's the economic life of Upwood was soundly shaken,<sup>30</sup> and as would be expected many smallholders were unable to retain their properties. At the same time some smallholders did gain control of a moderate amount of land. For example, by 1412 John Vernon held four pieces of demesne (three acres and three and one-half rods; four acres; two acres; four 'butts'), and John Skynner held three pieces (four acres; one acre; 2 s. 6 d. worth of meadow). On the whole, however, it was members of the families of the more important villagers who gradually established a stronger foothold in demesne lands (such as William Hering jr. with four acres, one-half rod, one acre, and three acre parcels; and Richard Attewell with parcels of four acres, two acres, four acres, two acres, three acres and three rods). It is difficult to comment on outsiders without a comparative study of neighbouring villages that is beyond this study. The ability of many of these to retain demesne parcels over this period would suggest that they too were substantial farmers from the district. John Cary, holding five parcels of demesne (three acres, three rods; one acre; two and one-half acres; two acres; four acres, three rods) is an example of such an outsider.

The rapid deterioration in demesne administration that appeared in the last decade of the fourteenth century ultimately brought about greater adjustments than the Black Death. From the fact that the account roll is the administrative instrument proper to the lord, it is difficult to assess the true condition of villagers at this time. There is evidence for poverty among small craftsmen families, like the 'Christine Sadeler, William

<sup>29</sup> There are another half-dozen years over this period for which this type of information is available. But the long run pattern remains the same, so for convenience they are not tabulated here. For Upwood there are extant for the years between the Black Death and 1413 twenty account rolls, of which five are the shorter receiver and beadle's rolls.

<sup>30</sup> For a general study of economic conditions in these villages from the 1390's, see my volume *The Estates of Ramsey Abbey*, Chapter Ten.

Taylor, John Draper, and Thomas Forgoon who were released from fines amounting to four shillings since they had nothing of goods that could be distrained.<sup>31</sup> Some members of important village families left little in the village by way of capital. It was reported in the account roll of 1412-13, for example, that William Hering who owed eight shillings, one penny, from the days he was beadle, had died during the year and left nothing in goods from which this might be collected, so the debt was cancelled. And in the same year fines to the amount of fourteen pence owing from Stephen Pykeler, William Fraunce, Agnes Skynner and John Skynner were cancelled since they had nothing in goods. But it is more often difficult to separate ineffective administration from insolvency. The account roll of 1408-9 notes that sixteen shillings, nine pence cannot be raised from tenants Simon Smyth and John Robbes of the neighbouring village of (Abbot's) Ripton. Over 1412-13 Nicholas Alston was forgiven an old debt contracted while beadle since some of those from whom he was to collect the debt had died, and others had fled the village leaving nothing from which it might be collected. In all account rolls from the 1390's there is also the complaint that administrators did not 'dare' collect from some powerful free tenant, especially Nicholas of Stukeley. By 1412-13 the le Moyne family, Henry Bereford and Adam Ramsey are also noted as those from whom they did not dare collect, and so the debts were cancelled.

Insolvency on the account roll must therefore be interpreted very carefully. On the surface the brunt of the collapse of the demesne economy fell immediately on the administrators, those who had prospered greatly from the demesne in earlier days. Debt lists like the following began to appear at the foot of account rolls from the 1390's: (1406-7) John Skynner, hayward, 2 s.; John Robyn, former reeve, 78 s. 8 d.; William Alcock, former reeve, 57 s. 8 d.; Stephen Pykeler, former beadle, 17 s.; John Catworth, former pigman, 36 s.; Richard Newman, former cowherd, 16 s.; William Hering, former beadle, 18 s. 1 d.; William Chamberleyn, former beadle, 30 s. 7 d.; Nicholas Alston, current beadle, £4. 8 s. 7 d.; Henry Berford, bailiff, 5 s. The aura of indebtedness must have come down hard at least on the morale of even the most prosperous villeins. It may be for this reason that a good many scions of leading Upwood families left the village about this time.<sup>32</sup> But indebtedness embraced powerful freemen,

<sup>31</sup> British Museum, Additional Roll 34859 (1408-9).

<sup>32</sup> In 1391, outside the demesne without licence were John Buckworth (at Ramsey), Richard Pykeler (at Alconbury), William Albyn (at London), and John Gouler (at London). Only John Gouler seems to have returned. A few villagers had left during the 1350's: William Hurre and Thomas (atte)Snap were outside the demesne without licence by 1360. But on the whole there is very little record of flight from the demesne after the Black Death, and from 1360 to 1390 there was only Walter Fraunce outside without licence from 1386.

such as the Henry Berford noted above, as well as the Upwood villeins. Debts were owed from inability to collect, and especially was this true for the beadle whose main job was to collect rents. But there is no evidence that administrators were allowed to suffer ruin from such obligations. Rather, the Ramsey Court Book that has a great deal of material for Upwood over the first half of the fifteenth century shows how many were finding new opportunities in the village. The Court Book shows that by 1427 the old family of Miles had added at least six pieces of property to the two virgates listed in the last rent roll. The Edwards family had added a portion of meadow and another 'piece' of land by 1442; the Goulers had added a messuage and three-quarters of a virgate by 1445; by the same date John Aleyn had one and one-quarter virgate, one cotland, another 'piece' of land, and three houses. Outsiders made more impressive gains at Upwood. Some smallholders who were appearing on the last rent rolls gradually increased these holdings. Nicholas Hendesson of Hemmingford Grey, for example, had added another one-half virgate and 'placea' by 1416; William Jonesson of Holme collected four small parcels of land over the first twenty-five years of the century. But the completely new names were more active, like the Richard Baron of Wokesden who leased two and one-half virgates and two smaller parcels of land in one year of the 1420's, and a Richard Gretham of Buckden who acquired one messuage and one virgate at one time, and at another two virgates and four small units of land.

### III

In summary, account roll and court roll materials show the village of Upwood responding as a community of interests to the situation occasioned by the Black Death. The effort of the lord's administration to keep land in tillage received a positive response from villagers and even from outsiders when parcels of demesne were made available at attractive terms and villeinage could be obtained for a variety of *ad censem* and *ad arentatum* rates. Roots of family, custom and sentiment were too deep to be torn away by even the tragedy of the Plague. More impressive than the lord's efforts to keep land in tillage were the efforts of pathetic remnants of Upwood families who tried to retain their old status after the mid-century. More noticeable than the compulsive force of serfdom to retain or allocate persons to lands was the co-operative tradition that re-allocated labour reservoirs along old lines by joint leasing of parcels of the demesne. More successful than the avoidance of services was the readiness to perform official services for the rewards that such expertise could command.

However, Upwood was not to recover its stability of the early fourteenth

century. A surface economic equilibrium from the 1360's to 1390 was belied by multiple social tensions in the village. Either from the personnel problems of outsiders, the apathy of exhausted families, or the insecurity of economic relations, the social community continued to break down at Upwood over the latter half of the fourteenth century. Not surprisingly, when a new economic crisis hit the village in the 1390's Upwood no longer had the resilience to adapt along old lines. Sons of important families forsook good holdings at home to go abroad; there was no longer a co-operative effort to continue working parts of the demesne; and even the best paid officials were trapped in a deteriorating situation. In the future good fortune in Upwood lay with the families who would 'go it alone' or with wealthy outsiders ready to pounce upon opportunities in any village. How quickly the village would be transformed depended of course upon many familial factors that cannot be traced in available documents,<sup>33</sup> and upon economic conditions that were never too attractive in the early fifteenth century to judge by the account rolls. Nevertheless, in a *divisio* of waste at Upwood made over 1448-9,<sup>34</sup> at least thirteen of the twenty-seven villagers' names noted were new to Upwood from the late fourteenth century.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

<sup>33</sup> Some indications of widening family associations may be seen in the Court Book evidence for marriage licences. Licences were granted for the marriage of the daughter of William Symond to William de Eye of Huntingdon, and for Agnes the daughter of Thomas Gouler to marry a servant of the cellarer at Ramsey. Robert Miles married at King's Ripton with permission to remain there; William Albyn received a licence to marry and remain at Wisbeach.

<sup>34</sup> See the text in my volume, *Tenure and Mobility: Studies in the Social History of the Mediaeval English Village* (Toronto, 1964), 29-30.

# Chauntecleer's Paradise Lost and Regained

BERNARD S. LEVY

GEORGE R. ADAMS

**A**T the end of his beast fable, the Nun's Priest counsels, "Taketh the moralite, goode men," expanding the advice a few lines later to "Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille."<sup>1</sup> Now the skillful and ironic priest cannot mean by "the moralitee" and "the fruyt" of his tale the simple morals which precede the conclusion, that is, that one should not shut his eyes when he should be looking or talk when he should be silent. Clearly, the morality, the theme of the Nun's Priest's Tale, lies in the total narrative and structure of the tale. But this morality is not simply that "Wommenes conseils been ful ofte colde" (3256) or that Chauntecleer suffers near death because of his "pryde" and the fox's "flaterie." Rather, the theme of the tale is a fusion of all these morals set in a narrative framework which in itself contains a moral, that is, the recapitulation by Chauntecleer of man's fall and redemption, and the theological meanings inherent in Chauntecleer's repeating Adam's experience.

The suggestion that the Nun's Priest's Tale is a comic version of the Fall is of course not new; in 1951 Speirs analyzed the tale as the Adam and Eve story, and recently both David Holbrook and Bernard F. Huppé have reinforced the analysis.<sup>2</sup> There is, perhaps inevitably, opposition to "allegorizing" the tale in this way; but the careful reader of the Nun's Priest's Tale will discover that Chaucer has very carefully put into the tale material which constantly directs the reader's attention not only to the basic biblical narrative of Adam and Eve, but also to theological commentary on the Fall.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This and all subsequent citations of Chaucer are from *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*, ed. F.N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1957).

<sup>2</sup> John Speirs, *Chaucer the Maker*, 2nd ed. (London, 1960), 185-193; David Holbrook, "The Nonne Preestes Tale," in *The Age of Chaucer*, ed. Boris Ford (London, 1954), 118-128; Bernard F. Huppé, *A Reading of the Canterbury Tales* (State University of New York Press, 1964), 174-184.

<sup>3</sup> R. T. Lenaghan, "The Nun's Priest's Fable," *PMLA*, 78 (1963), 300, condemns the tendency of critics to read the poem as an allegory and says: "To identify Chauntecleer with Adam seems as mistaken as to take what looks like a fabular *Moralitas* for the final statement of the poem's import." The same attitude can be found in E. Talbot Donaldson, "Patristic Exegesis in the Criticism of Medieval Literature: the Opposition," in *Critical Approaches to Medieval Literature*, ed. Dorothy Bethurum (New York, 1960) 18: "I doubt that the fox represents the Devil or that Chauntecleer represents the alert Christian... What we have here in poetic (or barnyard) terms is a devilish fox-villain and a conscientious, if foolish, rooster-hero."

The setting of Chauntecleer's unhappy experience is clearly a comic version of Paradise. Even though Chauntecleer's realm is only "A yeerd... enclosed al aboute / With stikkes, and a dry dych withoute" (2847-48), it bears a significant resemblance to the "paradisum voluptatis" of Genesis 2:8 and the New Jerusalem of Revelations 21:12 and 22:1, which has a "murmum magnum, et altum" and a "fluvium aquae vitae." Both Genesis and the New Jerusalem also have, significantly for the Nun's Priest's Tale, a "lignum vitae." But the basic description of the chickenyard with "beem" (presumably inside a chicken-coop), fence, and ditch, is a parody of Isaiah 5:1-2, one of the tracts for Holy Saturday: "Vinea facta est dilecta in cornu, in loco uberi. Et maceriam circumdedit, et circumfodit: et plantavit vineam Sorec, et aedificavit turrim in medio ejus."<sup>4</sup> Chauntecleer is the sole male and ruler of this chicken-yard paradise (2847-70) with a consort, Pertelote, who, like Eve, made from the rib of Adam and hence identical to him, is a copy of her mate (2865-70) and is instrumental in the fall from Paradise. Furthermore, their argument about the right mode of action takes place on what represents the forbidden tree, "beem" on which Chauntecleer and Pertelote are safely perched. The beam typologically foreshadows the tree at the end of the tale, so that the act of leaving the safety of the beam ("fley doun") is the culmination of Chauntecleer's prideful disquisition on dreams, a lecture prompted by Pertelote's advice to take a laxative.

Chauntecleer knows that he "shal han of this avisoun / Adversitee" (3152-53), but partly through Pertelote's chiding, partly because he has a duty in the yard ("it is my day, I may not dwelle," 3150), but mostly because he turns his attention to her charms, he wilfully chooses to leave the beam and expose himself to the fox.<sup>5</sup> Traditional commentary makes it clear that pride and turning away from God (i.e., flying from the beam)

<sup>4</sup> Charles Dahlberg, "Chaucer's Cock and Fox," *JEGP*, 53 (1954), 285-6, suggests that the description is a parody of Song of Songs 4:12, the enclosed yard parallel to the "hortus conclusus" and the "drye dych" antithetical to the "fons signatus," "because it has no living water."

<sup>5</sup> J. Burke Severs, "Chaucer's Originality in the *Nun's Priest's Tale*," *SP*, 43 (1946), 30, comments: "The parallel with Adam is exact. 'The woman... gave me of the tree, and I did eat.' Adam, against his better judgment, blinded by Eve's attraction, followed her advice and came to grief." Following this lead, other critics suggest that Chauntecleer's fall is his own fault, due to his vanity, pride, uxorious passion, sensuality, willful disobedience, or a combination of these. See Speirs, 186, 190; Charles A. Owen, Jr., "Crucial Passages in Five of the *Canterbury Tales*: A Study in Irony and Symbol," *JEGP*, 52 (1953), 307; Mortimer J. Donovan, "The Moralite of the Nun's Priest's Sermon," *JEGP*, 52 (1953), 506; Holbrook, 122-123; Arthur T. Broes, "Chaucer's Disgruntled Cleric: *The Nun's Priest's Tale*," *PMLA*, 78 (1963), 162; and Huppé, 177-181.

were the causes of Adam's downfall. In his discussion of the fall of Adam and Eve, Augustine attributes the original disobedience to pride:

In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboediantiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uoluntas mala. Porro malae uoluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia? *Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est.* Quid est autem superbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet.<sup>6</sup>

Augustine also suggests that Adam sins when he yields to Eve, unable to bear separation from her:

...ita credendum est illum uirum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, coniugem coniugi, ad Dei legem transgrediendam non tamquam uerum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse. Non enim frustra dixit apostolus: *Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est,* nisi quia illa quod ei serpens locutus est, tamquam uerum esset, accepit, ille autem ab unico noluit consortio dirimi nec in communione peccati; nec ideo minus reus, si sciens prudensque peccauit.<sup>7</sup>

Of Adam's uxoriousness, the Parson comments:

For trust wel, though so were that the feend tempted Eve, that is to seyn, the flessh, and the flessh hadde delit in the beautee of the fruyt defended, yet certes, til that resoun, that is to seyn, Adam, consented to the etynge of the fruyt, yet stood he in th' estaat of innocence. / Of thilke Adam tooke we thilke synne original; for of hym flesshly descended be we alle, and engendred of vile and corrupt mateere. / And whan the soule is put in oure body, right anon is contract original synne; and that that was erst but oonly peyne of concupiscence, is afterward bothe peyne and synne. / ... / And this concupiscence, whan it is wrongfully disposed or ordeyned in man, it maketh hym coveite, by coveitise of flessh, flesshly synne, by sighte of his eyen as to erthely thynges, and eek coveitise of hynes by pride of herte.<sup>8</sup>

A more subtle commentary on the same point is made by Augustine:

Quare ergo ita dicitur, nisi quia hic manifeste ostenditur non posse nos a diabolo tentari, nisi per illam animalem partem, quae quasi mulieris imaginem vel exemplum in uno ipso homine ostendit?<sup>9</sup>

Adam's pride and his lustful obedience to Eve are matched in Chauntecleer's response to Pertelote:

<sup>6</sup> Saint Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, xiii, 1-8, edd. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, *Corpus Christianorum*, Series Latina, 48 (Turnhout, 1955), 434.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, XIV, xi, 75-83, p. 433.

<sup>8</sup> Parson's Tale, 331-336.

<sup>9</sup> Saint Augustine, *De Genesi Contra Manicheos*, II, xviii, 28, *PL* 34, 210. Cf. Louis Beirnaert, "La Dimension mythique dans le sacramentalisme chrétien," *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, 17 (1949), 255-286.

Now lete us speke of myrthe, and stynte al this.  
 Madame Pertelote, so have I blis,  
 Of o thyng God hath sent me large grace;  
 For whan I se the beautee of youre face,  
 Ye been so scarlet reed abouthe youre yen,  
 It maketh al my drede for to dyen;  
 For al so siker as *In principio*,  
*Mulier est hominis confusio*, —  
 Madame, the sentence of this Latyn is,  
 "Womman is mannes joye and al his blis."  
 For whan I feele a-nyght your softe syde,  
 Al be it that I may nat on yow ryde,  
 For that oure perche is maad so narwe, allas !  
 I am so ful of joye and solas,  
 That I diffye bothe sweven and dreem. (3157-71)

Having pridefully chosen to defy his dream, a portent sent by God, Chauntecleer is fair game for the fox, who, as Mortimer J. Donovan points out, represents the devil.<sup>10</sup> In case the reader is not aware of the Satan-fox tradition, Chaucer himself gives clues to the proper identification of the fox:

Right as the humour of malencolie  
 Causeth ful many a man in sleep to crie  
 For feere of blake beres, or boles blake,  
 Or elles blake develes wole hem take. (2933-36)  
 A col-fox, ful of sly iniquitee... (3215)

Now, certes, I were worse than a feend,  
 If I to yow wolde harm or vileynde ! (3286-87)

The fox even hints that he has knowledge of heaven, as Lucifer naturally would:

For trewely, ye have as myrie a stevene  
 As any aungel hath that is in hevene. (3291-92)

And if there were not sufficient hints in the description of the yard, Chauntecleer, Pertelote, and the fox, Chaucer even refers to Genesis ("In principio," 3163),<sup>11</sup> the source of the Adam and Eve story, and later makes explicit reference to the Fall:

Wommennes conseils been ful ofte colde;  
 Wommannes conseil broghte us first to wo,  
 And made Adam fro Paradys to go,  
 Ther as he was ful myrie and wel at ese. (3256-59)

<sup>10</sup> Donovan, 500-504. Cf. Canon's Yeoman's Tale, 1074-1087, where the "feendly" canon is called a "fox." See also Speirs, 189; Holbrook, 122; Dahlberg, 280; and Huppé, 179.

<sup>11</sup> See Owen, 307; Huppé, 178.

Clearly, the plot, setting, and characters of the Nun's Priest's Tale are intended to be a comic parallel to the fall of Adam from Paradise. But Chaucer does not depend only on the fairly obvious parallels; imbedded in the tale is a precise dating of Chauntecleer's fall which fits exactly Patristic commentary on the fall of Adam.<sup>12</sup> Chauntecleer's troubles begin early, as he awakes "in a dawenynge" (2882) from a bad dream. He argues with Pertelote until it is "ny day" (3150) and flies from the beam when "it was day" (3173). He makes love to Pertelote twenty times "er it was pryme" (3178), that is, 9:00 A. M. By prime and shortly thereafter (3192 ff.) he is pridefully exulting in the birds and flowers of his garden. The devilish fox enters the plot at "passed undren" (3222), that is, about mid-morning. By late morning or forenoon Chauntecleer is bathing and singing "Agayn the sonne" (3269). Shortly after that the fox seizes him. Thus the whole action of Chauntecleer's fall takes place within a period of six hours, from dawn to noon. Moreover, it takes place on a specific day, Friday, May 3:

Whan that the month in which the world bigan,  
That highte March, whan God first maked man,  
Was compleet, and passed were also,  
Syn March bigan, thrity dayes and two,  
Bifel that Chauntecleer in al his pryde... (3187-91)

And on a Friday fil al this meschaunce. (3341)

The reason for Chaucer's precise dating of Chauntecleer's fall can be found in traditional commentary.

The *Legenda Aurea* notes that "Adam factus fuit et peccavit in mense Martio, feria sexta et hora sexta,"<sup>13</sup> a tradition echoed in Dante's *Paradiso*, 26: 139-142, which says that Adam was created and fell within a six-hour period, from "la prim' ora a quella che seconda / (Come 'l sol muta quadre) l'ora sesta." The relevance of May 3 is explained by the liturgy. It is the time of pagan festival, of the rites of Venus, and Chauntecleer responds to it erotically. But, as the liturgy tells us, it is the time of the Invention of the Holy Cross. When the Cross was found by Queen Helen on May 3, a church was dedicated to it on the spot where a temple of Venus formerly stood. The Invention of the Holy Cross is thus a concrete reenactment of the replacement of *eros* by *agape*.

Chaucer's use of Friday is more or less obvious.<sup>14</sup> The Old Law, Genesis,

<sup>12</sup> George R. Adams and Bernard S. Levy, "Good and Bad Fridays and May 3 in Chaucer," *ELN*, 3 (1966), 245-248.

<sup>13</sup> Jacobus a Voragine, *Legenda Aurea*, ed. Th. Graesse (Leipzig, 1850), 229.

<sup>14</sup> Several critics have pointed out that, as the Nun's Priest explicitly states, Friday is Venus's day, and note that Chauntecleer falls because he has become a servant of Venus. See Severs, 31; Dahlberg, 288-289; and Huppé, 181-182.

points out that the Old Adam was made on Friday; the New Law, John 19: 25-30, points out just as clearly that the New Adam, Christ, was crucified on Friday. Tradition, as exemplified in the *Legenda Aurea*, points out that the tree of Adam and the Cross are the same wood, and that "quia Adam factus et peccavit" in March, so Christ "pati voluit in Martio, quia in die, qua fuit annuntiatus, fuit et passus."<sup>15</sup> Durandus remarks that Christ was "in sexta feria conceptus" and "in sexta feria crucifixus" because Adam was born and fell on Friday.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, Durandus comments, Christ was aged "triginta duobus annis et mensibus tribus" or "triginta tribus et dimidio,"<sup>17</sup> phrases echoed in the Nun's Priest's Tale, 3190: "thritty dayes and two." Further in his discussion, Durandus comments on Christ as Light, a concept not original with him, but important in the Nun's Priest's Tale in that it recalls the fact that on the fateful Friday Chauntecleer "Caste up his eyen to the brighte sonne," a symbol of Him who died on Good Friday. Such conjunctions of symbols in the Nun's Priest's Tale indicate that Chauntecleer, the Adam-figure, succumbs to a woman because of "al his pryd," the sin of Adam, and in plain sight of the sun repeats the loss of Eden on a day dedicated to both Venus and Christ.<sup>18</sup> The implicit references to Christ are reinforced by the exemplary tales which Chauntecleer tells, stories which deal with the wrongful murder "in an oxes stall" (3004) of an innocent traveller, the drowning of another traveller, an allusion to Christ's walking on the water, baptismal water, the stories of Noah and Nicholas, and the allusions to traitors like "Scariot" (3227). Moreover, the cock, as Charles Dahlberg points out, is conventionally the symbol of Christ.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Legenda Aurea*, 229.

<sup>16</sup> Gulielmus Durandus, *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum*, Lib. vi, cap. 13, n. 2 (Venice, 1599), fol. 179v; vi, 77, 27, fol. 230r.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* Lib. vi, cap. 77, n. 28; fol. 230v.

<sup>18</sup> Holbrook, 125, comments that "the medieval mind would associate Friday with the death of Christ. It is appropriate that the poem should draw no parallel between Chauntecleer and Christ (though the fox is the 'newe Scariot'), and appropriate too that Chauntecleer should not die on a Friday."

<sup>19</sup> Dahlberg, 282-283. Dahlberg, 286-287, also suggests that refusal of the lodger to heed the dream three times and the description of the friend with bloody wounds deep and wide murdered in an ox's stall echoes Peter's denying Christ three times before cockcrow. Donovan, 501-502, suggests that the cock allegorically represents the priest. There are ironies in Chaucer's apparent use of the traditional interpretations of *gallus* and *gallina*. Rabanus Maurus, *Allegoriae in Universam Sacram Scripturam*, PL 112, 939, points out that the *cock*, *gallus*, is the "intelligentia" conferred on the learned by God; Chauntecleer, however, misuses his God-given wit. *Gallina*, Rabanus says, is "sapientia Dei," for she is the hen who shelters her chicks "quod Dei sapientia concessis donis spiritualibus electos ad salvationem perducit.." But Pertelote does not advise wisely, and, like Eve, does not lead Chauntecleer to salvation. As Owen, 306-307, has suggested, it is ironical that Chauntecleer should win the argument about dreams with Pertelote but forget the dream that

But the real clue to the Old Adam-New Adam pattern in the tale is the fact that Chauntecleer is lost when he flies from the safety of his “beem” (i.e., tree) but is saved when “heighe upon a tree he fleigh anon” (3417) at the end of the tale. The motif follows the hint given by the Good Friday Hymn, “Crux Fidelis” (“Crux fidelis... Arbor una nobilis”) but the ramifications of Chauntecleer’s escape are complex. Recent scholarship has demonstrated the persistence of an early Christian tradition which viewed Christ’s death on the Cross as “a mystery encompassing the whole history of the world before and after it” and “the Cross as a recapitulation of all cosmic and Biblical history,” in which “the Cross embraces the whole world and gathers it home to the Father.”<sup>20</sup> The Cross was thus conceived

occasioned it, especially since “in the examples which he uses to refute his wife’s skepticism people either fail to heed the warning or they have no chance of evading the fate foretold in their dreams.” Holbrook, 125, suggests that “in the debate between the cock and hen on the significance of dreams. both fail, in their retreat into bogus knowledge, to recognize the evidence before them.” It should also be noted that Chauntecleer has his dream “in a dawenynge” (2282), for this fact alone should have been a sufficient warning to Chauntecleer, since anyone with his apparently extensive knowledge of dreams certainly should have been aware of the common medieval tradition which assigned true dreams to the early morning hours.

The description of Chauntecleer indicates that Chaucer is making use of some pattern of color symbolism. Dahlberg, 286, interprets Chauntecleer’s colors as they indicate aspects of the priestly life, but Chaucer seems also to be alluding to lapidary symbolism, perhaps as based on Genesis 2: 11-12, which describes the rivers of Eden flowing through lands of gold and onyx. The medieval lapidaries edited by Joan Evans and Mary Serjeantson (*Medieval Lapidaries*, EETS, O.S. 190, London, 1933) are suggestive. The most likely stone suggested by Chauntecleer’s colors, “coral,” “blak,” “asure,” “whitter than the lylle,” and “gold,” is the agate (“achates”), which is “of many maners; þat one is blak & ouergirde with whiȝt veynes... þer bene som of colour of gold ... & of coral” (*Lapidaries*, 64-65). The agate is efficacious against “venym & aȝens bizting of serpentes & he keþeþ A man fro euell þinges; & he encresite strengþe & makeþ god spekyng togeder” (*Lapidaries*, 65). This characteristic of the agate makes it a symbol of Christ: “pe earn deþ in his neste enne deorwurþe ȝimston ðet hette achate... þes derewurðe ston ðet is iesu crist ase ston treowe & ful of alle mihten ouer alle ȝimstones. he is be achate þet after of sunne ne neihede neuere” (Mabel Day, ed., *The English Text of the Ancrene Riwle*, EETS O.S. 225, London, 1952, 59). Chaucer is of course using the agate symbolism ironically, or at least is countering its benefits with other meanings of the agate: the blackness of the agate “be-tokenes / ye sorow yt we haue in yis world for our synes, and ye whyt strake be-tokenes ye hyght of hyteres yt beres ye frute euer-lastyng” (*Lapidaries*, 53). And some agates “haue braunches figured as trees” (*Lapidaries*, 25). Other stones are of course relevant to Chauntecleer’s description: the coral “has colour of gernad red, & he is lik ye rote of a tre” (*Lapidaries*, 77-78). Whoever wears it will “suffre no schadow of fendas” (*Lapidaries*, 53). It “delyueriþ a man fro fantaseys; ane it yeveþ a gode begynnnyng & a gode endyng” (*Lapidaries*, 77-78). The azure-colored sapphire “helpeth him out of prison yt is imprisoned” and “ought to be set in gold” as worthy of a stone which gives one “wyte and myȝt” (*Lapidaries*, 101). Little need be said about the traditional meanings of gold (Christ) and lily-white (Mary).

<sup>20</sup> Hugo Rahner, “The Christian Mystery and the Pagan Mysteries,” in ‘*Pagan and Christian Mysteries: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*,’ ed. Joseph Campbell, trans. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull (New York, 1963), 179, 182-183.

to be a cosmological tree, planted at the center of the Cosmos, at Golgotha, "the navel of the Earth," and thus the natural link between hell, earth and heaven: "It rises from Golgotha to heaven, embracing the cosmos; it is erected in the same place where Adam was once created, where he lies buried, where at the same day and hour the Second Adam was to die."<sup>21</sup> In this tradition, the Cosmological Tree, the Cross, the true Tree of Life, is conceived to be of immeasurable dimensions: "Its arms extend to the ends of the earth; its top reaches the heavens; its lower extremity penetrates the abyss below."<sup>22</sup> The Tree of the Cross also becomes a ladder to heaven, prefigured by Jacob's Ladder, and thus the means of ascension to heaven.<sup>23</sup>

It is from this view of the Cross that the conceptions of the *Arbor vitiorum* and the *Arbor virtutum* developed, in which the former is seen as the tree of the devil and the latter becomes identified with the Cross.<sup>24</sup> In this tradition, the tree of vices springs from the seed of pride and the tree of virtues from the seed of humility, though the notion of humility was long before associated with the death of Christ on the Cross. For Christ's death on the Cross was traditionally seen not as a defeat but as a victory, a victory in which Christ triumphs over the Devil by His death on the Cross.<sup>25</sup> It is thus by his descent from the "beem" at the height of his pride, his struggle with and final triumph over the fox-devil, and his subsequent flight into the tree, that Chauntecleer recapitulates not only the Fall of Adam from Paradise, but also symbolically the Crucifixion, descent into Hell in which Christ triumphs over the devil, and the resurrection from death, evidenced by Chauntecleer's new-found humility, when he openly admits his fault and folly. Presumably, having learned his lesson from his

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 191. Furthermore, the Cross is seen to be "the structural law of the universe; in Christian eyes the two great celestial circles, the equator and the ecliptic, which intersect one another in the form of the horizontal X, and around which the whole vault of the starry firmament moves in a miraculous rhythm, are the celestial cross" (*Ibid.*, 181). As a result of this conception, "The Cross is everywhere in the universe: in the figure of the human body when a man holds out his arms in prayer; in the flight of birds; in agricultural implements; in the masts of ships, crossed by their yards" (*Ibid.*, 186). Perhaps most important of these conceptions for our purposes is the idea that just as "God in His suffering stretched out His arms and embraced the earth," *ibid.*, 183, (cited from Lactantius) so it is by stretching out his arms in prayer that man "may imitate the suffering of the Lord," *Ibid.*, 187 (citation from Maximus of Turin).

<sup>22</sup> Eleanor Simmons Greenhill, "The Child in the Tree: A Study of the Cosmological Tree in Christian Tradition," *Traditio*, 10 (1954), 331, 337.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 343.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 364.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 358-359.

harrowing experience, Chauntecleer is now prepared to meet all future adversities with confidence and reason.<sup>26</sup>

Further evidence of the likelihood of this interpretation is provided by Roger S. Loomis in his recent book, *A Mirror of Chaucer's World*, in which he reproduces an illustration from a Book of Hours to illustrate the Nun's Priest's Tale.<sup>27</sup> In this illumination is a scene presenting a widow carrying a stick and, along with the animals in her yard, chasing a fox with a cock in his mouth. The fox and cock are at the base of a tree in which, significantly, is a small child picking pears. As Eleanor Greenhill has pointed out, there is a long tradition for the portrayal of such a tree as the Tree of Life, the Cosmological Tree of the Cross, in which the child in the tree gathering fruit, the *gloria beatitudinis aeternae*, represents the purified soul gathering the fruit of blessedness on its journey toward heaven. As she points out, the fruit may be either the *dulcia poma salutis*, the apple of salvation in opposition to the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, or simply the *fructus beatitudinis aeternae*.<sup>28</sup> Such a representation of the Cross as the cosmological tree in correspondence to the image presented by the Nun's Priest's Tale suggests the likelihood of such a correspondence in Chaucer's Tale as well.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Severs, 38, says that "Chauntecleer's native wit preserves him from the consequences of his folly, and he emerges at the end of the tale a wiser and a safer cock," and, 40, that Chaucer's purpose in the tale "is to emphasize beyond all doubt that the cock has learned his lesson... he will never again be taken in as he was previously." Donovan, 507, suggests that "begging divine help, [Chauntecleer] devises a plan which shows a return of reason," citing the Parson's Tale, 733: "for as muchel as the devil fighteth agayns a man moore by queyntise and by sleighe than by strengthe, therfor men shal withstonden hym by wit and by resoun and by discrecioun." See also Speirs, 193; Broes, 159; and Huppé, 182.

<sup>27</sup> Roger Sherman Loomis, *A Mirror of Chaucer's World* (Princeton, N.J., 1965), plate 148.

<sup>28</sup> Greenhill, 348-349.

<sup>29</sup> Such an interpretation is also supported by John F. Mahoney, "Chaucerian Tragedy and the Christian Tradition," *An Med*, 3 (1962), 81-99, where he suggests that Chaucer does not accept the Monk's limited view of tragedy because it considers tragedy to be a presentation of the fall of man from high to low fortune, a movement simply from joy to woe, arguing rather that Chaucerian tragedy contains the Boethian view of a faith in Divine Providence which makes joy after woe possible. He suggests further that such a view is based on the "Christian recognition that the tragedy indeed 'hearkens back to the old tragedy of Adam,' but it then rebounds to the second 'tragedy' of Christ, the Second Adam, whose reversal of the commitment to wrong love which Adam's sin wrought made 'joye after woe possible'" (93). Discussing the Nun's Priest's Tale, he says: "Somehow, Fortune, or Providence switches sides in the Nun's Priest's story, and 'her enemy' has become the fox who brought about Chauntecleer's fall. This favor changes the pattern of the 'wo' to which the Adamite analogue leads, and by the favor can rescue the fallen one from the clutches of his and Fortune's common enemy, and restore him, wiser and resolved to fall no more, to the position from which he fell." (89).

The Adam-Christ pattern of the tale explains certain other parts of the tale, for example, the descriptions of the old widow's house and the chase of the fox. To be sure, the description of the widow's dwelling is intended to contrast with the arrogance of Chauntecleer in his chicken Paradise, but there are aspects of the description which are more thematically important. For example, the widow is actually a trinity, herself and "hir doghtren two" (2829). Her whole *menage* is in threes: "Thre large sowes" and "Thre keen" (2830-2831). But significantly, she has only one ram, which, despite its comically prosaic name, "Malle," is nevertheless a traditional symbol of Christ.<sup>30</sup> Chaucer is creating a comic trinity to rule over the chickenyard Eden which is the setting of the downfall of a rooster. The role of the widow-trinity thus helps to explain the role of the mock-epic chase of the fox in lines 3375-3401: the chaos of the chase is both Apocalyptic and a reflection of the disorder in God's universe when Adam wilfully, under the plotting of Satan, turned *up-so-doun* (as the Parson says) the natural order of marriage and directly disobeyed a divine commandment:

Now comth how that a man sholde bere hym with his wif, and namely in  
two thynges, that is to seyn, in suffraunce and reverence, as shewed Crist  
whan he made first womman. / For he ne made hire nat of the heved of Adam,  
for she sholde nat clayme to greet lordshipe. / For ther as the womman hath  
the maistrie, she maketh to muche desray.<sup>31</sup>

Eve's assuming lordship is the partial cause of the Fall as Milton shows in *Paradise Lost*, IX, 780-784:

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour  
Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd, she eat:  
Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat  
Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe,  
That all was lost.<sup>32</sup>

Adam is under the control of Eve's "rash hand" in 999-1004 where, like Chauntecleer, "fondly overcome with Female charm," he eats the apple and causes Nature to give a "second groan."<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Rabanus, *Allegoriae*, PL 112, 863 says: "Aries est caro Christi, ut in Genesi Isaac in altari  
ponitur, sed aries mactatur, quod Christus crucifigitur, sed sola ejus caro moritur."

<sup>31</sup> Parson's Tale, 925-926. See Huppé, 176: "The sentence of [The Nun's Priest's Tale] has to do with doctrine; specifically the tale will place 'desray' in marriage in the perspective of a scriptural view of God's order."

<sup>32</sup> This and all subsequent citations of *Paradise Lost* are from John Milton, *Complete Poems and Major Prose*, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York, 1957).

<sup>33</sup> Several commentators have suggested that the great climax of the tale, the commotion in the barnyard, is presented as a burlesque of universal chaos caused by the Fall and representative of the moral disorder. See Speirs, 192; Holbrook, 123; and Huppé, 182.

The immediate effects of the Fall on Nature, that is, the groaning earth in Milton and the chaos in the chickenyard in Chaucer, have, so far as we know, no single Biblical or Patristic source, but are a fusion of Biblical citations and later commentary. The primary source for Earth's response to the Fall is of course the cursing of Adam and the Earth in Genesis 3: 14-19 where, as a result of his sin, Adam must now labor in the heat and cold of the seasons and Eve, as a result of her sin, is made subservient to her husband. The second source for the motif of chaos is the description of Earth's response to the Crucifixion of the New Adam in Matthew 27: 45-51: "A sexta autem hora tenebrae factae sunt super universam terram usque ad horam nonam. Et circa horam nonam clamavit Iesus voce magna, dicens: Eli, Eli, lamma sabacthani? hoc est: Deus meus, Deus meus ut quid dereliquisti me?... Et ecce velum templi scissum est in duas partes a summo usque deorsum, et terra mota est, et petrae scissae sunt." The effects of the Crucifixion are the subject of much Patristic comment; for example, St. Thomas Aquinas cites St. Cyril of Alexandria who notes that "postquam cruci tradiderunt Dominum omnium mundi machina lugebat proprium Dominum,"<sup>34</sup> a comment echoed in Milton's line, "Nature... gave signs of woe" (*Paradise Lost*, IX, 782-783), describing Adam's fall. The Biblical foundation of the motif is furnished by texts such as Romans 8: 22-23, where Paul says: "Scimus enim quod omnis creatura ingemiscit, et parturit usque ad huc. Non solum autem illa, sed et nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes: et ipsi intra nos gemimus adoptionem filiorum Dei expectantes, redemptionem corporis nostri." Chaucer makes use of the groaning motif ("lugebat," "ingemiscit") in his description of Chauntecleer's groans at the beginning of the tale (2882-2887):

And so bifel that in a dawenyng,  
As Chauntecleer among his wyves alle  
Sat on his perche, that was in the halle,  
And next hym sat this faire Pertelote,  
This Chauntecleer gan gronen in his throte,  
As man that in his dreem is drecched soore.

Avitus, aware of the theological interpretation of the New Adam and Old Adam, links the Fall with the Apocalypse, and sees Adam's sin as directly responsible for the disorder and destruction which will come at the Last Judgment:

<sup>34</sup> Cited in Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Catena Aurea in Quatuor Evangelia* ed. P. Angelico Guarienti, II (Turin, 1953), 306. We were unable to locate the precise passage from Cyril cited by St. Thomas, but he seems to be echoing a gloss of Luke 23: 44, similar to the comment in Cyril, *Explanatio in Lucas Evangelium*, PG 72, 936-940.

Sic miseri mortem, nondum discriminé notam,  
 Cum primum meruere, volunt; exordia finem  
 Signant, et similes praedicunt adfore luctus,  
 Ultima cum mundi senium consumpserit aetas,  
 Cumque repentinus percusserit omnia fulgor  
 Coelorum, clangente tuba, qua puntius ante  
 Judicis adventu concussum terrent orbem. (III, 39-45)<sup>35</sup>

Later (III, 210-214, 325-340) Avitus describes the changed appearance of the Earth after the Fall, and depicts the uproar and disorder which later follows:

Angustatur humus, strictumque gementibus orbem  
 Terrarum fluis non cernitur et tamen instat.  
 Squalet et ipse dies, causantur sole sub ipso  
 Subductam lucem, coelo suspensa remoto  
 Astra gemunt, tactusque prius vix cernitur axis.<sup>36</sup>

Tum tristes morbi, et variii subiere dolore,  
 Et corrupta satis dira pinguedine tellus  
 Lethali quaedam suffudit germina succo.  
 Inde truces saevire ferae, dudumque timentes  
 Excitat ad pugnam tum primum conscientia virtus,  
 Reddit et armatas unguis, dens, ungula, cornu.  
 Ipsa etiam leges ruperunt tunc elementa,  
 Et violare fidem mortalibus omnia certant.  
 Inflatur ventis pelagus, volvuntur et undae,  
 Excitusque novum turgescit pontus in aestum.  
 Tunc primum tectis tetra caligine coelis,  
 Ingratos hominum castigatura labores,  
 Grandineos pavidis fuderunt nubila nimbos,  
 Atque polus discors invidit germina terris.  
 Quin magis ipsa sibi tellus adversa negavit,  
 Seminis excepti vertens mentita nitorem.<sup>37</sup>

Chaucer of course could have created the scene of chaos and disorder in the Nun's Priest's Tale by making use of standard commentary on the nature of Adam's sin or by following the example of contemporary English poets. A likely theological source, however, is St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 82, a. 3, resp.:

Tota autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae... est quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subjecta... Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus... Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile; quae quidem inordinatio communis nomine potest dici "concupiscencia."

<sup>35</sup> Saint Avitus, *De Mosaicae Historiae Gestis*, PL 59, 318.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 341.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 343.

At any rate, St. Thomas seems to be echoed in the Parson's Tale, 260ff., which speaks of the disorder caused by a wrong balance of reason and sensuality:

And ye shul understande that in mannes synne is every manere of ordre or ordinaunce turned up-so-doun. / For it is sooth that God, and resoun, and sensualitee, and the body of man been so ordeyned that everich of thise fourt thynges sholde have lordshipe over that oother; / as thus: God sholde have lordshipe over resoun, and resoun over sensualitee, and sensualitee over the body of man. / But soothly, whan man synneth, al this ordre or ordinaunce is turned up-so-doun. / And therefore, thanne, for as muche as the resoun of man ne wol nat be subget ne obeisant to God that is his lord by right, therfore leseth it the lordshipe that it sholde have over sensualitee, and eek over the body of man. / And why? For sensualitee rebelleth thanne agayns resoun, and by that way leseth resoun the lordshipe over sensualitee and over the body. / For right as resoun is rebel to God, right so is bothe sensualitee rebel to resoun and the body also.

This disorder is of course one of Adam's errors.<sup>38</sup> Disorderly too is Adam's gluttony (Parson's Tale, 817-818):

After Avarice comth Glotonye, which is expres eek agayn the comandement of God. Glotonye is unmesurable appetit to ete or to drynke, or elles to doon ynogh to the unmesurable appetit and desordeynee coveitise to eten or to drynke. / This synne corrumped al this world, as is wel shewed in the synne of Adam and of Eve.

It is no surprise, then, seeing that Adam's basic error is an "up-so-doun" use of his will, that he should misconstrue the marriage relationship, as Chauntecleer also does.

Besides these hints from standard interpretations of Adam's sin, Chaucer might also have known some English poetry concerned with the disruptive nature of sin and which describes the present ills in Apocalyptic terms:

Pe Rysing of pe comuynes in londe,  
Pe Pestilens, and pe eorþe-quake —  
Peose þreo þinges, I vnderstonde,

<sup>38</sup> D. W. Robertson, Jr., "Chaucerian Tragedy," in *Chaucer Criticism II: Troilus and Criseyde and the Minor Poems* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1961), 94, says: "The implications of the fall of Adam and Eve are very significant, since all tragic protagonists in the Chaucerian sense follow Adam's footsteps... These inner implications of the story were well known in the Middle Ages. They are explained at length in St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* (Lib. XII, Cap. 12), in the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard (Lib. II, Dist. XXIV, Cap. VI ff.), and in many subsequent works. Briefly, Adam, Eve and the serpent correspond to the higher reason, the lower reason, and the motion of the senses in an individual. The function of the higher reason is wisdom or *sapientia*, and that of lower reason is worldly wisdom, or *scientia*. The higher reason, which perceives the laws of God, should dominate the lower reason, which perceives the laws of nature, just as the husband should rule the wife. There is thus an inner marriage within man. Just as the serpent tempted Eve and Eve tempted Adam, so the motion of the senses tempts the lower reason, and this womanly faculty in turn tempts the higher reason." See also note 19 above.

Beo-tokenes þe grete vengaunce & wrake  
Pat schulde falle for synnes sake... (57-61)

Be war, for I con say no more,  
Be war for vengauns of trespass,  
Be war and þenk vppon þis lore !  
Be war of þis sodeyn cas;  
And ȝit Be war while we haue spas,  
And þonke þat child þat Marie bare,  
Of his gret godnesse and his gras,  
Sende vs such warnyng to be ware. (81-88).<sup>39</sup>

Coincidental, perhaps, though significant, is the parallel between “þe Rysing of þe comuynes in londe” and Chaucer’s “Jakke Straw and his meynée.” The motif of the Last Judgment, used by Avitus and the English poem, is echoed by Chaucer also in lines 3383-3401:

Ran Colle oure dogge, and Talbot and Gerland,  
And Malkyn, with a dystaf in hir hand;  
Ran cow and calf, and eek the verray hogges,  
So fered for the berkyng of the dogges  
And shoutyng of the men and wommen eeke,  
They ronne so hem thoughte hir herte breeke.  
They yolleden as feendes doon in helle;  
The dokes cryden as men wolde hem quelle;  
The gees for feere floweren over the trees;  
Out of the hyve cam the swarm of bees.  
So hydous was the noyse, a, benedicitee !  
Certes, he Jakke Straw and his meynée  
Ne made nevere shoutes half so shrille  
Whan that they wolden any Flemyn kille,  
As thilke day was maad upon the fox.  
Of bras they broghten bemes, and of box,

<sup>39</sup> *Religious Lyrics of the xivth Century*, 2nd ed. Carleton Brown, (Oxford, 1952), no. 113, “Verses on the Earthquake of 1382.” See also the same motif in *Piers Plowman*, 10th ed. W. W. Skeat, (Oxford, 1923), Passus V, 13-20:

He preued þat þise pestilences • were for pure synne,  
And þe southwest wynde • on saterday at euene  
Was pertliche for pure pryd • and for no poynt elles.  
Piries and plomtrees • were puffed to þe erthe,  
In ensample, ȝe segges • ȝe shulden do þe bettere.  
Beches and brode okes • were blowen to þe grounde,  
Torned vpward her tailles • in tokenyng of drede,  
þat dedly synne at domesday • shal fordon hem alle.

The traditional foundation for the precise effects of the Doomsday disorder is the motif, “Fifteen Signs Before Doomsday.” See, for example, in relation to the quotation from *Piers Plowman*, lines 129 ff. of “The Debate of the Body and Soul” (K. Bödecker, ed., *Altenglische Dichtungen des MS Harl. 2253*, Berlin, 1878, p. 240), which begins, “þe furþe day shal blowe a wynd.”

Of horn, of boon, in whiche they blewe and powped,  
And therwithal they skriked and they howped.  
It seemed as that hevene sholde falle.

Obviously, in his description of the chase of the Fox, Chaucer is fusing many motifs to create a scene of total collapse of order; the basic motif is the loss of the innocent pleasures of Eden (Genesis), the effects of which are repeated in the loss of the innocent Lamb (Matthew); supporting this motif is the analysis of Adam as creator of disorder through pride, gluttony, and sensuality: the final result of such disorder is the Last Judgment, in which the disorder of the sinful world is totally destroyed by a higher disorder (i.e., fire, pestilence, etc.) so that a new order ("caelum novum, et terram novam," Revelations 21:1) can be established.

Thus, the chickenyard world of Chauntecleer contains a means to reestablish order after the "desray" caused by Chauntecleer, the "heighe blisse" foreshadowed by the saving tree of lines 3416-3417. Chauntecleer, like Adam, succumbed to the temptations of Satan after fleeing the safety of his "beem"; but like Christ, he cannot be tempted (3418-3432) once he has assumed the divine nature implied by his mounting "heighe upon a tree." Thus order is restored to the world of Chauntecleer, a new order, symbolized by the wisdom which Chauntecleer has learned and made concrete in the aphoristic style in which he speaks:

For he that wynketh, whan he sholde see,  
Al wilfully, God lat him never thee! (3431-3432)

Like the union of the Old Adam and the New Adam in the Crucifixion, the Nun's Priest's Tale comes full circle, with Chauntecleer safely perched upon a tree, still the same old rooster, but yet not the same, for the pithy aphoristic style he uses is not the pompous lecturing with which his downfall began.

Given the analogues of the Nun's Priest's Tale, it is clear why the Priest warns us that the tale is not "a folye, / As of a fox, or a cok" and what he means by the fruit and the chaff of his tale. The chaff is the surface story, the beast-fable, which is entertaining but essentially trivial. Chaff also is the trivial morality (women are false, one should watch out for flattery, one should watch his tongue) of the tale. Not that the story of proud Chauntecleer and officious Pertelote is not meaningful on the beast-fable level; it is, but more meaningful is the fruit, the fact that Chauntecleer and Pertelote reenact, in beast-fable form, a pattern which is universally applicable to all men, the fall from Paradise through wrong use of the will and the possibility for salvation also inherent in that fall.

*State University of New York, Harpur College  
Wisconsin State University, Whitewater.*

## Second Thoughts on “Soul and Body I”

Ah ! wherefore all this wormy circumstance ?  
Why linger at the yawning tomb so long ?  
Keats: “Isabella” xl ix

CYRIL SMETANA O.S.A.

IT is hardly an exaggeration to say that the critics have ignored the Vercelli *Soul and Body*.<sup>1</sup> To be sure scholars have carefully studied and diligently transcribed the MS; capitals, abbreviations, accents and punctuation have all been duly recorded,<sup>2</sup> but there are only scattered references to it as a poem, and these in the popular handbooks and literary histories. The rather imposing list of critical studies in the CBEL is actually misleading, since all but one of these works<sup>3</sup> treat it only in passing, and this essay concerns itself with a very few lines of the poem. Though the *Soul and Body* text has been published a few times,<sup>4</sup> I am aware of only two translations of the whole poem.<sup>5</sup> In the light of this rather telling disregard it might seem best to let the *Soul and Body* die a natural death; but I feel that a closer examination of the poem proves that, taken as a whole, it has

<sup>1</sup> The O.E. address, *Soul and Body* is found in two MSS: the Vercelli poem, or *Soul and Body I*, has an address of both a lost soul and a saved soul; the Exeter Book, or *Soul and Body II*, is generally believed to be a rather broad transcription of the first 126 lines of the Vercelli version. It differs from the longer poem in vocabulary, arrangement of lines, omissions together with a few additions. The theme of the poem is a frequent one in both the poetry and prose of the middle ages. It has a prominent place in the *Blickling Homilies* and the pseudo-Wulfstan material, usually in the form of an *exemplum*. Generally it is the soul that berates the body; but there is one address of Irish origin where the body replies. See R. Atkinson, “The Passions of the Leabhar Breac,” *Royal Academy, Todd Lecture Series*, 2 (Dublin, 1887). For the genesis and development of the debate variety from the more simple address see: G. Kleinert, *Ueber den Streit zwischen Leib und Seele* (Halle, 1880), Th. Batiouchkof, “Le Débat de l’âme et du corps,” *Romania* 20 (1891), 1-55; 513-76.

<sup>2</sup> The Vercelli Book, ed. George P. Krapp, *The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records II* (Columbia University Press, 1936), pp. xx-xxxv, 54-59. All citations are from this edition.

<sup>3</sup> Bernard P. Kurtz, “Gifer the Worm, An Essay in the History of an Idea,” *University of California, Publications in English*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Berkeley, 1929), 235-261. Henceforth cited “Kurtz.”

<sup>4</sup> Die Verceller Handschrift, hrsg. von Richard Paul Wülcker, in *Bibliothek der Angelsächsischen Poesie*, 2 Bd.. 1 Hälfte (Leipzig, 1894), 93-107. G. R. Krapp gives a complete bibliography of MS reproductions and editions pp. lxxi-xciv.

<sup>5</sup> John Mitchell Kemble, *The Poetry of the Codex Vercellensis with an English Translation*, Pt. II (London, 1843), 100-110; *Anglo-Saxon Poetry* tr. by R. K. Gordon, Everyman Library, rev. edition (New York, 1954), 310-313.

a decided integrity and shows no signs of dissolution. In fact it holds together much better than many other O.E. poems, and an awareness of its structure goes a long way in disarming those who despise its theological or poetic merits. But first it will be well to review some of the prevailing views on it.

Stopford Brooke felt that the second part of the poem, the address of the saved soul to its body, was a decidedly inferior and much later piece.<sup>6</sup> The existence of the Exeter version, which imitates only the first part, was indicative for him that the address of the lost soul originally stood alone. Though George K. Anderson claimed that the second address offers "pleasing contrast to the charnel atmosphere of the preceding," this is but faint praise since he described the first part as "pitched to the shriek of horror and terror of dissolution."<sup>7</sup> This latter opinion is only an echo of what had been voiced twenty years earlier by Professor Kurtz.

Bernard Kurtz exploited the poem as "a striking example of the Christian theme of the grisly horrors of the grave: the cold obstruction of the kneaded clod, the darkness, the rotting body and the worm."<sup>8</sup> He finds in it a "dementia of hatred issuing from a faith in immortality" and a "calculated hatred, degenerate realism and ignoble fear."<sup>9</sup> Finally he suggests that it might be worthwhile in further investigations of the poem to posit the possibility "that the Anglo-Saxon *Address*, or an earlier Latin form of it, may have originated in some sort of relation to the Catharists' teaching concerning the evil of the body: either as an orthodox stealing of the enemy's 'thunder,' or as the composition of someone infected with those teachings, or even as the work of an out-and-out Catharist."<sup>10</sup> Charles W. Kennedy quotes Kurtz with apparent approval, and deprecates the weakness of the address of the saved soul: "The situation lacks the dramatic elements of terror and regret, and the verse loses correspondingly in force and realism."<sup>11</sup> Kemp Malone, though aware of the "inconsistencies and rough spots," is satisfied that the poet "does what he sets out to do: he brings home with power the lesson that life on earth, vain in itself, has the grim function of determining our lot in the life to come."<sup>12</sup> Stanley B. Greenfield concurs with this more balanced and positive view of the poem,

<sup>6</sup> *English Literature from the Beginning to the Norman Conquest* (New York, 1930), 206-207.

<sup>7</sup> *The Literature of the Anglo-Saxons* (Princeton, 1949), 169-170.

<sup>8</sup> Kurtz, 235.

<sup>9</sup> Kurtz, 256.

<sup>10</sup> Kurtz, 361.

<sup>11</sup> *The Earliest English Poetry* (Oxford, 1943), 321.

<sup>12</sup> "The Middle Ages," in *The Literary History of England*, ed. Albert C. Baugh (New York, 1948), 82.

for though he finds the first part "savage in its denunciation of the body, its vigor making living flesh creep. The portrayal of the righteous soul's words... is pallid by comparison. Nevertheless, the whole poem is quite effective..."<sup>13</sup>

Dissatisfaction with the poem, then, rests on two main charges: lack of taste in the first address: stylistic weakness in the second. In an extreme form the author is aligned with the Catharists in his denunciation of the body; the second address is considered weak to the point of ineptness. If one, however, looks at the poem as an integral whole and sees the functional relationship of each part to the whole, I think the poet can be exonerated from any taint of heterodoxy on the one hand, and lack of competence on the other. In fact a closer look may show that the poem is perhaps a happier performance than has been generally believed.

*Soul and Body I* is incomplete but not fragmentary.<sup>4</sup> Although the poem breaks off with line 166, it has been conjectured that not much has been lost. A glance at its balanced structure tends to confirm this view.

The poem opens with a warning that man should consider death, for this event will bring judgement of reward or punishment (1-8). The soul shall come to visit the body every seventh night (9-16). The soul then, in *propria persona*, rebukes the body for being the cause of its condemnation (17-102). The soul vanishes, and the poet describes the body in the unpalatable process of putrefaction. The leader of the wormy squadron is personified with the curious name *Gifer*. The first section ends with a repeated warning that man should take this as a reminder (130-126). The poet next introduces the saved soul (127-134), who thanks the body for its cooperation during life, and shows tender regard for the body and regret that the body must suffer temporary corruption. There shall, however, be a final reunion and never-ending joy (135-166).

The following outline reveals the balanced nature of the poem:

Preface by the poet (1-8).

## I

- A. The poet introduces the lost soul (9-16).
- B. The lost soul addresses its body (17-102).
- C. The poet comments on the body's state (103-126).

<sup>13</sup> A Critical History of Old English Literature (New York, 1965), 179-180.

<sup>14</sup> Krapp, Vercelli, p. xxxix, argues from the foliation that not much has been lost.

## II

- A. The poet introduces the saved soul (127-134)
- B. The saved soul speaks to its body (135-166)

What is not so evident from this outline is the art with which the poet has unified the poem. Since the interpretation of the poem depends on its balance and structure, it is necessary to first establish it as an integral whole.

The poet's purpose is quite evidently moral and didactic, and the poem's similarity to an *exemplum* and its dependence on homiletic material has been noticed.<sup>15</sup> It has been pointed out that the theme of the poem is the very common medieval imperative, *memento mori*.<sup>16</sup> But the poet is not so much interested in death as in its aftermath. It is not so much death itself but the alternative of punishment or reward that is his burden and it is precisely this that structures the poem.

þæt sē gāst nimeð swā wīte swā wuldor,	Lang bið syððan æt gode sylfum (5b-7a).
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Having enunciated this dual theme, the poet carries it through with no little zeal and, I think, with more than ordinary competence.

The poet introduces each speaker in an eight-line speech of contrasting woe and weal. Despite obvious differences in atmosphere and tone, the two addresses manifest a close similarity with conscious verbal echoes. The first visit is portrayed as a reluctant contact of an expiatory nature; the second is depicted as a joyous gravitating toward the body which was the cause of its salvation. In the case of the lost soul it is a forced return:

þone līchoman	sāwle findan þe hīe ēr lange wāg, (10b-11)
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in the other:

lustum þæt lāmfæt	Mid gefēan sēceð þæt hīe ēr lange wāg. (130b-131)
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The opposed situations are nicely crystallized in the words *cleopað* and *grētab*: the lost soul *Cleopað... cealdan reorde*, (15); the saved souls (*sic*) *lustum grētab* (134). The very obvious link of the two scenes of the diptych is *þe hīe ēr lange wāg*.

<sup>15</sup> Rudolph Willard, "The Address of the Soul to the Body," *PMLA* 50 (1935), 957-983; E. K. Heningham, "The Precursors of the Worcester Fragments," *PMLA* 55 (1940), 295.

<sup>16</sup> Kurtz, 236.

The speeches themselves show even more clearly that the poet is at pains to secure unity in his poem. This is particularly noticeable in the repetition of identical thought patterns and expressions. We may point out the following parallels.

1. The body's present state of decadence is resolutely faced in both addresses:

lȳt gefohtest,      þā ðū lustgryrum eallum  
ful geodest,      hū ðū on eorðan scealt  
wyrmum to wiste ! (23-25a)

Forþan mē ā langaþ,      lēofost manna  
on mīnum hige hearde,      þas þe ic þē on þyssum hȳnðum wāt  
wyrmum to wiste, (152-154a)

2. Bale or bliss of the present was determined by the body's ascetical and sacramental life (or lack of it):

Wære þū þe wiste wlanc      ond wīnes sād  
þrymful þunedest,      ond ic ofþyrsted wæs  
godes lichoman,      gāstes drynces. (39-41)

Fæstest ðū on foldan      on gefyldest me  
godes lichoman,      gāstes drynces. (142-143)

3. At the last judgement there will be shame for the body of the lost soul, glory for that of the saved.

Scealt ðū mīnra gesynta      sceame þrōwian  
on ðām myclan dāge      þonne eall manna cynn  
sē ancenneda      ealle gesamnað. (49-51)

Forðan ðū ne þearft sceamian,      þonne sceadene bēoþ  
þa synfullan      ond þa sōðfæstan  
on þām māran dāge,      þas ðū mē geafe, (145-147)

4. The lost soul threatens that the body will be charged with past behaviour,

Þonne ðū for unc bām      andwyrdan scealt  
on ðām miclan dāge, (88-89)

and again,

Ac hwæt wylt ðū þær  
on þām dōmdāge      dryhtne secgan ? (95-96)

but the blessed soul's message is balm for the body,

Wolde ic þē ðonne secgan      þat ðū ne sorgode,  
forðan wyt bioð gegæderode      æt godes dōme. (156-157)

or even more explicitly,

Nē þurfon wyt bēon cearie æt cyme dryhtnes,  
 nē þāre andsware yfele habban  
 sorge in hreðre, (160-162)

5. In both cases the body is regarded as responsible for the state of the soul at death and for its resultant punishment or reward. In the first instance the common plight is deplored; in the second the additional happiness of shared joy is extolled.

Sculon wit þonne eft ætsomne siððan brūcan  
 swylcra yrmða, swa ðū unc hēr ār scrife (101-102)  
 þæt wyt englas ealle gesāwon,  
 heofona wuldor, swylc swā ðū mē ār hēr scrife ! (140-141)

There is an echo of line 101 in the second address:

Mōton wyt þonne ætsomne syþan brūcan (158)

Such parallels of theme and repetition of phraseology might conceivably be explained away as a lapse of interest or failure of inspiration on the part of the original poet, or perhaps as a poor imitation by a less competent author, but there is little to suggest that the second part is the work of an uninspired bungler.

The very brevity of the saved soul's monologue suggests that the poet possessed keen sensitivity. Realizing that vice is usually more interesting than virtue, and vituperation more prodigal than praise, he did not attempt a full-scale imitation in the second part of the poem. Yet even as the poem stands, bereft of the closing lines, it does not seem glaringly incomplete. The second address, though only one-third as long as the first, incorporates all the main themes, and yet has sufficient variation to keep it from being a mere carbon copy of the first.

Granted that the address of the blessed soul is rather tame, this does not necessarily make it either infelicitous or superfluous. The clear enunciation of *swa wite swa wuldor* calls for double treatment. It is a story not only of crime and punishment, but also of virtue rewarded. The message of the soul saved is therefore an integral part, and as such shifts the balance of stress in the poem. Any interpretation of the poet's thought and any evaluation of the poet's art must necessarily begin with this datum. In this light the strictures of Professor Kurtz on the *Soul and Body* are not defensible. Certainly a very casual reading of the *whole* poem immediately renders doubtful his pronunciamento: "The horrible caveat of the rotting flesh is only an extreme, morbid form, and *Gifer* a special perverted symbol of the well nigh universal conception of the body as a thing essentially

evil.”<sup>17</sup> In the first place the poet’s commentary after the departure of the lost soul forms only twenty-four lines of the poem, and the Gifer passage only eight of these. His commentary for the most part is not expressive of hate for the body, nor does it picture the body as essentially evil. Quite the contrary. One gets the distinct impression that the poet is emotionally involved in the plight of the body. There seems to be a note of pathos in the lines:

Ligeð düst þær hit wās,  
nē mæg him ondsware ænige gehātan,  
geomrum gāste, gēoce oððe frōfre (105b-107)

In fact one cannot point to anything in the poem that betrays hate for the body as such.

An examination of the terms for “body” shows that they are surprisingly unpoetic and for the situation innocuous: *lic* (5), *līchoman* (11, 134), *flāesce* (128) are generic terms for the body; *duste* (16, 105), *druh* (17), *lāmes gelīcnes* (19) are biblical metaphors; *eorðfaet* (8) and *lāmfaet* (131) seem to be inspired by the Pauline expression *vas fictile* (II Cor. 4:7); *wyrma gyfl* (22, 124) and its variant *wyrmum to wiste* (25, 125) are less derogatory than statements of fact. This is clear from the fact that this term is used to describe the body of the blessed soul (l. 154). The only pejorative term in the poem is *eorðan fūlnes* (18), and considering the affront that the body at this point must have presented to both nose and eye, it is rather indulgently mild.

There is no sign of hate in the speaker or the poet himself. The language of the first part of the poem is an expression of sorrow rather than hatred, of grief for excesses committed and of opportunities lost. It spells out remorse for what might have been. The poet, for example, announces the soul as coming *gēohðum hrēmig*, (9) not enraged or vindictive. The lost soul speaks *cealdan reorde* (15) more evocative of a lovers’ quarrel or a broken marriage than a bitter feud. The soul speaks *grimlice* (16). Neither this nor the impression that the soul had to wait “thirty thousand winters” for the final dissolution are evidence of hatred for the body itself, but rather of contempt for the body’s deeds or misdeeds. It is a question then of pathos not a passion, and is brought out movingly by the use of a possessive adjective in: “Lýt þu gemundest / tō hwān þīnre sāwle þīng siðpan wurde,” (19b-20) and “ond þē þīn sāwl sceal / mīnum unwillum oft gesēcan,” (62-63). Furthermore there is recognition that the body was redeemed, “pe gebohte blōde þȳ hālgan” (30). This is certainly not hate; it can only be construed as honest regret.

<sup>17</sup> Kurtz, 243.

The *Gifer* passage, which scandalized Prof. Kurtz, is part of the poet's commentary after the departure of the lost soul. (104-126). This macabre little episode describes the advance guard of the swarming army of worms. The poet's originality consists of a curious worm who is given both the local habitation and a name:

Gifer hättē se wyrm,    þe þa ēaglas bēoð  
nædle sceapran. (116-117a)

This bizarre creation is the focus of attention in Professor Kurtz's paper. It is rather hard to fathom how *Gifer* can be a "perverted symbol" of hate for the body. I think that *Gifer* has been blown up out of all due proportion; after all he is not a fire-breathing dragon, only a hungry, and as his name suggests, greedy little worm. The passage in question argues no more than an ill-advised and amateurish realism. It is certainly a lapse of taste, but hardly of the magnitude of the young Dryden's bathetic piece on Lord Hastings and his fatal smallpox. Its fault is precisely that it distracts the reader from the horror and hopeless corruption of the body's present situation. The poem would certainly be grimmer without it.

The commentary of the poet, furthermore, betrays a definite emotional involvement in the tragic situation. He does not gloat over the plight of the body. There is rather a note of unmistakable pathos in the lines: "Ligeð dūst þær hit wæs, / ne mæg him ondsware ǣnige gehātan / geomrūm gāste, gēoce oððe frōfre." (105b-106). And, except for the *Gifer* passage it does not differ radically from the usual gory battle poetry. Compare, for instance, the description of the corpse in *Soul and Body*:

Bið þæt heafod tōhliden,    handa tōliðode  
gēaglas tōginene,    goman tōslitene, (108-109)

with the aftermath of the Finn episode in *Beowulf*,

hafelan multon,  
bengeato burston,    ðonne blōd ætspranc,  
lāðbite līces. (1120-22)

Our poet was apparently familiar with the worms in Job<sup>18</sup> and with the descriptions of O E battle poetry. There might be a question of how well he learned from them, but there is hardly reason to think that he used either to vent his hate for the body.

Kurtz's suggestion that the poem is in some way dependent upon Catharist sources<sup>19</sup> does not seem sound in light of either the poem's theme,

<sup>18</sup> Kurtz, 253.

<sup>19</sup> Kurtz, 260. The Cathars were dualists in the strict sense of the term. They taught that besides God there existed a principle of evil which was responsible for the material world; with

structure or tone. Admittedly there are elements that at first reading are offensive to pious ears. The very device of a soul reproaching its body for its damnation sounds dangerously dualistic.<sup>20</sup> But having accepted the fiction of a soul addressing its body, the imputation of guilt to the body does not seem particularly shocking. At any rate the impassioned accusations soon spend themselves and the soul clearly realizes that both will be affected by the sentence of judgement: "Sculon wit þonne eft ætsomme siððan brūcan / swylcra yrmða swā ðū unc hēr ēr scrif!" (101-102). There is a telling inconsistency here, but even this is proof that the poet is not an heterodox dualist. Though in the first part the soul felt imprisoned in the body, it is not intimated that the relationship was an unnatural or revolting one. On the contrary the union is described as a *sybbe* (4). There is no element of punishment involved: "ic wæs gāst on ðē fram gode sended." (46). Death is not merely shifting off a mortal coil; it is rather an act of God: "ic āna of ðē út sīðode / þurh þās sylfes hand pe ic ēr onsended wæs." (55-56).

The poet is orthodox in his references to Christian doctrine. Souls are infused by God (27-28); the soul and body shall be reunited at the last judgement (88-89); Christ will judge all men (50-51);<sup>21</sup> the souls of men are judged immediately after death (5-7); Baptism (87), Holy Eucharist (41, 142) and redemption through the blood of Christ (30) all play a part in the economy of redemption. Even the idea of a soul returning from hell is not necessarily unorthodox.<sup>22</sup> A Catharist would deny all these doctrines.

Our poet may be exonerated from the stigma of theological unorthodoxy, but he is less than orthodox in matters poetical. Though he shows time and again that he is not unschooled in O E poetic technique, he does not lean heavily on the ordinary devices of this highly stylized poetry. The poet can, of course, handle alliterative meter competently if not

God's permission it has imprisoned the soul in the body. They rejected the sacraments of the Eucharist and Baptism. They were only one variety of a breed that traces its lineage back through the Manicheans to a Persian dualism. Though the term "Cathar" is sometimes applied to the earlier Manicheans and Novatians, it is usually applied to a group in Europe which made its appearance in the twelfth century. See Steven Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee* (Cambridge, 1947), 116-170.

<sup>20</sup> To admit the dualism of the poem is a far cry from associating it with the Catharists. The classic expression of dualism is found in Romans 7: 14-25, where St. Paul speaks of the two laws at war within himself. Heterodox dualists considered the body as *per se* evil.

<sup>21</sup> Christ is obviously not an eon. He is the *āncenneda*, a literal rendering of *Unigenitus*. The use of *engel* earlier in the poem, though somewhat strained, has a scriptural parallel in Malachy 3:1, and may be evidence of a familiarity with the more subtle aspects of theology. At any rate this is not a Catharist writing.

<sup>22</sup> See St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, Suppl. Q. 69, a. iii, ad. 3.

brilliantly, and on occasion his variations evince real power, but the overall impression one gets is that he did not compose according to formulas. It would indeed be temerarious to intimate that we have here an early revolt against poetic diction and stylized expression, but one does feel that we have a man speaking to men and using language really used by men, and one can hardly deny that the poet has coloured ordinary situations by imagination to make them appear under an unusual aspect.

There are several noticeable differences both in form and in technique which set the poem apart from much of the O E tradition. There is first of all an unusual tidiness about the form of the poem. It is a kind of diptych: two addresses framed with an introduction, commentary and a conclusion (now lost). Two situations diametrically opposed are juxtaposed. It is clearly a study in black and white with little chiaroscuro. *The Seafarer* and the *Wanderer* both have something in common with the *Soul and Body*, but represent the more classical and conventional forms: the first presents two views generally believed to be presented by one speaker, but vague enough to admit an interpretation of two speakers; the second has much the same framework of introduction, commentary and views but its greatness is believed to consist in the portrayal of growth from the troubled *ānhaga* to the imperturbable *snottor on mōde*. The wide interpretation which these poems admit argues to a depth that the *Soul and Body* never plumbs; but clarity and directness are also virtues, and if our poem has any quality at all, it is certainly straightforward. The poet clearly announces his dual theme, and proceeds to illustrate it with two existential and concrete situations: a saved soul and a lost soul confront their respective bodies. It is precisely here in a dramatic situation where the poet manifests his ability to create an atmosphere of immediacy and urgency rare in O E literature. The poet can preach to and not at his reader, and perhaps it is more of a homiletic than an artistic triumph. But he is successful.

Again, the poet proves that he was doubtlessly well acquainted with, for instance, the technique of variation, but he uses it in a different way. The overall impression is not that we leisurely and slowly survey a situation with him by examining epithet after epithet. The very first lines are illustrative of this:

Huru, ðæs behōfað	hæleða āghwylc
þæt he his sāwle sið	sylfa gefence,
hū ðæt bīð dēoplic	þonne sē dēað cymeð,
āsyndreð þā sybbe	(1-4)

The kenning *sāwle sið* is unambiguously resolved by the clipped *dēað cymeð*, which in turn is heightened by a statement of effect: *āsyndreð þā sybbe*. An even more telling example later in the poem is noteworthy

showing as it does his mastery of O E technique and particularly his ability to use an ordinary series of variations with telling effect.

ƿonne ðū for unc bām andwyrdan scealt  
on ðām miclan dæge, þonne mannum bēoð  
wunda onwrigene þa ðē on worulde ār  
fyrenfulle men fyrn geworhton,  
ðonne wyle dryhten sylf dāda gehȳran  
hæleða gehwylces, heofena scippend,  
æt ealra manna gehwæs mūðes reorde  
wunde wiðerlēan. Ac hwæt wylt ðū þær  
on þām dōmdæge dryhtne secgan?  
ƿonne ne bið nān nā tō þas lȳtel lið on lime āweaxen,  
þæt ðū nē scyle for ānra gehwylcum onsunrum  
riht āgildan, þonne rēðe bið  
dryhten æt þām dōme. Ac hwæt dō wyt unc? (88-100)

This is a highly wrought, intercalated passage on judgement framed with a reference to the imputability of guilt: the body will answer at judgement. There are three objects of variation: the day itself, the judge, and his active response. The effect is, however, poles apart from the ordinary leisurely stance of OE poetry. This gives the effect of a nervous heaping up of images which is symptomatic not so much of poetic effect but of real tension. Again there is no very picturesque or impressive term involved, yet the passage is in its way as ominous and terrible as the threefold knell that announces the coming of Grendel to the mead hall in *Beowulf*.

The parallel passage of judgement in the second address, too long to quote here, is much more elaborate, taking in as it does almost half of the poem as it now stands and playing variations on the theme of confidence of the body in the face of judgement:

ðū ne þearft sceamian (145)... on þām māran dæge (147)  
nē ðē hreowan þearf (148)... on gemōtstede (150)  
ðū nē sorgode (156)... æt godes dōme. (157)

This is not mere repetition. There is a clear progression in each successive statement and at the same time it conveys again a nervous endeavour to reassure the body. This effect is heightened by the interjection of parenthetic remarks in praise of the body's solicitude for the spiritual welfare of the soul.

The poet is not much concerned with traditional poetic diction. O E poetry is rich in substantival compounds, and the rich brocade texture of some of the best poetry is fashioned by an artful use of these compounds. Our poet does not rely on substantival compounds for his effects. A word count shows that there are proportionately half as many compounds in *Soul and Body* as in the *Beowulf*,<sup>23</sup> and these are for the most part prose

<sup>23</sup> Arthur G. Brodeur, *The Art of Beowulf* (University of California Press, 1960), 7.

words used in their prose sense: *boldwela* (59), *eardungstōwe* (71), *dōmdæge* (96), *legerbed* (155). Possibly *lustgryrum* (23) and *flāschord* (103) are his own creations. If so, it merely shows that he had the power but did not use it prodigally. Words such as *ēorðfæt* (8) and *lāmfæt* (131), though respectable kennings, are certainly biblical. Combinations of a substantive and a limiting genitive are patently more abundant than the substantival compounds,<sup>24</sup> and it is in these juxtapositions that some of the most potent imagery is found: *sāwle sið* (2), *gāstes drinces* (41 & 143), *wyrma gyfl* (22 & 124), *eorðan fūlnes* (18), but for the most part they are the received kennings such as *weoruda dryhten* (14) and *heofena scippend* (93) or everyday objects used in a factual way: *ende worulde* (13), *bryde bēag* (59), *eorðan spēda* (77), *godes dōme* (157) and *mūðes reorde* (94).

I feel that the real power of *Soul and Body* is in the effective use of verbs and verbals. This is contrary to the practice of O E poets, and is peculiarly noteworthy considering the static quality of the poem. Again these verbs are not the property of poets alone, but the poet of the *Soul and Body* uses them effectively. One can almost sense the searing sensation of *āsyndreð pā sybbe* (4) or in *slitan sārlīce* (73), or the tearing action in the macabre tour de force,

Bið þæt hēafod tōhliden, handa tōliðode,  
geaglas tōginene, gōman tōslitene,  
sīna bēoð asōcene, swyra becōwen,  
fingras tōhrōrene. (108-111)

The *Soul and Body* does not rank with the best poems of O E literature. The verse is no more than competent, the use of kennings is negligible, compounds are neither frequent nor impressive, and yet despite the poet's neglect of most of the poetic stock in trade, his ability to evoke a scene and dramatize a situation is not mean. His deep moral earnestness and high seriousness carry the poem where poetic technique might not bear it up, and his sense for structure strengthens its lines considerably. One cannot read the poem without being moved by the tragedy of the lost soul and without feeling happy relief for the saved soul. His theme has a perpetual fascination concerning as it does "that lone bourne from which men ne'er return," and he can invest the whole with an immediacy and personal involvement which gives the exemplum both cogency and feeling. One cannot expect the heroic breadth or martial air of *Elene* or *Andreas*, the lyric ecstasy of the *Dream of the Rood*, or the epic sweep of *Beowulf*, but in

<sup>24</sup> Brodeur, 14: "Poets seem to have felt no distinction between poetic compounds and combinations of basic noun with limiting genitive. The two types are indeed logically identical: *ȳðgewinn* and *ȳða gewinn* mean precisely the same thing."

its own way it lacks neither the message nor the ability to put it across. The poet's theme is woe and weal, and he does justice to both. In the light of this double theme it is manifestly unfair to suggest an unorthodox strain in the poet, though as we have seen he is a somewhat unorthodox poet. Somehow the exigencies of his form and the moral tone of his message lend the poem a kind of nervous energy uncommon in O E poetry; and in the final analysis he has written a poem that touches the heart.

*Joseph E. Atkinson College  
York University, Toronto.*

# The Bonaventurean Way to God

ANTON C. PEGIS

## I

**A**N earlier article in *Mediaeval Studies* undertook to reach a pre-thirteenth-century interpretation of the *Proslogion* of St. Anselm of Canterbury.<sup>1</sup> Freeing the *Proslogion* from the occupations of the thirteenth century meant, in great part, seeing what St. Thomas was criticizing by asking *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*.<sup>2</sup> The question itself was an Aristotelian one both in form and content, and its point was to say that *deum esse* was not a self-evident proposition, it needed to be demonstrated before it was accepted as true. But since, as far as can be determined, no theologian prior to St. Thomas said that the proposition *deum esse* did not need demonstration, a further question presents itself. What was the point that St. Thomas had in mind if all he meant to say was that the proposition was a demonstrable truth and no one denied this? From *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, c. 10 we know the answer. There were some people known to St. Thomas who said that *deum esse* was an indubitable truth and that its opposite was unthinkable. Here, it seems, was St. Thomas' issue. Could the existence of God be such an indubitable truth and yet be a truth that needed demonstration? In other words, could it be an indubitable truth without ultimately being a self-evident truth and therefore a truth that somehow escaped the need of demonstration by its self-evidence? In that case, exactly how was it a truth of demonstration?

It is this question that requires the historian to distinguish between what St. Thomas was doing in the presence of his contemporaries and what in fact they themselves were doing. The rubric *utrum deum esse sit per se notum* was used by St. Thomas to measure the meaning and the truth of those who held that the existence of God was indubitable or undeniable and therefore that His non-existence was unthinkable. The only trouble is that St. Thomas himself seems to have been the inventor of the rubric and the question is to know the purpose and the historical relevance of the inven-

<sup>1</sup> A. C. Pegis, "St. Anselm and the Argument of the 'Proslogion,'" *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 228-267.

<sup>2</sup> For St. Thomas' criticism, see *ibid.*, 230-239.

tion. After all, what could St. Thomas hope to accomplish by a device that did not apply to the views of his contemporaries? True enough, the ultimate point that he wished to secure, namely, the position that the existence of God was a truth that needed demonstration and could therefore be denied short of demonstration, was indeed secured by the device. And yet no one held that the existence of God was not a truth of demonstration, and this is the case even for those who held that the non-existence of God was unthinkable. Such thinkers did not hold that the indubitability of the divine existence was grounded on its self-evidence to the human mind. The historian cannot but raise some questions at this precise point. What did St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure, to consider no one else, hold, and with what relevance, not to say propriety, did St. Thomas apply his rubric to them?

The case of St. Anselm seems to be quite clear. The *quo maius* formula of *Proslogion*, c. 2 was not for him a notion of God, and this for at least two reasons. In c. 1 St. Anselm had acknowledged with St. Paul that God dwelt in an inaccessible light (I Tim. 6. 16), and in c. 15 he likewise came to acknowledge in the light of his own intervening argumentation that God was *maiis quam cogitari potest*. St. Anselm had no notion of God from which to prove His existence and yet the non-existence of God was for him unthinkable. How was this possible? Let us here set aside the religious purpose and the theological character of the *Proslogion*<sup>3</sup> and consider its argument. How could St. Anselm say that God cannot be thought not to be (*Proslogion*, c. 3) when even for the author of the argument God cannot be thought at all? St. Anselm admitted to Gaunilo that the *quo maius* argument was unworkable if the conditional proposition—if God is thinkable, He exists—was not true. Gaunilo had said: you have no notion at all of a transcendent God, and no comparisons with creatures are possible in such a unique situation. St. Anselm's reply is contained in *Responsio*, #8 and leads back to *Monologion*, c. 65. From these crucial texts it is clear that the notion of God is constructed from things seen as a hierarchical unity leading to a maximum or highest term. God is the transcendent peak of the hierarchy of being seen at its ultimate moment of reduction to its source. It is not God, therefore, that St. Anselm grasps in his *quo maius* formula; it is things themselves, as he experiences them, taken in an absolute way, that is, as reduced to the pure unity that is their origin. As so taken, to use the language of *Monologion*, c. 65, things *designate* the divine essence. The argument of *Proslogion*, cc. 2-4, therefore, proceeds, not from thought or essence to existence, but from presence to existence; that is, it proceeds from God

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 240-243.

as present in things to God as their transcendent source designated in Himself. In short, for St. Anselm things both contain and designate God. The argument in *Proslogion*, c. 2 moves from the designated but hidden presence of God in things to His existence recognized and posited in itself.

The link between presence and existence in the Anselmian argumentation is Platonic participation, even though God Himself remains hidden from the human mind both before and after the proof. Participation, in fact, says that a hierarchy of perfections, which the universe is,<sup>4</sup> cannot exist or be understood except *in* and *from* a transcendent unity. Seen in this way, the *quo maius* of *Proslogion*, c. 2 is the constructed designation of that unity.

When we try to locate the argument of *Proslogion*, cc. 2-4 in the thirteenth century, one thing becomes immediately clear. The age of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas was the intellectual world in which Christian theologians came face to face with Aristotle's quarrel with Plato. Participation was a central piece in that quarrel, and one does not have to read beyond *Metaphysics A*, cc. 6 and 9, in order to become aware of the fact. What role did Aristotle play in the natural theologies of the thirteenth century? Was Aristotle's attack on participation the point of the Thomistic rubric *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*? For St. Anselm, God cannot be thought not to be, but the reason is not that *deum esse* is a self-evident truth to us. The reason is the designation of God in a hierarchical world of participated perfections. Since St. Thomas himself had to admit the designation of God in things, if only because St. Paul stood behind St. Anselm,<sup>5</sup> the problem is to know whether the mode of the divine designation in things, rather than the fact itself, is the issue in St. Thomas' mind.

## II

I propose to approach the study of St. Bonaventure and his proofs of God *via* the interpretation of his relations to St. Thomas expressed by Jean Chatillon in his survey of the argument of St. Anselm among the first scholastics in the thirteenth century.<sup>6</sup> This interpretation is greatly indebted to the discussion in *Le Thomisme* that Gilson has devoted to the "essentialism" of St. Bonaventure and to the substantial third chapter of his *Philoso-*

<sup>4</sup> St. Anselm, *Monologion*, cc. 1-5, 65; *Responsio*, §§ 8-9 (*S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, vol. 1 [Edinburgh, 1946], 13-18, 75-77, 137-138).

<sup>5</sup> St. Anselm, *Proslogion*, cc. 1, 9, 16; *ed. cit.*, 98, 107, 112.

<sup>6</sup> Jean Chatillon, "De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin: l'argument de saint Anselme chez les premiers scolastiques du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Spicilegium Beccense*, I (Paris, 1959), 209-231.

*sophie de saint Bonaventure.*<sup>7</sup> In following the Bonaventurean steps leading to God we shall meet St. Anselm and the *Proslogion*. The issue before us will be this. In what sort of world did St. Bonaventure locate St. Anselm's argument?

Beginning with the Thomistic critique of the *Proslogion*, Chatillon notes that for Karl Barth St. Thomas completely misunderstood St. Anselm; for Henri Bouillard, St. Thomas' criticism in the main did not touch St. Anselm's argument; and for Gilson St. Thomas criticized the Anselmian argument only after giving to it the meaning it would have in his own world. But if the Thomistic critique was not really aimed at St. Anselm, what was its target? According to Gilson and Bouillard, it was the use made of the Anselmian argument by thirteenth-century theologians.<sup>8</sup> Chatillon agrees and examines the texts in which St. Thomas deals with the question *utrum deum esse sit per se notum*, and particularly with *SCG I*, c. 10 where St. Thomas notes that the effort to prove the existence of God "will perhaps seem superfluous to those who assert that the existence of God is self-evident, so that its contrary cannot be thought, and thus that God exists cannot be demonstrated."<sup>9</sup> Chatillon likewise notes that St. Thomas does not name his thirteenth-century adversaries nor limit himself to St. Anselm as the source of the thesis that he is opposing. St. John Damascene and St. Augustine are also cited. In fact the text of the *Summa* reduces all the sources for the thesis to three names, namely, St. Anselm, St. Augustine and St. John Damascene. Only, *whom* was St. Thomas opposing in his own world?<sup>10</sup>

Chatillon begins by acknowledging that he cannot find in St. Bonaventure the formulas that St. Thomas attacks. St. Bonaventure did not say that *deum esse est per se notum*, nor did he say that God's existence was indemonstrable; repeating St. Anselm, he said only that the existence of God was an indubitable truth. How, then, do we justify St. Thomas' critique?<sup>11</sup> In his commentary on the *Sentences* St. Bonaventure asked this question: *utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum quod non possit cogitari non esse.*<sup>12</sup> In the *De Mysterio Trinitatis* he asked an allied question: *utrum deum esse sit verum indubitabile.*<sup>13</sup> Chatillon notes, properly enough, that according to St. Bonaventure

<sup>7</sup> Etienne Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 6th ed., (Paris, 1965), 59-60; *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., (Paris, 1943), 101-118.

<sup>8</sup> J. Chatillon, *ibid.*, 209-210. For the background, see A. C. Pegis, "St. Anselm and the Argument of the 'Proslogion,'" 240-242.

<sup>9</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 10, § 1.

<sup>10</sup> J. Chatillon, *ibid.*, 211.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 212, 221.

<sup>12</sup> In *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ed. minor, (Quaracchi, 1934), 118-121.

<sup>13</sup> *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, q. 1, a. 1 (*S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, vol. V, [Quaracchi, 1891], 45-51).

venture "the existence of God cannot be placed in doubt, and therefore one cannot think that God does not exist."<sup>14</sup> But St. Bonaventure recognizes that the failures and the weaknesses of our intelligence can lead it to refuse evidence and thereby to think that God does not exist. The failure of intelligence interests Chatillon indirectly. As he says, the possibility of such a denial of God by the perversity of men is evidently not due to the lack of intelligibility in the objective evidence for the existence of God; it can be explained only "by a failure of intelligence, which, not aware of what God is, goes so far as to confuse Him with pagan idols or to refuse to Him such essential attributes as justice, and thus also not to recognize that He is what He is, that is, existence. But intelligence does not end up in such a negation except in consequence of starting out with a false idea of God."<sup>15</sup> On this basis, Chatillon continues, St. Bonaventure forcefully defends his main thesis by carefully examining the reasons why, when it proceeds correctly, the intelligence cannot think that God does not exist.<sup>16</sup>

There is no serious question about St. Bonaventure's arguments for the existence of God. These are three in number, as we shall see, and Chatillon has no difficulty in setting them forth. Argument one rests on the conviction that God is innately present within the human mind. The second argument holds that the existence of God is proclaimed by things, which are participated and from another. For St. Bonaventure, as for St. Augustine, things proclaim with a loud voice that God exists. Finally, there is the argument that when the mind looks above itself, it sees the evidence of truth itself in which God is the first truth and the source of all truth. As truth, God indubitably exists, and St. Bonaventure joins the position of both St. Anselm and St. Augustine. From these three lines of argument St. Bonaventure draws his main conclusion, namely, that the existence of the first and highest being is most evident in its truth.<sup>17</sup> But these arguments pose a question. Exactly what do they mean? Here, as Chatillon sees it, we are face to face with the Bonaventurean doctrine of the divine illumination and we have to recognize that human demonstrations prove the existence of God, not by their own force, but by force of the divine light within which they move and on which they rest. Chatillon explains this mixed situation as follows. "In the course of the first and second way, in fact, Bonaventurean demonstration already tends to make known to the intelligence that the profound tendencies of the soul and the metaphysical

<sup>14</sup> J. Chatillon, *ibid.*, 222.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 223-225.

limitations of created being require it to admit, without any doubt whatever, the existence of God. The demonstrative force of the arguments thus set forth does not come to them, as it does in the Thomistic proofs, from an objective consideration of created reality, but from the discovery, in this situation, of irreducible rational exigencies in which is mirrored the eternal reason, that is, God Himself. Before taking the more direct way that the argument of St. Anselm establishes, then, the mind is already led to recognize that God exists and that it cannot think that He does not exist, since the very exercise of its reason reveals to it something of God, namely, that God is its light and that He is its truth.”<sup>18</sup>

We are now in the presence of the triumph of the divine illumination over demonstration in the teaching of St. Bonaventure. “This manifestation of the divine existence becomes still more evident when the intelligence turns to the third way, toward which the two prior ways have led it. The resistance that the mind experiences to saying that God does not exist here proves the existence of God because, better than before, it reveals to the mind the light of the eternal reason which alone founds and justifies it. In recognizing that it is impossible for it to think that the highest being or the most perfect conceivable being does not exist, the intelligence somehow grasps the light of the eternal truth whose first traces the arguments of the first and second way had already enabled it to glimpse within its own depths. Finally, the Anselmian proof, such as Bonaventure understands and presents it, is reduced to that which the great doctor, following Alexander of Hales, attributes to St. Augustine: no truth can be known except in the light of the first truth; if, then, the intelligence admits but one truth, be it only in saying that truth does not exist, it admits the existence of the first truth, that is to say, the existence of God.”<sup>19</sup>

This outcome leads Chatillon to some conclusions, of which the first is quite surprising. For him, the theologians of the thirteenth century, including St. Bonaventure, “profoundly modified” the argument of St. Anselm. “In fact, Anselm had presented his whole demonstration as the reflection of a believer whom his own religious meditation had familiarized with the truths of faith. He had taken pains to make known to his reader that the idea of something than which one cannot think a greater is a datum of faith, which must serve as the starting point in our elevation to knowledge and understanding. On the contrary, the theologians whom we have studied present the Anselmian argument as a rational proof, containing its force within itself and without recourse to faith... They agree in omitting

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 226-227.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

the word *credimus* that Anselm had used in order to show us the starting point of his demonstration.”<sup>20</sup> Let us reserve comment and consider Chatillon’s second conclusion, which has to do with the relations between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas concerning the argument of the *Proslogion*. Chatillon admits that “Bonaventure in fact never taught that the existence of God was self-evident, and still less that it was indemonstrable.” But he goes much farther than this point. As he sees it, “to say that the existence of God is self-evident or to say that one cannot think that God does not exist, are two different ways of presenting the same thesis.”<sup>21</sup>

This conclusion insists, at one and the same time, that the Bonaventurean proofs of God bear no relation to the Thomistic proofs and yet that the Thomistic critique launched under the rubric *utrum deum esse sit per se notum* is historically relevant and even justified. If true, this conclusion is important for the understanding of St. Thomas’ procedure. We can agree that the Bonaventurean proofs bear no relation to those of St. Thomas. “They tend, in fact, much less to prove the existence of God than to establish its evidence. They have for their ultimate goal—as the whole argumentation of Bonaventure proves—to lead the mind progressively toward that complete clarity which will render perfectly useless the proofs [of God] that a disciple of St. Thomas will never consent to do without here on earth.”<sup>22</sup> But there is more. Beyond words and formulas, there is for Chatillon a fundamental opposition in the respective theses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. “The central argument of the demonstration proposed by Bonaventure, as we have seen, is certainly the argument coming from the *Proslogion*. But we have also seen that this argument took on a meaning in his eyes only when it was attached to the Augustinian proof from the idea of truth. It is because the first truth dwells in us and reveals itself in us in a certain way that we know its existence in an evident way. This is what St. Thomas cannot accept. No doubt, the Angelic Doctor recognizes that the knowledge of the existence of God is impressed in us, as John Damascene had said, but only in a confused manner and in the sense that there is in us something (*aliquid*) which permits us to arrive at this knowledge that God exists.” As for St. Anselm’s *quo maius*, Chatillon insists that “in the idea of something than which a greater cannot be thought, in which Bonaventure had thought he had found a reflection of the divine light, St. Thomas wishes to recognize merely a concept. It is in favor of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, which he had chosen once for all, that he will reject the An-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 227-228.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 228.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

selmian argument as presented by the Seraphic Doctor." And Chatillon concludes: "And if his [St. Thomas'] critique [of St. Anselm] remains debatable, the position of Bonaventure, which explains it, remains no less debatable. The two doctors have examined the argument in the light of their respective metaphysics, without seeing that Anselm had appealed to faith for his illumination."<sup>23</sup>

The interpretation of St. Anselm's *credimus* is, in the present context, a regrettable slip. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas both ignored the *credimus* with which *Proslogion*, c. 2 began, and in this sense Chatillon is correct. But since St. Anselm thought that the argument in cc. 2-4 was both an illumination and a proof, what St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure left out amounts to a religious misinterpretation of the argument within the framework of the *Proslogion*, but not a doctrinal misuse of its structure. Much more serious than this point, however, is Chatillon's insistence on finding an opposition between demonstration and illumination in St. Bonaventure and on making this opposition serve as the basis of the further opposition that he sees between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. According to him, the divine illumination guides demonstration and makes it possible for St. Bonaventure, and it is the light of this illumination that shows man that God exists; with the result that, in a way, the demonstration *does not prove* because the illumination is already there with the evidence of God's existence. On the other hand, in St. Thomas, the Anselmian *quo maius* is a mere concept, the existence of God is not known until it is demonstrated, and the demonstration is the necessary structure by which the mind knows that God exists.

Now there is no doubt that when, as in St. Bonaventure, illumination and demonstration go together, the combination is difficult to interpret. Consider, for example, this Bonaventurean statement: "For the certitudinal knowledge of the intellect, even in the wayfarer, it is necessary that the eternal reason be reached as the regulating and moving reason; not solely however in its clarity but with the proper created reason and as known in a mirror and in a riddle."<sup>24</sup> St. Bonaventure is saying that there is no certitude without the divine illumination—without our reaching the eternal reason of God as the guiding and directing cause of our certitude. Yet he is also saying two other things. We do not know this eternal reason in itself, we know it in a mirror—the mirror of creation, including the human mind. Moreover, we need to grasp the particular reason of the thing to be known here and now, so that the effect of the divine illumination is, not to be known

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 230-231.

<sup>24</sup> St. Bonaventure, *De Scientia Christi*, q. 4, *Opera Omnia*, vol. V, (Quaracchi, 1891), 22.

in itself, but to guide us to know with certitude truths that we would not otherwise know with certitude. Does a proof prove, then, even when it remains true that without the divine illumination it would not give us demonstrative certitude? Does illumination dispense with proof for St. Bonaventure or does it act as the ground of its certitude? And if the latter seems to be the case, does the difference between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas lie in the latter's Aristotelian empiricism, as Chatillon thinks, or, if St. Bonaventure himself accepts such an empiricism, does it not lie in the fact that they do not agree in how truth is present in what we know, including what we know by demonstration? Does St. Bonaventure know any less empirically than St. Thomas, and does he demonstrate with any less faith in the process of reasoning by the fact that the truth of certainty comes, not from things or from the mind itself, but from God's ruling presence in both?

This last question raises a more ultimate point. Does St. Bonaventure believe that the knowledge of God is innate in man? And does he think so because of his belief in the divine illumination? To say that God is the first object of the intellect, on the ground that we would not know truth without somehow reaching Him as the source and the guide of our knowledge of truth, is this to be involved in any innatism? That is, is it to be involved in the view that we know God before we know other things, and we know them by and in Him? Moreover, whatever the Bonaventurean innatism may be, how different is it from St. Thomas' view that *naturali ratione statim homo in aliqualem dei cognitionem pervenire potest*?<sup>25</sup> A natural knowledge of God that is immediate, what is it but a knowledge that somehow comes with the nature of man?

The position of Chatillon on the natural theology of St. Bonaventure leads us directly to the views, expressed over forty years ago, in Gilson's *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*. In the third chapter of that work Gilson is concerned to explain how for St. Bonaventure the existence of God is evident rather than a truth reached by demonstration. I propose here, not so much to follow Gilson as he examines the text of St. Bonaventure, as to listen to his reflections as a historian. Gilson's starting point is to see St. Bonaventure in the world of St. Augustine and St. Anselm and confronted by their question: can the human soul be unaware of God? To affirm that this is impossible would mean that men somehow had an innate idea of God. But how can this be if in fact men have adored idols of stone? Bonaventure's answer is simple enough. There is a considerable distance between the pure knowledge and the pure ignorance of God. There is a difference between being

<sup>25</sup> St. Thomas, *SCG* III, c. 38, # 1.

mistaken about the divine nature and not knowing that God exists. One can know that God exists and still be mistaken about His nature. The impious and the idolaters do not know God's nature, but they do not deny His existence.<sup>26</sup>

As distinguished from St. Thomas, according to Gilson, St. Bonaventure interprets the words of St. John Damascene in a very strong way. Damascene had said that no mortal being was without the natural possession of the knowledge that God existed. To St. Thomas this meant that man possessed that by which he could come to know that God existed. But to St. Bonaventure it meant that this knowledge itself was innately given—an incomplete knowledge, but one that was a constant invitation to being discovered. We desire wisdom, the highest good, peace, and these we cannot desire without knowledge; this means that the knowledge of an immutable and eternal being is naturally present in the human mind.<sup>27</sup> How is this possible? Gilson points out that, according to St. Bonaventure, the soul is present to itself and knows itself immediately; then, God is eminently present to the soul. The soul is intelligible in itself and God is intelligible in Himself; which means that one intelligible is present in another. Nor is this impossible on the ground that God is disproportionately superior to the soul. If this were true, the soul could not come to a knowledge of God. The soul is capable of knowing all things, and it is like God, as made to His image. "It is, then, in a profound harmony between two intelligibles of which one is the cause and the archetype of the other, that our innate knowledge of the existence of God takes root."<sup>28</sup>

This innateness is the first Bonaventurean way to God. The second way is from things, that is, from effect to cause. Here Bonaventure notices that things are limited, composite, imperfect, finite, in motion. We must therefore go from the relative to the absolute, the necessary being that is the cause of all the rest. In this line of argumentation Gilson notices a further difference between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. St. Bonaventure seems indifferent about his starting point, and he does not elaborate the technicalities involved in (for example) following motion to an unmoved source. This technical negligence is not a failure, but a genuine indifference to the starting point in sensible things of the Bonaventurean proofs. The reason that St. Bonaventure does not want to *construct* ways to God, in the manner of St. Thomas, is that his aim is "to show that God is so universally witnessed by nature that His existence is a sort of evidence and scarcely requires to be

<sup>26</sup> E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 104.

<sup>27</sup> E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 105.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 105-106.

proved." On the other hand, "St. Thomas insists on the fact that the existence of God is not evident ; hence he must naturally bring his whole effort to bear on the choice of one or more preferred points of departure and on the dialectical solidity of the proof. On the contrary, St. Bonaventure insists on the fact that the whole of nature proclaims the existence of God as an indubitable truth, provided only that we make the effort to look at it."<sup>29</sup>

This conclusion goes very far. The reason for it, according to Gilson, is that for St. Bonaventure proofs that begin with sensible things are proofs, not because of the sensible things themselves, "but because, on the contrary, they set in motion intelligible notions that imply the existence of God." We are now at the juncture of illumination and demonstration. We learn in and from sensible experience that there exist things that are mutable, composite, relative, imperfect, contingent ; but all these deficiencies we find in things only because we already possess the idea of the perfection that acts as their measure. Hence, "it is only *in appearance* that our reasoning takes its origin in the recognition of sensible data. All knowledge comes from prior knowledge, and the apparently immediate and primitive recognition of the contingent supposes the prior knowledge of the necessary. Now the necessary is nothing other than God; human intelligence, therefore, experiences the fact that it already possesses the knowledge of the first being at the very moment when it undertakes to prove it."<sup>30</sup>

Consider the consequences of such a position. "When we look at them from this point of view, the proofs by the sensible cannot be compared with one another in the system of St. Bonaventure and in that of St. Thomas. If the idea of God is innate, the sensible world will never aid us in constructing it ; it can only offer us the occasion to recover it, and it will necessarily constitute our point of departure. Now, for anyone who considers the problem attentively, this point of departure is itself a point of arrival. If we have the idea of God in ourselves, we are sure that He exists, since we cannot not think Him as existing. The second way has led us to the first and it is again the first that will lead us to the third: the immediate evidence of the existence of God."<sup>31</sup> St. Bonaventure remained faithful to this fundamental point of doctrine from the beginning to the end of his career. As Gilson says, for him, the divine being, taken in itself, is absolutely evident. "When we know the terms of a first principle, we know thereby the principle itself, and it is evident to us because, in such a proposition, the predicate is included

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

in the subject. The situation is exactly the same with the proposition *God exists*. God, as the supreme truth, is being itself, and such that one cannot think of anything more perfect; hence, it cannot not be, and the intrinsic necessity of its being is such that it has an influence somehow on our thought. We can be ignorant of the meaning of the word *God*, and if we are mistaken about the essence of God we shall certainly not discover the necessity of His existence; but if we have already learned the meaning of the word, by reasoning or experience, or... owing to the teaching of faith, or, again, if we consult the naturally innate idea of God that all men possess, then the necessity of the divine being will become a necessity for our thought itself, and we shall not be able not to think it as existing.” We are now in pure Anselmianism. “The metaphysical substance of the proof, clearly foreseen by Anselm, reaches in Bonaventure the full awareness of itself: it is because the necessity of the divine being communicates itself to thought that a simple definition can become a proof... More simply still, since it is the intrinsic evidence of the idea of God which grounds the assertion of His existence, it ought to be enough to place it before our eyes for us to perceive its necessity: if God is God, God exists; now, the antecedent is evident, and so therefore is the conclusion.”<sup>32</sup>

Two things, according to Gilson, are necessary to such an argumentation if it is to work. There is first the necessity—the unique necessity—of the object. God is such a unique object, and God alone. But, second, this uniquely necessary object must be known to us in its necessity; the identity of essence and existence must be perceptible in the identity of subject and predicate that grounds the necessity of our judgment that God exists. This transference of necessity from being to thought takes place every time we think of being; accordingly, it is in the profound metaphysical link that binds the soul to God that for Gilson “we must seek the ultimate justification of the argument of St. Anselm and of all the other proofs of the existence of God.”<sup>33</sup> The soul and God, as Gilson has already noted, are for Bonaventure both intelligible. God Himself in His necessity is somehow present to and in the mind of Bonaventure. This is the Bonaventurean ground of argument, and that is why, as Gilson goes on to observe, “with St. Bonaventure the presuppositions of the argument of St. Anselm come to the foreground and, made more completely evident, in a way absorb the proof.”<sup>34</sup> Another way of reaching this conclusion is to say that “it is thus the irradiation of the divine object itself within our soul that grounds meta-

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-109.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 109-110.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

physically the knowledge that we have of it, and it is in the order of being that the argument of St. Anselm here finds its ultimate justification.”<sup>35</sup> That is why all the Bonaventurean arguments for God confirm one another, since they begin in the same place. We cannot go back to the starting point of any one of them without finding the same beginning: a linkage between the soul and God which makes it possible for God to reveal Himself in the soul, to be present in the truth that the soul grasps, and to be more internal to the soul than it is to itself.<sup>36</sup> We cannot therefore compare the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. They have no common ground and no common measure. That is why the famous effort of Lepidi, followed by the Quaracchi editors, to argue that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas both believed in an implicit knowledge of God is for Gilson seriously misleading.

We certainly know that according to St. Thomas man has an implicit desire of God. He desires beatitude, which is God, and so he desires God and does not know it. The only question is: what does implicit here mean? Is it a virtually preformed but undeveloped knowledge that will develop in the manner of a seed? Or is it a confused knowledge that later additions will determine? For St. Thomas the latter alternative is the true one. No ideas are written in or preformed in our intellect, none are innate, including the idea of God. Our intellect is by nature a *tabula rasa*. Is the idea of God contained in the first idea formed by the intellect, the idea of being? Well, the idea of being does not contain in any virtual way the idea of God. It is not from the idea of being that the mind will derive the idea of God; it is the determinations added to being by the intellect, as it explores the world of sense, that will determine and construct the idea of God. For St. Thomas, man’s natural knowledge of God is not of a content to be explicated, but of an object whose richness the mind has not yet explored and whose nature it has not yet defined. Thus, to determine the implicit knowledge of God, the intellect must return to the sensible experience through which it acquires that knowledge. The position of St. Bonaventure is quite different on this point. We can be ignorant of God’s nature, but not of His existence. We are always given His existence, but we know His nature only implicitly; that is, it is virtually known and subject to development from within under God’s help.<sup>37</sup>

As a sort of exegetical corollary Gilson contends that the *verum indubitabile* of St. Bonaventure cannot be assimilated to the *per se notum* of St. Thomas, at least, not without reservations. On the basis of his theory of know-

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 114-116.

ledge, St. Thomas holds that none of our concepts can give us the intuition of the existence of its object. But for St. Bonaventure the idea of God is not thus constructed from sensible experience. It is innate. This is why, ultimately, the idea of a proof of God is so different in St. Thomas and in St. Bonaventure. In St. Thomas the original data and the reasoning structure constitute the proof and its meaning. In St. Bonaventure, the return of the soul to God is the world that animates the proof. This is ultimately a mystical world, as is that of St. Anselm, demanding a purification of intellect and will for the very possibility of the proof itself. We cannot compare the natural theologies of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure except to recognize their profound differences from one end to the other ; and certainly we should not confuse them with one another by confusing their perspectives and their methods.<sup>38</sup>

The innateness of the notion of God certainly dominates Gilson's interpretation of the Bonaventurean proofs, and it is natural to concentrate our attention on it. This view also dominates the actual role that Gilson assigns to other and related notions in Bonaventure's proof of God. Bonaventure is not concerned with empirical data as such because ultimately it is not they but their measure in and by the divine illumination that is the true starting point of the proof. And the proof itself, subject to this overpowering presence of the divine light, yields its force to that light ; or rather, that light makes its own force more and more known and the proof yields to it and its irresistible power. God is for Bonaventure virtually known in every knowledge of truth because He is the present origin of that truth, visible in His very presence since such a truth, but for Him, would not be. Yes, the innate idea of God dominates such a search for Him—from sensible things to reasoning to the light itself above the mind and yet also within it. And because the innate idea of God is so dominant in Gilson's presentation of Bonaventure's natural theology, it raises two questions for us.

The first question was already raised by Chatillon. What is the relation of the divine illumination—the innate idea of God as truth—to our experience of things and to the reasoning process by which we, seemingly, demonstrate our way to God ? Is God for St. Bonaventure reached as evident in His existence rather than as proved from data that are other than He ? In other words, is our experience here and now *external* to our discovery of God or, somehow, a *part* of it ? In the second place, in what sense is the idea of God an *idea* and an *innate idea* ? Is Gilson applying Aristotelian categories in his analysis of the idea of God as innate in St. Bonaventure ? If we are not dealing with an Aristotelian innateness, or with an innateness

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 117-118.

grasped in Aristotelian terms, what exactly are we thinking about? The answer to this question clearly has a bearing on the meaning and the role of the "idea" of God in St. Bonaventure's proof. The question, moreover, is similar to that raised in connection with the interpretation of St. Anselm.<sup>39</sup> St. Anselm had an idea of God, not in the sense of knowing a unique object grasped somehow in itself, but in the sense of knowing a designated presence—the presence of God designated at a unique moment by other things. What is St. Bonaventure's idea of God?

### III

There are three fundamental Bonaventurean texts bearing, from different points of view, on the problem of the existence of God. They are: *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (*Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse*); *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, q. 1, a. 1 (*Utrum deum esse sit verum indubitabile*); *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, c. 5 (*De speculatione divinae unitatis per eius nomen primarium, quod est esse*).<sup>40</sup> In a large way, the converging thesis of these texts is a lesson dear to the heart of St. Bonaventure. He has expressed it as a conclusion at the end of the *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*. "It is thus clear," he there writes, "how the multiform wisdom of God, which is clearly taught in Sacred Scripture, lies hidden in all knowledge and in every creature... It is clear, too, how broad is the illuminative way, and how within every thing, whether it be a thing sensed or a thing known, God lies hidden: *Patet etiam quam ampla sit via illuminativa, et quomodo in omni re, quae sentitur sive cognoscitur, interius lateat Deus.*"<sup>41</sup> Perhaps I have mistranslated *lateat* by *lies hidden*. Let me rather say that God lies in waiting for us in every creature: we cannot avoid Him.

The text of the *Sentences* is not here in question and we can deal with it rather briefly. Is the divine being so true that it cannot be thought not to be? St. Bonaventure makes two distinctions which go to the heart of the matter. We can think God not to be if we think without assent, as when we think something false, e. g. *homo est asinus*. "To think" in this case "is nothing other than to understand the meaning of what is said," so that in this same sense we can think that the truth of the divine being does not exist. But when the "I think" (*cogito*) carries with it a *credo*, then we must

<sup>39</sup> A. C. Pegis, "St. Anselm and the Argument of the 'Proslogion,'" 229-230, 248, 252-253, 256-261.

<sup>40</sup> See notes 12 and 13. For *Itinerarium*, c. 5, see *S. Bonaventurae Tria Opuscula ad Theologiam Spectantia*, 5th ed., (Quaracchi, 1938), 330-338. The scholion of the Editors, cited below in the present article, follows the *Itinerarium* in this edition, 349-361.

<sup>41</sup> *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, c. 26 (*Gria Opuscula*, p. 384).

make a further distinction. In this sense, to <sup>think</sup><sub>think</sub> (that is, to believe) the non-existence of what exists can take place either through a defect on the part of one understanding or through a defect on the part of the truth understood. A defect on the part of one understanding is a question of blindness or ignorance, as when a man, while not knowing a thing, thinks that it does not exist. But, moreover, we can think of a being from two points of view, namely, in terms of whether it is and in terms of what it is. Now, precisely, the position of Bonaventure is that "our intellect fails in the knowledge of the divine truth as concerns the knowledge '*what it is: quid est*,' but it does not fail as concerns the knowledge '*whether it is: si est*'." Bonaventure therefore quotes the famous saying of Hugh of St. Victor that "from the beginning God so moderated the knowledge of Himself in man that, just as man could not grasp what He was, so he could not be unaware that He was." In other words, our intellect never fails in knowing whether God exists, neither can it be unaware that He exists, nor still can it think Him not to exist. This is the Bonaventurean position. St. Bonaventure admits that the intellect fails in knowing what God is, it frequently thinks Him to be what He is not, e. g. an idol, or not to be what He is, e. g. just. Hence: "And because he who thinks God not to be what He is, e. g. just, consequently does not think Him to be, therefore by reason of a defect in the intellect God or the highest truth can be thought not to be. This is the case, not absolutely or generally, but as a consequence, as he who denies that beatitude is to be found in God denies that God exists." The intellect's failure in the order of the *quid est* knowledge of God is at the source of such a denial. Absolutely speaking, however, the intellect cannot be unaware that God exists and it cannot deny His existence. The only way in which the intellect could deny the existence of God is if there were some defect, either of presence or of evidence, on the part of the divine truth as an intelligible object. But since God is everywhere and always, and is always and everywhere whole (as St. Anselm had argued), we must conclude with both Bonaventure and Anselm that, in virtue of His own intelligibility, God cannot be thought not to be. Similarly, since God is being itself, than which nothing better can be thought, it follows again that He cannot non-be nor be thought not to be. "And not only does it [the divine truth] have evidence of itself, it also has evidence from proof. For every truth and every created nature proves that the divine truth exists and concludes to it." There now follows a whole series of well known Platonic arguments proving that if there is being by participation and from another, there is being through its own essence and not from another.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (*ed. cit.*, pp. 119-120); Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, c. 3 (PL. 176, 21A).

St. Bonaventure's main line of argument is not difficult to see. Exemplarism and participation, as with St. Augustine and St. Anselm before him, are the backbone of his reasoning. God is uniquely pure truth and in this sense truth is the property of the divine being. The truth of God makes all things to be true and knowable as an exemplary cause. The divine truth is uniquely supreme, eternal, omnipresent and whole in its eternity and omnipresence. The same argument can be found in the *Monologion* of St. Anselm, though St. Bonaventure refers to the *Responsio*. Given its nature, the divine truth cannot be thought not to be: this is a question of its existence; as to its essence, we do not know, we can be mistaken about what it is and thus equivalently deny that it exists. This is a failure on the part of the intellect. But there is no defect of presence or evidence in the divine truth itself. Not of presence, because, as we have seen, it is eternal, omnipresent and whole in its eternity and omnipresence; not of evidence, because (a) in itself it is like a self-evident principle: the cause of the predicate is contained in the subject, and (b) it can be proved by participation, by the illumination of the intellect, and by the existence of any and every created truth or thing.

It is a direct but still complicated step from the unique way in which God possesses truth (*His* truth cannot be thought not to be) to the further point that the existence of God is an indubitable truth. In his introduction to the *De Mysterio Trinitatis* St. Bonaventure refers to the notion that the existence of God is an indubitable truth as the *fundamentum omnis cognitionis certitudinalis*. It is. Our own concern, therefore, is not with the answer to the question *utrum deum esse sit verum indubitabile* but with the argumentation. St. Bonaventure marshals no less than twenty-nine arguments under three headings, from both authority and reason, in support of his affirmative answer. The first ten arguments prove that *omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est verum indubitabile*; the second ten prove that *omne verum quod omnis creatura proclamat est verum indubitabile*; and the last nine arguments prove that *omne verum in seipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile*.<sup>43</sup>

St. Bonaventure has no difficulty in arguing from authority (Hugh of St. Victor, Boethius, St. Augustine and even Aristotle) that the love and the knowledge of true beatitude and wisdom, which is God, have been impressed on the minds of all men. Arguments from reason reinforce this same conclusion, and St. Bonaventure can go on to summarize his first conclusion as follows. "By these arguments, then, it is shown that the existence of God is indubitable to the human mind, as being naturally

<sup>43</sup> *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, q. 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., 45, 46, 47).

inserted within it; for no one doubts except concerning that about which he does not have a certain knowledge.”<sup>44</sup> From the text of St. Bonaventure it is quite clear that *indubitabile*, *naturaliter insertum* and *certa notitia* function in this argument as though they were equivalent in meaning. Moreover, we now see the character of the *via* we have been arguing for, namely, the notion that “every truth impressed on all minds is an indubitable truth.” It is indubitable because it is naturally present and certain: such is the truth of the divine being.

A second way to the same indubitable truth now follows. “Again, this very same thing is shown thus. Every truth that every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth. But that God exists every creature proclaims. Therefore, etc. Now that every creature proclaims that God exists is shown from ten self-evident conditional propositions and premises.”<sup>45</sup> Conditional in form, St. Bonaventure’s ten arguments for the existence of the divine truth proceed by positing the antecedent and then positing the consequent. The method in such argumentation is clear enough. St. Bonaventure wishes to hold that if there is being from another, then there is being not from another, on the principle that nothing educes itself from non-being to being. Hence, that this be possible the first being must have the character of not being educed from another. Now if we call being from another created being, and being not from another uncreated being, in other words, God, then in principle such differences prove that God exists.<sup>46</sup> The same results can be obtained by using the notions of prior and subsequent. Applying this method of reasoning, which we cannot fail to recognize as the Platonic participation already used by St. Augustine and St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure is able to make a whole series of inferences, e. g. from the possible to the necessary being, from the diminished to the absolutely perfect being, from the potential to the actual being, from the composite to the simple being, from the mutable to the immutable being.<sup>47</sup> The conclusion of the second way is not in doubt. “From these ten necessary and manifest suppositions, therefore, it is inferred that all the differences or parts of being argue to and proclaim that God exists. If, then, every such truth is an indubitable truth, it is necessary that the existence of God be an indubitable truth.”<sup>48</sup>

The third Bonaventurean way to the existence of God as an indubitable truth is deeply Anselmian in inspiration. “Every truth that is so certain

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 46-47.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

that it cannot be thought not to be is an indubitable truth. But that God exists is such a truth [that is, it cannot be thought not to be]. Therefore. The first proposition is self-evident, while the second is proved in many ways.”<sup>49</sup> Of the nine arguments offered for this conclusion, the first four are from the *Proslogion* of St. Anselm. The first is the concluding sentence of *Proslogion*, c. 4. Anselm at this point believes that, as a result of the gift of illumination that he has received in addition to the gift of faith, should it be the case that he did not believe God to exist, he would still not understand or know that He did not exist. Moreover, “God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. But what is such that it cannot be thought not to be is truer than what can be thought not to be; therefore, if God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, God will not be able to be thought not to be.” Again: “The being than which a greater cannot be thought is of such a nature that it cannot be thought unless it exist in reality. For if it should exist in thought alone, then it is not the being than which a greater cannot be thought. Therefore if such a being is thought to be, it is necessary that there be in reality such a being that it could not be thought not to be.” Finally: “You alone are what it is better to be than not to be;” but every indubitable truth is better than every dubitable one; therefore to be indubitably is more to be attributed to God than to be dubitably.”<sup>50</sup>

The final three arguments for this same conclusion deserve careful reading. “The more a truth is prior and more universal, the more known it is. But this truth, by which it is said that the first being exists, is the first of all truths both in reality and in the order of understanding. Therefore it is necessary that this truth be most certain and most evident. But the truths of principles or of the common conceptions of the mind are so evident because of their priority that they cannot be thought not to be. Therefore no intellect can think that the first truth does not exist, or be in doubt about it.” Next: “No proposition is truer than that in which the same thing is predicated of itself.”<sup>51</sup> But when I say: *God exists*, the *exists* said of God is absolutely the same as God because God is His own existence (*esse*). Therefore no truer or more evident proposition is expressed than the one by which it is said that God exists. Therefore, no one can think that it is false or be in doubt about it.” Finally: “No one can be unaware that this is a true proposition: *the best is the best*, or think that it is false. But the best is the most complete being, and every most complete being is thereby an actual being. Therefore, if the best is the best, the best exists. Similarly,

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Boethius, *In Librum De Interpretatione*, editio prima, II, (PL. 64, 387).

it can be argued that, if God is God, God exists; but the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be; therefore, that God exists is an indubitable truth.”<sup>52</sup>

What is the meaning of these arguments? Is St. Bonaventure looking at the existence of God as some sort of proposition in which he can infer that God exists from the perfection of the subject? If God is God, apparently, God exists because existence is part of the perfection of God. So, too, the existence of God seems to have the indubitability of a first principle. Is this what St. Bonaventure means to say? Without anticipating his own answer, let us here remind ourselves of the questions raised by Gilson’s interpretation of the three ways to God contained in the *De Mysterio Trinitatis*. Is the first way *innatism*? Does the second way, proceeding from all the limitations in things, represent more the evidence of God in all the conditional propositions than an effort to rise from sensible things to God by means of a genuine proof? Is the existence of God, as the highest being, immediately evident and undeniable, so that no one can think God not to be? St. Bonaventure has gone very far in the direction of saying so. He has not said, strictly speaking, that *deum esse* is self-evident, as principles are: but he has said that God, the first truth, cannot be thought not to be, just as a first principle cannot be thought not to be. Indeed, since St. Bonaventure himself lists some fourteen arguments intending to prove both that God can be thought not to be and that the existence of God can be doubted,<sup>53</sup> we can direct our attention to the main point at issue. In exactly what way, and by what means, does St. Bonaventure undertake to *prove* that God exists? All the fundamental issues involved in the interpretation of the Bonaventurean natural theology are concentrated in such a question.

Is the existence of God an indubitable truth? St. Bonaventure begins his own answer to this question by distinguishing two meanings in the notion of *indubitable*, based on the two ways in which something can be dubitable. The dubitable is such either by reason of procedure or by reason of defect. The first sense of the dubitable refers to the known and the knower together, the second refers only to the knower. In the first way the “dubitable” applies to a truth because the character of evidence is missing from it either in itself, or with reference to the means proving it, or in relation to the intellect that apprehends it. In none of these ways is certitude lacking to the truth that God exists. The intellect is certain of it because, made in the image of God, it is naturally directed, by appetite and knowledge, toward that being in whose image it exists. Moreover, creatures proclaim,

<sup>52</sup> *De Mysterio Trinitatis*, *ibid.*, 48.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

by reason of their perfections and their defects, that they need God because of their defects and receive their perfections from Him. By their differences in perfection they proclaim, some more and some less, that God exists. As for the truth that God exists, considered in itself, we can say that it is the most certain of truths on the ground that it is the first and most immediate truth. The supreme being is and is supremely, so that "for the first and supreme being to be is most evident in its truth."<sup>54</sup> Hence St. Bonaventure's first conclusion. "If we understand the indubitable in the sense of removing doubt in the procedure of reason, then the existence of God is an indubitable truth; for, whether the intellect enters within itself, or goes outside itself, or looks above itself, provided it proceed rationally, it knows that God exists with certitude and without doubt."<sup>55</sup> Procedurally, then, there is nothing in the world of creatures, in the intellect or above the intellect, to cast the least shadow of reservation on the indubitability of the divine existence.

If, however, we understand the indubitable in a second way, namely, according as its meaning is to take away a doubt that arises through a defect of reason, we can in this sense concede that, through a defect in his reason, a man can doubt whether God exists. Such a doubt is of three kinds, having to do either with the act of apprehension, or the act of comparing, or the act of resolving his argument. Thus, when the name *God* is improperly or only partially understood, as was the case with the pagans who worshipped idols, then a doubt arises as the result of such an understanding of what God is. Similarly, when a fool, finding that justice does not exist in some particular situation, infers that there is no government in the universe and therefore no first or highest ruler, then such a defect likewise leads to a doubt concerning the existence of God. So too, if a man, seeking for a cause of the universe, has an intellect so sunk in the body that he cannot see any more than corporeal causes, he may think that the sun in the heavens or some other corporeal creature is God. The defect here is a failure to resolve the argument to a truly first cause.<sup>56</sup> The existence of God, therefore, can be doubted as a result of a defect on the part of the intellect in its work of apprehending or comparing or resolving its search for a cause. In this sense it is possible for the intellect to think that God does not exist because, namely, what is signified by the name *God* is not understood adequately or in its integrity. But, given an intellect that fully apprehends what the name *God* signifies, by thinking (as it should) that

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, then, not only is it not possible to doubt whether God exists, but in no way is it even possible to think that He does not exist.<sup>57</sup>

The existence of God, consequently, is certain because it is innate in the soul as a divine image. It is more certain when compared with things because, as the second way showed, creatures proclaim God as their maker and absolute source. It is most certain in itself because what God is and that He is are identical—*esse*. Wherever the intellect looks—within, outside or above itself—it knows with certitude and without doubt that God exists, provided that *rationaliter* *decurrit*. Nevertheless, Bonaventure recognizes and emphasizes a threefold defect in the intellect. The intellect can conceive God wrongly or imperfectly, it can deny His government (and thus His existence) because of the existence of wickedness, or it can stop its reasoning too soon and deny God by deifying the universe or some part of it. But if the intellect thinks of God as it should, adequately and fully, it cannot doubt that God exists or ever think that He does not.

Let us agree with Gilson that the key to this Bonaventurean position is the first way: *cognitio huius veri (deum esse) innata est menti rationali*. It is this view that seems to loosen the argument for God from its data in the second way and make the existence of God so peremptory in the third way. And yet the data, the very same data that creatures speak by means of their defects and their perfections, should prove God. Do they? Or does the irresistible certitude of *deum esse* appear before the human intellect with such force that its truth is somehow greater than the data can support, greater and even independent of them? Some light is thrown on this question by St. Bonaventure's reply to objection 13. This argument had said that "no one knows the principle that every whole is greater than its part unless he knows what a whole is. Therefore no one knows that God exists unless he knows what God is. If, then, what God is is dubitable, it is dubitable also whether He exists."<sup>58</sup> In reply, St. Bonaventure concedes that no one knows principles unless he knows their constitutive terms. But he adds that the knowledge of some terms is hidden, while that of others is clear or manifest. Moreover, in the case of the signification of terms, our knowledge can vary from full to fuller or to most full. Let us apply this to God. God is known comprehensively only by Himself. He is known clearly by the blessed. He is known as in a mirror darkly by us. In this last way God "is known as the first and highest principle of all things in the world; and this truth, as far as it is concerned, can be manifest to all. For since

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 49-50.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 49, 51.

any person knows that he did not always exist, he knows that he had a beginning, and the same holds of others; and since this knowledge is available to all, and when it is known we know that God exists, therefore, this truth, as far as it is concerned, is indubitable for all.<sup>59</sup> The existence of God, then, is *of itself* evident; it is comprehended by God, clearly seen by the blessed, and seen by us as in a mirror. Of itself, it is manifest to all, and man has only to reason his way to it. It is indubitable but *not* self-evident to man here and now.

Far from being hidden, the being of God is out in the open for all to see. Only error and/or perversity can prevent men from finding God. *Deum esse* is absolutely evident in itself, but Bonaventure does not say that it is so to us. We ask two questions before turning to *Itinerarium*, c. 5. Is the innateness of the knowledge that God exists a matter of notions? We asked a similar question about St. Anselm's *quo maius* formula, and we know the answer to it. Or is it rather an ability that the human soul has, as an image, to return and unite itself to God because that return is, for it, the absolute meaning of both being and knowledge? The point of this question should be clear. An intellectual substance is the sort of being that is living with absolute freedom within the order of being—within the perspective of the absolute origin and end of being in and from the first being. The first being *as first* is thus part of the internal life of the intellect and its causality as creator and exemplar is the light guiding the intellect in its knowledge of truth. From this point of view, *Itinerarium*, c. 3 is an important text because it makes an effort to answer the question *how* the notion of the divine image in the soul is a *functional* principle in the return of the soul to God and *in this sense* is stamped with His presence. That is why *Itinerarium*, c. 5 must be read in the light of c. 3. More generally, when *Itinerarium*, c. 3 has introduced us to the dynamic structure of the divine image in the soul, c. 5 will then direct us to the heart of the Bonaventurean position by posing the ultimate question before us. Is God the *first* object of the human intellect, and, if so, in what precise sense?

There is a second question. Is it the innateness of the idea of God, somehow understood as a notion of God, that neutralizes the empirical character and force of the arguments in the second way of the *De Mysterio Trinitatis*? It seems not. It seems rather to be the participational structure of being, the necessary correlation between the relative and the absolute, that makes of the Bonaventurean proofs, less an effort to study and explain empirical data, each according to its kind and leading in each case to the appropriate cause, and much more an effort to show that the relative (the contingent,

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

the potential, the mutable, the limited, the derived) is and is what it is because it is not from itself but has come from the absolute. It is the dialectic of Platonic participation applied to created being which, by placing the emphasis of its concern, not on the empirical in its particular structure (not on motion *as* motion, the potential *as* potential, the limited *according to* its particular limitation), but on the empirical understood generally as the relative, gives to the Bonaventurean ways to God their dialectical character and their freedom from the control of empirical data. Any Bonaventurean proof leads directly to the absolute God. But, to take only one example, the first Thomistic way leads directly to an unmoved prime mover. It is tied to the data it explains and the prime mover is not freed from the way leading to Him until, by using the method of remotion *at the point of arrival*, we realize that we have reached, not simply the source of motion, but the pure subsistent being. To put the comparison with St. Thomas textually within the limits of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*: St. Thomas reaches the existence of the prime mover in *SCG* I, c. 13; he expounds the *via remotionis* and its propriety at this point in c. 14; he then goes on to reach the *ipsum esse subsistens* in c. 22. St. Bonaventure would have no methodic distance from c. 13 to c. 22 because, unlike St. Thomas, he does not explain the empirical empirically; he explains it absolutely by first and directly translating it into the relative and the dependent.

#### IV

By way of transition to the *Itinerarium*, let us here recall a text from the *De Mysterio Trinitatis. Cognitio huius veri* (St. Bonaventure writes, referring to the truth *Deus est*) *innata est menti rationali in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quem naturaliter tendit ut in illo possit beatificari.*<sup>60</sup> There are two main propositions in this teaching. The knowledge that God exists is innate in the rational mind because it has the character of an image, an image of God. By reason of this image, the natural desire, knowledge and memory of God, toward whom the soul is naturally tending, are inserted within it. What does this doctrine mean?

A working—though not complete—answer to the question is to be found in *Itinerarium*, c. 3, which deals with the contemplation of God through the image stamped on the soul's natural powers.<sup>61</sup> We are now at that precise moment when the vestiges of God in external creatures have led us to enter

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>61</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, *ed. cit.*, 314-323.

ourselves where *conari debemus per speculum videre Deum.*<sup>62</sup> "Enter within yourself," St. Bonaventure urges each one of us, "and see that your mind loves itself most warmly. Nor could it love itself unless it knew itself, nor know itself unless it remembered itself. For we grasp nothing through the understanding which is not present in our memory; and from this fact you notice, not with the eye of the flesh but with the eye of the reason, that your soul has a threefold power. Consider, then, the operations and the relations of these three powers and you will be able to see God through yourself as through an image, which is to see through a mirror darkly."<sup>63</sup>

Consider the work of the memory. It retains and re-presents not only present corporeal and temporal things, but also simple and eternal things. It records the past, receives present things and foresees future things. It retains simple things, e. g. the principles of continuous and discrete quantity—the point, the instant, and unity—without which it is impossible to remember or to think of what is derived from them. It retains the principles and the rules of the sciences, as something eternal and in an eternal way: it cannot forget them as long as it has the use of reason, and it has only to hear them to assent, not as perceiving them for the first time, but as recognizing them as innate and familiar to it—as happens when we are told that "concerning anything there is affirmation or negation," or that "every whole is greater than its part, or any other rule, which we cannot contradict according to the reason within us."<sup>64</sup> These retentions have consequences. From the retention of past, present and future things, the memory has a likeness of eternity, whose indivisible present extends to all times. The memory, likewise, is impressed not only from the outside through phantasms, but also from above by receiving and possessing the simple forms that cannot enter through the doors of the senses and sensible phantasms. The memory, moreover, has an immutable light present within it in which it remembers unchanging truths. To conclude on the memory: "And thus through the operations of the memory it appears that the soul is the image and likeness of God, so present to itself and having Him as present to it that it actually grasps Him, and through its power 'it has the capacity for God and can share in Him'."<sup>65</sup> Let us at least notice the present language. But there is more, much more, when we turn to the operations of the intellectual power.

In its operation, the intellectual power of the soul has to do with terms, propositions and inferences. In the case of terms, the intellect grasps what

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 3, # 1, 314.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 314-315.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, # 2, 315.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, # 3, 316; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, 8. 11 (PL. 42, 1044).

they signify when it comprehends what each thing is through a definition. A definition is put together from higher elements, until we arrive at the highest and most general elements without a knowledge of which lower elements cannot be understood in a definitional way. In other words, unless we know what *ens per se* is "the definition of any particular substance cannot be fully known. Nor can *ens per se* be known unless it is with its conditions, which are *one, true, good*. But since being"—and here let us remember St. Bonaventure's second way—"can be thought as diminished and as completed, as imperfect and as perfect, as actual and as potential... given that privations and defects can be thought only through their positive counterparts, our intellect does not reach the point of having a fully resolutory understanding of any created being unless it is aided by the notion of the most pure, the most actual, the most complete and absolute being, which is a being absolutely and eternal, in which are the exemplars of all things in their purity. For, would the intellect know that this is a defective and incomplete being if it had no knowledge of the being that was without all defect? And the same thing holds for all other conditions of being already mentioned."<sup>66</sup>

Propositions and inferences are in a similar situation. The intellect is then said to comprehend the meaning of propositions truly when it knows with certitude that they are true; and to know this is to know that it cannot be mistaken in its comprehension. For it then knows that that truth cannot be otherwise than as it is; and it thus knows that that truth is immutable. Now, precisely: "But since our mind itself is mutable, it cannot see that truth shining immutably except through a light radiating immutably, which cannot possibly be a mutable creature. It knows, then, in that light *that illumines every man coming into this world*, which is the *true light and the Word that was in the beginning with God*."<sup>67</sup>

We cannot be in any doubt about the direction of the argument. Consider inference. "Our intellect then perceives the meaning of an inference as true when it sees that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises; and this it sees not only in the case of necessary terms, but also of contingent ones, e. g. that if a man is running, he is in motion. And this necessary relation it perceives not only among existing things, but also among non-existent things. Thus, given an existing man, if follows that if a man runs, he is in motion; so, too, given that he does not exist." But where does the necessity of the inference come from? "The necessity of the inference does not come from the existence of the thing in matter, because it is contingent, nor from the existence of the thing in the mind, which would be a

<sup>66</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, # 3, 316-318.

<sup>67</sup> John 1. 1 and 9.

fiction if the thing did not exist in reality. It therefore comes from the exemplarity contained in the eternal art, according to which things have an aptitude and a relationship among themselves in keeping with the representations in that eternal art." There is only one conclusion possible. "From this it appears clearly that our intellect is united (*coniunctus*) to the eternal truth itself, since it cannot grasp any truth except through its teaching. Thus, you can see through yourself the truth that teaches you, if desires and phantasms do not impede you and place themselves like clouds between you and the ray of truth."<sup>68</sup>

St. Bonaventure finds an analogous situation in the power of choice, which contains three elements, namely, counsel, judgment and desire. We take counsel to find the better choice, and *better* is said only by an approach to the best, which takes place by a greater assimilation. "No one, then, knows whether this is better than that unless he knows that this is more assimilated to the best." This ultimately means that the notion of the supreme good is necessarily impressed on everyone taking counsel: *omni igitur consilianti necessario est impressa notio summi boni.*<sup>69</sup> There is more. A judgment that is certain concerning a matter of counsel takes place only through some law; and no one judges with certitude according to a law unless he is certain that that law is right and that he should not judge it. Now our mind does judge itself, and since it cannot judge the law by which it judges, that law is higher than our mind, and our mind judges according as that law is impressed on it. But there is nothing higher than the human mind except God himself. Hence: "In judging, our deliberative power reaches to the divine laws, provided that it proceeds in a fully resolutory way."<sup>70</sup> There is still more. Desire is of that which moves it most, and that moves the desire most which is most loved. We most love to be happy, which can be obtained only through the highest and final end. In other words, human desire does not seek anything except because it seeks the highest good. From all this what can St. Bonaventure conclude? "See, then," he says, "how the soul is near to God, and how, according to their operations, the memory leads to eternity, intelligence to truth, and the elective power to the supreme good."<sup>71</sup>

Once more, the direction of this conclusion cannot be doubted. The impression of the divine exemplars in the mind, the special presence of the light of God in certitudinal knowledge, the special awareness by the soul of this special guiding presence of God, this is pure Bonaventurean doctrine,

<sup>68</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, # 3, 318-319.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, # 4, p. 320; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VII, 3. 4 (PL. 42, 937).

<sup>70</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, # 4, 320-321.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, ## 4, 5, 321, 322.

but this is not a doctrine of innate ideas; rather, it is a doctrine of how the human mind is constituted in its nature and how it works accordingly. God is present in the soul and in knowledge as the immutable guiding object without whose influence there would be no truth, no immutability, no stability, no certitude. Thus to reflect God is not a theory of knowledge but a theory of the constitution of the soul and its location at that point in reality where it *sees* the mutability in the universe and in itself being held in check by the light of God, and where it experiences in its own knowing activity the ruling presence of God as truth in its definitions, its judgments and its inferences. The nature of *living* as an image of God, of seeking Him in the very effort to be itself and act according to its nature, this is innate in the intellectual soul; and this innateness does contain within itself the special presence of God, but a presence impressed in the very movement of a life. God is the light without which the human soul cannot see or think or love; it cannot define or judge or reason or take counsel or desire without finding the ultimate and justifying ground of its activity in God.

All the difficulties involved in understanding Bonaventurean innatism are concentrated in this point. Indeed, we have only to read the first paragraph of *Itinerarium*, c. 5 to meet the light of God that is within us but also above us. Let us direct our eyes toward God in the unity of the divine essence. *Qui est*, as we know from Exodus (3. 14), is the first name of God. In His essence God is pure *esse*, so that in contemplating the invisible things of God in terms of the unity of His essence, we are somehow contemplating pure *esse*. In thus seeing the divine being, what are we seeing? "This *esse* is in itself so certain that it cannot be thought not to be. The most pure *esse* is found only in the complete absence of *non-esse*, just as *nihil* is found in the complete absence of *esse*. Therefore, just as that which is absolutely nothing shares not at all in *esse* or its conditions, so, contrariwise, *esse* has no part of *non-esse*, either actually or potentially, either according to what is true in reality or according to our judgment." There is more. "Since, however, *non-esse* is the privation of being, it does not enter the intellect except through being (*esse*). But *esse* does not fall in the intellect through another, since whatever is understood is understood either as non-being, or as being in potency, or as being in act. But *esse* names the pure act of being: *esse nominat ipsum purum actum entis*. *Esse*, then, is what first falls in the intellect, and that *esse* is what is pure act. But this is not a particular *esse*, which is a limited *esse* because mixed with potency. Nor is it an analogous *esse*, because this has least actuality, existing in the least way. It remains, then, that this *esse* is the divine *esse*."<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 5, §§ 1-3, 330-334.

There is no doubt that at this point we are in difficulties. That the pure *esse* of God is in total opposition to *nihil* we can understand. That *nihil* does not enter the intellect itself we can also understand. But does St. Bonaventure mean to say that the *esse* which names the pure act of being, which can be only God, is the first object that falls into the intellect? Such does seem to be the situation. "Strange, therefore, is the blindness of the intellect that does not consider what it sees first and without which it cannot know anything else. But just as the eye, fixing its attention on the various differences among colors, does not see the light through which it sees the rest, and if it sees does not notice, so too the eye of our mind, intent as it is on particular or universal beings: being itself, which is outside every genus, though it first falls on the mind and other beings through it, the mind yet does not notice."<sup>73</sup> St. Bonaventure evidently does mean to say that the pure *esse* of God is what first falls into the intellect. We see it first and everything else through it. And yet we do not really see it if it is true that, because it is most manifest, we see other things through it, but not it. We are like the famous owls in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: we see shadows and phantasms of beings and if we do not grasp them we seem to ourselves to see nothing at all. And yet, if we could see, the *caligo* that settles on our intellect, when we try to look beyond sensible things, really is the supreme illumination of our minds. If we could penetrate it, we would see the pure *esse* of God. God is there in the darkness, the pure light that illuminates everything else and makes it visible. And because the *caligo* has intervened, we now realize that seeing the pure *esse* of God is not the direct business that it seemed. "See, therefore, the most pure *esse* itself, if you can," Bonaventure remarks. *If you can!*

"See, therefore, the most pure *esse*, if you can, and you will recognize that it cannot be thought as received from another. For this reason it is necessarily thought as prime in every way, because it cannot be from nothing or from another. What indeed is through itself if *esse* itself is not through itself or of itself?" This is the first condition of pure *esse* that we recognize. There are others. It is pure *primum esse*, uncomposed with anything else, and hence most simple. Again, having no possibility within itself because no non-being, it is supremely actual. As indefectible it is most perfect, and as totally lacking in diversity it is supremely one. To conclude, "the *esse* that is the pure *esse*, the unqualified *esse*, the absolute *esse*, is the *esse* that is primary, eternal, most simple, most actual, most perfect and most one."<sup>74</sup>

This character of *ipsum esse* in itself has a decisive effect on how a knower

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, # 4, 334.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, # 5, 334-335.

thinks about it. The attributes of *ipsum esse* are so certain "that their opposite cannot be thought by one who understands *ipsum esse*, and one of these attributes infers another." For, as absolutely *esse*, it is absolutely prime; as absolutely prime, it is eternal; as prime and eternal, it is most simple; as prime, eternal and most simple, it has no admixed possibility and is therefore most actual. As a consequence, lacking nothing, it is most perfect and therefore supremely one. Such a being can be only one, and if the name of such a being is *God*, then it is not possible to think that God does not exist or that He is not one and one alone. True enough, we do not see the eternal light of *ipsum esse*, but we cannot escape it. What is more, we have only to grasp it somehow in order to have a hold of an absolute whole that insists on being present to our minds as a whole. We have only to grasp pure being in its aseity to know that it must be eternal and absolutely simple, actual, perfect and one. This is what being is—all at once even if we see it in a cloud. For even in a cloud it explodes upon us in its absoluteness, and instead of being an abstraction, it is a world, an irresistible world of being, eternal, perfect and one. Nor have we exhausted the perfections of *ipsum esse*. It is prime and for this reason ultimate. It is eternal and most simple and therefore the greatest in power; it is most united and therefore infinite; as most actual it is most immutable; as most perfect it is immense (that is, nothing better can be thought to exceed it, nothing more noble and thus nothing greater).<sup>75</sup>

How much St. Bonaventure sees in *ipsum esse*! Indeed, he has deduced a whole natural theology from a contemplation of it, and at this moment his contemplation is not even completed. The eternally present *esse* encircles all things and penetrates in all directions, as though it is the center and the circumference of all things. It is wholly within all things and wholly outside them. It is within all things but not included by them, outside all things but not excluded, above all things but not removed, below them, but not abased. It is all in all (I Cor. 15. 28).<sup>76</sup> We hardly know how to end this Bonaventurean contemplation of the divine *esse*, and it is scarcely easier to know whether we have been reading a religious contemplation, a metaphysics of being and creation, or a hymn in praise of God. No doubt, as St. Bonaventure's contemplation became more elevated in its admiration, he did chant the praises of this God who held everything fast within the circle of the divine existence. And this meditation, whose eye is fixed on the essence of the pure actuality of God, is at once a contemplation, a metaphysics and a doxology. Just as prayer was not for St. Anselm an un-

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, # 7, 336-337.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, # 8, 337-338.

befitting vehicle in which to prove the existence of God, so a contemplative doxology is not for St. Bonaventure an unbefitting vehicle for a metaphysics of being. True, another metaphysician, rigorously pursuing God through being, would try to proceed from being in its manifoldness to its transcendent cause; in other words, he would try to go from being to God. In an important sense, while St. Bonaventure accomplishes this purpose it is still true that he does not proceed in such a way. In his contemplation, he rather proceeds from God to being, that is, from pure *esse* in all its divine transcendence to the existence of being, as though even within creation God is in a sense better known than creatures. For God can explain the being of being, and creatures cannot, and He can explain it because He is the explanation. Here begins the Bonaventurean metaphysics, which is, less an investigation of being as being, and enormously more an urgent journey to the divine center of being, *ipsum esse*, that hidden light which, though we may not know it, nevertheless shines in our minds whenever we say: *being is*. A whole world is in that assertion, absolute and divine, irresistible to the mind and rooted in the hidden eternity of being.

A clarification is in order at this point, supplied by the Quaracchi Editors.<sup>77</sup> For St. Bonaventure, creatures have a threefold relation to and dependence on God, namely, as the *principium creativum*, as the *objecrum motivum*, and as the *donum inhabitans*. The first applies to all created effects, the second applies to all intellects, the third applies to all spirits acceptable to God.<sup>78</sup> The first and the third offer no difficulty; the second does. It is part of the doctrine that we have seen. To say that God is an *objecrum motivum* for all intellects is to say with the Editors that "omnis intellectus... natus est per cognitionem et amorem capere Deum."<sup>79</sup> The Editors likewise insist on a point of doctrine that is deeply Bonaventurean, namely, that things have a threefold existence—in themselves, in the created intellect, and in the divine art.<sup>80</sup> Finally, the Editors point out that for St. Bonaventure the intellect of man can consider the mirror of creation, both external and internal, in three ways, namely, by purely rational investigation (= philosophy), or by believing (= theology) or by contemplation (= mystical doctrine). These are useful distinctions, as is the Bonaventurean distinction between the *intellectum apprehendentem et resolventem*. "As concerns the *apprehending intellect*," writes St. Bonaventure, "nothing can be understood without something else which is for it a principle of understand-

<sup>77</sup> For the reference, see note 40.

<sup>78</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, II, c. 12 (*Tria Opuscula*, 93-95).

<sup>79</sup> *Scholion*, 351.

<sup>80</sup> *Breviloquium*, *ibid.*

ding, as *God* cannot be understood without *Deity* and *man* without *humanity*. But an effect can be understood without the understanding of a cause, and something inferior without the understanding of something superior, because one can understand *man* without understanding anything superior. And thus the Philosopher says that he who says one in a way says many, not absolutely, but in a certain manner, that is, implicitly.—In another way, we may understand something without another thing by means of the *resolving intellect*. This intellect considers the essentials of a thing, e. g. we may understand a subject without its proper attribute. This can take place in one of two ways: either by an intellect resolving fully or perfectly or by a deficient intellect and one resolving semi-finely. By an intellect resolving semi-finely something can be understood to be without understanding the first being. But by an intellect resolving perfectly something cannot be understood without understanding the first being.”<sup>81</sup> This distinction between the intellect apprehending and resolving is important for the meaning of *Itinerarium*, c. 5, and particularly the problem of the contemplation of pure *esse*, the divine being.

To understand where we are in c. 5, we must begin our ascent to God from the beginning, that is, where Bonaventure himself places the first grade of the contemplation of God. It is at the bottom, so to speak, in the world of sense, which we consider to be “a mirror through which to rise to God, the supreme maker.”<sup>82</sup> The Editors rightly point out a distinctive characteristic of Bonaventure at this juncture, namely, that “he delays very little in describing the particular things of the world of sense,” but “he immediately proceeds to the ideal world or to the non-physical, or metaphysical, being that the world has in the mind of man.”<sup>83</sup> The human mind, so to speak, raises the material things it grasps by abstraction to an immaterial order of being and endows them with characteristics of universality, immutability, eternity and necessity—characteristics that in no way befit the world of material things. But, as we know, the possibility of such an idealization does not lie entirely with the intellect. It, too, is mutable because it is a creature. The rules by which the intellect makes mutable material things into immutable intelligible objects “are grounded in the eternal light and lead to it.”<sup>84</sup> This grounding is part of the life of the intellect: every time it judges immutably it is both touched by the eternal reasons and in a state of return to them. Ultimately this is what the three-

<sup>81</sup> *Scholion*, 351-352.

<sup>82</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 1, # 9, 299.

<sup>83</sup> *Scholion*, 353.

<sup>84</sup> In *Hexaëmeron*, II, coll. 10 (*Opera Omnia*, V, 338).

fold existence of things implies and what exemplarism, as understood by St. Bonaventure, involves. The eternal light is the *objecum motivum* of the human intellect. This doctrine says that the eternal light is present within the intellect as guiding it toward truth and even toward itself; but the eternal light, as such a guiding rule, is not itself an object of direct apprehension. As Bonaventure says: "These [immutable rules of the intellect] are rooted in the eternal light and lead to it, but the eternal light itself is not on this account seen: *sed non propter hoc ipsa videtur.*"<sup>85</sup> On this point Bonaventure offers us a principle by which to interpret even those texts that *seem* to say that we perceive God directly here and now by having some sort of innate impression of Him in the intellect. "If some authorities are found to say that God is seen and perceived by man in the present life, they are not to be understood as meaning that He is seen in His essence, but that He is known in some interior effect."<sup>86</sup>

We can now return to the main difficulty offered by *Itinerarium*, c. 5. Did Bonaventure mean to say that the first object known by the *apprehending* intellect is the divine being? If so, was he not confusing the common being which first falls into the intellect with the divine being? The Quaracchi Editors are particularly annoyed by such a "perverse" interpretation of St. Bonaventure, and they can scarcely be blamed. The origin of intellectual knowledge in the sense is established by Bonaventure from the first chapter of the *Itinerarium*, and the rise to the *esse divinum* is not by apprehension *but by resolution*. As Bonaventure has already told us, "our intellect does not as *plene resolvens* reach the understanding of any creature unless it is aided by the understanding of the being that is most pure, actual, complete and absolute, which is being absolutely and eternal, in which are the reasons of all things in their purity."<sup>87</sup> It is by a *resolving* activity that the intellect grasps the *esse divinum* in c. 5; which means that the *esse divinum* is, not an object itself perceived, but a *guiding* object.

We must therefore agree that the *esse divinum* is neither an object of apprehension in c. 5 nor, therefore, confused by Bonaventure with the notion of being that first falls into our intellect. St. Bonaventure distinguishes the *esse divinum* both from the particular beings that we experience and from the analogical notion of being that we have in our minds. The *esse* he wishes to contemplate in c. 5 is pure *esse*, God Himself in His essence, to the extent that he can. The effort to contemplate the *esse* of God is a *resolving* intellectual effort, and God is present in the intellect as a guiding and ruling

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> In *II Sent.*, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ed. minor, (Quaracchi, 1938), 563.

<sup>87</sup> *Itinerarium*, c. 3, # 3, 317.

object, not as a seen object. That *esse divinum* is the luminous circle of being within which everything exists, and Bonaventure, as standing within the shadows of the being that creatures are, looks toward the light that God is. He sees only a *caligo*, the inaccessible cloud in which the divine light is hidden, but which is nevertheless visible by the light with which it covers its creatures, and especially visible to the human mind, which lives under the direct influence of the immutable truth of God, a truth that it experiences but does not see, and which it seeks as the fount of every certitude.

## V

There is both a profound truth and a profoundly Augustinian sentiment behind the *Itinerarium*, and especially c. 5. The profound truth is the irresistible way in which Bonaventure travels the distance from the common being that is the first object of our apprehension to the divine being that is its ultimate ground. Bonaventure does not in the least deny the empirical origin of our concepts. As he says, this macrocosm enters our mind through the doorway of the five senses, and we apprehend the sensible characteristics of things, we are affected by them, and we judge them.<sup>88</sup> But, once within us, the sensible world is caught up in what is above us. We judge things in an eternal light that is neither their own nor ours; and though it is further into the order and beauty of things that we proceed to penetrate, it is toward the beauty of God that we are going as we judge the order of things in the light of the divine exemplars.<sup>89</sup> The more we know creatures in this way, the more we see the invisible things of God in creatures, and we go from the likeness to the original and from the sign to the reality.<sup>90</sup> As the intellect "sees" God hidden in things, so it sees the *esse divinum* hidden in its weakest reflection, the confused notion that we have of being. Let there be the weakest claimant to being, of which the mind can say: *it is*, *it is a being*, and the same mind not only "sees" (i. e. apprehends) this particular being, it also "sees" it in the resolutory movement that leads both that being and itself to the *esse divinum* that is the immutable source of both. Let there be any being, therefore, and the mind irresistibly moves from *it is* to *the divine being is*, from a particular *ens* to the *pure esse divinum*. There is no confusion in St. Bonaventure on this point, but there is, though not a confusion, certainly a hidden paradox in the situation. It is the paradox of Parmenides.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 2, §§ 2-6, 304-308.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, # 10, 311-312.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, §§ 12-13, 312-313.

Say with Parmenides that *being is* and understand what you have said and you will find that you have also said: being is necessarily and without origin; it is homogeneous, it is just being; and how can this be true unless, when you say that being is, you are also saying that God is? God is just being, and only God just *is*. What, then, are you saying when you say that being is? Are you talking about being or God, or somehow both? St. Bonaventure was somehow talking about both. He could not experience any being without returning to the divine being that really and truly *is*. All those conditional propositions of the second way receive here their full meaning and also something of their ambiguity. For when Bonaventure translates his experience of sensible things into the language of being he is caught up in the paradoxes of the *being of being*, he then sees more than he finds in the sensible world, and historians have been driven to wonder where he gets this "more".

Let us ask Gilson's questions. Is the idea of God innate for St. Bonaventure, and does the experience of sensible things rouse us to it without leading us to it? The answer seems to be *yes* and *no*. It is *no* because we do not apprehend God, we resolve our way to Him; that is, we do not see Him, but we cannot see creatures fully unless we fully resolve them into the *esse divinum* that is their cause. It is *yes* because it is in the mind, and in the mind's contact with the eternal exemplars, that creatures are seen as thus totally dependent on the *esse divinum*. What is innate, then, is not any notion of God, but the way that the mind, as the divine image, experiences both sensible things and itself. This experience may be called exemplaristic, that is, it reveals the existence of a world below man in the revealing light above man. God is there in the mind of man, and is thus innate; but He is not innate as an object known, He is innate as a guiding object reached in the mind's effort to locate other things as beings. They cannot be located according to what they are (this is the second way) unless they are located in and by the *esse divinum* as their source.

Clearly, St. Anselm belongs on that Bonaventurean highway that runs from common being to the *esse divinum*. The Anselmian *quo maius*, were we to express it in Bonaventurean terms, is the highest moment in the effort of the intellect resolving things in God. Like Bonaventure after him, Anselm cannot think of the limited or the lesser and understand it fully for what it is without invoking the *esse divinum* that fully explains it. In this sense, God as *quo maius* in the Anselmian teaching corresponds to the divine immensity as understood by Bonaventure, for the *immensum* as a divine name says that *nihil potest cogitari ultra ipsum melius, nobilior nec dignius, ac per hoc nihil maius*.<sup>91</sup> Neither the Anselmian *quo maius* nor the Bonaventurean divine

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 5, # 7, 337.

*immensum* is in the intellect by an idea of itself; it is there as the point of resolution and location of other things; and it is there, too, as the guiding light of the mind that makes the resolution and the return to God possible. God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, and He cannot be thought not to be. But we are introduced to these truths, and we see them, not in themselves, but in everything else that we see. We cannot see any being fully without coming to see it in its absolute location in reality, which is to see through that being the absolute location itself—the absolute circle of the *quo maius* and the divine *immensum* itself.

Participation is St. Bonaventure's means in this resolution to the *esse divinum*. The reason why sensible experience plays such a little part in the second way is that when the sensible world enters the mind of man it also enters the world of the divine illumination, that is, the world in which the sensible is not so much seen as sensible as it is judged particular, temporal, mutable, related, limited, etc. As far as apprehension is concerned, the empirical foundations of intellectual knowledge remain intact; as far as resolutory explanation is concerned, the mind sees things in the light of the eternal exemplars and judges accordingly. The mind's inner experience of living under the guidance of what is above it supplements and transforms that experience of the world that comes to it through the five senses. The Bonaventurean world of the mind remains as irreducible to the limits of sensible experience as it is open directly to the experience of immutability within it, to the awareness of the eternal and the absolute, and no less open to the transcendent source of this experience above it.

Does St. Thomas disagree with this view? Once more the answer must be *yes* and *no*. He does not go from the experience of sensible being to the divine being in the manner of St. Bonaventure. The Thomistic intellect does not have the same kind of internal experience that the Bonaventurean intellect has. Finally, the eternal light of God is not present within the intellect in the way that St. Bonaventure explains. The Thomistic intellect is radically more tied to sensible experience than St. Bonaventure allows, it has no direct knowledge of itself (except of its existence), and the divine illumination does not enter within the domain of intellectual knowledge to explain human certitude or its structure. Aristotelian empiricism is at the origin of these Thomistic positions, and the Aristotelian notion of *nature* controls for St. Thomas the whole question of the presence of God in the activity of human intellectual knowledge.

These differences are real, to St. Thomas they seem necessary, and they form a part of his Aristotelian revolution in the thirteenth century. Yet these differences did not change the outlines of the world in which St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure lived. Every man coming into this world was, for both of them, sealed with the divine light. The divine exemplars were

the ultimate ground of truth, and God was uniquely present to the soul for both St. Thomas and for St. Bonaventure. St. Thomas, too traveled the road from common being to the divine being, and he too recognized that man was confusedly aware of the existence of God on this road. But he did not ground this confused awareness on any Platonic principle. The existence of God was evident but not self-evident; this meant not only that it was demonstrable, but also that, failing demonstration, it was in a clear sense deniable. Between St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas there stood both the Platonic Augustine and Aristotle. Bonaventure gave to Aristotle a minor role and kept the Platonic Augustine as his major guide. St. Thomas accepted Aristotle, eliminated Plato in the name of Aristotle, and then recast Augustine so that he was not in open conflict with Aristotle. At least, to do so was his aim. Whether St. Bonaventure, in following Augustine, was successful in formulating a tenable synthesis in the face of Aristotle is not in question here. Judging by such followers as Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marston and John Peter Olivi, he was not. However this may be, he chose to live deliberately within a world defined by Augustine and to find his way to God along the illuminative highway already traveled by both Augustine and Anselm, rather than within the physical world of Aristotle.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

# The “De contemptu mundi” of Bernardus Morvalensis-Book Three A Study in Commonplace

GEORGE J. ENGELHARDT

THE last book of the *De contemptu mundi* begins and ends with paronymic terms that are ominously apt: “perdita,” “pereamus.” Once again as in Book Two the poet assimilates the lost generation of his own ambiguous age to the perverse generation that Christ came to convert in the advent of mercy. Now as then the wrath of God has withdrawn His grace from those that resist His truth. Reverting to the three-forked love of world, this desperate age emulates in its lusts of the eyes and of the flesh the twin depravities of the universal apostasy: the moneymakers seated in the temple of God like the ultimate apostate and the gentiles abandoned to sensuality. In its pride of life, in its worldly ambition, it conforms to the divisive wrath of the first apostate and of the last. It is so tumid with the pharisaic leaven of hypocrisy that what it will not confess in penance it involuntarily confesses in act.<sup>1</sup> Thus the sheepfold that might seem to be one in the epoch of the *pax Christiana* is rent: the sheepfold of the soul by duplicity, the sheepfold of society by strife. Few therefore are the abodes of the sons of peace where the workers of God, no less rare, may worthily eat and drink, accepting the reward of the journey so that in their conversion of men they may persevere the more firmly to the reward of the fatherland.<sup>2</sup> Since the times are so evil, the prudent are silent, yet Bernard, as he avows in a paradigmatic statement of theme (III.15-18), is impelled to lament like the prophet Amos, like Jeremiah to root out sin now in the acceptable time before the sinner uprooted forever perishes in the advent of justice, to probe not as a detractor but as a confessor the sins in which a universal hypocrisy now acquiesces, to scandalize but from charity not malice, to rub the sores of an insensate generation that may well have relapsed beyond cure in its apathy to the wounds of sin.<sup>3</sup> Intractable to

<sup>1</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XV.14. This study of Book III completes the examination of the three books of the *De contemptu mundi* begun with the study of Book I published in *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 108-135 and continued with the study of Book II published in *Mediaeval Studies*, 26 (1964), 109-142.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XVII. 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> Amos 5: 13.

the fourfold regimen of penance, it will not humbly confess the sinfulness that in its sloth it publishes. It will not reclaim itself. It will not redeem its soul with alms. Contentious, litigious, it perseveres in its wrath, unforgiving, therefore unforgiven.<sup>4</sup>

In this generation wisdom has grown cold — the wisdom that is the ultimate gift of the Holy Spirit, the grace of the perfect in Christ who have faith with rectitude of life, the loving knowledge by which the *homo spiritualis* discerns right from wrong and loves good as he abhors evil.<sup>5</sup> This loving knowledge, which is consummated in the contemplative life, he shares with the less perfect in the active life, in obedience to the social nature of man correcting their errors and leading them back to the way of rectitude, rooting out evil that virtue may be planted.<sup>6</sup> In the generation now teeming with the *homo animalis*, who has spurned this sagacious devotion, this knowledge and emulation of God, that natural wisdom long enjoyed by the philosophers but forsaken by the gentiles in the universal apostasy has also grown cold: prudence and fortitude — enlightenment and virtue — justice begun in innocence, perfected in beneficence, sobriety preceding justice as the governance of self is presupposed in the governance of others and as the wisdom from above is first chaste, then pacific.<sup>7</sup>

When the wisdom of God has thus been withdrawn from mankind, the silence of His word may well be charged as in the instance of Eli and his sons to the sinfulness of both leaders and subjects.<sup>8</sup> In keeping, however, with the theme proper to the second part of the poem, the blame is now inclined toward the leaders who despoil the Church like the soldiers that cast lots for the tunic of Christ. Inimical to the cross of Christ, they will not crucify in themselves the *homo animalis* so that as spiritual men they may share in the resurrection of the spirit. As they will not convert themselves in the works of justice, so they will not convert others by the works of mercy. Ostensibly laborers in the Lord's harvest, feeders of His flock, and healers of the spiritually infirm, they serve as carnal men their own stomachs and like the lost bishops of this lost generation sequester for themselves as *homines terreni* the wages of the journey with which the poor in Christ and His ministrants ought rather to be sustained as they persevere to the reward of the fatherland. They have perverted their office, which is the con-

<sup>4</sup> Alcuin *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Hebreos VI.4-6* (*PL* 100, 1058).

<sup>5</sup> Eccl. 1: 14; Alcuin *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Hebreos VI.1* (*PL* 100, 1056).

<sup>6</sup> Lactantius *Div. inst.* V.18 (*PL* 6, 604-609).

<sup>7</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones de diversis* LIV (*PL* 183, 677); Baldwin *Tractatus undecimus* (*PL* 204, 517-530); Peter of Blois *Sermones* 38 (*PL* 207, 672-677).

<sup>8</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXX.83; *Hom. in Ez.* I.xii.16.

version of others to God. Converted themselves to the spirit of error, they have come to spurn as *homines animales* the authentically spiritual. Seducing their charges from the way of truth, crowding the left way with an abundance of sinners that portends the ultimate apostasy, they conform to the dominical prediction for the end of time paraphrased by Jerome: "quando iuxta prophetam Zachariam stultus pastor esse coeperit, sapientia decrescente refrigescet caritas multorum."<sup>9</sup> With a confusion appropriate to the ultimate hypocrisy, those who would have been ignoble in the golden age are now ennobled. The ignominious who shall be nameless like Dives in the land of the living are now honored in the shadow of death. Amid the squalor and stench that the prudence of this world will not recognize — images of horror no less apt to the *mala culpae* of the present generation than to the *mala poenae* of the Jews in exile or to the *summum malum* of the damned — hypocrisy flourishes with the show but not the fruit of virtue and pullulates with roses that prove to be briars destined like the aptly named *urtica* to the last burning.<sup>10</sup> That grace (*charis : honestas*) without which no man can appear in the land of the living withers as each man, schooling himself in impiety, converting himself to evil, perverts the works of justice; and the graces (*charismata : utilitates*) lent to the well endowed for the benefaction of the unendowed are wasted as the misleaders of men, schooling their subjects in impiety, converting them to evil, pervert the works of mercy.<sup>11</sup> Thus, inspired by the *pseudologos*, the flagrance of vice has superseded the zeal of virtue.

What passes for justice now is not that benign virtue of good faith that preserves the society of men, furthering the common profit as it gives and takes in the interchange of services, but a false justice negligent of duty, eager for gain, not rigorous but cruel, remiss rather than mild, that respects persons, accepts bribes, punishes the guiltless, oppresses the weak, seeks its own advantage by force or guile, a false liberality neither nourished by nor nourishing sobriety, parsimonious to the poor in Christ, lavish to the wicked, that robs to give and gives to get, the specious order of the simonist, the inhumanity of the peace without peace — a peace, perhaps, from pagans, from heresiarchs, but not from sons and brothers — in which the kiss of peace survives as a ritualistic vestige of the golden age.<sup>12</sup> What passes for fortitude now is not the virile contempt of fortune and pleasure that champions equity, but a despotic ambition which prefers like Caesar

<sup>9</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LII.4 (CSEL 54, 420-421).

<sup>10</sup> Gregory *Mor.* VIII.66.

<sup>11</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XII.60-61.

<sup>12</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XXXIII.16 (PL 183, 959).

the recourse of beasts to that of men, the hazards of war to the arbitrament of reason. Where modesty is not supplanted with irreverence or by effeminacy, it is simulated by a morbid sensibility that shrinks from reprobating the complaisant or by a false shamefacedness unabashedly evil, shy of good.<sup>13</sup>

Fraud, accordingly, the *pseudologos* personified, stands out among the tragic company of stark abstractions with which Bernard casts the prelude to his third book (III.1-116).<sup>14</sup> The forerunner of that multitude of false

<sup>13</sup> For the four virtues comprising *honestas* see Cicero *De officiis* I.

<sup>14</sup> III.1 *Perdita*, Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lvii (*PL* 205, 177). III.1 *moribus aemula*, Gregory *Mor.* XX.29; *Hom. in Ev.* XVII.14. III.2 *pacis et oscula*, Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* IV.2 (*PL* 183, 797). III. 5, *Carmina Burana* xxvii.3.4, xxxiii.3.5, ed. Alfons Hilka and Otto Schumann (Heidelberg, 1930); Gregory *Mor.* XX.28: “squalorem culpae.” III.7, cf. Gregory *Mor.* XX.25-26. III.10 *Quartus*, cf. Rev. 20:7. III.11, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XVII.4; *Carmina Burana* xli.18; vol. II, p. 74. III.12 *mel*, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.13. III.12-14, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.ix.21. III.13 *Diploidem*, Bar. 5:2; Philip de Harveng *De institutione clericorum* I.21-22 (*PL* 203, 691-694). III.16, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XL.2. III.17 *carpere*, cf. III.114 *vellere*; Jer. 1:10. III.18-20, The first member of 18 is resumed by epimone in 19b and 20b, the second in 19a and 20a, the third in 19c and 20c. For *pestis* = avarice or simony, see Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* xxiv (*PL* 205, 93); cf. IV Kings 5 *lepra Giezi*. III.19 *tumultuat*, Isa. 3:5; Gregory *Mor.* XXXI.88. III.19c, Eccles. 10:19. III.20 *unio scinditur*, This member has, appropriately, a twofold reference, internal (22b), external (18a, 19b); cf. Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIV.3; Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.12 (*PL* 176, 1059-1060); Bernard of Clairvaux *In Festo Sancti Michaelis* II (*PL* 183, 451-454). III.21 *reverentia*, Jerome *Commentaria in Isaiam* II, iii.5 (*PL* 24, 64); Gregory *Mor.* XXV.37, *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.17-18, *Hom. in Ev.* XIV.2; Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.10 (*PL* 176, 1057-1058); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxi (*PL* 205, 188); Cicero *De officiis* I.xxviii.99; *Carmina Burana* xli.8. III.21 *luxus*, *Carmina Burana* xxi.5.7. III.22b, *Carmina Burana* iv.3.1. III.22 *error*, II Tim. 3:13; Gregory *Mor.* XXIV.53, XXXI. 21; *Carmina Burana* xxi.4.8, xxxi.4.5. III.24a-b, Gregory *Mor.* XXII.53-54; Raban Maur *De ecclesiastica disciplina* (*PL* 112, 1251-1253); cf. III.27 *ars pia*. III.24 *honestas*, Cicero *De officiis* I.iv,14; vi,19; xix,65. III.26 *area minatur*, i.e., *de minatur*. III.27 *tumet*, *Carmina Burana* xli.23.4. III.32b-c, See “The *De contemptu mundi* of Bernardus Morvalensis, Books Two: A Study in Commonplace,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 26 (1964), 122, n. 55. III.33, *ibid.*, XXII, 122, n. 67; XXVI, 122, n. 54. III. 36a, Ezek. 22: 27; Gregory *Mor.* XX.33. III.37 *schola*, *Carmina Burana* xi.50. III.38a, Ps. 140: 5. III.43, Bar. 3: 30; Heb. 13: 14. III.57 *alea fati*, Lucan *Pharsalia* VI.7,603; Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.23 (*PL* 176, 1085-1086). III.58a, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.17. III.58b-c, Gregory *Mor.* XXV.28. III.59-60, Juvenal VI.16-17. III.63a, Cicero *De officiis* I.v,15; Juvenal XIII.60. III.64 *tangere*, Juvenal XIII.89. III.65, *ibid.*, 107-108. III.81, John of Salisbury *Policraticus* I.xiii.409d. III.82, *ibid.*, II.xxviii. III.91a Mens mea conscientia for Mens male conscientia. III.91b *fraudis et inscia*, cf. III.8b *criminis inscia* III.91c, *Carmina Burana* xix.1.1-2. III.92 *onus*, i.e., *reatus*, e.g., Alcuin *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Hebreos* VI:4-6 (*PL* 100, 1058): “ex onere peccatorum”; Helinand *Sermones* XII (*PL* 212, 586). III.93, Rom. 16:18; Phil. 3: 19. III.98, cf. Juvenal XIII.64-65. III.99, *ibid.*, VI.165. III.103 *Gens Belial*, i.e., the sons of Eli, I Kings 2: 12. III.103 *lege vel ordine*, i.e., justice and temperance, Cicero *De officiis* I.v, 15; xxviii.98; Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones de diversis* LIV (*PL* 183, 677). III.103c, Rom. 3: 11; I Cor. 13: 5; Phil. 2: 21; Col. 3: 1. III.104c, Isa. 59: 14. III.106, Isa. 55: 13; Heb. 6: 8; *Carmina Burana* x. 21. III.107, *Carmina Burana* xxii.18. III.109a, Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones de*

preachers, the counselors of Antichrist symbolized by the Apocalyptic beast that is horned like the lamb but speaks like the dragon, she is clad as of old in the sheep's clothing of the false prophets, in the whitened raiment not of the lamb's spouse but of the pharisee, in the double garment not of simple justice but of that simulated justice which is twofold iniquity, in the variety that adorns not the queenly Church but the graven image.<sup>15</sup> The honey (*mel*) in her mouth is not the wisdom that is sweet to the just, but the evil savorsome to the hypocrite; it is truly the gall (*fel*) of the dragon and the asp, the venom of the scorpion, the persuasion of demons.<sup>16</sup> The confusion that she inspires pervades even the style of the prelude. It informs that *hypozeugis* of repugnant terms proper to the medieval plaint with which Bernard varies his inculcative style: thus, for example (III.36), the verb “aret” — apposite to the praise of the hypocrite, which will wither while yet in flower — is yoked to the subject “honestum” — the praiseworthiness of the just man, whose leaves shall not fall off.<sup>17</sup>

Amid this procession of curt members, Bernard pauses to dilate upon two instances of the *homo fictus*: the perjurer and the conjurer. Each exemplifies both in his greed and superstition a lust of the eyes.<sup>18</sup> In each a mode of animal man intrudes upon an age when the faith has long been proclaimed and received, a time therefore not for doing miracles as of old but for fulfilling the works of the faith. Relying less upon miracles now than upon teaching and good works, the Church is loth to tempt God in those uncertainties to which human reason suffices; in those to which man's discretion is inadequate, it commends itself to God. The perjurer, spurning this devotion of the spiritual man, is not content when accused to purge himself with oath. Not only does he mock with his falseswearing the oath that ends all controversy, he proceeds in further temptation of God to the judicial ordeal and the judicial combat. Thus he compounds sacrilege with superstition in a satanic mockery of both justice and fortitude. The virtue, in turn, counterfeited by the soothsayer is prudence.

*diversis* LIV (PL 183, 677). III.109b-c, Luke 21: 17; Lactantius *Div. inst.* V.9 (PL 6, 575-580). III.111-114, Jer. 1: 10; Rom. 3: 12; Jerome *Commentaria in Jeremiam* I,i.10 (PL 24, 684). III.112a-b, Cicero *De officiis* I.vii,20; Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones de diversis* LIV (PL 183, 677). III.113 *vulnera*, i.e., sins. III.113-114, Isa. 41: 10. III.114, Helinand *Sermones XXVIII* (PL 212, 711-720). III.115, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XVII.3.

<sup>15</sup> Ps. 44; Wisd. 15: 4; Rev. 19: 8; Gregory *Mor.* VIII.19; XXXIII.59-60; Helinand *Sermones XXVI* (PL 212, 692-700).

<sup>16</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XV.13, 15; *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.13.

<sup>17</sup> Ps. 1: 3; Gregory *Mor.* VIII.67-69.

<sup>18</sup> Raban Maur *De universo IX. prologus* (PL 111, 260).

Devoid himself of spiritual understanding, this *ψυχικὸς ἀνθρωπός* pretends to a marvellous knowledge conjured from mere animals or even the inanimate.<sup>19</sup>

The exordium of Book Three concludes with a thematic passage (III. 117-162) in which the poet addresses the false leaders of a generation among whom impunity has bred hardihood.<sup>20</sup> The manner of address, ironically preceptive, is appropriate to these precursors of the ultimate dissimulator. Like the wrath of God that leaves the apostate to his own devices, Bernard, dissimulating his indignation, exhorts the reprobate with their own counsel, symbolizing in the geminated “stertite, stertite” the snug complacency of those who snore when the cock should crow, the foward tutelage of the spiritually disengaged (*otiosi*) slumbering after the labors (*negotia*) of self.<sup>21</sup> For such as these Bernard counsels not the innocence of the true Christian, patient and benign, but guile and violence, the twin modes of injury by which the ambitious may now become friends of Caesar.<sup>22</sup> Emulating those antic heroes exposed in the *Philippics* of Cicero who would pledge peace only to impose servitude, these are to harden under the selfsame peace (*otium*) that softens luxurious men. They must mock the zeal of charity with the lust for rapine and parody the discipline of the Christian ruler with the inhumanity of the tyrant. As if to confirm this counsel, Bernard instances the preferment of the third son, the perjured travesty of the *iuvénis senex*, favored over his two brothers who are piously silent (like Cordelia) and therefore (like her) rejected.<sup>23</sup> This motif

<sup>19</sup> Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxxviii (PL 205, 226-233).

<sup>20</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.vi,21 (PL 182, 786). III.118, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIX.2. III.120 *fabula*, II Tim. 4: 4. III.130, continues the *antithetum* of 129b-c, where “cernere” means “to attack.” III.130 *Da, rape*, Eccles. 14: 16; Cicero *De officiis* I.vii, 22; xiv,42-43; II. xxiii,83; xxiv,85. III.130 *tona, freme*, contrasted in tone, “tona” appropriate to the *rex*, “freme” to the *tyrannus*. III.133 *Barba*, Cicero *Philippics* XIII.i-ii. III.135 *Dromo*, The Terentian “Dromo” has been influenced by *dromas*. III.136. Isa. 14: 14; Ezek. 28: 2; II Thess. 2: 4. III.139 Arce levaberis, unus *for Arte levaberis*, imus. III.142 *tremor*, cf. Gregory *Mor.* XVI.18. III.144b-c, cf. Gregory *Mor.* XX.13-14; Helinand *Sermones* XIV (PL 212, 591-592). III.146-150, repeats by epimone III.19-20. III.147-150, *versus applicati*: see *Carmina Burana* vol. II, p. 8. III.151 *recondere*, cf. III.157, 162c; Rom. 8: 10. III.153 *tertius*, Rupert *Commentaria in Apocalypsim* V (PL 169, 979). III.159-160 *cornibus, cordibus, dentibus*, refer to false fortitude according to the trichotomy of deed, thought, word respectively; cf. III.154-156. See Amos 6: 14; Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxiv (PL 205, 196). III.162, cf. Gregory *Mor.* XV.56; XX.60.

<sup>21</sup> Rom. 1: 28; II Thess. 2: 11; Heb. 6: 4-6; Rupert *De operibus Spiritus Sancti* VIII.6 (PL 167, 1788). The paronymic *otium: negotium* is implicit in Bernard; for an express but distinct instance, “non otium Mariæ sed Marthæ negotium,” see Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XL.3.

<sup>22</sup> Gregory *Mor.* VIII.2; Cicero *De officiis* I.xiii,41.

<sup>23</sup> III.156. For the *iuvénis senex* paradox, see my “On the Sequence of Beowulf’s *Geogoð*,” *Modern Language Notes*, LXVIII (1953), 91-92.

of the third son the poet has accommodated from a fairy tale. The provenience befits the import of this passage, the reprobate sense of a generation that has given up the Christian truth for the false counsel (*fabula : favele*) of the world, a generation which like its leaders is inert in the twin acceptations of that epithet, devoid of understanding and devoid of zeal, insensible to God, contemptuous of His work, a generation so confounded as to confuse the spiritual man whose faith lives in good works with an inert Dromo of a comic *fabula*, to put to death the deeds not of the flesh but of the spirit, and with an opprobrium that portends the onset of Antichrist to reduce the good counselor to a byword.<sup>24</sup>

A second statement of theme (III.163-168) prepares for the dilatation proper of Book Three. Here the mode is paradigmatic rather than preceptive. Bernard as pastoral exemplar weeps for the lost for whom he may not pray, to whom he cannot preach, who cannot be saved because they will not be saved, withdrawn in their apostasy beyond the ministration of prayer or sermon.<sup>25</sup> Conforming to the principle of good taciturnity and the need for pastoral discretion, he must pose to himself the quotidian consideration of the homilist: “*vide quae, quot, quanta, qualia, quando loquaris*”; but at this epoch of profuse and diffuse confusion he can only exclaim in response: “*Heu modo qualia, quanta, quot impia quaeve nefanda/ Gens agit impia.*”<sup>26</sup> In the exordium he had recurred by epimone to the Johannine trichotomy of the contempt for God: lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes — whether construed as curiosity or the avarice of the mercenaries encroaching upon the dominions of grace — and pride symbolized by the divisive wrath and impatient ambition of the lost leaders and their lost multitudes who afflict the order without order of the *pax Christiana* with prodigies of tribulation that portend the ultimate man of disorder, the antitypic lost one ( $\delta\ \alpha\nu\theta\varrho\omega\nu\pi\sigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\nu\mu\pi\iota\alpha\varsigma$ ,  $\delta\ \nu\iota\delta\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \alpha\pi\omega\lambda\iota\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ ).<sup>27</sup> In the second thematic passage the triad is reduced to a dichotomy of the extremes, the pride through which men emulate demons and the lust through which they exceed beasts. These extremes, however, are less opposites than cause and effect.<sup>28</sup> Presuming to be more than human, the vainglorious prove to be less than beasts. Spurning the supernatural, engrossing themselves in the merely natural, they become addicted to the unnatural.

<sup>24</sup> Rom. 8: 13; Bruno of Asti *Expositio in Psalmos lxxviii* (PL 164, 1007); *Middle English Dictionary* s.v. *favel*; cf. Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.xxiii (PL 176, 1082).

<sup>25</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *Tractatus de gradibus humilitatis et superbiae* II.xxii (PL 182, 969-972).

<sup>26</sup> Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxiii (PL 205, 194-195); cf. Gunther *De oratione, jejunio et eleemosyna* I.i (PL 212, 105).

<sup>27</sup> II Thess. 2: 3.

<sup>28</sup> Gregory *Mor.* III.60; XXVI.27-28.

The passions of ignominy, nameless and not to be named, the poet had touched upon in Book Two proleptically, after the peribolic fashion, and paraliptically, but it is in this passage of Book Three (169-282) that the poet perfects his elaboration of that ineffable vice prefigured for his generation by the cry of Sodom and the reprobate sense of the universal apostasy and foreshadowing in his generation the ultimate apostasy of Antichrist.<sup>29</sup> No imagery is more apt than that of putrefaction to express the deformity of this sin by which the reprobate who dishonors God in pride is left to defile his own body with a brutishness for which even among animals the hyena, beast among beasts, is unique. The metaphor of sepulture, the Scriptural image of habituation to mortal sin, is invoked by the poet to distinguish the basest enormity of a confusion once again become as diffuse as profuse. Unlike the ordinary sinner who comes forth with Lazarus from the tomb of sin, uncovering in humble confession the sins he had before hidden with audacious defense, this evil prodigy exposes to the world his insensibility of shame with an impudence that proclaims to heaven his outrage upon nature.<sup>30</sup> His lost soul, as if in a travesty of confession, flaunts the perversion of its faculties, luxuriating where it should sorrow in its reprobate sense and bestialized appetite. Inverting the order of history no less than of nature, he has retrogressed beyond the license of the heretical age to the utmost wickedness of the universal apostasy. He is no longer disposed to content himself in spiritual incest with the illicit though natural embraces of Petronilla, the priest's "daughter," whose name memorializes the endeavors by such heretics as Jovinian to enlist the marriage of Peter in their attack upon the merit of celibacy. The yet more ancient figures of a more primitive incest are pleased as they watch from the pages of heathen legend to see in him a thing of more tragic horror than themselves. The Juvenalian Venus, meanwhile, still prostitutes herself in the propagation of evil, but the robust infirmity of this *tota femina*, too unmanly to be virtuous, too mannish to be womanly, is inade-

<sup>29</sup> III.177-178, 187-188, Gen. 18: 20-21; Isa. 3: 9. III.182, Jerome *Adversus Jovinianum* I.26 (*PL* 23, 245-248); *Middle English Dictionary* s.v. *file* (2); but cf. John of Salisbury *Historia Pontificalis* vi-vii, ed. M. Chibnall (London, 1956), pp. 12-15. III.184 *hyaena*, Pliny *Natural History* VIII.xliv, 105. III.195-200, a dyslogistic use of the *quot-tot* formula; cf. J. K. Bostock, *A Handbook on Old High German Literature* (Oxford, 1955), p. 242. III.212 *Lycissa*, Juvenal VI.123. III.249-250, Jer. 1:10; Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lvi (*PL* 205, 172). III.251 *mortis imagine*, Gregory *Mor.* XI.28: "Umbra enim mortis est prava operatio." III.252 *levis*, Helinand *Epistola ad Galterum* (*PL* 212, 750). III.254 At *juvenum* for At *juvenem*. III.256b-257, Gregory *Mor.* XV.70. III.266a-b, Bernard of Clairvaux *In conversione Sancti Pauli* I.3; *Parabolae* IV.5-6; *Serm. in Cant. XXXIII.* 15-16 (*PL* 183, 361-362, 769-770, 958-959) III.266c, Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione II.i.1* (*PL* 182, 741-743).

<sup>30</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXII.31.

quate to the appetites of the *semivir*, the effeminate man. Even the lawful wife is displaced as the degenerate male conforms not to Christ, who during the universal apostasy rose in the flesh that men might rise in the spirit, but to Jove and Ganymede, idols with whom the gentiles dishonored God and to whom they transferred the degradation of their own flesh.

Confronted by so feral an image of humanity, the poet resorts to the most vehement mode of prayer, expostulation with God. This becomes the most compelling paradigm of ministerial zeal among the several thematic motifs which, changing and interchanging, envelop and divide in the peribolic manner the dilatation of the nameless passions. As the dominating motif, the expostulatory is set at both the hinge and close of the dilatation. Phrased midway like the remonstrance of the Hebrew prophet expostulating with God for His withdrawal from the world withdrawn from Him, it is at the end transposed into the solicitations of the disciples awash on the Galilean storm while Christ — and an apostate world — sleep.<sup>31</sup> Both adaptations from Scripture are anagogically oriented: as the anxieties of a Habakkuk foreshadow the universal apostasy at the first coming, so those of the disciples prefigure its antitype, the ultimate apostasy at the last.<sup>32</sup> Bernard, petitioning like the prophet, the disciples, and in the last tribulation the saints, evokes for those contemporaries entrusted with the conversion of others in this nameless interim between the third and last age of Christendom the solicitude for the elect appropriate to those who stand in the forefront of the congregation on the verge of the end of time.

In the northwinds fleeing before the southwind, a circumstance adapted from the imagery of the Old Testament which refines upon the imagery of the Gospel storm, the poet envisions the infidels and false Christians, who now disrupt the Christian peace from without and within, fleeing before the Holy Spirit as in the second advent Christ shall slay Antichrist with the spirit of His mouth, when the sea shall be no more and the second resurrection shall fulfill the first, the baptism of Christ, prefigured by the burning wind that dried the Red Sea for the passage of the Hebrews.<sup>33</sup> Implicit in this imagery of the wind are further counsels to the preachers: they must like the fragrant garden of the *Canticle* — to rise from which the

<sup>31</sup> Hab. 1: 13; Bede *In Matthaei Evangelium expositio* II,8 (*PL* 92, 42).

<sup>32</sup> Tertullian *De baptismo* xii (*PL* 1, 1214); for an anagogical interpretation of the kindred imagery of Matt. 14: 22-33, see Anselm *Homiliae* iii (*PL* 158, 597-602), Bernard of Clairvaux *Parabolae* IV.7 (*PL* 183, 770).

<sup>33</sup> Isa. 11: 4; II Thess. 2: 8; Rev. 21: 1; Jerome *Commentaria in Osee* III,xiii.15 (*PL* 25, 939-940); Eucherius *Liber formularum spiritalis intelligentiae* iii (*PL* 50, 740); Bede *Explanatio in Exodum* xiv (*PL* 91, 310); Raban Maur *De universo* IX.25 (*PL* 111, 281-282); Rupert *Commentaria in Exodum* IV.8 (*PL* 167, 707).

northwind has been bidden, to blow through which the southwind — exhale with their good works the good odor of Christ, and they must lead not to the confusion of the reprobate sense the troops of smoke that come from the north, but rather to the love of truth the army of light.<sup>34</sup>

A preacher must also review before he speaks the *circumstantiae eleemosynarum*, the quality and quantity of that which is to be said.<sup>35</sup> The formulary for such deliberation the poet had already adapted in the preceding thematic passage to an ejaculation upon the abounding of iniquity. The ejaculation is here repeated, although ascribed in keeping with the tragic ambience to *amor pius*, love of truth personified, who laments antiphonically with *vita sobria*, the personification of order, the order without order, the peace without peace of a Christian peace in which disorder abounds as the charity of the many grows cold. Against such impiety Bernard protests in his own person that if he cannot like a prophet root up and pull down, he will at least like the satirist reprehend.

Like the asyndetic ejaculation, a third motif derives from the premeditations entailed upon the homilist. The preacher is bound always to consider the quality of his audience, and of this obligation Bernard is especially sensitive in a world become so evil that, as the expostulatory motif implies, God has averted from it the splendor of His glance and the spirit of His mouth, by which alone the elect shall be saved from the last tribulation. It is to preserve these elect from their infirmity that Bernard in a world clamorous with unspeakable sin names the nameless passions. If he seems to veer in his counsels to the elect, now averting their eyes from evils not to be seen, now fixing their eyes upon them, it is because he wishes the elect to believe the actuality of these evils, not so that they may be attracted to these works of lust like the perfidious, but that, seeing these ominous actualities through the poet's eyes, the faithful may weep with their own eyes for the many that seem lost.

This generation like its type, the gentiles of the universal apostasy, has been abandoned to the passions of Sodom because it has repudiated the knowledge of God with a zeal so perverted that it outdoes itself (III.201). Refusing to acknowledge God, it exceeds in sins before unacknowledged (III.236). The refusal to proceed in charity by the grades of perfection from knowledge to wisdom is exemplified in Bernard's generation by the malefactors of literacy (III.283-390).<sup>36</sup> Abasing in their pride of life to

<sup>34</sup> II Thess. 2: 10; Gregory *Mor.* XXVII.63-64; Adam Scot *De tripartito tabernaculo clv* (*PL* 198, 760-761).

<sup>35</sup> Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxv (*PL* 205, 197-199); Alanus de Insulis *Summa de arte praedicatoria* xxxii (*PL* 210, 175-176).

<sup>36</sup> III.286-287, Rupert *Commentaria in Osee* III (*PL* 168, 125). III.288, Jerome *Commentaria in Ezechiem* VI (*PL* 25, 185); Gregory *Mor.* XXVI.75-77; Rupert *Commentaria in Osee* VI (*PL* 168,

vainglory and ambition the tools of knowledge bequeathed by pagan antiquity, they regress to the reprobate sense of the universal apostasy by the selfsame increments of perdition through which the gentiles moved before the advent. Once again the modern *ethnici*, more gentile than Christian, pass from vanity of thought to arrogance of mouth, from darkness of heart to fatuity of work, from idolatry to sodomy.<sup>37</sup> In them is renewed with the mobility of the Satanic lion the volubility of the sophist and the serpent.<sup>38</sup> They seek rather to be made rich in worldly goods through the knowledge of the flesh than to be made wise in the knowledge of grace through the poverty of the humble spirit. Refusing to honor God and benefit neighbor by applying the learning of the gentiles to the furtherance of His word or the refutation of error, embracing rather the knowledge that inflates than the charity that edifies, they have in contempt of God reverted, when not to the ancient idolatries of the avaricious or curious eye (like the perjurer or conjurer), at least to the idolatry of the sensual eye.<sup>39</sup>

201); Hildebert *Sermones* xxviii (*PL* 171, 474). III.290-294, Hildebert *Epistolae* I.1 (*PL* 171, 141-143); Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XXXVI.2-3 (*PL* 183, 967-968); Alanus de Insulis *Summa de arte praedicatoria* xxxvi (*PL* 210, 179-181). III.299 *Garrula*, Jerome *Epistolae* LIII.7 (*PL* 22, 544); Augustine *De civ. Dei* XVIII.41; Raban Maur *De clericorum institutione* III.20 (*PL* 107, 398). III.305-308,315, Peter the Venerable *Epistolae* I.9 (*PL* 189, 77-78). III.319, II Cor. 6: 14-16; Jerome *Epistolae* XXII, 29-30 (*CSEL* 54, 186-191); Peter Damiani *Opuscula* XI.1 (*PL* 145, 232-233); Helinand *Sermones* XV (*PL* 212, 603-604). III.321, Gregory *Mor.* XIX.56. III.323, Helinand *Sermones* XVIII (*PL* 212, 633-635). III.325, Ovid *Met.* I.468-471. III.325 *modo*, i.e., *nunc*. III.326, Rupert *Commentaria in Apocalypsim* VI (*PL* 169, 1030). III.329 *draco*, Cassiodorus *Expositio in Psalterium* CIII.25-27 (*PL* 70, 737-738). III.330, Bede *Explanatio in Exodum* xv (*PL* 91, 311): “Ternistatores.” III.333-334. Hildebert *Sermones* lxix (*PL* 171, 675-676). III.333 *audet*, Jerome *Commentaria in Evangelium Matthaei* IV, xxv.24-28 (*PL* 26, 187-188); Gregory *Mor.* IV. 49,X.21. III.334 *gaudet*, Hos. 9: 1; Rupert *Commentaria in Apocalypsim* VI (*PL* 169, 1030-1031); Hildebert *Sermones* xli (*PL* 171, 549). III.343 *instat*, Bede *Explanatio in Exodum* xiv (*PL* 91, 310). III.344, Hos. 4: 9. III.347, Jerome *Commentaria in Evangelium Matthaei* II, xii.43-45 (*PL* 26, 83-84); Gregory *Mor.* XIX.20,53; Bede *In Matthaei Evangelium expositio* II,12 (*PL* 92, 64); Anselm of Laon *Enarrationes in Evangelium Matthaei* xii (*PL* 162, 1366-1367); Hildebert *Sermones* lxxxiv (*PL* 171, 737). III.371, Hos. 4: 8; Matt. 24: 48-51; Hilary *In Evangelium Matthaei commentarius* xxvii.2 (*PL* 9, 1059). III.374. Matt. 5: 13; Mark 9: 49; Gregory *Mor.* XVII.27, XXIII.4,8; *Hom. in Ev.* XVII.16. III.377, Matt. 24: 51; Bruno of Asti *Sententiae* VI.ii.6 (*PL* 165, 1062-1064); Rupert *Commentaria in Osee* III (*PL* 168, 125); Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LXXVI.7-10 (*PL* 183, 1153-1155); Adam Scot *Sermones* XII.10 (*PL* 198, 167). III.380, I Cor. 5: 5; Bede *Explanatio in Exodum* xv (*PL* 91, 311); cf. Gregory *Mor.* VI.57; Rupert *Commentaria in Joelem* (*PL* 168, 231-233). III.382, Exod. 14: 16, 21; Matt. 14: 31; cf. Matt. 8: 26. III.383, Jerome *Commentaria in Ezechielem* VI (*PL* 25, 185-186). III.390 *stercore*, Raban Maur *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* (*PL* 112, 1052-1053); Alanus de Insulis *Distinctiones dictiōnum theologicalium* (*PL* 210, 956).

<sup>37</sup> Adam Scot *Sermones* XII.11 (*PL* 198, 167).

<sup>38</sup> Raban Maur *Commentaria in Genesim* I.15 (*PL* 107, 489).

<sup>39</sup> Raban Maur *De universo* IX. *prologus* (*PL* 111, 260); Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* XXXVI (*PL* 183, 967-971).

Preferring to Christian truth the superstitious figments of ancient poets and philosophers, enthralled by the vain eloquence of that outward discipline which the inward eloquence of a Gregory contemns, they sacrifice to the demons whose cults such vanities once served as faithfully as if they offered incense.<sup>40</sup> Confronted, then, with the venerable charge: “Dant sibi turpiter oscula Iupiter et schola Christi” (III.319), they cannot with Jerome summon from *Deuteronomy* the figure of the captive woman shaven and pared for marriage with the Israelite: “quid ergo mirum, si et ego sapientiam saecularem propter eloquii venustatem et membrorum pulchritudinem de ancilla atque captiva Israhelitin facere cupio, si, quidquid in ea mortuum est idolatriae, voluptatis, erroris, libidinum, vel praecido vel rado et mixtus purissimo corpori vernaculos ex ea genero domino sabaoth? labor meus in familiam Christi proficit, stuprum in alienam auget numerum conservorum.”<sup>41</sup> The tropology, however, of a kindred figure, Goliath beheaded with his own sword, is exemplified by the poet himself in his challenge to the dialecticians who have exploited their verbal skills to gain the episcopal honor. He uses the logical maxim for relative terms, *alterum alteri praeesse non potest*, to demonstrate their defection from the principle of leadership, *non praeesse sed prodesse*, that the doctors of the Church had with Christian sagacity retrieved from the pagan *λειτορογία*<sup>42</sup>. Still more sardonically, Bernard lapses into the Ovidian conceit of a new-fledged Cupid whose arrows in this salacious age are duly pared of those leaden tips with which in quainter times the boy put passion to flight.

The pastors of the flock, professing as false Christians a faith that does not live in charity, have grown insensible to the heart that makes men understand and to the wisdom animated by love of God and of self and neighbor in God.<sup>43</sup> Apostate to their duty, they have left the people of God, like the house to which the unclean spirit returns, empty of good works and adorned not with the inward beauty of the royal daughter, but with the specious virtues of the Pharisee. Infatuated with the salt of their own prudence, they are, although called to be the salt of the earth, too arrogant to season with the salt of divine wisdom the souls of men which are the food of God.<sup>44</sup> Devoid of that strength that invigorated the witnesses and the confessors of the first and second epochs, made arid of

<sup>40</sup> Gregory *Mor.*, *epistola missoria v*; Yves of Chartres *Panormia* II.137 (*PL* 161, 1116).

<sup>41</sup> Jerome *Epistulae LXX.2* (*CSEL* 54, 700-703); Raban Maur *De clericorum institutione* III.18 (*PL* 107, 395-396); Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant. XXXVII.2* (*PL* 183, 971-972).

<sup>42</sup> Jerome *Epistulae LXX.2* (*CSEL* 54, 700-703); Isidore *Etymologiae* II.xxvi.7; Alanus de Insulis *Summa de arte praedicatoria* xxxvi (*PL* 210, 179-181).

<sup>43</sup> Jer. 24: 7.

<sup>44</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ev. XVII.16*.

grace like dried up lilies by the burning wind of Satanic temptation, they are the patrons of the iniquity that abounds while charity grows cold in the many and the metaphor of the heart yielding to the flesh and the devil, the tropology of Adam acceding to Eve and the serpent, becomes universally germane as the will of man submits not to the will of God, but to itself and Satan. They infuse body and soul, thought, word, and deed, with sin as urgent as the Egyptian host pressing upon the Hebrews at the passage of the Red Sea. Inured to sin, not only do they dare like Adam and Eve or the hoarder of the single talent to cavil with God in defense of their transgressions, they rejoice in their pride and lust like the denizens of the Apocalyptic Egypt and Sodom. In every power of the soul, therefore, in the rational, the concupiscent, and the irascible, they are derelict.

In their wilful blindness, in the inward schism that splits their tongues from their hearts, they are the antitype of those Pharisees who refused to acknowledge Christ, but blindly and hypocritically led the blind. In their travesty of mercy they conform as complaisant fathers to the indulgent Eli, who knew that his sons did wickedly and did not chastise them. Like him they are slothful in excommunicating the scandalous, in delivering to Satan those whom he has manifestly driven, as Pharaoh drove his chariots, into the sea of this world — those who, unless they can thereby be induced to wash away their sins in the second baptism of penance, will, like the land of Sodom sunk beneath the Dead Sea, be cast into the eternal pool of fire and brimstone.<sup>45</sup> Like the sons of Eli who devoured in sacrilege the offerings proper to God, like the wicked servant that eats and drinks with drunkards, so they in simony exploit the power of the keys, for their own profit binding and loosing, separating the contumacious from the Church Militant and restoring them as the brazen bow of the anathema is made flexible by the brazen coin.<sup>46</sup> Unlike Elijah, such pastors do not feed the spiritually bereft whose hunger is foreshadowed in the widow of Sarepta nor denounce the misleaders whose patent hypocrisy is prefigured by Jezebel.<sup>47</sup> Unlike Moses and Christ, who stretched their hands over the threatening sea, they, accepting persons as well as bribes, truckle to the oppressors both human and demonic and, forsaking the oppressed, sleep as Christ seemed to sleep on the Galilean lake. Like the foolish virgins and the keeper of the single talent in the parables, they use their God-given intellects not to serve themselves in the works of justice or their neighbors

<sup>45</sup> Orosius *Historiae* I.5 (*PL* 31, 702-704).

<sup>46</sup> Rabanus Maurus *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* (*PL* 112, 863); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* xxiv, cliii (*PL* 205, 91-92, 366).

<sup>47</sup> Rupert *In Libros Regum* V.7,14 (*PL* 167, 1239-1242, 1251-1254).

in the works of mercy, but to heap up the profits of darkness, burying their talent not merely in the slothful earth, but in the dung of concupiscence.<sup>48</sup> Like the faithless princes denounced by Isaiah, they follow rewards — unlike the faithful Christian, who must transcend benefaction, exchanging not merely good for good but good for evil.<sup>49</sup> Seeking rather to be rewarded here than hereafter, they are rewarded here with the reprobate sense and hereafter with the eternal schism of the hypocrite. They perish spiritually because they worship gold and silver with the lust of the eyes for which the covetous pagans and the idolatrous Jews perished.<sup>50</sup> As bishops they are blind overseers. As pontiffs they erect no bridge between their charges and God. As leaders of the children of God they prove rather to be the pedagogues of Antichrist, ominously like the heavenly stars dragged to earth in the Apocalyptic image by the dragon's tail.<sup>51</sup> As teachers they traffic in their learning like the pagan sophists; unlike the exemplary clerk who gladly learns so that he may gladly teach, they have no mind to emulate the Pauline *hilaris dator*. As preachers they are neither opportune nor properly importunate. They confuse night and day, the works of darkness and the works of light. Fostering iniquity, suppressing good, they bark when they should be silent, are mute when they should bark, like the dumb dogs of Isaiah. Impudent dogs, unsated by the offerings of the altar, they are voluble only for self gain, choosing to ignore that zealous importunacy for which the spherule of the Mosaic candlestick served as emblem to medieval exegetes and of which the poet Bernard proffers himself as an exemplar ready to undergo like the two witnesses in mystical Sodom the mockery of those who rejoice in sin.<sup>52</sup>

To represent such *illusores*, leaders that make a mockery of their profession, Bernard has chosen the figure of the *puer praelatus* (III.391-469).<sup>53</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Bruno of Asti *Sententiae* VI.5 (*PL* 165, 1058-1062); *Allegoriae in Novum Testamentum* II.34-35 (*PL* 175, 799-802).

<sup>49</sup> Herveus *Commentaria in Isaiam* I (*PL* 181, 42).

<sup>50</sup> Jerome *Commentaria in Isaiam* I, ii.8; II,iii.12 (*PL* 24, 48, 66).

<sup>51</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXXII.25.

<sup>52</sup> Exod. 37: 17; Isa. 56: 10-11; Rev. 11: 10; Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.vi.8; Raban Maur *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* (*PL* 112, 1050); Rupert *Commentaria in Exodum* IV.8 (*PL* 167, 706).

<sup>53</sup> III.395c, Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* III.v,20; IV.vii,23 (*PL* 182, 770-772, 787-788). III.398b, Gregory *Mor.* XII.57; John of Salisbury *Letters* I.91, ed. W. J. Millor et al. (London, 1955), p. 140. III.407-408, Jerome *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Titum* I.5 (*PL* 26, 562). III.421-458, Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.23 (*PL* 176, 1085); Bernard of Clairvaux *De moribus et officio episcoporum* ii, 6-7; *Serm. in Cant.* XXXIII.15 (*PL* 182, 815-816; 183, 959). III.444a, cf. Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.7 (*PL* 176, 1055-1056). III.454a, cf. Amalarius *De ecclesiasticis officiis* III.5 (*PL* 105, 1110). III.456, *ibid.*, III.7 (*PL* 105, 1114-1115). III.457a, 462b-c, 464b-c, Alcuin *Epistolae* CLXXXV (*PL* 100, 457). III.466 *satagit*, Augustine *Sermones CCCXXXIX.iii,4* (*PL*

This figure derives from a vision of Isaiah which medieval exegetes referred typologically to the first coming of Christ and anagogically to the advent of Antichrist.<sup>54</sup> Effeminate and insensate, he displays in himself the twin apostasies of body and spirit endemic to both the first and second coming. Even when not a child in years but a lately converted courtier, he is a child in faith and wisdom like the Pauline neophyte and the instant prelate, the *momentaneus sacerdos* of Jerome, to whom despite his modern circumstances he manifestly reverts.<sup>55</sup> Advanced to leadership while abounding in iniquity, he becomes a travesty of the *puer senex*, the child or youth, the Jeremiah, the Daniel, or the Timothy, who is endowed despite his years with the wisdom of mature age.<sup>56</sup> Like the puerile prince deplored by Ecclesiastes, he rises in the morning to eat and drink, devouring the people as he arrogates their goods for his pleasure while ministering neither to their salvation nor to the glory of God.<sup>57</sup> Spurning that labor of which the Mosaic beaker is an emblem, incapable of inebriating his people with the spiritual fervor that will dispose them to forget their love of world, closer to the butler that supplies his earthy wines than to the ministers who should dispense the austere wine of Christian doctrine, debasing in his parody of the active life even such appurtenances of his office as the ring and candle, such a prelate not of God but of the stomach that he serves, a globe of flesh, thick, fat, and gross like the apostate of *Deuteronomy*, is most himself when he presides, a latter-day Epicurean, over nightly banquets as far removed in grossness as in time from the love feasts with which the primitive Church exercised its piety to the comfort of the poor.<sup>58</sup> Waking at night not to pray but to gormandize, by day in juvenile defiance of the canons he hunts with greyhound and falcon, doing battle not with the formidable stag or boar but with the timorous doe and hare.<sup>59</sup> Possess-

38, 1481). III.466b-c, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II.ix.22, III.469a, Jerome *Epistulae* LII.7 (CSEL 54, 426-428). III.469b, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II.ix.20; cf. Jerome *Epistulae* LXIX. 8 (CSEL 54, 696). III.469c, Jerome *Epistulae* LXIX.8 (CSEL 54, 694).

<sup>54</sup> Jerome *Commentaria in Isaiam* I-II, iii (PL 24, 21-72); Herveus *Commentaria in Isaiam* I, i-iii (PL 181, 17-67); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxi (PL 205, 185-189).

<sup>55</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LXIX.8-9 (CSEL 54, 694-699); Herveus *In Epistolam I ad Timotheum* iii (PL 181, 1420-1423).

<sup>56</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *Tractatus de moribus et officio episcoporum* VII,25-26 (PL 182, 825-827).

<sup>57</sup> Jerome *Commentaria in Isaiam* II, iii.4 (PL 24, 64); Augustine *Enarrationes in Psalmas* XIII.5 (PL 36, 142); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxi (PL 205, 187).

<sup>58</sup> Deut. 32: 15; Tertullian *Apology* xxxix; Jerome *Commentaria in Isaiam* I,i.22 (PL 24, 38); Bruno of Asti *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (PL 164, 204); Rupert *Commentaria in Exodum* IV.8 (PL 167, 706).

<sup>59</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LXIX.8 (CSEL 54, 695); Nicolaus I *Epistolae et decreta* CXXVII (PL 119, 1126-1127); Hugo de Folieto *De claustru animae* II.23 (PL 176, 1085); Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant. LXXVI.7* (PL 183, 1153); John of Salisbury *Policraticus* I.iv.

ed by a demonic asp that does not trouble him from without because it dominates him within, filled with the spirit of the Satanic fox rather than the Apocalyptic lamb, himself a little fox devouring the vineyard of the Lord, this vicar of God emulates not the bridegroom of the widowed Church or the bridegroom's friends, not Christ or His Apostles, but the rapacious suitors of a husbandless Penelope.<sup>60</sup> Never chosen by God for His Church in a free and canonical election, he is the simoniac whose promotion money, service, or flattery has bought, the Corite thrust upon the Church by the might or advocacy of powerful friends, the sanguinite whom ties of blood have endued with the patrimony of the crucifix.<sup>61</sup>

He accommodates to self indulgence the ancient precept for those charged as bishops with the ministry of the divine word: "praedica verbum, insta opportune, importune" (II Tim. 4:2). His ministry, although it does not importune his flock, is in its own fashion opportune. It spurns all but lucrative occasions, one set of which the poet has chosen to phrase in words "pascua menstrua animarum" concording wryly with an ancient term, the *menstrua dies* on which the early Church received toward its works of mercy the modest offerings of an unconstrained piety.<sup>62</sup> In the celebration of the divine office this raw prelate dispenses no less arrogantly with that other principle of episcopal responsibility: *non praeesse sed prodesse*.<sup>63</sup> Although militant in the chase, he hardly favors in this sacred ceremony the standing position, which symbolizes the *Church Militant*, and hastening to ascend his seat, hardly sustains the symbolism of that position, the Church Triumphant seated with the ascended Christ.<sup>64</sup> Preaching tumidly if at all, since in his insensibility he lacks that consonance of word with deed and thought indispensable to the preacher, he does not convert others from love of world to love of God nor, learning as he teaches, even awaken himself from sloth to compunction. Making no converts, he has none for whom to intercede with God and thus before God fails even to justify himself through that charity which afflicts itself in lamentation for the sins of others.<sup>65</sup>

From this description of an unworthy bishop, the poem turns to the-

<sup>60</sup> Cant. 2: 15; Isa. 3: 14; Ezek. 13: 4; Gregory *Mor.* XVII.51; Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LXXVII.1 (*PL* 183, 1155-1156); Peter Lombard *Commentarium in Psalmos* LXII.9 (*PL* 191, 575); Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simoniaeos* xxxii-xxxiii (*PL* 194, 1368-1371).

<sup>61</sup> Jerome *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Titum* I.5 (*PL* 26, 562); Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.iv,12 (*PL* 182, 782); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* xxxv-xliii (*PL* 205, 120-136).

<sup>62</sup> Tertullian *Apology* xxxix.

<sup>63</sup> Peter Lombard *In Epistolam I ad Timothaeum* iii.1-4 (*PL* 192, 342-343).

<sup>64</sup> *De divinis officiis* xxxix (*PL* 101, 1245); Amalarius *De ecclesiasticis officiis* III.10 (*PL* 105, 1117); Sicardus *Mitrale* III.2 (*PL* 213, 101-102).

<sup>65</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LII.7 (CSEL 54, 426-427); Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II. ix.20-22.

matic statement (III.470-506), accumulating precepts that make for a virtuous bishop.<sup>66</sup> A papal formula used in transmitting the pallium supplies the words with which the poet commends the assiduity of Jacob, the patriarchal exemplar of the active life.<sup>67</sup> To his preference for sacerdotal dignity above earthly advantage, for the priestly vestments of Esau above his own lentil pottage, the poet has oriented a terse conflation of Paul’s charge to Titus that he uphold the good and useful while avoiding the useless with the ethnic maxim which, appraising the *τελικὰ κεφάλαια*, prefers the *honestum* to the *utile*.<sup>68</sup> The vestments of Aaron, miter, rational, and humeral, are invoked, set in phrasing that varies emphatically the formulas in which they traditionally recur. The miter, translated from the bishop’s head to his pastoral rule, signalizes the holiness of both the rule and the bishop who, ruling his life wisely, honors his Head, the ruler of all.<sup>69</sup> Biblical phrasing is sharpened and the ancient paronomasia *ratio: oratio* evoked when the poet enjoins not simply the prelate but more pointedly his voice with bearing the rational so that he may bring forth in speech the truth borne in his breast. His labors are likewise commanded to link humeral and rational as they were coupled in the vesture of the high priest. Thus coupling action with knowledge, he must know the truth of the faith and act in pursuance of that knowledge, and he must so act before he teaches, not presuming to convert others when he has not converted himself.<sup>70</sup> Acceding to an office that is not to be won by ambition but imposed by divine necessity, the bishop must emulate the example of Christ and not of the crowd that would have seized Him and made Him king. He must not as they would seize upon this office for worldly gain, but like Christ spurning temporal dominion, labor humbly

<sup>66</sup> III.471 *infula*, i.e., *mitra*; cf. III.463c-464a; Jerome *Epistulae* LXIV.3 (CSEL 54, 591); Sicardus *Mitrale* II.5 (*PL* 213, 78,81); Innocent III *De sacro altaris mysterio* I.11 (*PL* 217, 781). III.473-474, Theodulf *Carmina* IV.iv.51-54 (*PL* 105, 338). III.476 aut vitiorum for ut vitriolum. III.479-480, *versus applicati*. III.483, The conflation of Titus 3: 8, “bona et utilia,” with *honestum et utile* suggests that Bernard was in some way acquainted with the Greek version “καλὰ καὶ ὀφέλιμα.” III.493b-c, Implied is the paronomasia *speculum / specimen : speculator*; cf. Alcuin *Epistolae* LXXII (*PL* 100, 245); Theodulf *Carmina* IV.iv.48 (*PL* 105, 338). III.506 aut for at.

<sup>67</sup> *Liber diurnus Romanorum Pontificum* IV.1 (*PL* 105, 81); Paschal II *Epistolae et privilegia CCLXVIII* (*PL* 163, 252).

<sup>68</sup> Augustine *Enarrationes in Psalmos* CXXXVI.18 (*PL* 37, 1771-1772); Bede *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (*PL* 91, 247-248); Bruno of Asti *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (*PL* 164, 202-204); John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvi; cf. Bernard of Clairvaux *Sermones de diversis* XLV.5 (*PL* 183, 668): “Puritas autem est ut quidquid agitur aut ad utilitatem proximi aut ad honorem fiat Dei.”

<sup>69</sup> Hugh of Saint Victor *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* II.iv.8 (*PL* 176, 436-437); Innocent III *De sacro altaris mysterio* I.44 (*PL* 217, 790).

<sup>70</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LXIV.20-22 (CSEL 54, 610-615).

and patiently for the restoration of the spiritual kingdom.<sup>71</sup> With such consonance of word and thought and deed, diffusing far and wide among the opinions of men the fragrance of his exemplary action, he will fulfill in the spirit the command laid upon the sons of Israel to bring with ready heart sweet-smelling incense to the altar of the Lord.<sup>72</sup> Living in virtue and mortifying in himself the love of the world, he is to become through this spiritual observance of the Levitical law the living sacrifice urged by Paul and a living document in whom comes to life the doctrine of life.<sup>73</sup> Mindful of the eternal judgment reserved for him and his sons in Christ, he must, by transcending them in virtue and by exhorting them in doctrine, fulfill the dual task imposed by the Lord upon the ancient prophets — to be both watchman and trumpet to the house of Israel.<sup>74</sup> Like the good and wise cock of *Job* and *Proverbs*, he must, ever wakeful himself, zealously rouse the slothful from their slumber, proclaiming amid the shadows of this present time the imminent day of the Lord, causing his sermons to resonate in his virtuous actions so that the sound of wings may be heard now as they were by Ezekiel, and with a discernment infused only by divine grace, accommodating his ministrations to the circumstances of mercy.<sup>75</sup> This gift of such wisdom as the office of bishop presupposes binds him to teach his subjects what virtues block what sins, thus in a tropologic sense erecting ramparts like the geometer in *Ezekiel* and spewing sin from the body of the Church lest he and those subjects that sin through his sloth be spewed by the Eternal Judge from the body of His elect like the lukewarm of Laodicea that did not persevere in the faith.<sup>76</sup> In the exercise of his office he must respond with discretion to the counterclaims of the inner and outer life, of justice and clemency, of supremacy and equality. He will in contemplative renewal lift the vision of his heart to the invisible things of God while with the compassion of the active life he takes upon himself the infirmities of his subjects, united by the bond of charity to the highest and the lowest like the angels ascending and descending the ladder of Jacob's vision.<sup>77</sup> He will temper discipline with pity, associating

<sup>71</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXIV.55; *Pastoral Care* I.3; Rupert *In Evangelium Joannis commentaria* VI (*PL* 169, 446-448).

<sup>72</sup> Bede *De tabernaculo* I.3 (*PL* 91, 399-401).

<sup>73</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II.x.19; Alcuin *Epistolae* X, CLXXXVI (*PL* 100, 152-156, 457-458); *Liber diurnus Romanorum Pontificum* IV.1 (*PL* 105, 82); Herveus *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos* xii (*PL* 181, 763-764).

<sup>74</sup> Isa. 58: 1; Ezek. 3: 17; 33: 1-9; Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.xi.4-7; *Pastoral Care* II.4.

<sup>75</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXIV.19; XXX.9-16; *Hom. in Ez.* I.vii.21-viii.5; xi.12-20; *Pastoral Care* III.40; Alanus de Insulis *Summa de arte praedicatoria* xxxiii (*PL* 210, 175).

<sup>76</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XXVI.9; Anselm of Laon *Enarrationes in Apocalypsin* iii (*PL* 162, 1515-1516).

<sup>77</sup> Gregory *Pastoral Care* II.5.

them as the rod of Aaron and the manna were associated in the ark of the covenant.<sup>78</sup> A staff to the weak, to the obdurate the Psalmodic iron rod, fostering the rude in faith as the hen gathers her little ones under her wing, obedient to the precepts with which Paul mitigated the rigor of Timothy, outwardly severe, inwardly as mild as the olive, ever conscious that the imposition of discipline should be a work of mercy, among his subjects an equal to the virtuous, a servant to the just, a master and father when discipline is needed, he is never to forget despite the diversity of human nature in its fallen state the equality in which it was created.<sup>79</sup> Preserving humility in his heart and discipline in action, he is not to confuse meekness with timorousness; rather, abhorring the approbation of the reprobate and revering only the judgments of the just, he is, without fear of earthly loss unlike the foolish prophets of Israel, to set up a wall for his flock, defending them with a free voice against the powers of this world.<sup>80</sup> Rejoicing, when his subjects are freed from sin, not in the singularity of his power but in that nature common and equal to which diversity acceded only from sin and not concealing under the measure of worldly advantage that God-given lamp of precept and example with which he might light his subjects to salvation, but shining forth among his subjects in good works which he hides from them to avert self-praise, yet manifests to them to augment the glory of God, he will, unlike the proverbial father of the foolish daughter, see his own merits augmented by the merits of those subjects whom in his authority he has converted.<sup>81</sup> Through his works of mercy in this epoch of the *pax Christiana* he will strive to restore among his subjects the authentic peace of the first age so that justice, which fled when that golden age passed, may return to them as the false Christian of this age is put to flight from their midst. With a hand free from avarice he will sow the works of mercy so that unlike the lukewarm of Laodicea he may bring to fruition in charity the office that he has received in humble good faith. With a hand free from every kind of simony he will buy, as the lukewarm were counseled to buy, with unremitting good works that gold refined by fire which is the wisdom of a faith perfected in charity.<sup>82</sup> A true son of the Church, of

<sup>78</sup> Gregory *Mor.* XX.14.

<sup>79</sup> Matt. 23: 37; Gregory *Mor.* VII.19; XX.14; *Hom. in Ez.* II.ix.18; *Hom. in Ev.* XX.13; *Pastoral Care* II.6; III.16; *Vitis mystica* XLVI, 163 (*PL* 184, 732-733); Helinand *Sermones XIV* (*PL* 212, 591-595).

<sup>80</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.ix.13-14; *Hom. in Ev.* XIV.2; *Pastoral Care* II.4; *Epistolae* I.25.

<sup>81</sup> Eccl. 22: 3; Gregory *Mor.* VIII.83-84; XXI.22-24; XXIV.54; XXX.77; *Pastoral Care* III.35; Alcuin *Epistolae X* (*PL* 100, 155).

<sup>82</sup> Gregory *Mor.* IV.61; XII.61; *Hom. in Ev.* IV.4; XXXIII.5; *Pastoral Care* III.34; Alcuin *Epistolae LXX* (*PL* 100, 243).

Jacob's seed, well disposed toward the words of Christ that saddened the rich young ruler, he will sell what he has and purchase the grace of the priesthood, exchanging vanity for the celestial kingdom.<sup>83</sup> Such a purchase must not be confused with the traffic for which Simon Magus bid in the first age of the Church. Newly planted in the faith like the neophyte, baptized in water but not in the Spirit, he aspired to buy and sell the powers of the unique dove, the manifestation of the Holy Spirit, by whose gratuitous love that binds the confirmed in the bond of perfection Bernard is now impelled to compose his plaint (III.507-596) for those infirm in the faith who have relapsed in simony.<sup>84</sup> As if washing his garments like the Israelite who has carried dead things, he deplores those Christians in name only who have chosen to conform to the revived Simon — “reparatum <mercede>” — alive now in the many followers of the one heresy that has survived the condemnation of repeated synods, rather than rise with Christ in the first resurrection through the bath of regeneration and renewal by the Holy Spirit.<sup>85</sup> He deplores the reprobate sense to which they like Caiaphas have delivered themselves: dry of grace, self-anathematized, they presume to judge true Christians as he judged the true Christ.<sup>86</sup> Confusing the spiritually dead and alive like the false prophets of Ezekiel, they refuse to see that what in traffic of the sacraments they buy and sell is not the power of the Spirit but the spiritual death to which Simon was banished and the leprosy of Naaman with which Giezi was requited.<sup>87</sup> They wander in the way that is no way while Simon once

<sup>83</sup> Bede *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (*PL* 91, 247-248); Bruno of Asti *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (*PL* 164, 203-204).

<sup>84</sup> Augustine *In Joannis Evangelium tractatus* VI (*PL* 35, 1425-1437); Gregory *Epistolae* V.53; IX.106; Peter Damiani *Opuscula* VI.28 (*PL* 145, 140); Rupert *In Evangelium Joannis commentaria* III (*PL* 169, 313); Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simoniacos* ii (*PL* 194, 1337). III.508 *instat*, cf. II Tim. 4: 2; III.520b, 560. III.508 *aestuat*, Peter Damiani *Opuscula* VI.7 (*PL* 145, 107). III.508 *satagendo*, cf. Peter Damiani *Opuscula* VI.28 (*PL* 145, 140). III.510 *praebita*, Peter Damiani *Opuscula* VI.6,28 (*PL* 145, 105, 141). III.515 *regia iussio... itur*, cf. Alcuin *Epistolae* CLVIII (*PL* 100, 415): “*Hic vero infamis clericus... sicut Paulus apostolus Caesarem appellavit, sed nequaquam, ut Paulus, Caesarem aditurus est.*” III.522, Geoffrey of Vendôme *Opuscula* ii (*PL* 157, 215). III.526 *alea daemonis*, catachrestically for *sors, cleris daemonis*. III.541, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* IV.4; XVII.7. III.557b-558a, Gregory *Epistolae* I.25. III.560a, cf. Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXXIII.5. III.571 *arundine*, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIII.7. III.575c, Prov. 28: 1; Gregory *Mor.* XXXI.55-56. III.584 *celebratier*, John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvi,776b: “*ab appetitu celebritatis et reverentiae*”; Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XIV.2. III.592 *manens*, a Medieval Latin designation for “serf.” III.593 *ad for it*.

<sup>85</sup> Geoffrey of Vendôme *Epistolae* IV.16 (*PL* 157, 159-160); Hildebert *Sermones* xcvi (*PL* 171, 783); Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simoniacos* xxxiii (*PL* 194, 1369-1371); *Carmina Burana* ix.4.5-6.

<sup>86</sup> Rupert *In Evangelium Joannis commentaria* IX (*PL* 169, 603-604); Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simoniacos* xxvi (*PL* 194, 1362-1363).

<sup>87</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXVI.5-6.

again seems to soar aloft like the Satanic dragon loosed from Hell in the last days to strike the Church with its tail which is Antichrist, the son of disorder.<sup>88</sup> The iniquity of Simon Magus abounds in an ominous confusion of the simoniacal with the canonical, and charity grows cold as venality is taken for grace.

Inflamed with the lusts of the world rather than the many-tongued fire of the unique dove that rebukes the powers of the world, conforming to the adversary that eyes with malice the Church in its sheepfolds of peace, such venal bishops, although bound by their office to oversee the Church with the simple eye of pure intention, deviate in the double way of the false Christian, spuriously within, in truth outside the Church, leading not by the way that is Christ, leading therefore to the way that is no way, blind guides like the Pharisees that seeing sin because they will not seek the light but spurn and bar the door of the sheepfold which is the free and canonical election in Christ.<sup>89</sup> The traffic which those Pharisees countenanced in the temple is exceeded now by the traffic in the Church: no longer is the ox, the sheep, the dove sold, but worse — the prelates, minding only the things that are their own, the things of earth, with an instance that mocks the assiduity of the true pastor, sell the word of God, perform the works of mercy, bestow the sacraments of the unique dove for worldly gain like Simon Magus or Giezi, for fear of magnates like the Corites, or for favor of the populace like demagogues.<sup>90</sup> Like the enemy in the parable, they sow evil seed, supplanting with intruders the shepherds called by the Church. As neophytes newly planted in the ecclesiastical life, they simulate in demonic travesty the child Jeremiah sent by the Lord to root out and plant.<sup>91</sup> They are the latter-day thieves who in the parable of the Lord climb into the Church by simoniacal purchase, contemning the door of canonical election.<sup>92</sup> They are the modern mercenaries who in the contemporary paradox of the servile pastor at once remain and flee, withholding their comfort from the flock and taking refuge in silence when the fold is attacked by the wolf and the Church is rent by the tyrannic forces of divisive evil.<sup>93</sup> They are the brigands who, breaking down the

<sup>88</sup> Gregory *Mor. XIX.27; XXXII.25*; Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simonicos* xxxiii (*PL* 194, 1370); Helinand *Sermones XV* (*PL* 212, 602).

<sup>89</sup> Augustine *In Joannis Evangelium tractatus VI.3* (*PL* 35, 1426-1427); Bruno of Asti *Commentaria in Joannem II*, 27-28 (*PL* 165, 532); Rupert *In Evangelium Joannis commentaria IX* (*PL* 169, 603); Gerhohus *Tractatus adversus simonicos* xxvii (*PL* 194, 1363-1365).

<sup>90</sup> Augustine *In Joannis Evangelium tractatus VI.18* (*PL* 35, 1433-1434); Bede *In Joannis Evangelium expositio* (*PL* 92, 664); Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum xxxvi-xliii* (*PL* 205, 122-136).

<sup>91</sup> Matt. 13: 24-30; John of Salisbury *Policraticus VIII.xvii*, 784d.

<sup>92</sup> Bruno of Asti *Commentaria in Joannem II*, 28 (*PL* 165, 532).

<sup>93</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ev. XIV.2*; Bruno of Asti *Commentaria in Joannem II.30* (*PL* 165, 535-537).

door of the Church, are thrust into positions of ecclesiastic authority by the might or at the bidding of temporal powers.<sup>94</sup> They are not princes of the Church but tyrants long ago execrated by the Lord in the shepherds of Israel that fed only themselves, the fat oxen of the Psalm, and the gross apostate of *Deuteronomy*.<sup>95</sup> With tyrannic or sycophantic caprice they engage in a travesty of that beneficence and justice which mark the good ruler, penalizing the upright, rewarding the unrighteous, depriving one to enrich another. Rendering to Caesar that which is God's like the chief priests before Pilate, they accede to lay investiture, appealing to temporal authority with a litigiousness alien to the spirit of the unique dove.<sup>96</sup> Accepting ecclesiastical office from the hand of secular power, they assent to a heresy even more obtrusive than simony, to which it is similar, and as they expose that which is holy to the dogs, they foment contention and schism within the Church.<sup>97</sup> With a verbal sleight familiar to the ancient sophists these modern hypocrites, devoid of that liberty which would embolden them to speak out against the tyrannies of the world, colorably justify their purchase of clerical privilege from lay authority (*emptio*) as redemption of ecclesiastical liberties even though liberty can not be where the spirit of God is not.<sup>98</sup> Thus the clergy of Satan is multiplied, a clergy not elected by divine lot like the clergy (*clerus : sors*) of God, but like its eponym having no part or lot except in the congregation of confusion.<sup>99</sup>

The miter, which should symbolize the glory of God, is sold, as the poet laments in refrain, to the pharisaical, whose glory is in their shame — the vainglorious, who aspire to an episcopal honor (*honos*) empty of its awesome burdens (*onus*), who refuse to crown their own conversion with almsgiving or their conversion of others with thanksgiving.<sup>100</sup> Although overseers they will not see to their own good fame, by which as exemplars of perseverance in virtue they might become to their subjects the good odor of Christ.<sup>101</sup> Nor will they learn from the tropology of Christ weeping for Lazarus four days dead and fetid — or awakening to calm the tempest of the sea — how they should pray for themselves and for their subjects

<sup>94</sup> Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* xxxvi (*PL* 205, 125).

<sup>95</sup> Deut. 32: 15; John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvii.

<sup>96</sup> Bruno of Asti *Expositio in Genesim* xxv (*PL* 164, 203-204).

<sup>97</sup> Geoffrey of Vendôme *Opuscula* ii; iv (*PL* 157, 214-218, 219-221); Hildebert *Sermones* xcii (*PL* 171, 769).

<sup>98</sup> Geoffrey of Vendôme *Epistolae* I.27 (*PL* 157, 68); John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvi, 777c; xvii, 781b; *Historia Pontificalis* xlvi.

<sup>99</sup> Acts 8: 21; Hildebert *Sermones* xcii (*PL* 171, 768); John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvii, 783c.

<sup>100</sup> Phil. 3: 19; Gregory *Mor.* IV.57; Honorius Augustodunensis *Gemma animae* I.ccxiv (*PL* 172, 609).

<sup>101</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.iv,12 (*PL* 182, 780-782).

inured to notorious sin.<sup>102</sup> Such prelates have no time to succor the poor or pray for the sinful whom they are bound to oversee, because they willfully overlook that eternity in which the succored become their advocates and the prayers the pastor has offered for his flock supplicate for him before God. Disregarding the scandal with which they rend the Church, they sensitively use popular favor to advance their own interests. Like the wicked of old who used the creatures as in youth and crowned themselves with roses, they dishonor the insignia of their office; ignoring its burdens, they transform the miter and rod to a crown of thorns and a reed — not, those with which Christ suffered here for the salvation of men, but those with which the disciples of Antichrist shall suffer in the time of retribution.

The plaint against simony graduates into an apostrophe to Rome (III. 597-744) in which the dilatation of iniquity is culminated.<sup>103</sup> This apos-

<sup>102</sup> Augustine *In Joannis Evangelium tractatus XLIX* (*PL* 35, 1746-1758); Bruno of Asti *Commentaria in Joannem* II.32 (*PL* 165, 540-545).

<sup>103</sup> III.597a, Humbert *Adversus simoniacos* III.6 (*PL* 143, 1148-1150). III.597 *urget*, Hildebert *Sermones* lxxxvi (*PL* 171, 745). III.600a, Gregory *Mor.* XXII.43. III.600b, Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XXVI.5. III.600 *jacet*, Hildebert *Sermones* xc (*PL* 171, 761-765). III.600b-c, i.e., neglecting self-conversion (works of justice), presumes to convert others by the works of mercy; Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XVII.18. But cf. Gregory *Mor.* XXXIV.5-7. III.601, *Carmina Burana* i.5; xli.11; xlv.1.1-2. III.602c, *Carmina Burana* xlivi.3.1. III.605, Lactantius *Div. inst.* V.18 (*PL* 6, 608-609); Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.1 (*PL* 171, 1441). III.609, *Carmina Burana* i.2. III.610, *Carmina Burana* xli.25. III.612 *foederat*, *Carmina Burana* i.1.3. III.613 *coeca*, *Carmina Burana* xi.26. III.614, cf. *Carmina Burana* xlvi.8.3. III.616 *schola*, cf. III.667a-668a; *Carmina Burana* xi.50. III.618, Anselm of Laon *Enarrationes in Evangelium Matthaei* vi (*PL* 162, 1304); Bruno of Asti *Commentaria in Matthaeum* I.14 (*PL* 165, 113); John of Salisbury *Letters* I.17,118 (ed. Millor, pp. 28,193-194). III.619a, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.6. III.619b, *Carmina Burana* xxi.3. 16-17; xliv.16. III.619c, Gregory *Mor.* XXXIV.40. III.620 *protervis*, I.1037; Bruno *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 153, 420); Herveus *Commentaria in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 181, 1394); Peter Lombard *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 192, 319). III.621-622, John of Salisbury *Policraticus* III.xi,498a. III.623, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.2; *Carmina Burana* xlvi.3.3;4.1. III.623 *capis*, *Carmina Burana* xlvi.5.1; xlvi.1.4. III.623 *trahis*, *Carmina Burana* i.4.2. III.625 *arca*, *Carmina Burana* xlvi.11.4. III.625 *lacuna*, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.5. III.629 *guttura*, *Carmina Burana* xlvi.3.3. III.630, *Carmina Burana* xlvi.11.3. III.631a, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.8,14. III.631b, *ibid.*, i.12. III.633-698, Hildebert *Carmina miscellanea* lxiv (*PL* 171, 1409-1410). III.636a, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.3,38. III.645 *aliquis for aquilis*; thus Hildebert *Carmina miscellanea* lxiv.11: “Plus aquilis vexilla crucis.” III.647c, Jerome *Commentaria in Ezechiel* III,ix.4-6 (*PL* 25, 87-89). III.651 *sata*, cf. *Carmina Burana* xlvi.7.4. III.653, *Carmina Burana* xlvi.6.3. III.655, *Carmina Burana* i.4.7-8. III.667 *stola*, Alcuin *Commentaria in Apocalypsin* IV,vi.11 (*PL* 100, 1126). III.667 *ligustrum*, substituted for the traditional olive. III.675 *trecentis*, cf. Humbert *Adversus simoniacos* II.23 (*PL* 143, 1096-1098). III.681 *lumina*, Gregory *Mor.* XVIII.81. III.681 *flumina*, Gregory *Mor.* XXX.8. III.691 *perdomisti*, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.13. III.693-694 *premat... levitatem*, Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.vi,22 (*PL* 182, 787). III.694 *regula*, Hildebert *Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.11. III.695, Wisd. 1: 1. III.695-696, *Carmina Burana* i.1.9-10. III.703, Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.18 (*PL* 176, 1070-1072); Philip de Harveng *De institutione clericorum* IV.111 (*PL* 203, 817-818). III.705-707, Bernard of

trophe is developed from three *topoi*, the first and third of which relate to the decline of the city of men, the second to the rise of the city of God. The first *topos*, the Pauline *discessio* or *apostasia*, derives from a cryptic passage in the *Second Epistle to the Thessalonians*. It had figured before in the poem, toward the end of Book One (1034-1038), where as an instance of maximal evil presaging the onset of doom it had heightened the dilatation of the first commonplace. Now resumed, it begins and ends the elaboration of the apostrophe (III. 597-632, 721-744). In these passages of Bernard the apostasy is endued with a sense distinct from that which is common to the exegetes of his day.<sup>104</sup> It has come to signify not the defection of the Christian people from king or pope or faith, all symbolized by the image of eternal Rome, but the defection of Curial Rome itself from its eternal Lord. No longer fixed in God, the center of the world (*urbs orbis*) has relinquished the stability of the axis for the instability of the wheel (*orbis, rota*). Forsaking the conversion to God of which it should be the supreme exemplar, Rome has ceased to be the good odor (*aroma*) of Christ to Christendom. Rome has become an opprobrium, the head has become the tail as the Mosaic curse devolves upon a city which, sinning in adversity and prosperity, in war and peace, has deviated from justice to the left and to the right.<sup>105</sup> The beneficent Rome of Sabine virtue that brought law and order to a tumultuous world has succumbed to that other Rome, the malign Rome (*Roma nocens*) now effete, but no less haughty (*insociabilis*), rapacious, and venal than when in the long legend of its impiety Romulus slew Remus, Crassus thirsted for Parthian gold, and Jugurtha bribed its statesmen.

In the phrasing of this dilatation paronyms are salient (e.g., *Roma, aroma, rota, rutilans* and the more deferred *rutilans, obruta, marca, marces, arca, arces*). Still more emphatic are the oxymora. Some of these express the apostasy

Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.iii.6 (*PL* 182, 776). III.707 *lateralis*, Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.iv,9 (*PL* 182, 778); John of Salisbury *Policraticus* V.ii,540c; *Historia Pontificalis* xxi,xxxviii; *Carmina Burana* xli.29.5. III.708, cf. Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* IV.v,16 (*PL* 182, 784). III.711 *Serica pallia*, Alcuin *Epistolae CXIV* (*PL* 100, 344); Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.8 (*PL* 176, 1056); Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* II.vi,13; ix,18; IV.iii,6 (*PL* 182, 750, 753, 776). III.711, John of Salisbury *Historia Pontificalis* xxxviii. III.712 *resupinum*, Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* II.vi,10,12 (*PL* 182, 747, 749). III.733 *Clauda*, Gregory *Mor. XXX.7*. III.733-735, *Carmina Burana* xlivi.4. III.734a, Hildebert *Carmina miscellanea* lxiii.22,26.

<sup>104</sup> Bruno *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 153, 418-419); Hugh of Saint Victor *Quaestiones et decisiones in Epistolas Pauli* IX.6 (*PL* 175, 591); Herveus *Commentaria in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 181, 1392-1394); Peter Lombard *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 192, 316-319).

<sup>105</sup> Deut. 28: 13-15,44; Prov. 4: 27; Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* II.vii.15-16; Bede *Super Parabolam Salomonis allegorica expositio* I,4 (*PL* 91, 956); Raban Maur *Allegoriae in universam Sacram Scripturam* (*PL* 112, 890).

of Curial Rome (“alta jaces,” “stare jacentem”) or its hypocrisy (“clamitat et tacet”) and the emptiness of that authority which, neglecting the conversion of self, simulates the conversion of others (“erigit et jacet,” “dat egena”). Others express the abounding iniquity of a charity grown cold (“arida plena,” “dives indiga,” “pinguis arida”), the disorder of which is emphasized by the very antilogy of the oxymoric form.<sup>106</sup> The motive for this *anomia*, the love of world supplanting the love of God, is signalized in the oxymoron “libera servis,” in the *polyptota* of the verse “Roma dat omnibus omnia dantibus omnia Romae,” in the paradox of the “dextera laeva,” the right hand become left hand, and in such traditional images of malign Rome as “Scylla vorax,” “gurges altior,” and “arca voracior.” These images paronymically suggest that image of which they are variants, the *vorago* reminiscent of the “vorago vetus” as Mount Hebal was construed in the anagogical interpretation of *Deuteronomy* 27:13 that prefigured in Mount Hebal the left hand on which Christ shall set the iniquitous in the last judgment.<sup>107</sup> This image of the *vorago* had long been established in Bernard’s poem as the emblem of Babylon, the city of man, whose very name is confusion.<sup>108</sup> The Apocalyptic proclamation of her fall echoes in the refrain with which Bernard culminates his apostrophe. The symmetry of this refrain — “Roma fuisti,” “Roma peristi,” “Roma peristi,” “Roma ruisti” — is in itself a figure of apostate Rome.

The second *topos* (III.633-686) presents a paradox. Opposing Christian Rome to pagan Rome, it reverses the mundane judgment that prefers the secular city that was all powerful in the world but spiritually infirm to the Apostolic city abject without but puissant within. The achievements of the Roman legions, the classical orators and ethnic philosophers, although acknowledged to be superlative, serve only in this reappraisal to magnify the preeminence of their Christian counterparts: the martyrs, whose innocence vanquished the truculence of *Roma nocens*; the virgins, no less steadfast in their mortification of the flesh, who signalized the diversity of the time when the epoch of the old man gave way to that of the new, when the weak superseded the mighty, the virginal the fecund, and the peopling of heaven the peopling of earth; the unlettered apostles, in the eloquence of whose lives the New Testament becomes a living page.<sup>109</sup> The Roman eagle is abased before the Apocalyptic stole, the rose, the lily, and the olive — emblems of the virgins and martyrs who served under the virgin and martyr Prince of peace to win not the *pax Romana*, the peace of Babylon,

<sup>106</sup> Peter Lombard *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli* (PL 192, 318-319).

<sup>107</sup> Rupert *In Deuteronomium* II.5 (PL 167, 960-962).

<sup>108</sup> Hildebert *Sermones lxxxvi,xc; Carmina quaedam indifferentia* i.2 (PL 171, 745, 764, 1441).

<sup>109</sup> Lactantius *Div. inst.* V.9,13 (PL 6, 575-580, 589-593); Ambrose *De virginibus* I.iii,13 (PL 16, 192); Jerome *Epistulae* XXII.21 (CSEL 54, 171-174).

the specious order imposed by the sword, but that tranquillity of order secured by the bond of charity, a peace no less removed from the peace of Curial Rome procured by the eloquent bribe, the *uncia nuncia*.

The paradox of the second *topos* reverts to certain oxymora that support the elaboration of the first, but these are repeated with a divergence that heightens the contradistinction of these two topics. Thus the oxymoron “*serva libera*” expresses in the first *topos* the venality of Curial Rome, in the second the justice of Christian Rome, the submission of the will to the will of God that alone constitutes freedom. The oxymoron “*indiga divite*,” which epitomizes in the first *topos* the abounding iniquity of apostate Rome, underscores in the second the superiority of Apostolic to pagan Rome. The two *topoi* interact ultimately to augment the apostasy of Curial Rome, which is revealed to have fallen not only from the glory that was pagan Rome, but from the immeasurably greater glory that is Apostolic Rome.

The transcendence of Christian Rome is personified in the rude and simple fisherman, *Petrus idiota*. The conversion of *Roma nocens* to Christian Rome and the mundane decline obverse to that spiritual ascent are prefigured in the physical fall from which the persecutor Saul, “*Saulus atrox*,” rose to become the Apostle Paul. Both figures symbolize that ministry of the active life by which pagan Rome was brought to baptism and Curial Rome may be brought to repentance. As servants of divine wisdom and grace they are represented in their ministry with the traditional images of light (“lumina”) and water (“flumina”), the one especially apposite to the episcopal function, the other expressive of that superabounding grace which alone can wash away the abounding iniquity of a charity grown cold.

Peter and Paul are antipodal to the *stultus pastor* of Zechariah, the person of the third *topos*, the type of Antichrist linked in patristic tradition to the abounding iniquity that portends the last age.<sup>110</sup> As the omen of an ineffable evil utterly to be avoided, the presence of this figure hovers over the passage (III.699-720) in which Bernard, without presuming like the heretics to set his mouth against heaven, animadverts upon the pope and his legates.<sup>111</sup> In their ministry of the active life they seem to have become unduly preoccupied with the material exigencies of the ecclesiastic institution. As judges they betray more concern with fines than for vindication. The knightly equipage, the numerous retainers, and the silken garb with which they journey to synod in France are adjudged by Bernard to befit rather the temporal service (*militia*) of an earthly monarch. Alluding to the monastic humility with which by contrast in youth or in Rome they walk

<sup>110</sup> Jerome *Epistulae* LII.4 (CSEL 54, 420).

<sup>111</sup> John of Salisbury *Policraticus* VIII.xvii,783c-d.

afoot or wear goatskins, the poet draws upon the *locus de quo*, one of the circumstances upon which Bernard of Clairvaux constructed the treatise *De consideratione* addressed to Eugenius III.<sup>112</sup> The presumption that precipitates had long before been stigmatized by Jerome in the figure of the “negociatorem clericum et ex inope divitem et ex ignobili gloriosum.”<sup>113</sup> This aggrandizement of the self parodies the transvaluation of the cross from ignominy to glory, which signalizes in the second *topos* the progress of the city of God. The dedication of the self to the Church precluding such aggrandizement is signified by the episcopal ring, which replaces the more generalized *infula* in the refrain of the plaint upon simony — “*infula venditur*” — when that refrain is carried over — “*venditur annulus*” — into the beginning of the apostrophe to Rome.<sup>114</sup> The replacement is emphatic, for the ring is an ambiguous emblem, having belonged in pagan Rome to the insignia of the equestrian order.

The figure of the *stultus pastor* latent in the strictures upon the all too secular service (*militia*) of pope and legates emerges more discernibly in preceptive statements of theme appended to the second *topos*. In pastoral imagery reminiscent of the foolish shepherd the Roman prelates are exhorted to resume the works of mercy from which in the prediction of Zechariah the foolish shepherd is expressly dissociated. The statements of theme interposed in the second *topos* dissuade from the simoniacal concupiscence of the eyes. The phrasing of these statements accentuates paronymically the perversion of the episcopal (“*respicis*,” “*inspicis*”) and the sacerdotal (“*dare... danti... sacra nomina sacraque culmina*”) functions in Curial Rome, while the metaleptic sequence *magistra*, <*magis*>, *minus*, <*ministra*> converges on the pride intensifying the venality that alienates Curial Rome from its Petrine heritage — an alienation vividly elicited by the paronymic inversion of the sacerdotal etymon (*sacrum dans*), which opposes the virgins and martyrs of Apostolic Rome — “*sacra culmina dant tibi nomina vana Catonom*” (III.671) — to the venal functionary of Curial Rome — “*Das sacra culmina, das moderamina sacra probrosis*” (III.729, 653-654). The contradistinction of the Apostolic epoch and the present age of Christendom is further enhanced by the injunction to choose (“*elige*”) and love (“*dilige*”) ministers that love justice: the imputation that Curial Rome has withdrawn from justice, which in turn has withdrawn from Curial Rome, calls to mind the allegory of the golden age symbolizing this contradistinction which began the development of the

<sup>112</sup> Heb. 11: 37; Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione* II. v, 8 (PL 182, 746-747).

<sup>113</sup> *Epistulae* LII.5.3; 6.3 (CSEL 54, 422, 425-426).

<sup>114</sup> Honorius Augustodunensis *Gemma animae* I.216 (PL 172, 609); Bernard of Clairvaux *De consideratione*, *prologus* (PL 182, 727).

commonplace iniquity. The image foremost in thematic statements of the apostrophe is one that corresponds to the positional imagery (e.g., “corruit,” “erigit,” “jacet,” “recumbit,” “clauda”) pervading the elaboration, the image of resurgence — “quando resurget?” (III.598), “Roma resurgo” (III.687). Recalling the image of the first resurrection thematic in Part One, it does more than summon to the conversion of self. It exhorts the servants of Curial Rome both high and low, apostate now in their service of self, to convert themselves in the service of God to the conversion of their fellow men.

To the defection of Curial Rome corresponds a pandemic defection which renews throughout Christendom the universal apostasy that preceded the first advent of Christ and portends the ultimate apostasy that shall precede the second. This apostasy imputed by Bernard to his age, an age envisioned as an ambiguous interval between the third and fourth epochs of Christendom, has throughout the poem determined his presentation of the third commonplace of the *contemptus mundi*, the iniquity or *anomia* of man. This apostasy is less an aversion from the faith universally professed in the epoch of the *pax Christiana* than a reversion to the perverse works from which the Christian had been converted in baptism.<sup>115</sup> After the apostrophe to Rome, as the poem draws inevitably to its end (III.745-914), the reversion of Christendom is lingered over by the poet with an elegiac importunacy that reaches from the antitheses of Paul (Romans 5-7) to the images of the Egyptian darkness.<sup>116</sup> The lament dwells upon the regression from the reign of justice and life to the reign of sin and death,

<sup>115</sup> Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.ix.6.

<sup>116</sup> III.746b, *Carmina Burana* xxvii.3.4. III.747 *tetragonalis*, Gregory *Mor.* II.76-77; *Hom. in Ez.* II.x.17-18. III.748 *gratia... spiritualis*, Rom. 1:11. III.750, I Cor. 16: 13-14; Gregory *Mor.* X.39. III.751, Jas. 2: 17; I Pet. 4: 8. III.752, II Cor. 6: 5; 11: 23. III.755, Gregory *Mor.* XXIX.65; *Hom. in Ez.* II.vii.15-20. III.756, Gregory *Mor.* III.16. III.762, John 3: 20. III.763, Bruno *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli* (*PL* 153, 415). III.768 *remordent*, Gregory *Hom. in Ez.* I.x.13. III.770, Matt. 23: 27. III.772-800, *Carmina Burana* i, xi. III.773 *volutat*, II Pet. 2: 22. III.793-794, Juvenal III.159. III.802 *garrula*, Jerome *Epistulae* LII.8; LXIX.9.2. (*CSEL* 54, 428-430, 697). III.804b, Hugo de Folieto *De claustro animae* II.7 (*PL* 176, 1055-1056); *Carmina Burana* xi.29. III.810 *turbine*, II Pet. 2: 17. III.816, Gregory *Mor.* V.13-14; *Hom. in Ez.* II.x.21; Bernard of Clairvaux *Serm. in Cant.* LVIII.11 (*PL* 183, 1061). III.836 *pervigilantia*, Heb. 13: 17. III.845, Isa. 56: 11; Rom. 3: 12. III.846, Isa. 59: 7; Ezek. 22: 27; Rom. 3: 15. III.853, Isa. 57: 17. III.855-856, I Cor. 16: 13-14. III.858, Bar. 5: 1; Rom. 13: 12; Eph. 4: 22-24; 6: 11. III.859, Rom. 13: 11; Eph. 5: 14. III.860, I John 2: 18; cf. John 12: 46-47. III.863-864, Ezek. 7: 10; Zeph. 1: 7,14-15; Gal. 6: 10. III.865, I.1073-1074. III.866, Isa. 52: 2. III.880, Augustine *Sermones* XXVI.xii,13 (*PL* 38, 177); Heliand *Sermones* XXVI (*PL* 212, 693). III.892, Gregory *Mor.* VIII.16; XX.38-40. III.895 *monilia*, Jerome *Adversus Jovinianum* I.34 (*PL* 23, 258); Philip de Harveng *Commentaria in Cantica canticorum* VI.16 (*PL* 203, 461-462); Alanus de Insulis *Elucidatio in Cantica canticorum* vii (*PL* 210, 98). III.895c, Rom. 9: 23. III.901-902, Jerome *Commentaria in Ezechiel* III,ix.4-6 (*PL* 25, 89). III.910, Isa. 40: 11. III.911 *Respicere*, Exod. 2: 25; Eccl. 36: 1. III.914 *dirige*, Eccl. 36: 19.

from the tetragonal law of God to the law of sin ( $\delta\; \nuόμος\; τῆς\; ἀμαρτίας$ ), from the freedom of grace to the bondage of venality and concupiscence, from peace with God and hope for glory to wrath and oblivion. The Apocalyptic portents of the seventh vial and seventh trumpet are once again called to witness. The dominical signs are once more proclaimed. Iniquity abounds, diffused over Christendom, profuse, confused. Spiritually sterile like the gentiles before the first advent, the iniquitous abound in fleshly offspring, their malign pullulation symbolized by the scriptural viper, in turn augmented by the ethnic hydra, the etymology of which ( $\check{\nu}\delta\omega\rho$ ) makes it accord with the imagery of abundance.<sup>117</sup> Headlong and insensate, they are insensible of vanity. Their insatiable and indiscriminate lust of eyes and flesh has for its emblem the *vorago*, the anagogical image of hell-mouth, which their own mouths, mocking the faith, busy with gluttony, garrulous with sophistry and litigation, anagogically prefigure. Laden with transient goods, they spurn the less commodious way, the narrow gate, of social poverty. In them charity has grown cold as they rend the tetragon of virtue and the bonds of humanity, as the spirit of God withdraws from a people that will not perfect their faith in works. For-saking that justice which is the gift of the spirit, they oppress the just, consummating their impiety while enslaving their own members to uncleanness and injustice. They pervert the laws of society in their idolatry of this world's wealth, then sink to the nameless perversions of their bodies like the reprobate pagans at the first advent. Like the incredulous Pharisees they are blinded to the light that has come into the world by the glitter of wealth. They will not see the hairiness, the horror, of sin beneath the sepulchral gleam of hypocrisy because they will not discern the inward grace of the benign servant that alone renders man beautiful to the sight of God. Like the magi of Pharaoh they have rejected the bond of charity.<sup>118</sup> They have chosen rather to hide themselves in the bonds of darkness, where their sins gnaw at their troubled consciences while they themselves gnaw in detraction at the sons of light. Hating the light, they have preferred that inner darkness, the image of death, that foreshadows the outer darkness, where the weeping and gnashing of teeth shall requite anagogically their iniquities of eye and mouth. Like the quiet silence that held all Egypt when the word of God, leaping from heaven, filled the night with death, a blind silence holds all Christendom with that darkness unillumined by the simple eye which, symbolizing the reprobate sense, foreshadows the advent of retribution.<sup>119</sup> Then the dead shall rise like the phoenix, the

<sup>117</sup> Raban Maur *De universo* VIII.3 (PL 111, 232-233).

<sup>118</sup> Wisd. 17-18; Raban Maur *Commentaria in Librum Sapientiae* III.12-15 (PL 109, 751-757).

<sup>119</sup> III.835,841; Hugh of Saint Victor *De sacramentis Christianae fidei* II.xiii.12 (PL 176, 548); Bernard of Clairvaux *De preecepto et dispensatione* xiv (PL 182, 880-884).

witness of bodily resurrection to the pagans that would understand through the creatures of God (*πονηματα*, Rom. 1:20). Then Christ, the dual visaged Judge, shall separate His chosen people from the lot of hell, the ignominious mass whose confusion does not admit distinction.<sup>120</sup>

The pillar of fire, the column of cloud no longer guide through adversity and prosperity the ministers of zeal. The remembrance of Christ's passion no longer sharpens the zeal of rectitude. Love of world has broken the fortitude of charity. Deceived and deceiving for love of world, the eyes that should oversee the body of Christendom are no longer simple.<sup>121</sup> They have accommodated themselves to bribery, relinquishing to it the dual function of leadership, *praesesse ac prodesse*. The *bulla aurea*, talisman of the free born in pagan Rome, of servile avarice in Curial Rome, has subverted the *bulla plumbea* or papal seal imprinted with the heads of Peter and Paul. The renunciation of self in voluntary poverty, the renunciation of the powers of darkness in baptism are themselves disavowed in the self love of a false generation that no longer responds to the typology of the Red Sea or the achievement of the Crucifixion. While the multitude of sinners confuse with happiness the laborious anxieties of concupiscence, the poet bids the remnant that is elect, marked with the sign of the cross, to lament the sins of the many. Against the universal silence Bernard opposes the wraith of charity, then the voice of Paul, and at last his own. In statements of theme at once preceptive and paradigmatic, which recur to thematic metaphors of resurgence, vigilance, and immersion, to the anagoge of the Galilean storm, and to the allegory of the golden age, the poet exemplar of ministering zeal petitions the Redeemer to sustain in penance the faithful whom He freed in baptism lest they too be handed over in this ambiguous time to the reprobate sense and like the faithless shepherds be separated forever from His sheep.<sup>122</sup>

*Loyola University, Chicago.*

<sup>120</sup> Hildebert *Sermones xc* (PL 171, 762).

<sup>121</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux *De praecipto et dispensatione* xiv,40 (PL 182, 882-883).

<sup>122</sup> *Addenda:* II.20-22, 26, Seneca *Moral Epistles* XC.46; cf. Augustine *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I.i.8 (PL 40, 106). II.174 *Dissociabilis*, Seneca *Moral Epistles* XC.36. II.212 *unctio*, Ps. 140: 5; Gregory *Hom. in Ev.* XII.3. II.238, Augustine *Sermones* IX (PL 38, 75-91). II.730 *locus unio*, Alanus de Insulis *Summa de arte praedicatoria* xxi (PL 210, 154). II.790, Ps. 140: 3; Matt. 23: 13; Col. 4: 3; Gregory *Mor.* VII.61; Petrus Cantor *Verbum abbreviatum* lxii (PL 205, 189-193). II.803-804, cf. Boethius *De consolatione philosophiae* III, metrum 8. III.423-430, Gratian *Decretum*, prima pars, dist. lxxxvi, can. xiii (*Corpus iuris canonici*, ed. Friedberg, I, 300). III.646, Leo *Sermones* LXXXII.1 (PL 54, 422-423). III.683-686, Leo *Sermones* LXXXII.1 (PL 54, 422). III.880 *Massa*, Augustine *Contra Julianum* I.126-129 (PL 45, 1128-1129).

# Master Peter Bradley on the “Categories”

EDWARD A. SYNAN

ALTHOUGH Peter Bradley of Balliol seems to have left few traces for the historian, those few traces put him in distinguished company. One is a legal document that confirms the transfer of certain property rights from him, there designated a *scolaris* of Balliol, to Master William of Gotham, a fellow of the same House. Witnesses to this transfer, whose names have been recorded (for some are masked by the formula *et aliis*), were Master Thomas of Pontefract, Master Adam of Burley, and three bachelors: Stephen of Cornwall, Richard of Campsall, and Geoffrey of Tendring.<sup>1</sup> Of more significance are the two known works of Bradley, extant in a unique manuscript, Gonville and Caius College MS 668\*, the first a series of disputed questions on the *Categories*, and the second a disputed question on a problem from the second book of the *Prior Analytics*.<sup>2</sup> Bradley's works associate him with Oxford personalities; among the authors represented in this manuscript collection of questions that bear mainly on the *Organon* are Adam Burley and Richard of Campsall, witnesses to the transaction with Gotham, but also Walter Burley, Thomas Chirmister, and William Duffeld. The codex opens with the text edited here. An even more eminent sometime Oxonian may, perhaps, be present in this text. John Duns Scotus formulated five arguments in favour of the metaphysical univocity of being when he commented at Oxford on the *Sentences*.<sup>3</sup> Bradley thought it right to list and to refute, in his questions on the *Categories*, five arguments for univocity.<sup>4</sup> The five Bradley listed do not coincide with

<sup>1</sup> H. E. Salter, *The Oxford Deeds of Balliol College* (Oxford, 1913) 141; Salter has read the second name as Adam de Kurle, but it seems preferable to read Adam de Burle, and so it has been read in A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* (Oxford, 1957-1959) 1,311 where this source is cited under the entry for Adam de Burleye.

<sup>2</sup> Research on this text must take its starting point from M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College* (Cambridge, 1908) 2, 665, but to the indications given there must be added the fact that the fifth component of the codex, *Questiones super librum II priorum*, fols. 30<sup>r</sup>-33<sup>v</sup> is not anonymous: fol. 33<sup>va</sup> carries at the foot: *Explicit questio magistri petri de bradley circa II priorum* and column b, carries in an otherwise blank area: *Magister petrus de bradley*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ordinatio I*, *distinctio 3*, *pars 1*, *quaestiones 1-2*, *Ioannis Duns Scoti doctoris subtilis et Mariani opera omnia* (Vatican City, 1954) 3, 18, *par. 27-30*, *par. 45*.

<sup>4</sup> See edition below, 1.27-1.31; for Bradley's refutations, 1.51-1.56.

those of Scotus; indeed, only his first and second seem very close to reasons adduced by Duns. But one of Bradley's five turns on a characteristic of univocity to which Scotus had adverted before he gave his five reasons, namely, that univocity confers on the middle term of a syllogism a unity sufficient to preclude the fallacy of equivocation.<sup>5</sup> Because the number of principal arguments in each author is five, because of Bradley's five, two are close to reasons given by Scotus, and finally, because another, listed by Bradley, makes a point that the greatest exponent of univocity held essential to all demonstration, Bradley may well have had the teaching of Scotus in mind, perhaps in a form preliminary to that which he would give it in his *Ordinatio*.

In the absence of any firm evidence as to the date of Bradley's work on the *Categories*, it may be remarked that a year in the first decade of the fourteenth century, and earlier rather than later, seems to be compatible with all our data, biographical and doctrinal.

Since this edition has been made from a single manuscript,<sup>6</sup> every characteristic of the codex has been preserved except its punctuation and paragraphing; titles of works cited explicitly by Bradley have been italicized for ease of location on the page, although the scribe has done nothing to set them off from the rest of his text. The three punctuation marks he has employed, the point, not only for a stop, but also as a quotation mark, the colon, and the inverted semi-colon, give a modern reader insufficient guidance through the intricacies of a scholastic text; the editor must take responsibility for the interpretation implied by the modern punctuation. Phrases used as headings for the major articulations of Bradley's argument have been enclosed in a frame: where this occurs, it is indicated in the edition by italics. Where a lemma has been written in bold and formal characters, it is here printed in upper case and the italics of the *Explicitum* indicate a somewhat larger and more open calligraphy than that of the text itself. Where the scribe has used an Arabic numeral without an indication of inflection, the number has been transcribed as it stands; where an inflection has been added to an Arabic numeral, this has been understood as an abbreviation of an ordinal number and it has been expanded. Some curiosities of spelling are thus included and the capricious capitalization, for instance: 'Wult' (l. 33), has been preserved so that any

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.* 18, par. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Thanks to a generous grant from The Canada Council to work on Campsall's contribution to this codex, and to the courtesy of Doctor Philip Grierson, Librarian of Gonville and Caius, who deposited the manuscript in the Anderson Room of the University Library, it has been possible for me to work from the text of Bradley as well as that of Campsall under optimum conditions.

interest that may attach to the scribe's habits will not be lost in transcription. It ought to be noted that this scribe was not mechanically uniform in his practice; 'ten,' to cite one striking illustration, he wrote indifferently as '01,' '10,' 'x,' or 'decem;' frames are missing from some headings, the same word occurs in variant spellings. All Roman numerals to indicate the principal arguments and their responses are editorial additions as are the Arabic numerals that serve to identify question and paragraph; on two occasions it has seemed useful to supply a heading, and this has been done between pointed brackets, the first before paragraph 1.27, the second before 6.30. Where a slip by the scribe has required no more than the insertion of letters or words, the emendation has been made within pointed brackets and without further explanation; in all other instances of emendation, footnotes provide the readings that have been emended. Last, although the name of the author is given on fols. 1<sup>r</sup> and 33<sup>v</sup> as 'Bradley (bradley)', it is there written in a hand other than that of our scribe; he has written the name only once, in the *Expliciunt* of the present questions, 11.18; for him, the author is 'bradley'.

Distinccio prima	questio prima	Bradley <sup>1</sup>
EQUIVOCA DICUNTUR QUORUM SOLUM NOMEN COMMUNE EST ET CETERA. <sup>2</sup>		

Circa istum librum, queratur primo de ente quod est commune ad 01<sup>3</sup> predicamenta, et ens causatum et incausatum: utrum ens sit commune univocum ad x predicamenta, et simul cum hoc, ad ens causatum et incausatum?

1.01 quod non ad ens causatum et incausatum ostendo primo quia, si sic, sequentur multa inconveniencia: quod prima causa esset corruptibilis, et similiter, quod aliqua pars prime cause esset in quolibet ente alio ab ea tanquam pars componens totum et, per consequens, aliqua pars dei esse in diabolo, et aliqua pars diaboli esset in deo, et similiter, aliqua pars diaboli de necessitate esset in anima cuiuslibet hominis.

<sup>1</sup> This first line in the top margin is in a larger and more formal hand than that in which the text is written; 'Distinccio prima' indicates that this work of Bradley is the first of the thirteen items that constitute this codex; although two former catalogue numbers, 445 and 196, are visible, they have not been transcribed.

<sup>2</sup> This lemma, *Categories* 1; 1a 1, *Aristoteles Latinus, Categoriae vel Praedicamenta*, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, (Bruges, Paris, 1961), has been written in large characters and with minimal abbreviation; it seems to stem from the translation of Boethius, given, *ed. cit.* p. 5, l. 3, as: Aequivoqua dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est.

<sup>3</sup> Initial letter of 'Circa' has been done in blue, the sole instance in this codex where the space left by the scribe for a lettrine has been filled; headings in column 'a' have been stroked in red, but not those of column 'b'; the Arabic 'ten,' '01,' is the first instance in which the numeral occurs.

1.02 quod autem ista sequantur patet; primo de primo: nam, si ens sit univocum deo et creaturis, igitur res significata per ‘ens’ est pars componens primam causam et quodcumque ens causatum et, per consequens, eadem res est pars socratis et pars prime cause; cum, igitur, socrates sit corruptibilis, quia cras corumpetur,<sup>4</sup> sic illa; igitur, pars componens primam causam corumpetur cras quia corumpcio est transmutatio tocius in totum et ita, corrupto socrate, corumpitur prima causa. vel dabitur quod una pars eius manet et ita, prima causa habebit unam partem intrinsicam essencialiter ipsam componentem corruptam, et aliam manentem, quod est satis impossibile cum in ea non sit ponere talem pluralitatem parcium cum sit essencia simplicissima. quod istud sequatur patet, nam res significata per ‘ens’ est pars prime cause, et eadem res est pars componens animam cuiuslibet, et eciam diabolum, igitur, eadem pars, que est pars diaboli, est in anima cuiuslibet hominis, quia est pars anime cuiuslibet hominis. nec valet dicere ad primum quod aliqua pars dei, puta, ista que est in socrate, non corumpitur ad corruptionem socratis. et quando dicitur quod, corrupto socrate, corumpitur quidlibet quod est in eo, dicitur quod verum est per se, vel per accidens, Contra: ex isto sequitur quod pars tunc corumpitur per accidens, quod est maximum impossibile quia si, corrupto socrate, corumpatur quidlibet in eo per se, vel per accidens, et aliqua pars prime cause est in socrate, igitur illa corumpitur per accidens, vel per se. si per accidens, habetur propositum; si per se, adhuc habetur propositum, quia istud est impossibilius primo.

1.03 *Aliud principale*: nullum predicatum est univocum ad x predicamenta, nec aliqua univoce unum in eis; sed res significata per ‘ens’ est aliquod predicatum; igitur, et cetera. maior patet per veritatem cuiuslibet singularis, distribuendo per decem predicamenta. minor patet, nam arguo sic: quodlibet istorum, demonstrando per hoc ‘istorum’ x predicamenta, est aliquod predicatum; et ‘a’ est aliquod istorum; igitur, ‘a’ est aliquod predicatum, et appellat ‘a’ rem significatam per ‘ens.’

1.04 si neget minor, Contra: sequitur: ‘a’ est pars istorum, igitur ‘a’ est aliquod istorum, igitur hec vera. et tunc capiatur hec: quodlibet istorum est aliquod predicatum, que est vera, ut probatum est, et tunc sequetur conclusio prius dicta.

1.05 et similiter, arguatur sic: quodlibet istorum est aliquod predicatum; ‘a’ est istorum; igitur, ‘a’ est aliquod predicatum. premisse sunt vere, igitur conclusio. minor patet, nam sequitur: ‘a’ est aliquod, et illud idem est istorum, igitur ‘a’ est istorum quia, si ‘a’ est ‘b’, et e contra, quorumcunque est ‘a’, et eorumdem est ‘b’.

1.06 Preterea, hoc dicto, ‘quodlibet istorum est aliquod predicatum,’ quero: an fit distribucio pro quolibet de quo dicitur hoc subiectum, vel non? si non, sit illud ‘a’; tunc ‘a’ est aliquod istorum x; et non fit distribucio pro ‘a’; igitur, non fit distribucio pro x predicamentis. si sic, cum istud subiectum dicitur de ‘a’, quod est natura significata per ‘ens,’ sequetur quod hec sit vera: ‘a’ est aliquod predicatum. assumptum patet vocibus, quod subiectum universalis dicitur de ‘a’, quia subiectum huius infinitum: ‘aliquod istorum <universal>’ ter<sup>5</sup> dicitur de “a” et hec est infinita universalis; igitur, et cetera. assumptum patet quia ista sunt convertibilia: ‘aliquod istorum’ et ‘aliquod ens istorum,’ igitur, de quo verificatur (1<sup>r</sup> a/b) unum, et reliquum. sed hec est vera: “a” est aliquod ens istorum’ quia sequitur tan-

<sup>4</sup> Phrase evokes Mtt 6: 30: Si foenum... quod hodie est... cras in clibanum mittitur...

<sup>5</sup> Emendation required owing to damage to text.

quam ab inferiori ad superiorius: ‘‘a’’ est hoc ens istorum,’ demonstrando partem istorum, ‘igitur ‘a’ est aliquod ens istorum.’ antecedens verum, igitur consequens consequencia patet quia, ex opposito consequentis cum antecedente sequitur istud quod: ‘hoc ens istorum non est aliquod ens istorum.’

1.07 si dicatur huic distinguendo istam: ‘quidlibet istorum, et cetera,’ eo quod potest esse construccio partitiva vel possessiva; primo modo est falsa, secundo modo vera. Contra: hic nullo modo potest esse construccio possessiva quia, si hec esset vera sub tali construccione, ‘quidlibet istorum, et cetera,’ hec esset vera: quodlibet possedium ‘a’ x predicamentis esset aliquod predicatum, et cum nichil aliud a predicato sit predicatum, sequeretur quod unum predicatum possideret relicum, quod a nullo est opinatum. consequencia patet quia, cum hec sit vera, ‘cuiuslibet hominis, et cetera,’ sub construccione possessiva, sequitur quod ‘cuiuslibet hominis possidentis asinum, aliquis asinus currit.’

1.08 similiter, demonstrando socratem et platonem, quorum cicerho est pater, hec esset vera: ‘cicerho est aliquod istorum,’ et non sub construccione partitiva, igitur possessiva, et ita esset concedendum quod filius possideret patrem suum, et omnes eius parentes.

1.09 Preterea, probatur quod falsa non est falsa, ut est construccio partitiva quia, si esset falsa pro ‘a’, tunc ‘a’ esset pars componens quodlibet predicatum. Sed, in quolibet composito est ponere partem, vel ponere duas partes, igitur quodlibet predicatum componeretur ex ‘a’ et alia parte ab ‘a’; quero, igitur, de alia parte: aut ens univoce predicatur de ea, vel non? si non, tunc non univoce predicatur de omnibus entibus causatis et incausatis, ita eciam de predictatis. si sic, illa pars componetur ex ‘a’ et alia parte ab ‘a’ et quero de illa alia parte ut prius, et erit processus in infinitum, quod videtur impossibile salvare in entibus nature.

1.10 *Aliud principale*: arguo autoritatibus et racione, autoritate porfirii primo; dicit, enim, quod ‘si quis omnia encia vocet, equivoce nuncupabit, et non univoce,’<sup>6</sup> et, per consequens, ens non erit univocum.

1.11 Item, in isto libro, ‘singulum’ incomplexorum ‘aut significat’ singula, et cetera; hoc, igitur, incomplexum ‘ens’ aliquod istorum, determinate est predicatum et, per consequens, non erit univocum ad omnia ista.

1.12 Preterea, per aristotelem, primo *physicorum*, ‘principium’ accedendi contra antiquos est quod ‘ens dicitur multipliciter.’<sup>7</sup>

1.13 Item, per aristotelem, quarto *metaphysice*, ‘idem, diversum,’ opposita, et contraria, dictuntur multipliciter, quia ens dicitur multipliciter.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Porphyrii introductio a Boethio translata*, ed. A. Busse, (Berlin, 1887), p. 31, ll. 13, 14: vel si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce, inquit, nuncupabit, nod univoce; cf. PL 64, 108 B-C.

<sup>7</sup> *Categories* 4; 1b 25-27, ed. cit. p. 6, ll. 27-30: Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur singulum aut substantiam significat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.

<sup>8</sup> *Physics* I, 2; 185a 20-23, *Aristoteles Latinus, Physica*, ed. A. Mansion, (Bruges-Paris, 1957), p. 5, ll. 1-3: Principium vero magis proprium omnium, quoniam multipliciter dicitur ens, quomodo dicunt dicentes esse unum omnia, an ut substantiam omnia aut quanta aut qualia.

<sup>9</sup> *Metaphysics* IV, 2; 1003a 33-35; texts of Aristotle, not yet available in the *Aristoteles Latinus* edition, and all texts of Averroes, are cited according to the Venice edition (Apud Iuntas) in 13

1.14 Preterea, 8 eiusdem, dicit aristoteles quod ‘statim’ ens est quale quid, quantum, et cetera,<sup>10</sup> quia non expoccat alias differencias per quas descendit in predicamenta, nam sic esset genus, sed istud non esset verum, si esset univocum.

1.15 Item, per rationem sic: si ens esset univocum, et cetera, tunc substancia et quantitas adderent aliquid supra ens; quero de illo addito, quod substancia addit supra ens: aut est ens, aut est non ens? si ens, hoc est impossibile, quia illud contrahit ens ad substanciam, et contractum est extra intellectum contrahentis, igitur ens esset extra intellectum illius additi et ita, non esset de intellectu cuiuslibet, quod est contra commentatorem.<sup>11</sup>

1.16 huic dicitur quod contraccio est duplex: una, generis per substancias reales, ipsum non includentes, et sic non contrahitur ens; alia, per diversos modos essendi, et sic contrahitur ens ad substanciam et accidens.

1.17 et quando tunc queritur de modo contrahente ens ad substanciam: aut est ens, aut non ens? dicitur quod neque sic, neque sic, sed concedendum est quod non est ens, Contra: si ille modus non est ens, et est pars componens substanciam, igitur substancia componitur ex ente et eo quod non est ens, et ita, ex alico et nichilo.

1.18 similiter, ille modus: aut est pars intrinsica substancie, vel non? si non, tunc substancia intrinsice non includit nisi rationem entis, quam intrinsice includit quantitas et quodlibet predicamentum, igitur omnia predicamenta realiter essent eadem. si sic, igitur est pars realiter extra animam et, per consequens, est ens.

1.19 similiter, quilibet modus est actus alicuius primo; (1<sup>r</sup> b/1<sup>v</sup> a) aut, igitur, iste modus est actus entis in communi primo, vel substancie primo. si entis, et modus non separatur ab eo cuius est, cum, igitur, natura entis intrinsice inveniatur in quantitate, igitur et iste modus, et ita, cum substancia non includit nisi naturam entis cum isto modo, sequetur quod tota realitas substancie est in quantitate. si sit actus substancie primo, tunc arguo: res presupponitur suo modo, ita quod modus posterior est eo cuius est modus; igitur, iste modus erit posterior substancia et sic, substancia non erit formaliter substancia per istum modum.

1.20 similiter, ex isto sequeretur quod homo et asinus magis different quam substancia et quantitas, quia illa magis differunt que differunt realiter, ita quod re

volumes that appeared between 1562 and 1576; the present text is to be found there, vol. 8, fol. 64 v L: Et ens dicitur multis modis, et non dicitur aequivoce, sed attribuitur uni rei, et uni naturae... 1005a 11-13, fol. 71<sup>r</sup> E-F; Et ideo Geometra non habet dicere quid est contrarium, et quid est unum, et quid perfectum, et idem et diversum... una scientia habet considerationem de ente simpliciter.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* VIII, 6; 1045b 1-7, fol. 224<sup>v</sup> G: ...unumquodque eorum statim est unum illud, quod est per essentiam, sicut illud, quod est aliquid ens. et ideo in definitionibus non est ens neque unum... quoniam unumquodque eorum statim est aliquid ens, et aliquid unum, non quia sunt in ente et in uno, sicut illa, quae sunt in genere...

<sup>11</sup> Averroes, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 71<sup>v</sup> K-M: ...si ens, et unum non significant nisi unam intentionem universalem in omnibus rebus dictam univoce, neque etiam fuerit diversum ab omnibus rebus. Et dicit hoc, quia isti duo modi sunt impossibilis... una est scientia, et quod ista debet consyderare ce ente, secundum quod est ens, et de accidentibus eius... non tantum in substantiis, sed etiam in eis quae accidentum substantiae...

differunt, et in modo essendi rei differunt, quam illa que solo modo differunt; sed primo modo differunt homo et asinus, certum est; et secundo modo substancia et quantitas; igitur, et cetera.

1.21 *Aliud principale*: si ens esset univocum ad omnia encia nature et racionis, tunc ad metaphisicum pertineret considerare de entibus racionis; cum, tamen, ipsem et excludit illa in sexta sua consideracione,<sup>12</sup> consequencia patet, nam ad quem pertinet considerare de alico communi univoco, ad eundem pertinet considerare de quolibet recipiente predicacionem eius univoce; sed ad metaphisicum pertinet determinare de ente in quantum ens, igitur, et cetera.

1.22 similiter, tales essent concedende: aliquid est peius diabolo, et: aliquid est melius deo.

1.23 similiter, ens esset commune univocum ad seipsum, et ita, idem esset inferius et superius, respectu eiusdem.

1.24 Item, si ens sit univocum, igitur est universale respectu univocorum, quia est unum in multis et de multis univoce, et hec est diffinio 'universalis,' et certum est quod ens non est aliquod universale a genere, quia nec species, nec differencia, et cetera, igitur erit genus, cuius oppositum probat philosophus.<sup>13</sup>

1.25 similiter, si sic, ens predicetur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid, et ita erit conceptus per locum a diffinizione.

1.26 Item, predicamenta sunt primo distincta, igitur nichil erit ens commune univocum.

### <Raciones pro univocatione entis>

#### I

1.27 *Ad oppositum*: si aliquis sit certus de alico, et dubius de aliis duobus, alias erit conceptus illius unius et aliorum duorum, sicut, animali viso a remotis, aliquis est certus de animali, quia scit quod est animal, dubitat, tamen, an sit homo vel asinus, et ideo, alias conceptus erit animalis et aliorum duorum, nam aliter, idem conceptus simul de eodem esset dubius et certus. sed ens: antiqui sciverunt de primo principio, quod fuit ens, dubitabant, tamen, an fuit substancia vel accidentis; igitur, alium conceptum importat ens quam substancia vel accidentis et, per consequens, conceptum univocum importabit.

#### II

1.28 Preterea, unius potencie realis est unum obiectum univocum; sed ens est obiectum intellectus; igitur, erit univocum. minor patet, nam quiditas substancie mate-

<sup>12</sup> That is, Aristotle in *Metaphysics* VI; thus the 'summae libri' (sexti) provided, *ed.cit.* vol. 8, fol. 143<sup>v</sup>: In Prima declaratur, de quo ente prima Philosophia consydereret... In Secunda declarantur quaedam entis species, quae ab hac scientia secluduntur; thus also Averroes, *ed. cit.* fol. 152<sup>v</sup> H-I: Deinde dicit Aristoteles dimittamus ergo ens, et cetera, id est, dimittamus igitur perscrutari perscrutationem de ente, quod est per accidentis, et de ente quod est veridicans (SIC: veridicens ?), scilicet, quod est in anima... et ideo perscrutandum est de ente perfecto, quod est ens extra animam.

<sup>13</sup> See above, n. 10; also, *Metaphysics* III, 3; 998b 22, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 48<sup>r</sup> D: sed impossibile est ut genus entium sit unum, aut ens.

rialis non potest esse obiectum quia aliquid intelligitur quod non continetur sub quiditate substancie materialis.

### III

1.29 Preterea, idem est obiectum potentie et primi habitus eiusdem potentie; sed primus habitus potentie intellective est sciencia metaphysica, cuius sciencie ens est subiectum vel obiectum; igitur, erit obiectum potentie intellective.

### IV

1.30 Preterea, nisi ens esset univocum, non possimus habere aliquam cognicionem de prima causa, quia non possimus cognoscere eam per causatum, nisi sit univocatio in ente, et hoc statim in comparacione ad causam et causatum et, eadem ratione, ad substanciam, ad accidens; sed non est nobis possibilis alia via; igitur, et cetera.

### V

1.31 Preterea, aristoteles, secundo *metaphysice*, probat quod ista sciencia est aliqua verissima, et arguit sic: veritas inest causato per causam, igitur cause magis.<sup>14</sup> sed iste modus arguendi non valeret, nisi veritas esset univocum, nam aliter essent quatuor termini, si reduceretur in sillogismum, et cum ens et verum convertitur, ens erit univocum. (1<sup>v</sup> a/b)

1.32 *Ad istam questionem* tres sunt vie: prima, quod ens est equivicum pure, sed istud est plane contra aristotelem, quarto *metaphysice*; dicit, enim, quod ens nec est equivicum, nec univocum, sed est analogum, sicut sanitas, enim, dicitur per prius de animali, per posterius de urina, ita ens se habet ad substanciam et accidens.<sup>15</sup>

1.33 similiter, commentator, supra eamdem literam, dicit quod postquam aristoteles manifestavit<sup>16</sup> quod ad hanc scienciam pertinet considerare de ente, Wult ostendere quod ens non est equivicum quia, si sic, de eo nulla ars de eo posset considerari.<sup>17</sup>

1.34 similiter, hec esset impossibilis omni sensu: substancia est magis ens quam accidens, quia, si accipiatur ens pro substancia, significatur quod accidens est substancia; similiter, si accipiatur pro accidente, significatur quod substancia sit accidens.

1.35 unde, quia ista via est contra aristotelem et commentatorem, ideo dicitur aliter quod ens est univocum, et non solum ad substanciam et accidens, sed ad primam causam et ens causatum, et hoc propter 5 raciones ultimo factas. Contra istam viam est aristoteles et etiam commentator plane, septimo *metaphysice*, nam, ut allegatum est prius, ens neque est univocum, neque equivicum, sed analogum.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Metaphysics* II, 1; 993b 19-31, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 29<sup>v</sup> H-M, especially L: Ex quo oportet ut maxime verum sit illud, quod est causa veritatis rerum, quae sunt post.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* IV, 2; 1003a 33-b 22, fol. 64<sup>v</sup> L-65<sup>r</sup> D, especially: Et ens dicitur multis modis, et non dicitur aequivoce, sed attribuitur uni rei, et uni naturae, sicut omne sanans attribuitur sanitati...

<sup>16</sup> Em. MS: manufestavit.

<sup>17</sup> Averroes, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 65<sup>r</sup> D: si enim esset aequivocum, non consyderaret de eo una ars.

<sup>18</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 1; 1030a 32-35, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 164<sup>v</sup> M: Oportet igitur ut non dicantur entia eodem modo aequivocationis sed secundum magis et minus. sicut illud quod non est notum et verum, etiam de noto et ignoto. sermo enim verus qui non est modo aequivoco, sed secundum

1.36 Preterea, arguo sic: si ens esset univocum, et cetera, igitur substancia et accidens essent univoce unita, et primo in ente, sed, in quo aliqua sunt unita, in eodem non sunt ordinata et, per consequens, substancia et accidens non sunt ordinata in ente, et ita, substancia non esset per prius ens quam accidens, quod est contra philosophum, septimo *metaphysice*, dicentem quod accidens non est ens, nisi 'quia entis';<sup>19</sup> unde, non entitate sua dependet a substancia, cum substancia sit primum ens.

1.37 similiter, secundum istam viam, oportet necessario concedere quod prima causa componatur ex re et re,<sup>20</sup> quia ex re significata per 'ens,' et ex residuo in ea, et ita, non esset ex natura simplicissima, immo, aliquid esset simplicius eo, simplicitate rerum, quod videtur contra fidem.

1.38 similiter, aliquid esset prius ea quia simplicior ea, cum omnia posteriora dependent realiter a primo extra genus, et huiusmodi primum est aliquid aliud a prima causa, quia aliquid aliud est simplicius, ergo magis primum, et ita, prima causa realiter dependeret ab alico alio a se, quod includit incompossibilia.

1.39 similiter, raciones facte pro ista parte in nullo concludunt quia, in prima est fallacia consequentis, et in qualibet alia accipitur falsum, ut patebit in soluzione earumdem et ideo, pro ipsis rationibus, non videtur hec via esse tenenda, eciam quia est plane contra philosophum et commentatorem, ut prius allegatum est, eciam quia oportet concedere necessario, ut sustinentes istam viam concedunt, aliqua pars diaboli est in quolibet homine, et in anima cuiuslibet hominis, que videntur conclusiones valde periculose, maxime in quadam materia.

1.40 et ideo, dico aliam partem, videlicet, quod ens nec est univocum, nec equivocum, sed analogum. istud patet plane per aristotelem, quarto *metaphysice*; dicit, enim, ibi quod ens nec dicitur equivoce, nec univoce, sed dicitur ad unum, et ad unam naturam, et exemplificat de sanitate, que de animali dicitur per prius, per posterius de urina, et consimiliter, secundum ipsum ibidem, ens per prius dicitur de substancia, per posterius de accidente.<sup>21</sup> unde, de predicamentis non dicitur equivoce, quia sic hec esset omni sensu falsa, ut argutum est: 'substancia est magis ens quam accidens,' nec eciam dicitur univoce, quia, ut argutum est, in quo aliqua unificantur, non ordinantur secundum prius et posterius, sed in entitate ordinantur substancia et accidens, tum quia substancia est prius ens quam accidens, tum quia substancia precedit accidens diffinizione, cognitione, tempore, ut patet septimo *meta-*

similitudinem. sicut Medicina, quae attribuitur alicui, ita quod sit idem, non quia idem cum eis unum neque modo aequivoco etiam... By 'ut prius' Bradlay refers to the texts adduced above in nn. 9, 13, and 15.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1028a 18-20, fol. 153<sup>r</sup> E-F: Et alia dicuntur entia, quia sunt entis, quod est huiusmodi, quaedam quantitates, et quaedam qualitates, et quaedam aliud tale.

<sup>20</sup> The phrase 'ex re et re' with respect to the First Cause evokes Boethius, *De trinitate* II, PL 64 1250 C: divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unumquodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc...

<sup>21</sup> See text cited above, n. 15, especially fol. 65<sup>e</sup> A-B: ...quaedam enim dicuntur entia, quia sunt substantiae: et quaedam etiam, quia sunt passiones... quae dicuntur esse in substantia, aut quia negant aliquod istorum accidentium, aut substantia... Quemadmodum igitur scientia sanorum est una, sicut scientia aliorum similium...

*phisice.*<sup>22</sup> (1<sup>v</sup> b/2<sup>r</sup> a) erit, igitur, analogum respectu x predicamentorum, unde ‘ens’ significat alium conceptum a x predicamentis et aliam naturam, quia ens est subiectum realis scientie, ut metaphisice, igitur significat naturam realem, aliam a natura cuiuslibet predicamenti que ‘natura’ dicitur, sive dividitur in naturas predicamentorum secundum prius et posterius.

1.41 et istud bene probant 5 raciones factae<sup>23</sup> pro parte dicencium univocationem entis, unde bene probant quod ‘ens’ significet alium conceptum a x predicamentis. et quando inferunt ultra: ‘igitur significat conceptum univocum x, et cetera,’ plane faciunt fallaciam consequentis, quia ad conclusionem appareat quod hoc est consequens: ‘ens’ significat conceptum, igitur conceptum univocum, cum ‘conceptus’ se extendit ad conceptum univocum, analogum, et equivocum, et ideo arguunt sicud hic arguitur: ‘homo currit, igitur socrates currit.’ sic, igitur, patet quod ‘ens’ est analogum ad x, et cetera.

1.42 analogia, tamen, triplex est: una ex parte vocis, alia ex parte conceptus, tercia ex parte rei. prima analogia non est in ente respectu x, et cetera, sed est in hoc quod est ‘ridere,’ quod ex transumpcione significat ‘floracionem in pratis’<sup>24</sup> et ideo, istam analogiam appellat logicus ‘equivocationem penes secundum modum.’ et ideo distinguitur talis: ‘pratum ridet,’ sed ipse ibi extendit equivocationem ad omne illud quod non est pure univocum, et ideo, iste est intellectus istius propositionis: ‘si aliquis omnia encia vocet equivoce,’ hoc est, ‘non univoce nuncupabit,’ et hoc est verum.<sup>25</sup> unde, de analogia nunc dicta, habet proposicio veritatem; analogum per se positum stat pro modo famosiori, et hoc si non comparetur ad secundarium eius significatum, sicud hic: ‘homo ridet’ — non, enim, potest hic stare nisi pro ‘ridere’ hominis. utraque aliarum analogiarum est in ente respectu x predicamentorum quia conceptus eius per prius dicitur de substancia, per posterius de accidente, et non solum conceptus, sed res subiacens conceptui; sic, igitur, patet qualiter ‘ens’ de se habet ad x, et cetera.

1.43 Pro solucione<sup>26</sup> tamen argumentorum que possunt fieri, et facta sunt, sciendum quod ens non descendit in substanciam et accidens, sed statim est unumquodque predicamentorum, ut patet octavo *metaphisice*,<sup>27</sup> unde, tantum substancia addit supra ens, et hoc se ipsum, et ideo se ipso distinguitur ab accidente, et quodlibet predicamentum ab alio. unde, substancia componitur ex natura significata per ‘ens,’ et ex se ipso, et ista composicio non est nisi composicio inpropte dicta, quia est ex rebus ordinatis secundum superius et inferius.<sup>28</sup>

1.44 et tu dices: secundum istud, idem esset pars componens se ipsum, et idem pars et totum.

<sup>22</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 1; 1028a 30-32, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 154<sup>v</sup> H: Et primum dicitur multis modis, sed substantia est prima omnium rerum definitione, et cognitione, et tempore.

<sup>23</sup> That is, the series of five arguments adduced above, 1.27-1.31.

<sup>24</sup> Example is standard; see *Petri Hispani summulae logicales*, ed. I. M. Bocheński, (Rome, 1947), p. 69, 7.14.

<sup>25</sup> See above, n. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Left marg., drawing of a pointing hand.

<sup>27</sup> *Metaphysics* VIII, 6; 1045b 1-7; see above, n. 10.

<sup>28</sup> Left marg., ‘argumentum.’

1.45 similiter, esset procedere in infinitum, quia semper altera pars componeretur ex se ipso, et ente, in infinitum.

1.46 dicendum quod in tali compositione, que non est ex rebus inordinatis, sed ex superiori et inferiori, necessarium est quod idem sit pars componens se ipsum, quia in talibus, pars est totum, quia ens est de intellectu cuiuslibet.

1.47 Ad aliud: dicendum quod non est procedere ultra, quia substancia includit ens, et addit supra ens se ipsam, et certum est quod hec pars 'ens' nullam compositionem habet, quia est simplicissimum et communissimum, cum nichil sit superius eo, sed substancia, que est alia pars, componitur ex ente et se ipsa, et non est procedere ulterius quia, si accipias (2<sup>r</sup> a/b) substanciam iterum non accipis nisi quod erat acceptum, et ideo non est processus in infinitum.

1.48 utrum, tamen, ens sit univocum, vel analogum, prime cause et causatis, adhuc nichil est dictum et ideo dicendum est quod non, sed est pure equivocum, et hoc quia, si ponatur analogia, vel eciam univocatio, respectu prime cause et causati, oporteret concedere conclusiones ad quas prius deductum est, quas nolo concedere.

1.49 similiter, 'ens' equivoce dicitur de diabolo et causa prima, et de entibus causatis, nec pono quod diabolus sit in genere, licet sit substancia incorporea, sed intelligentie continentur sub 'substancia incorporea' in genere, nec substancia incorporea predicitur de eis et de diabolo nisi equivoce, quia non videtur esse ponendum quod ipse teneat ordinem cum intelligentiis. per ista patet ad argumenta facta et fienda contra istam viam.

1.50 Ad 5 raciones, tamen factas pro univocatione entis, dicendum est ad formas, quia in posicione dictum est ad materiam satis.

### Ad I

1.51 *Ad primam rationem:* patet per posicionem quod est fallacia consequentis, quia non sequitur: 'ens' significat unum conceptum, igitur univocum, sicud non sequitur: 'homo currit, igitur socrates currit.'

### Ad II

1.52 *Ad secundam rationem:* dicendum est quod ens non est primum obiectum intellectus possibilis adequatum, sed quiditas substancie materialis, quia eius species abstrahitur a virtute fantastica per intellectum agentem. et quando dicitur 'aliquid intelligitur ab intellectu quod non continetur sub ea,' concedo, sed non sequitur propter hoc quod ipsa non est obiectum intellectus, sed hic est consequens, sicud prius; sicud patet, non sequitur: aliquid videtur quod non continetur sub colore, quia socrates; igitur, color non est primum obiectum visus.

1.53 Aliter, tamen, posset dici, quod duplex est primum obiectum intellectus, 'quod' et 'quo'; unde, ens est primum obiectum 'quo,' quia omnia intelliguntur in quantum encia, sed quiditas, et cetera, est primum obiectum 'quod,' quia in eam intellectus primo fertur.

### Ad III

1.54 *Ad tertiam:* dicendum quod non potest ens esse primum obiectum in quod intellectus fertur, sed si probet ens esse obiectum intellectus, hoc solum erit obiectum 'quo,' et non obiectum 'quod'; unde, sicud color est primum obiectum 'quod' visus,

quia in colore primo fertur visus, sed lux est primo obiectum ‘quo,’ quia, mediante lumine, fertur visus in colore, eodem modo est dicendum ex parte intellectus.

#### Ad IV

1.55 *Ad quartam:* dicendum quod non possumus habere aliam cognitionem de prima causa nisi cognitionem ‘quia est,’ et istam habemus, sive sit equivocam, sive univocam, sive analogam, quia in hoc quod nos cognoscimus causatum, et scimus quod est effectus prime cause, satis cognoscimus primam causam cognitione ‘quia est,’ nec de ea est nobis alia cognitio possibilis.

#### Ad V

1.56 *Ad 5 et ultimam:* dicendum quod verum, quod convertitur cum ente, non est univocum, sed analogum ad substanciam et accidens. et quando dicitur quod in argumento aristotelis sunt quatuor termini, dicendum quod hoc est falsum, quia unitas analogie sufficit ad distributionem, unde iste sillogismus est bonus: omne ens est substancia; accidens est ens; igitur, accidens est substancia. nec sunt hic quatuor termini, et tamen, medium non est univocum, sed solum analogum.

#### questio secunda

<Q>ueratur circa predicamenta: utrum sint 01 predicamenta, et non plura, neque pauciora?

#### I

2.01 et quod non sint tot, immo pauciora, ostendo quia, substancia non est predicamentum quia, si sic, haberet duas species in quas primo decenderet, cum quodlibet genus primo decendit in duas species primas per duas differencias formales; sed, si substancia haberet tales, cum non habet alias species nisi specialissimas, primo decenderet in illas — consequens impossibile.

2.02 Assumptum ostendo quia, si haberet alias, hoc non esset verum nisi pro generibus intermediis et, per consequens, omnia intermedia essent species, et cum illa sunt genera, genera essent species. huic dicitur quod illa intermedia sunt genera subalterna, et ideo, non repugnat eis quod sint species, et ideo, quelibet est species.

2.03 Contra: igitur animal est species, cum animal sit genus subalternum; huic conceditur conclusio.

2.04 Contra: si animal sit species, igitur homo et asinus erunt eiusdem speciei; consequens falsum, consequencia patet quia, si animal sit species, cum homo sit per se inferius ad animal, tunc est species hominis et, per idem, est species asini.

2.05 Preterea, hec esset vera: ‘asinus est de specie hominis.’

2.06 Ad rationem dicitur concedendo quod homo et asinus sint eiusdem speciei; Contra: homo et asinus differunt specie, si, igitur, essent eiusdem speciei,<sup>1</sup> eadem secundum speciem different secundum speciem.

2.07 similiter, hec esset falsa: ‘homo et asinus differunt specie’ quia sequitur: differunt specie, igitur non sunt eadem specie, quia aliter non sequeretur: ‘socrates

<sup>1</sup> Scribe repeated, then cancelled: si igitur essent.

et plato differunt specie, igitur non sunt eadem specie.' sed hec est falsa: 'homo et asinus non sunt eadem specie' quia eius oppositum sequitur ex isto concessso: sunt eiusdem speciei. huic: negatur hec consequencia: 'differunt specie, igitur non sunt eiusdem speciei'; Contra: hoc verbum 'differunt' confundit et, per consequens, sequitur. assumptum patet, nam aliter hec esset vera: 'socrates et plato differunt specie,' quia sequitur: 'socrates et plato differunt secundum hanc speciem,' demonstrando asinum, 'igitur, differunt specie.' et antecedens est verum, quia sequitur: non convenient in hac specie, nec sunt eadem in hac specie, igitur differunt in hac specie.

## II

2.08 *Aliud principale*: si substancia esset unum predicamentum, haberet duas species eque primas, ut prius; consequens impossibile quia, dato isto, sequeretur quod in quolibet genere essent plures coordinaciones eque primo, et cum predicamentum non sit aliud quam coordinacio predicablem,<sup>2</sup> sequitur quod unum predicamentum esset duo predicamenta.

2.09 si negetur prima consequencia, Contra: si substancia haberet duas species eque primas, in utramque decenderet eque primo et tunc, eque primo coordineretur ad utramque; sed alia est coordinacio substancie ad hanc speciem, quocunque sit illa, et ad aliam; igitur essent due coordinaciones eque primas.

2.10 Ideo aliter dicitur concedendo conclusionem, et hoc quia ille due continentur sub tercia, unde, quando albertus dicit quod predicamentum est coordinacio, et cetera, loquitur de coordinacione tercia, que est generis primi ad omnia inferiora, sub qua continentur alie due. Contra: si genus primum coordineretur ad omnia inferiora primo, igitur omnia sunt unum coordinatum primo ei, et tunc arguo: substancia tunc decenderet in 'a', quia coordinatur ad 'a'; sed hoc est impossibile propter duo, nam primum impossibile est istud, quod sequitur ex isto quod substancia decenderet in aliquid quod nec est genus subalternum, nec species specialissima, nec individuum, quia 'a' non est genus subalternum, quia tunc, sub eo esset species specialissima, quod est impossibile; nec est species, et cetera, quia tunc, in speciem specialissimam decenderet primo; nec est individuum, certum est. secundum impossibile, quod sequitur est istud: quod genus decenderet, et non per differentiam aliquam, quia substancia non discendit in 'a' per corporeum, nec per incorporeum; igitur, et cetera.

2.11 similiter, secundum istam responsonem, oportet concedere quod in omni predicamento sunt tres coordinaciones prime.

<sup>2</sup> See below, 2.10, where Bradlay names Albert (the Great) as the source of this conception; *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, (Paris, 1890 sqq.), vol. I, p. 17 (*Liber de praedicabilibus*, tr. 2, c. 1). Cum ergo primus actus rationis (qui scientiam ignoti investigat per notum) sit ordinatio praedicabilium...; p. 149 (*Liber II De Praedicamentis*, tr. 1, c. 1): Et ideo hic ordinabilia ad subjici et praedicari sunt ordinanda et determinanda secundum omnem sui diversitatem, quae consistit in decem generibus praedicabilium sive praedicamentorum; p. 150 (*Ibid.*): Finis autem propinquus est, qui est terminus operis, ut scientia habeatur ordinabilium secundum omne genus, secundum quod potest esse diversus modus praedicandi, vel diversus ordo praedicabilis ad subjectum de quo praedicatur: quae scientia libri *Praedicamentorum* est proprius finis.

2.12 similiter, nulla coordinacio est in genere substancie nisi inter coordinata que sunt in eodem genere; si, igitur, substancia, que est genus, coordineretur ad omnia inferiora eiusdem generis, sequeretur quod substancia, que est genus, esset in genere substancie; consequens impossibile, tum quia idem non est in se ipso, (2<sup>v</sup> a/b) tum quia nichil est in genere nisi quod est genus subalternum, vel species specialissima, vel individuum, cuius non est substancia, que est genus primum.

### III

2.13 *Aliud principale*: prima principia sunt in alico predicamento, et non in genere substancie, igitur in undecimo genere, quia non sunt in alico predicamento de numero 9 certum est. assumptum ostendo sic: prima principia sunt prime transmutationis, et prima transmutacio est transmutacio secundum ubi; igitur, principia transmutationis secundum ubi sunt prima principia, et principia illius transmutationis sunt in genere ad ubi; igitur, prima principia sunt in illo genere, non, igitur, in genere substancie. maior manifesta est; minorem probo, nam, 8 *phisiorum* probatur quod omnium transmutationum<sup>3</sup> illa est perfectissima, que fit secundum locum, et maxime illa que est circularis, tum quia maxime perfectis inest, tum quia coniungit finem principio.<sup>4</sup>

2.14 Preterea, principia cause sunt priora principiis causati; sed transmutatio corporum celestium est causa transmutationis hic inferius; igitur, principia prime transmutationis sunt priora principiis secunde transmutationis, et ita, principia transmutationis secundum ubi sunt prima principia, et ita, illa erunt in genere ubi

### IV

2.15 Preterea, privacio secundum se nichil est, cum sit sola carencia forme in apto nato et, per consequens, non est in genere substancie.

2.16 similiter, si essent in alico genere, ut in genere substancie, esset alicuius perfectionis, quia omne quod est in genere habet aliquam perfectionem; sed privacio est privacio cuiuslibet perfectionis, cum sit carencia et privacio forme, a qua est omnis perfectione, et ita, privacio, quod est primum principium, non est in genere substancie.

### V

2.17 hoc idem arguo ex parte materie, nam, quod est ad aliquid, non est in genere substancie; materia est ad aliquid per aristotelem, primo *phisiorum*;<sup>5</sup> igitur, non est in genere substancie; igitur, et cetera.

<sup>3</sup> *Physics* VIII, 7; 260a 26-29, *ed. cit.* vol. 4, fol. 395<sup>v</sup> G: Dicamus igitur quod, cum motus sunt tres, scilicet in magnitudine, et in passione, et in loco, et necesse est, ut iste sit primus motuum.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 9; 265a 24-27, fol. 419<sup>r</sup> C-D: Et etiam motus, qui potest esse aeternus, praecedat motum, in quo est hoc impossibile. Et motus circularis est possibile ut sit aeternus, alii vero non, neque corruptibiles, neque alii modorum cessantium est possibile ut sint aeterni; also, *Ibid.* 8; 264b 19 and 24-28, fol. 416<sup>v</sup> L-M: Et motus rectus est de uno loco ad aliud... Et ideo impossibile est, ut aliquid moveatur in semicirculo, aut in alio arcu omnino secundum continuationem... quoniam finis non coniungitur cum principio: in circulo autem est infinitum, et est solus perfectus.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 7; 191a 8-11; *Aristoteles Latinus* VII, 2, *ed. A. Mansion*, p. 18, ll. 20-24 and 192a 22-23, p. 21, l. 15: Sicut enim ad statuam es, aut ad lectum lignum, aut ad aliud aliiquid habentium formam materia et informe habet ante acceptationem forme, sic ea ad substantiam se habet et hoc aliquid et ens... Sed hoc est materia, quemadmodum femina maris et turpe boni...

## VI

2.18 *Aliud principale*: quando non est predicamentum, quia sic haberet duas species primas; consequens falsum quia non habet nisi quando presens. si dicatur quod habet duas, ut preteritum quando et futurum quando, Contra: si sic, et habet quando presens, igitur tres habet primas et, per consequens, non tantum duas.

2.19 similiter, quando est id quod est derelictum, sive derelinquitur ex adiacencia rei temporalis ad tempus, sed nichil derelinquitur adhuc ex tempore futuro in rem temporalem, cum non est, nec fuit; igitur, nullum est quando futurum.

## VII

2.20 *Aliud principale*: quod sint plura quam x ostendo, nam ens incomplexum, et cetera, quod ponitur esse subiectum huius, est aliquod predicamentum, et non aliquod de numero x; igitur undecem. Assumptum patet sic, nam: omne quod est ordinabile in genere, vel est genus primum, vel genus subalternum, vel species specialissima, vel individuum; sed illud, quod ponitur esse subiectum huius, est ens incomplexum ordinabile in genere, et non est genus subalternum cum excedat genus primum et, per consequens, genus subalternum quia superius est ad quodlibet genus; nec est species specialissima, nec individuum, pro eodem pro quo prius; igitur, erit genus primum et ita erit undecimum, cum non sit aliquod de numero decem.

2.21 huic dicitur quod est ordinabile in genere, non tamen sic, quod sit aliquid in genere, sive in predicamento, sed est commune ad rem cuiuslibet predicamenti, communitate analogie, ut patet in questione precedente. Contra: illud 'ens incomplexum, et cetera,' non est aliud quam ens, vel res significata per 'ens,' quod dividitur in x predicamenta, et illa res est in predicamento alico et, per consequens, ens incomplexum, et cetera, erit in alico predicamento. Assumptum patet, nam res significata per 'ens' est in quolibet predicamento, quia est pars componens quodlibet predicamentum, cum substancia componatur ex re significata per 'ens' et ex eo quod substancia addit supra ens et, cum pars sit in suo toto, res significata per 'ens' erit in quolibet predicamento.

2.22 similiter, quod est in predicamento non est predicamentum; substancia est in predicamento substancie; igitur, non est predicamentum, et sic, non erunt x. minor patet nam predicamentum substancie componitur ex natura entis et ex substancia, ut patet in questione (2<sup>v</sup> b/3<sup>r</sup> a) precedente, igitur substancia, que est genus primum, est pars<sup>6</sup> componens predicamentum substancie et, per consequens, cum pars sit in eius toto, substancia, que est genus, erit in predicamento substancie. huic conceditur quod non est inconveniens conclusio quia in ista compositione pars est totum, et e contra, unde substancia componitur ex se ipsa et ex ente, et se ipsa est pars componens se ipsam, et ideo potest esse in se ipsa per accidens, non, tamen, est sic in predicamento substancie, quod sit species, vel individuum eiusdem generis.

2.23 Contra istud: res significata per 'ens' aut est substancia, aut accidens; si substancia, et est pars intrinsece componens accidentis, igitur accidentis componeretur ex substancia, et ita, ex non accidente. si accidentis, et substancia componitur intrin-

<sup>6</sup> Em. MS: per.

sice ex re significata per ‘ens,’ igitur substancia componitur ex non substancias consequens impossibile. quod, autem, oporteat quod sit substancia vel accidens; patet quia est res vera extra animam, et non aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum; igitur, est substancia vel accidens.

2.24 Preterea, si substancia componeretur ex ente et se ipsa, dissoluto alico toto, sive ipso corrupto, totum actu maneret; consequens, tamen, est plane impossibile. consequencia patet quia, dissolutis istis partibus componentibus substanciam, manet utraque pars, nam aliter argumentum aristotelis non valeret, immo acciperet falsum, ubi probat, septimo *metaphysice*, quod aliquid sit in hanc sillibam ‘ba’ preter ‘b’ et ‘a’, nam arguit sic: dissolutis ‘a’ et ‘b’ manet ‘b’ et manet ‘a’, et non manet ‘ba’: igitur, aliquid prefuit in ‘ba’ preter ‘b’ et ‘a’<sup>7</sup> patet, igitur, secundum aristotelem, quod, partibus alicuius tocius dissolutis, non manet totum, sed partes manent et, per consequens, dissolutis partibus substancie, substancia non manet, sed utraque pars manet; cum, igitur, per resonsum, ipsamet substancia est altera pars, et eciam totum est altera pars, igitur totum manet, et sic idem simul manet et non manet, quod videtur impossibile.

### VIII

2.25 *Aliud principale*: arguo ex parte actionis et passionis; ista, enim, non sunt nisi unum predicamentum quia non sunt duo predicamenta. quod probo sic: nam sunt una res extra animam, quia unus actus extra animam, nam, secundum philosophum, tertio *phusicorum*, idem est actus agentis et pacientis;<sup>8</sup> sed actus agentis est accio, et actus pacientis est passio; igitur, accio et passio unus actus numero.

2.26 huic dicitur quod, licet accio et passio sint una res et unus actus numero, ut sunt in paciente, ista tamen, accepta per eorum raciones formales, sunt distincte res et actus formaliter, et sic constituant duo predicamenta. unde, ratio formalis actionis est esse ab, et sic non est in paciente subjective. Contra istud: qualitercunque sumantur accio <et passio> semper sunt unus actus numero quia, si sint duo actus numero, aut igitur unus est in agente et aliud in paciente, aut uterque in paciente; sic enim arguit aristoteles, tertio *phusicorum*, ad probandum quod sint unus actus numero: si primo modo, sequeretur quod omne agens movebitur, vel habens motum, non movebitur; sic enim arguit aristoteles ibidem.<sup>9</sup> sed secundo modo, sequeretur quod prius, scilicet, quod omne movens movebitur, vel habens motum, et cetera.

<sup>7</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 17; 1041b 11-33, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 208<sup>r</sup> B-E: Ergo compositum est aliquid, quod est secundum hunc modum, ita quod totum sit unum, non ita quod sit sicut coacervatio. quemadmodum syllaba non est litera, et B, et A, neque caro est ignis, et terra, quoniam ista cum dissolvuntur quaedam, non sunt sicut caro, et syllaba: literae vero sunt sicut ignis et terra. ergo syllaba est aliud quod non est literae scilicet literae vocales, et consonantes, sed est aliud etiam... Elementum enim est illud, in quod dividitur res, et est in re quasi materia, ut A, et B, in syllaba.

<sup>8</sup> *Physics* III, 3; 202a 13-b 22, Venice ed. vol. 4, fol. 92<sup>r</sup> F-94<sup>v</sup> M: actio igitur utriusque est eadem, et eodem modo, quemadmodum idem spatium in respectu duorum utrumque est unum, et in respectu unius est duo, et similiter ascendere et descendere: haec duo sunt idem...

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* continued: Et dicamus generaliter quod intentio doctrinae apud disciplinam, et intentio actionis apud passionem non est eadem in rei veritate, sed secundum illud, per quod ista inventiuntur, est motus. dicere enim quod hoc est actio huius in hoc est aliud a dicere quod hoc est actio huius ab hoc.

si tercio modo, sequetur quod idem simul et semel movebitur, motibus contrariis, ad eundem terminum per se; igitur, relinquitur quod sint unus actus numero, qualitercumque sumantur accio et passio.

2.27 similiter, accio, ut est predicamentum ex quo, ut sic est accidentis, et in alico subiecto, non enim agente, ut probatum est prius, igitur in paciente; sed ut est in paciente, est eadem res cum passione, per consequens, igitur, accio ut predicamentum non distinguitur realiter a passione et, per consequens, non faciunt distincta predicamenta.

2.28 similiter, si accio ut predicamentum non sit subiective in paciente, nec in alio, certum est, igitur, esset dare accidentis actu (3<sup>r</sup> a/b) existens, et non in subiecto — consequens impossibile.

## IX

2.29 *Aliud principale*: hoc predicamentum ubi, si sit predicamentum, erit aliquid extra animam ab alico causatum, sed ubi non causatur ab alico, quia non nisi a loco, et ab illo, non igitur a nullo, et ita, non erit predicamentum. huic dicitur quod causatur a loco, et eciam a re locata; est, enim, ubi circumscripcio loci a circumscriptione rei locate precedens ex hoc, enim, quod aliquid est in loco, est in ubi. Contra: si ubi causetur a loco, igitur equale ubi ab equale loco; sed socrates sedens, et postea stans, habet equale ubi et, tamen, non equalē locum. dicitur quod nec habet locum, nec equale ubi, quia aliquis sedens minorem locum occupat quam idem stans.

2.30 Contra: dato isto, locus non esset equalis locato, cuius oppositum dicit philosophus, capitulo de loco.<sup>10</sup> consequencia patet, quia socrates in sedendo et in stando est eiusdem quantitatis numero; ex isto, igitur, quod 'a' sit locus eius in sedendo, et 'b' in stando, tunc socrates et 'a' sunt eiusdem quantitatis, quia sunt equalia, vel locus et locatum non erunt equalia; tunc arguo quod est equale uni equali, est equalē cuilibet illi equali; si 'a' est 'a' equale socrati, et socrates et 'b' sunt equalia, nam aliter dabitur quod locus non est equalis locato, cum 'b' sit locus socratis in stando, igitur 'a' et 'b' erunt equalia.

2.31 similiter, socrates et 'a' sunt eiusdem quantitatis, et socrates et 'b' sunt eiusdem quantitatis, quia aliter 'b' non esset locus adequatus socrati, igitur 'a' et 'b' sunt eiusdem quantitatis, et ita, equalia.

## X

2.32 *Aliud principale*: si ubi esset predicamentum, et non est predicamentum nisi predicamentum ad quod est motus, igitur, ad ubi esset motus; consequens falsum, quia aquiritur alicui, nulla mutacione facta in eo, igitur ad ipsum non est motus. per hoc enim probat quod ad<sup>11</sup> aliquid non est motus. assumptum patet, nam esto quod aliquod mobile quiescat, ut domus, et moveantur partes aeris circa ipsam; tunc aliud ubi habet nunc et prius, quia alium locum habeat; patet quia aliud est ultimum partis aeris continentis ipsam nunc et prius, cum pars prius continens est nunc corrupta.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* IV, 4; 210b 34-211a 2, vol. 4, fol. 133<sup>r</sup> E: Dicamus igitur quod omnes conveniunt in hoc quod locus primo continet illud cuius est locus, et non est aliquid illius. Et post, quod primus locus non est maius, aut minus illo.

<sup>11</sup> Em. MS: ad ad aliquid.

## XI

2.33 *Aliud principale*: sciencia est in genere relacionis et in genere qualitatis, et eadem est sciencia realiter in hoc genere et in illo et, per consequens, ista genera non sunt duo predicamenta realiter, sed unum, et ita, non erunt x. quod autem sit eadem res patet, nam eadem sciencia, que refertur ad scibile, potest sciri et, per <consequens>, potest esse habitus et qualitas anime, et ita in genere qualitatis.

2.34 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles in isto libro,<sup>12</sup> et similiter, septimo *metaphysice*.<sup>13</sup> hoc idem patet per rationem nam, si essent plura vel pauciora quam x, aristoteles vel esset superfluus, vel diminutus, quia ubicunque determinat de predicamentis ponit tantum decem. si tunc essent plura, cum non determinet de pluribus nullucubi,<sup>14</sup> determinaret sufficienter de predicamentis; similiter, si essent pauciora, et ipse ubicunque in determinando de eis ponit x, ubicunque in determinando de eis diceret falsum.

2.35 *Ad questionem: dicendum* quod sunt x predicamenta et neque plura, neque pauciora. Ad evidenciam cuius sciendum quod omnia alia a primis substanciis dicuntur de primis, vel sunt in primis, ut in isto libro probatur.<sup>15</sup> si autem, alia a primis substanciis dicantur de primis, dicentur de primis secundum nomen et rationem, quia hoc est dici de alio proprio: dici secundum nomen et rationem, ut patet in litera; sed, igitur, alia a primis dicantur de primis secundum nomen et rationem, sic est predicamentum substancie. si autem alia sint in primis, illa erunt accidentia illius, igitur aut insunt primis substanciis ab intrinsico, aut ab extrinsico. si ab intrinsico, aut per naturam materie, aut per naturam forme; si per naturam materie, (3<sup>r</sup> b/3<sup>v</sup> a) sic est predicamentum quantitatis, si per naturam forme, sic est predicamentum qualitatis. ista enim insunt substancie prime ab intrinsico et absolute.

2.36 Si Autem accidens insit substancie prime ab intrinsico et non absolute, sed solum in habitudine ad aliud, sic est relacio. si accidentia insint substanciis primis ab extrinsico, illud extrinsicum comparabitur ad substanciam sicud agens ad paciens, vel e contra, et sic habentur duo predicamenta, ut accio et passio; accione enim agentis in passum causatur quidam motus qui, secundum opinionem communem, ut ad agens comparatur est accio, hoc est, ut ab agente, sed ut ad paciens, comparatur ut receptum in passo, est passio. sed non videtur concedendum esse verum quod accio, que est subiective in passo, sit predicamentum, immo accio, que est predicamentum, est formale principium agentis, ut patebit postea in responsione ad argumentum de accione, et cetera, aut sicud mensura ad mensuratum, et cum non sit nisi duplex mensura extrinsica, ut locus et tempus, locus tunc comparatur ad primam substanciam ut mensura, et sic habetur hoc predicamentum ubi, unde ubi non est nisi quedam habitudo in re locata ad locum absolute.

<sup>12</sup> *Categories* 4; 1b 25-2b 25, ed. cit. p. 6, l. 27-p. 7, l. 27.

<sup>13</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 1; 1028a 10-31 mentions all ten categories.

<sup>14</sup> Earliest listing of this form, 'nullucubi' in the *Revised Mediaeval Latin Word List From British and Irish Sources*, R. E. Latham, (London, 1965), s.v., is 1346; this may be an earlier occurrence of the form.

<sup>15</sup> *Categories* 5, 2a 34-35, ed. cit. p. 8, ll. 3-4: Cetera vero omnia aut de subiectis dicuntur primis substanciis aut in eisdem subiectis sunt; also, *Ibid.* 2b 4-5, ll. 10-11: Quocirca cetera omnia aut de subiectis primis substanciis dicuntur aut in subiectis ipsis sunt.

2.37 si autem locus non comparetur ad rem locatam absolute, sed in comparacione ad partes locati, et sic est posicio, que nichil aliud est quam habitudo loci ad rem locatam in comparacione ad eius partes, vel quidam modus causatus in re locata ex illa habitudine. si, autem, tempus comparetur ad substanciam primam tempore mensuratam, sic habetur quando, quod nichil aliud est, per autorem <sup>6</sup> *principiorum*, nisi id quod derelinquitur ex adiacencia temporis ad rem temporalem.<sup>16</sup>

2.37 si, autem, accidens comparetur ad primam substanciam per modum habitii, ad id quod habet ipsum, sicud vestis socratis comparatur ad socratem vestitum, sic habetur hoc predicamentum habitus, quod nichil aliud est quam adiacencia eorum que sunt circa corpora, unde consistit in applicacione eorum que sunt circa corpora, ut vestimentorum ad corpora vestita. unde, istud predicamentum non reperitur in aliis animalibus ab hominibus, nisi ut cadunt in usu hominum; unde, Thomas, tertio *physicorum*, dicit quod, si illud quod pertinet ad hoc predicamentum reperiatur in aliis animalibus, illud pertinebit adhuc ad genus substancie, ut tamen, reperitur in hominibus, pertinet ad predicamentum habitus.<sup>17</sup>

2.38 sic, igitur, patet certus numerus, et eciam sufficiencia, predicamentorum, et eciam, quod nec sunt plura, nec pauciora. qualiter, tamen, ista predicamenta distinguuntur ab invicem non est sic ymaginandum quod per aliquam partem in predicamento, que non est totum, distinguatur ab alio predicamento, immo quodlibet se toto distinguitur ab alio, sicud hec intellectiva se tota distinguitur ab alia.

### Ad I

2.39 *Ad primam principale*: dicendum quod substancia primo discendit in duas species subalternas, et quando dicitur quod tunc animal esset species, quia species subalterna, dicendum est quod potest loqui de specie dupliciter: vel proprie, vel extendendo nomen 'speciei' ad quodlibet in genere preter ad individuum. primo modo, nullum intermedium est species; secundo modo, est quelibet species. et quando dicitur quod tunc homo et asinus erunt eiusdem speciei, dicendum quod, sumendo nomen 'speciei' primo modo, istud non sequetur; sic enim est falsum. secundo modo, tamen, sequitur et est verum. unde, concedendum quod aliqua, que differunt specie specialissima, convenient in specie subalterna.

### Ad II

2.40 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum ut prius, quod in quolibet genere sunt due coordinaciones eque prime, et utraque continetur sub tercia, que est predicamentum; unde, non est ymaginandum quod substancia sit coordinata primo in omnia inferiora, tanquam ad unum in quod discendit per differentiam, sicud, ratione facta<sup>18</sup>,

<sup>16</sup> *Liber de sex principiorum* Gilberto Porretano ascriptus ed. A. Heysse, recogn. D. Van Den Eynde, (Münster in Westph., 1953), c. IV, p. 16, ll. 10-11: Quando vero est quod ex temporis adiacentia relinquitur.

<sup>17</sup> S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici *In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, cura et studio P. M. Maggioli, (Turin-Rome), 1954, Liber III, lectio V, no. 322, p. 159: Sed attendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.

<sup>18</sup> Em. MS: facte.

ymaginatur. nec etiam est ymaginandum quod omnia inferiora sint unum coordinatum, sicut species, vel genus, subalternum; immo, coordinatur ad omnia ista prius et posterius, et mediate et inmediate.

### Ad III

2.41 *Ad aliud principale:* dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse primum duplicitate: (3<sup>v</sup> a/b) vel via perfectionis, vel via generacionis. primo modo, principia motus secundum ubi, seu motus circularis, sunt prima; secundo modo, principia generacionis, sive rei transmutabilis naturaliter, sunt prima. Istud patet, nam, sicut transmutatio ad transmutationem, ita principia unius ad principia alterius; sed transmutatio circularis est prior omni alia perfectione, eo quod maxime perfectis inest, ut celo; ideo, principia eius erunt priora principiis cuiuslibet alterius transmutationis. secundum patet nam res naturalis, hic inferius existens, primo generatur, postea commutatur, alteratur, et postea localiter movetur; via, igitur, generacionis principia transmutationis rei naturalis, ut generacionis, sunt prima principia. per hoc tunc, ad argumentum dicendum, sumendo primum pro primo — via perfectionis — sic: prima principia sunt in genere ubi; si, tamen, sumatur pro primo via generacionis, sic prima principia sunt in genere substancie.

2.42 sed contra istud potest argui sic: et potest probari quod transmutatio circularis non sit perfectior generacione, quia transmutatio capit perfectionem sicut speciem a termino ad quem; illa, igitur, est perfectio cuius terminus ad quem est perfectior; sed terminus ad quem generacionis est perfectior cum sit substancia, quam terminus ad quem motus circularis, cum sit ad ubi, quod est accidentis, et substancia est perfectior accidenti; igitur, et cetera.

2.43 Ad istud: dicendum quod argumentum concludit generacionem subitam esse perfectiore motu circulari, et hoc est verum, unde, motus circularis est perfectior omnibus motibus successivis, sed generacio non est successiva, sed subita.

2.44 *Ad aliud principale:*<sup>19</sup> dicendum est ut prius, quod argumentum concludit quod principia motus circu<la>ris sint priora, via perfectionis, principiis cuiuslibet alterius transmutationis.

### Ad IV

2.45 *Ad aliud principale:* conceditur quod privacio non est in genere substancie, nisi per accidentis, et hoc probat argumentum; unde, solum est in genere substancie, quia suus habitus est in illo genere.

### Ad V

2.46 *Ad aliud principale:* dicendum quod materia non est in genere relacionis, nec est ad aliquid, nisi quia quedam respectum habet ad formam, unde, est in genere substancie, non, tamen, sicut species, vel ens completum eiusdem generis, sed sicut principium entis illius generis.

2.47 et quando dicitur per aristotelem, primo *phisiorum*, materia est ad aliquid, dicendum quod ipse non intelligit sic, quod sit in genere relacionis, sed supra essen-

<sup>19</sup> Formula *Ad aliud principale*, does not refer here, as it does elsewhere, to one of the series of major arguments, even though it has been enclosed in a frame by the scribe or a subsequent reader.

ciam materie fundatur quidam respectus ad formam, ratione cuius, dicitur relative ad formam. vel aliter posset dici quod et materia potest accipi, vel pro essencia materie, et sic est in genere substancie, vel pro respectu fundato in illa essencia in comparacione ad formam, et sic est in genere relacionis.

2.47 et si arguatur per aristotelem, septimo *metaphysice*, de se nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum, nec aliquod istorum quibus ens determinatur, dicendum quod sic intelligit quod non est quale de se, et cetera, nec quod sit aliquod ens completum, ut species, vel individuum, in genere substancie; de se, tamen, est aliquid eiusdem generis ut principium entis completi.

#### Ad VII<sup>20</sup>

2.48 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum quod illud quod ponitur subiectum huius libri, non est sic ordinabile in genere quod sit species, vel genus subalternum, vel individuum, vel genus supremum, eiusdem generis, sed sic est ordinabile, et cetera, quod ordinatur in x genera, sicud commune ordinatur in sua inferiora, secundum, tamen, prius et posterius.

#### Ad VI

2.49 *Ad principale* inmediate precedens istud argumentum, ad quod responsum est nunc alterius de quando, dicendum quod quando habet duas species primas tantum, ut quando preteritum et quando futurum, nec quando presens est aliqua eius species prima; unde, quando nichil aliud est quam<sup>21</sup> habitudo quedam rei temporalis ad (3<sup>v</sup> b/4<sup>r</sup> a) tempus futurum, vel preteritum, et quando subiective est in re temporali.

2.50 et si arguatur: tunc quando preteritum et quando futurum sunt simul in eodem et, per consequens, cum quando futurum sit habitudo rei temporalis ad tempus futurum, et quando preteritum est habitudo ad tempus preteritum, sequetur quod iste habitudines simul erunt in eodem, et cum sint contradictorie, quia terminiistarum sunt contradictorie, contradictoria essent in eodem.

2.51 similiter, nichil est contentum sub quando futuro quin erit contentum sub quando preterito, vel saltim, aliquod contentum sub eo erit contentum sub alio, et ita non erunt species distincte, sicud homo et asinus.

2.52 *Ad primum istorum*: dicendum est quod habitudines predicte non sunt contrarie, quia non tanta repugnancia est in illis sicud est inter preteritum et futurum et, ideo, simul possunt esse in eodem.

2.53 Ad aliud: dicendum quod, licet aliquid, quod nunc est contentum sub una specie, posset contineri sub alia, non sequitur quin ille species sint opposite, quia id quod continetur sub substancia corporea, potest contineri sub substancia incorporea, vel saltim id quod continetur sub substancia animata potest contineri sub substancia inanimata et, tamen, substancia animata et inanimata sunt species opposite.

<sup>20</sup> Bradley has here deliberately inverted the order of his responses to arguments VI and VII; see 2.49.

<sup>21</sup> Em. MS: quod.

## Ad VIII

2.54 *Ad aliud principale*: de accione dicendum est quod accio et passio sunt duo predicamenta, et quando dicitur quod accio et passio sunt una res, quia unus actus, dicendum quod accio potest accipi dupliciter: vel pro principio formalí quo agens agit, quomodo autor *6 principiorum* diffinit actionem dicens quod est id secundum quod in id quod subicitur agere dicimur,<sup>22</sup> et isto modo accio est predicamentum, et est subiective in agente, nec ut sic accio et passio sunt unus actus. alio modo, sumitur accio pro operato, seu acto, ab agente, et sic est subiective in paciente, et sic accio et passio sunt unus actus, et sic loquitur aristoteles de accione, tertio *phisi-corum*, ubi probat actionem esse in paciente subiective, nec ut sic est accio predicamentum aliud a passione.

2.55 et si arguatur quod, secundum istam viam, infinite acciones simul essent in eodem, quia esto quod visibile aliquod videretur simul ab multis videntibus, vel saltim a pluribus, tunc in isto visibili essent tot acciones quot essent potencie visive apprehendentes istud visibile, quia alia accione agit hoc visibile in hunc visum, et in alium.

2.56 similiter, ista accio est actionis, igitur efficitur ab alico, non ab hoc agente cuius est accio, et non nisi per accidens, quero tunc de illa accione: illa efficitur ab alico per actionem, et sic erit processum in infinitum.

2.57 Ad primum istorum dicitur quod, si plures videant unum visibile, illud visibile agit in visum cuiuslibet in mutando, eadem accione que est principium agendi, et non alia et alia, ut ymaginatur per argumentum.

2.58 Ad aliud: dicendum quod accio, que est principale principium agendi, non est effective ab agente cuius est accio, sed, si ab alico sit effective, hoc erit a generante agens, sicud proprium<sup>23</sup> non est effective a suo subiecto, sed a generante subiectum.

## Ad IX

2.59 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum est, sicud prius dictum est de ubi; ad argumentum, tamen, factum de loco et locato, dicendum quod socrates sedens et socrates stans habet equale ubi, et equalē locum, quia quanto magis occupat de loco in stando (4<sup>r</sup> a/b) quantum ad unam dimensionem, in tantum et tantum occupat de loco in sedendo quantum ad aliam dimensionem et ideo, semper, dum est eiusdem quantitatis, equalē locum et equale ubi habet, ut argutum est demonstrative, ut prius contra aliam responsionem, que ponit quod locus in sedendo et locus in stando sunt inequalia.

## Ad X

2.60 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum quod ad ubi est motus et in ubi est motus; et quando dicitur ‘adquiritur alicui, ipso non mutato,’ negatur; et quando dicitur domus quiescens habet alium locum nunc et statim post, igitur aliud ubi, dicitur quod non, immo eundem locum; et quando dicitur ‘aliud est ultimum aeris conti-

<sup>22</sup> Ed. cit. c. II, p. 12, ll. 7-8: Actio vero est secundum quam in id quod subicitur agere dicimur.

<sup>23</sup> Em. MS: propria.

nentis ipsum nunc et tunc,' dicendum quod ultimum nullius partis aeris est locus eius, sed ultimum tocius aeris, vel posset dici quod compositum ex ultimo terre et ultimo aeris circumdantis est locus eius.

### Ad XI

2.61 *Ad ultimum principale*: dicendum est quod sciencia non est in genere relacionis, sed solum in genere qualitatis, quia ad hoc quod aliquid sit in alico genere, oportet quod illud, quod primo significat, sit res eiusdem generis; sed id, quod primo significatur per 'scienciam' est de genere qualitatis; significat, enim, qualitatem anime, et est qualitas anime; est, igitur, in genere qualitatis et non relacionis. quia, tamen, supra rem quam primo significat, que est qualitas, fundatur quidam respectus ad, scibile, ideo, mediante illo, refertur ad scibile. non, tamen, sequitur propter hoc, quod sit in genere relacionis quia, quod est in genere relacionis, necessario inponetur a<1>cui respectivo et non absoluto pro suo significato primario, et sciencia nulli tali inponitur primo; ideo, et cetera.

#### questio tercia<sup>1</sup>

#### CIRCA PREDICAMENTUM SUBSTANCIE<sup>2</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum substancia suscipiat magis et minus?

3.01 quod sic videtur per autoritates, nam, septimo *metaphisice*, dicit philosophus quod forma substancialis non intenditur, nec remittitur, nisi in materia;<sup>3</sup> sed, in exceptiva negativa vera, predicatum inest parti excepte; igitur, forma substantialis in materia suscipit magis et minus et, per consequens,<sup>4</sup> substancia suscipit magis et minus.

3.02 Preterea, secundo *de generacione*, dicitur quod elementa sunt ad invicem transmutabilia quia sunt contraria;<sup>5</sup> sed<sup>6</sup> ubi est contrarietas, ibi est magis et minus, cum ibi sit maximum.

3.03 similiter, tertio *celi et mundi*, dicit commentator quod forme elementales sunt velud medium ad suscipiendum formam mixti,<sup>7</sup> unde remittuntur usque ad medium,

<sup>1</sup> Notation 'questio .3.' occurs in top margin over column 'b', and in the right margin, opposite the first line of the question.

<sup>2</sup> This heading was written in the space left after the last words of the last line of the second question; a small 'q' stands in the left margin for the artist who was expected to insert the lettrine of *Queratur*.

<sup>3</sup> *Metaphysics* VIII (not VII as in text), 3; 1044a 9-12, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 217<sup>v</sup> L-M: Et quemadmodum in numero non est magis et minus, et similiter neque in substantia, quae est quasi forma, nisi sit substantia quae est cum materia.

<sup>4</sup> 'consequens' has been added above the line by a contemporary hand, perhaps that of the scribe himself.

<sup>5</sup> *De generatione et corruptione* II, 4; 331a 13-17, Venice ed. vol. 5, fol. 375<sup>v</sup> H: Quod igitur omnia nata sint adinvicem transmutari manifestum est. Generatio enim in contraria, et ex contrariis, elementis autem omnia habent contrarietatem adinvicem, quia differentiae sunt contrariae.

<sup>6</sup> Em. MS: contraria sed sed ubi.

<sup>7</sup> Averroes *In de coelo* III, 8; 307b 18-24, Venice ed. vol. 5, fol. 233<sup>r</sup> C: Et, cum iam declaratum sit quod operationes elementorum non sunt propter suas figuratas, manifestum est quod non sunt, nisi propter suas formas, et suas qualitates contrarias, et quod actiones eorum non differunt, nisi secundum haec duo.

nam aliter ex uno elemento posset generari mixtum equaliter sicud ex omnibus, et hoc si corumperentur; substancia, igitur, intenditur et remittitur.

## I

3.04 *Aliud principale*: per rationem, tota entitas effectus est a sua causa; intensio, igitur, et remissio in effectu arguit intensionem, et cetera, in sua causa; cum, igitur, caliditas sit proprius effectus ignis, et caliditas suscipit magis et minus, igitur et ignis et, per consequens, substancia.

## II

3.05 Preterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum, quod est perfectissimum in illo genere, et quanto aliquod illius generis magis accedit ad hoc est magis perfectum, et quanto magis recedit est minus perfectum in genere, igitur substancia erit tale et, per consequens, in eodem genere erit aliqua substancia magis perfecta, et aliqua minus perfecta, quia aliqua magis accedit ad primum illius generis, et aliqua minus; sed intencio in perfeccione substancia est intendi et remitti; igitur, substancia intenditur et remittitur.

3.06 Preterea, in quolibet genere est una prima contrarietas, igitur et in genere substancia; sed ubi est contrarietas, ibi est magis et minus; igitur, in substancia est magis et minus.

## III

3.07 Preterea, 6 *physicorum* probat aristoteles quod omne quod mutatur est divisibile, quia partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem, et istud dicit esse verum, non solum in mutationibus successivis, sed in generacione et corruptione;<sup>8</sup> cum, igitur, generatur compositum, forma partim erit sub termino a quo, et partim sub termino ad quem, et ita divisibilis, et ita suscipiet magis et minus.

## IV

3.08 Preterea, forma preexistat in materia antequam inducatur; et non sub esse perfecto; igitur, sub esse imperfecto; magis perfecte, igitur, est in materia post inductionem quam ante, et sic suscipit magis et minus. assumptum patet, nam, nisi sic esset, forma fieret ex nichilo.

3.09 similiter, ex qualibet indifferenter posset quidlibet fieri.

## V

3.10 *Aliud principale*: per aristotelem in litera<sup>9</sup> aliqua substancia est magis substancia quam alia, quia substancia prima est magis substancia quam substancia secunda, et

<sup>8</sup> *Physics VI*, 4; 234 b 10, 15-16, Venice ed. vol. 4, fol. 265<sup>v</sup> H-I: Et omne transmutable necessario est divisibile... sequitur necessario ut transmutatum secundum quandam partem sit in hoc, et secundum aliam sit in hoc ; 237a 35-b 1, fol. 283<sup>v</sup> H ; Quoniam demonstratio eadem est in ec, quod non est continuum omnino... ; 237b 10-11, 16-17, fol. 284<sup>r</sup> D-E : (Bradley's response, 3.36), shows he had this line in mind also : Illud quod generatum est, necesse est quod prius generabatur, et quod generatur prius generatum fuit, et quod est ex hoc divisibile... et similiter est de eo, quod corrumpitur.

<sup>9</sup> *Categories* 5; 2a 11-16, ed. cit. p. 7, ll. 10-15: Substantia autem est, quae proprie et principaliter

substancialium secundarum species est magis substancia quam genus et, per consequens, generaliter substancia suscipit magis et minus.

## VI

3.11 Preterea, iste homo est modo minus albus quam postea erit; igitur, suscipit magis et minus de albedine, et ultra, igitur suscipit magis et minus ab inferiori ad superiorius.

## VII

3.12 Preterea, hec est vera: 'hoc album suscipit magis et minus quia hoc album est magis album quam<sup>10</sup> aliud album,' demonstrando socratem album et platonem album, et sit socrates albior platone. tunc arguo: 'hoc album' suscipit magis et minus, igitur hec substancia suscipit magis et minus, antecedens est verum, igitur consequens. si negetur consequencia, Contra arguatur sic: 'hoc album, et cetera' est hec substancia, igitur hec substancia suscipit magis et minus, precise sunt vere, igitur conclusio similiter; idem demonstratur per pronomen in antecedente et in consequente, igitur consequencia est bona, que est negata.

3.13 similiter, si 'hoc album, et cetera,' igitur omne quod est hoc album suscipit magis et minus; et hec substancia est hoc album, igitur hec substancia, et cetera, prima consequencia patet, quia oppositum non stat: 'aliquid, quod est hoc album, non suscipit, et cetera,' quia, cum nichil aliud quam hoc album sit id quod est hoc album, igitur, id quod est hoc album non capit magis et minus, et ita, 'hoc album non suscipit, et cetera,' que repugnaret prime, huic, scilicet: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera.'

3.14 similiter, hec est vera: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera'; esto quod tantum socrates et plato sint albi; quero tunc: quid hoc<sup>11</sup> pronomen 'hoc' demonstrat, aut socratem, aut platonem? si, enim, aliud demonstret, est falsa quia nichil aliud est album per casum; si socratem, igitur socrates suscipit, et cetera, et ultra; igitur, substancia. si plato, igitur plato, et cetera, et ultra; igitur substancia, et cetera. huic dicitur quod hoc pronomen 'hoc' demonstrat socratem, vel platonem, et negatur hec consequencia: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera,' demonstrando socratem, 'igitur socrates, et cetera,' sicud non sequitur: 'iste', demonstrando socratem, 'est pronomen, igitur socrates est pronomen,' quia antecedens est verum quia 'iste est pronomen,' hec est vera, et 'iste' demonstrat socratem quia demonstrat socratem in hac propositione: 'iste currit,' demonstrando socratem. et idem pronomen numero est 'iste' in hac: 'iste est pronomen' et 'iste currit.' Contra istud: si hec sit vera: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera,' demonstrando socratem; et socrates non suscipit, et cetera; igitur, predicatum huius: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera' vere removetur a socrate, et socrates est res demonstrata per pronomen in subiecto huius: 'hoc album, et cetera' et, per consequens, hec non erit vera: 'hoc album suscipit, et cetera' quia predicatum non inest rei significate per subiectum quia non rei demonstrate

et maxime dicitur, quae neque de subiecto praedicatur neque in subiecto est, ut aliqui homo vel aliqui equus. Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et harum specierum genera...

<sup>10</sup> Em. MS: quod.

<sup>11</sup> 'hoc' has been added, perhaps by the scribe himself.

per pronomen in subiecto, et pronomen significat quod demonstrat, secundum grammaticos.

3.15 similiter, oportet concedere quod proposicio sit vera, et similiter, ubi ponitur pronomen in subiecto demonstrans aliquid, predicatum non inest rei demonstrare.

3.16 similiter, satis inconveniens est<sup>12</sup> concedere quod ‘hoc album,’ demonstrando socratem, ‘suscipiat magis et minus.’ de alio exemplo, videtur quod ibi dicatur falsum quia conceditur hanc esse veram: ‘iste,’ demonstrando socratem, ‘est pronomen’ quia hec est vera: ‘iste est pronomen et “iste” demonstrat socratem,’ sed eadem ratione hec erit concedenda: ‘iste,’ demonstrando platonem, ‘est pronomen,’ et sic de singulis. sed nunc arguo: ‘iste,’ demonstrando socratem, ‘est pronomen; et iste,’ demonstrando platonem, ‘est pronomen, et sic de singulis; igitur, omnis homo est pronomen,’ vel aliter induccio non valebit.

3.17 similiter, oppositum conclusionis non stat cum premissis, istud, scilicet: ‘aliquis homo non est pronomen,’ quia sequitur: ‘aliquis homo non est pronomen, igitur iste’ demonstrando socratem, ‘vel iste,’ demonstrando platonem, ‘non est pronomen,’ que repugnat antecedenti plane.

3.18 Ideo, aliter videtur esse dicendum, quod in ista: ‘iste est pronomen,’ ‘iste’ non demonstrat socratem, quia supponit hic pro voce quia, si demonstraret socratem hic, tunc in hac: (4<sup>v</sup> a/b) ‘iste est una vox,’ ‘iste’ demonstraret socratem, et ita, hec esset vera: ‘iste,’ demonstrando socratem, ‘est vox, et ultra; igitur, iste,’ demonstrando socratem, ‘non est homo.’

3.19 similiter, si demonstraret socratem, tunc significaret socratem, quia pronomen significat quod demonstrat, et tunc proposicio esset vera ubi predicatum repugnat rei significate per subiectum. Contra istam responsionem: idem pronomen in subiecto huius: ‘iste est pronomen’ et ‘iste currit’, demonstrando socratem, quia illud idem pronomen numero quod demonstrat socratem hic: ‘iste currit’ est pronomen; igitur, de eodem pronomine numero verificatur hoc predicatum ‘pronomen,’ et non aliter quam predicando unum de alio sic: ‘iste est pronomen, idem, igitur, pronomen numero est “iste” in subiecto huius: “iste est pronomen” et in subiecto huius: “iste currit”; sed in subiecto Secunde demonstrat socratem; igitur, in subiecto prime, et ita, hec esset vera: “socrates est pronomen”’.

3.20 huic conceditur quod hoc pronomen ‘iste,’ quod est in subiecto huius ‘iste est pronomen’ demonstrat socratem, non, tamen hic demonstrat socratem, sed in alia propositione. Contra: si hoc pronomen ‘iste,’ sic dicto: ‘iste est pronomen’ demonstrat socratem, igitur significat socratem et hec est vera: ‘iste est pronomen,’ igitur hec: ‘socrates est pronomen.’ consequencia patet, nam aliter proposicio erit vera, et tamen, predicatum non inest rei significate per subiectum. nec valet dicere quod pronomen quod demonstrat non significat, et ideo, demonstrando socratem, ‘iste’ non significat socratem.

3.21 Contra illud: significatur per terminum quod primo intelligitur, illa voce expressa; sed, expressa seu prolata hac voce ‘iste,’ si demonstratur socrates, primum quod concipitur per prolatum est socrates, et ita, significat socratem.

<sup>12</sup> From ‘est’, which begins a line, to ‘non valebit,’ the last words of 3.16, a bracket has been drawn in the left margin and this bracket has been given fanciful features to form a human face in profile; below this, a pointing hand has been drawn.

3.22 similiter, si 'iste,' sic dicto: 'iste est pronomen,' demonstrando socratem, et hec est vera, igitur predicatum inest rei demonstrate per subiectum, vel aliter proposicio erit vera, et simpliciter, ubi pronomen demonstrativum subicitur et predicatum non inheret rei demonstrate per predicatum, et ideo, hec erit concedenda: 'socrates est pronomen', ut prius.

3.23 si dicatur ad primum argumentum principale, immediate sequens tres primas autoritates,<sup>13</sup> quod caliditas <s> non consequitur ignem sub quoconque modo, sed sub certis <gradibus> caliditatis, ultra quos, si inveniatur, non manet ignis et ideo, si caliditas suscipiat magis et minus secundum se, non tamen, secundum quod consequitur ignem, Contra: si istud esset verum: aqua posset esse calidior igne, et ignis, frigidior aqua quia, esto quod caliditas sub x gradus caliditatis consequatur ignem, et frigiditas sub tot aqua, et volo quod ignis agat in aqua ex una parte et aqua in ignem ex alia parte, possibile est tunc aqua expellere 9 gradus<sup>14</sup> caliditatis ab igne et inducere tot gradus frigiditatis in igne; tunc, in igne non est nisi unus gradus caliditatis et 9 gradus frigiditatis sunt in igne, et in aqua eodem modo sunt novem gradus caliditatis inducti, et non nisi unus gradus frigiditatis et, per consequens, ignis est frigidior aqua, quia habet plures gradus frigiditatis et, per consequens, plus de frigiditate.

3.24 similiter, per aristotelem, primo *physicorum*, causa, particularis et in actu, simul est et non est cum suo effectu;<sup>15</sup> cum, igitur, ignis sit causa particularis et in actu cuiuslibet gradus caliditatis ignis, sequatur quod, quolibet gradu expulso, quisunque fuerit, non manebit ignis.

3.25 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles in litera, nam 'substancia non suscipit magis et minus.'<sup>16</sup>

3.26 similiter, 'substancie nichil est contrarium,'<sup>17</sup> sed, si susciperet magis et minus, aliquid esset ei contrarium. antecedens patet in litera et similiter, quinto *physicorum*, probatur quod in substancia non est motus quia nichil est ei contrarium.<sup>18</sup>

3.27 similiter, si susciperet, et cetera, posset adquiri successive et ad omne tale, et in omni tali, quod adquiritur successive est motus; igitur, in substancia, et ad substancialm, esset motus, cuius oppositum probat philosophus, quinto *physicorum*, quia

<sup>13</sup> Reference is to 3.04 above.

<sup>14</sup> Em. MS: grados.

<sup>15</sup> *Physicas* I, 7; 190a 9-13, *Aristoteles Latinus*, p. 16, 9-13: Horum autem hoc quidem non solum dicitur hoc aliquid fieri, sed et ex hoc, ut ex non musico musicus. Hoc non dicitur in omnibus, ut ex homine factus est musicus, sed homo factus est musicus. Factorum vero ut simplicia dicimus fieri, hoc quidem sustinens fit, illud vero non sustinens; *Ibid.* 8; 191a 33-b 1, p. 19, ll. 14-17: Nos autem dicimus quod ex ente aut non ente fieri, aut ens aut non ens facere quid aut pati, aut quodcumque hoc fieri, uno quidem modo nil refert aut medicum facere aliquid aut pati, aut ex medico esse aliquid aut fieri.

<sup>16</sup> *Categories* 5; 3b 33, *ed. cit.* p. 11, l. 21: Videtur autem substancia non suscipere magis et minus.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 3b 25, p. 11, l. 13: Inest autem substancialis et nihil esse contrarium; cf. *Physica* V, 2; 225b 10-11, Venice ed. vol. 4, fol. 215r D: In substantia vero non est motus, quia nullum ens est contrarium substantiae.

<sup>18</sup> See text cited n. 17.

in tribus generibus solum est motus, ut probatur in quinto, scilicet, in qualitate, et in quantitate, et in ubi.<sup>19</sup> (4<sup>v</sup> b/5<sup>r</sup> a)

3.28 similiter, si aliqua forma substancialis susciperet magis et minus, illa esset forma elementaris, sed illa non, igitur nulla. minor patet, quia si sic, adquireretur divisibiliter et successive et, per consequens, in substancia esset motus quia adquiritur per motum per se. consequencia patet, quia motus nichil aliud est quam adquisicio partis post partem perfectionis ad quam vadit; sed adquisicio successiva partis post partem, et cetera, et ista est motus; et ista oportet concedere: si substancia suscipiat, quod in substancia esset motus — cuius oppositum probat aristoteles, quinto *phusicorum*.

3.29 *Ad questionem: dicendum* quod substanciam suspicere magis et minus contingit dupliciter: sive intendi uno modo quod intensio et remissio ita sint in eadem forma substanciali, ita quod nunc substancia sub uno gradu remisso et postea sub gradu intensiori; alio modo quod intensio sint in diversis formis substancialibus. primo modo impossibile est aliquam substanciam suspicere magis et minus, sed secundo modo necessarium est. primum patet sic, nam, si intensio et remissio sint in una forma substanciali, aut, igitur in essencia illius forme, vel in esse eiusdem non in essencia, quia essencia est indivisibilis et indivisible in quantum tale non habet intra divisibilitatem; unde, istud est commune omnibus formis, tam accidentalibus, quam substancialibus, quod nulla forma secundum essenciam suscipit magis et minus. et ideo, dicit autor *6 principiorum* quod ‘forma est’ quod in ‘simplici et’ in ‘invariabili essencia’ consistit,<sup>20</sup> quod, autem, intensio et remissio non sint in esse forme patet sic, nam propter hoc dicitur forma suspicere magis et minus secundum esse, quia magis et minus participatur a subiecto; sed impossibile est formam substancialis sic participare a subiecto quia, quod subiectum non perfecte participat formam, hoc est propter aliquod incompossibile ei in subiecto, quia, enim, non statim abiicit caliditas ab igne, ideo non statim ignis participat caliditati perfecte, sed forma substancialis non habet aliquod sibi incompossibile in suo susceptivo quia, si sic, illud esset substancia, vel actus; non substancia, quia due forme substanciales non simul perficiunt idem susceptivum, sive eamdem materiam, nam forma ignis non perficit materiam aque, manente forma aque; ante, igitur, inductionem forme inducende, expellitur quelibet forma substancialis ei incompossibilis. nec potest esse accidens, quia, ex quo forma prior necessario expellit ante inductionem forme posterioris, necesse est quodlibet accidens ipsam consequens simul expelli cum ea, et forma inducenda non habeat sibi incompossibile, nisi quod consequitur formam priorem. nec, igitur habet forma substancialis in suo susceptivo aliquid ei incompossibile, quod sit substancia, nec quod sit accidentis. unde, susceptivum, quod est materia vita, saltim in elementis, est summe dispositum ad formam elementi et, per consequens, impossibile est illud susceptivum formam elementi participare secundum magis et minus, et ita, isto modo forme elementares, nec eciam alie forme substanciales, suscipiunt magis et minus.

3.30 secundum patet sic, nam in quolibet genere est ponere unum primum et perfectissimum in illo genere, ut patet per philosophum, decimo *metaphysice*,<sup>21</sup> a quo

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 1; 225b 7-9, fol. 214<sup>r</sup> B: ...necessere est ut motus sint motus qualitatis, et motus quantitatis, et motus in loco.

<sup>20</sup> *Ed. cit. c. I.*, p. 8, ll. 3-4: Forma est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens.

<sup>21</sup> *Metaphysics X*, 4; 1055a 10-12, *ed. cit. vol. 8*, fol. 261<sup>r</sup> C: Sed maximum in quolibet genere est perfectum. Maximum enim est illud, cui non est additio. Perfectum vero, extra quod nihil est.

omnes species posteriores eiusdem generis derivantur, et per recessum et accessum ad illud primum dicuntur quedam magis perfecte, et quedam minus perfecte. et ideo dicitur quod in quolibet genere est una prima contrarietas, quia contraria sunt que posita sunt sub eodem genere, et maxime distant; prima radix, tamen, istius contrarietatis est habitus et privacio, quia ex quo ibi est primum ponere, ibi ultimum, et hoc in quolibet genere, et illa contrariantur sicud perfectum et imperfectum in genere; igitur, substancie est ponere unum primum, et quanto aliquid illius generis magis accedit ad hoc, tanto est perfeccius, et quanto minus, tanto est minus perfectum. et cum aliqua (5<sup>r</sup> a/b) substancia magis accedit ad primum in genere quam alia substancia, sequetur quod aliqua substancia est perfeccior alia, et isto modo substancia suscepit magis et minus.

3.31 *Ad primam autoritatem:* dicendum quod pro tanto dicit aristoteles quod forma substancialis non suscipit magis et minus, nisi ut in materia, quia agere debetur forme et pati materie; unde, compositum agit per formam et patitur per materiam quia, enim, propter dispositionem materie compositum aliquando melius agit per formam, aliquando peius. unde, unus homo est magis intelligens quam alio; unde, quantum ad istam operationem, forma suscipit magis et minus ut est in materia.

3.32 *Ad secundam autoritatem:* dicendum quod elementa, ut ignis et aqua, non contrariantur ratione substancie, sed ratione qualitatum activarum et passivarum, quia ratione caliditatis et frigiditatis.

3.33 *Ad tertiam:* dicendum quod, si commentator debet sustineri hic, est sic glossandus: quod, quia aristoteles, secundo *de generacione*, dicit qualitates elementorum esse formales in elementis et ille qualitates contrariantur, ideo concedit ipse elementa contrariari et suscipere magis et minus, quia qualitates suscipiunt, et cetera. sed quia ipse plane dicit quod forme elementares mediant inter substanciam compositam et accidentis, et plane ibidem Wult quod huiusmodi forme intenduntur et remittuntur in suis essencias, ideo hic est negandus, sicud communiter hic negatur.

### Ad I

3.34 *Ad primam rationem principalem:* dicendum quod hec proposicio: variacio in effectu arguit variacionem in sua causa, est vera de causa univoca et eiusdem generis cum effectu; cuiusmodi non est ignis respectu caliditatis — differunt, enim, genere, et ideo non oportet quod, licet suscipere, et cetera, insit isti effectui, ut caliditat, quod insit sue cause, ut igni.

### Ad II

3.35 *Ad aliud principale:* dicendum quod concluditur in genere substancie esse unam speciem perfecciorem alia, et hoc est concessum; unde, solum probat substanciam intendi et remitti secundum quod intensio et remissio est in diversis formis substancialibus, et hoc modo concessum est substanciam suscipere magis et minus in positione.

### Ad III

3.36 *Ad aliud:* dicendum quod hec proposicio, ‘omne quod mutatur partim est, et cetera,’ vera est de mutacione successiva, non, autem, de mutacione subita, cuiusmodi est generacio. et si arguatur per aristotelem, omne quod mutatur muta-

batur<sup>22</sup> et quod generatur generabatur,<sup>23</sup> et, per consequens, generacio est mutacio divisibilis et ita, quod generatur partim erit sub termino a quo, et cetera, huic dicendum 'quod generatur' ibi accipitur pro alteracione precedente subitam inductionem forme includente eamdem, et non accipitur pro subita mutacione, et ideo, nichil ad propositum. unde, generacio primo modo dicta, et secundo modo dicta, in hoc differunt quod primo modo dicta est ad qualitatem et secundum qualitatem, sed secundo modo est ad substanciam.

#### Ad IV

3.37 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum quod nichil forme preexistat in materia, nam sic materia esset compositum ex materia et forma, et forma substancialis adveniret composito et enti in actu, quod est impossibile, sed, tamen, non sequitur propter hoc quod forma fieret ex nichilo, et ita quod forma esset creata, quia creacioni nichil presupponitur, quia aliquid presupponitur ex quo fiat forma, quia materia; unde, forma, sicut figura, fit ex materia, proprie, tamen, non fit, ut probat aristoteles: nec, enim, enea generatur, nec spera, sed hoc compositum: enea spera;<sup>24</sup> forma, tamen, fit per accidens ex materia, et hoc sic, quia agens naturale educit formam de potentia materie, ut dicit commentator, septimo *metaphysice*,<sup>25</sup> non, tamen, sic quod aliquid forme sit sub esse incompleto in materia et quod agens naturale extrahat illud sub esse completo, sed sic fit ex materia, quod materia est in potentia ad formam, et agens naturale transmutat (5<sup>r</sup> b/5<sup>v</sup> a) materiam, ipsam disponendo, et sic formam inducit in materia, et tunc compositum est factum ex materia et forma, et forma per accidens est facta. et sic patet qualiter forma fit, et ex quo fit.

3.38 et si arguatur Contra istud sic: si agens naturale transmutet materiam, ipsam disponendo ad formam, agit, igitur, in materiam, et cum accio sua non sit inmanens, recipietur in materia, et cum accio agentis naturalis sit accidens, ac esset subiective in materia prima, quod est impossibile, huic dicendum: quod agens naturale in transmutando materiam agit in compositum, ratione materie, que nunquam est nisi in composito, ut patet per philosophum, ibi de generacione,<sup>26</sup> nunquam est sine morpha et passione, unde, accio eius recipitur in composito. et si arguatur: illud est quod disponitur ad inductionem forme per agens naturale in quod recipitur accio eiusdem in disponendo, si, igitur, accio agentis naturalis in disponendo materiam ad formam recipiatur in composito, compositum erit dispositum ad formam, et non materia, quod tamen, est impossibile, huic dicendum: quod prima proposicio

<sup>22</sup> Em. MS: matabatur.

<sup>23</sup> See above, third text cited, n. 8.

<sup>24</sup> *Metaphysics* VII, 9; 1034b 10, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 182<sup>r</sup> A: Est enim sicut sphaera cuprea, sed non est sphaera nec cuprum. et si generatur ex cupro, oportet semper ut materia sit ante formam per essentiam: et forma etiam.

<sup>25</sup> Averroes *In metaphysicae* VII, 9; 1034b 18, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 182<sup>r</sup> E: Deinde dicit qualitatem autem esse etc. id est, sed non est necesse ut ante qualitatem generatam sit alia qualitas agens: sed est necesse ut ante generatam sit aliquid, quo est in potentia qualitas, idest materia.

<sup>26</sup> Although Bradley's language here suggests that he had in mind a text from the *De generatione*, a work cited above, n. 5, it seems rather that he refers to the argument of 3.07 in which the contention is that not only in successive changes, but also in the instantaneous changes encountered in generation and corruption what is changed is divisible, with the consequence, (3.08), that form pre-existed in a state of lesser perfection and within matter before generation.

accepta est falsa, quia aliud est quod disponitur ad formam, et quod recipit actionem disponens subiective; unde, primum est materia, secundum est compositum.

### Ad V

3.39 *Ad aliud principale*, quod racio concludit substanciam suscipere magis et minus eo modo quo concessum est in posizione, vel dicendum quod aristoteles <dicit> primam materiam esse magis substanciam quam<sup>27</sup> secundam, quia pluribus substat, et ideo, quantum ad istam proprietatem que est pluribus substare, suscipit, et cetera, non, tamen, quantum ad suam propriam essenciam.

### Ad VI

3.40 *Ad aliud*, quod concludit albedinem suscipere magis et minus quia suscipitur secundum magis et minus in isto homine, et in illo, unde, iste homo est nunc magis albus quam prius fuit, et ideo, iste homo suscipit magis et minus de albedine, et isto modo, iste suscipit magis et minus; sed tunc, nichil ad propositum, quia intensio ista, et remissio, non est in isto homine, sed in albedine recepta in eo.

### Ad VII

3.41 Ad ultimum: dicendum quod non est falsa 'hoc album suscipit magis et minus' ita quod ista intensio et remissio sit in 'hoc albo'; hec etiam est falsa: 'album suscipit magis et minus,' sed hec est vera: 'albedo suscipit magis et minus' et hoc, sumpto subiecto simpliciter. unde, nichil intenditur et remittitur, nec suscipit magis, et cetera, nisi tale quod potest participari a subiecto intensus et remissus; sed 'hoc album' non est huiusmodi, sed albedo est huiusmodi, nec 'album' est huiusmodi, et ideo, albedo suscipit magis et minus, sed 'hoc album' seu 'album' nequaquam.

#### questio quarta

##### CIRCA QUANTITATEM<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum quantitas sit genus?

##### I

4.01 quod non, nam quantitas predicatur denominative de suis speciebus, igitur non est genus. consequencia patet quia predicacio denominativa est eorum que sunt diversorum generum. antecedens patet nam hec est vera: linea est quanta, et superficies est quanta, et linea et superficies sunt species quantitatis, ut patet in litera.<sup>2</sup>

##### II

4.02 Preterea, quantitas non eque primo dicitur de omnibus suis speciebus et, per consequens, non est genus. consequencia patet quia species sunt coequve et eque

<sup>27</sup> Em. MS: quod.

<sup>1</sup> This heading is written within a frame and fills out the last line of the third question; at this point, 'questio .4.' is written in the left margin.

<sup>2</sup> *Categories* 6; 5a 1-5, ed. cit. p. 14, ll. 10-14: Linea vero continua est; namque est sumere communem terminum ad quem partes ipsius coniunguntur, hoc est autem punctum, et superficie linea (superficiei enim partes ad quendam communem terminum coniunguntur).

prime respectu generis. Assumptum patet nam racio quantitatis, aut sumitur a ratione masure, aut a ratione divisibilis. si primo modo, tunc quantitas per prius inheret quantitati discrete quam continue quia racio masure prius inest quantitati discrete et ex consequenti quantitati continue, nam, per aristotelem, decimo *metaphysice*, racio masure primo inest numero;<sup>3</sup> non, enim, ulna mensurat pannum nisi quia ipsa est mensurata pollice, nec quantitas continua est mensura istius, nisi quia ipsa mensuratur quantitate discreta. si secundo modo, adhuc racio quantitatis prius competenter ( $5^v$  a/b) quantitati continue quam discrete quia, secundum aristotelem, tertio *physicorum*, ex divisione continui causatur numerus,<sup>4</sup> si causa prior est causato et, per consequens, quecumque istarum racionum fuerit prima racio quantitatis, sequetur quod quantitas non eque primo dicitur de suis speciebus.

III<sup>5</sup>

4.03 Preterea, in genere quantitatis non est ponere aliquod unum primum et minimum, quod sit mensura omnium eiusdem generis, igitur quantitas non erit genus primum. consequens patet, per philosophum, decimo *metaphysice*, dicentem quod, in omni genere est ponere unum primum et minimum, quod est mensura omnium posteriorum eiusdem generis.<sup>6</sup> Assumptum patet nam, genere quantitatis continue, punctum est primum et minimum, et in genere quantitatis discrete, unitas est primum et minimum, et ita sunt formaliter diverse, igitur in quantitate sunt duo minima et prima, et sic, quantitas non erit genus.

IV<sup>7</sup>

4.04 Preterea, quantitas predicatur essencialiter de suis speciebus et de passionibus quantitatis, sive specierum quantitatis, et, per consequens, quantitas non erit genus. consequencia patet quia passio accidit subiecto, nec subiectum essencialiter predicatur de passione, et ita, quantitas, si essencialiter predicitur de passione quantitatis, sive specierum quantitatis, non erit genus ad istas species. primum assumptum patet nam longum et breve sunt passiones lineae, que est quantitas, et de quolibet istorum predicatur quantitas essencialiter quia hec est predicacio essencialis: brevitas est quantitas.

V<sup>8</sup>

4.05 Preterea, quodlibet genus unum habebit unam rationem primam, que equaliter participabitur a qualibet eius specie, nam ex una ratione prima, equaliter in omnibus speciebus salvata, accipitur unitas generis primi; sed quantitas nullam talem rationem habet quia, si sic, aut illa racio esset racio masure, aut racio divisio-

<sup>3</sup> *Metaphysics* X, 1; 1052b 20-25, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 251<sup>r</sup> D: *omnis quantitas, secundum quod est quantitas, cognoscitur per unum, et illud, per quod primo cognoscitur, est unum. et ideo unum est principium numeri, et non numerus;* *ibid.* fol. 252<sup>r</sup> B: ... Et ex hoc dicitur mensura in aliis, per quam scitur primo quodlibet eorum...

<sup>4</sup> *Physics* III, 1; 200b 19-20, Venice ed. vol. 4, fol. 85<sup>v</sup> H: *accidit multoties, cum definierimus continuum, uti in eius definitione infinito: illud enim, quod dividitur in infinitum, est continuum.*

<sup>5</sup> Right margin: ‘3.’

<sup>6</sup> See third question, n. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Right margin: ‘4.’

<sup>8</sup> Right margin: ‘5.’

bilis; non racio mensure, quia illa per prius participatur a quantitate discreta quam continua, ut probatum est prius,<sup>9</sup> nec racio divisibilis, quia illa per prius participatur a quantitate continua quam discreta, ut argutum est;<sup>10</sup> igitur, et cetera. huic dicitur quod racio prima quantitatis est duplex: racio mensure et racio divisibilis. unde, licet non omnes species quantitatis eque primo participant rationem mensure, quia hec racio primo inest quantitati discrete; omnes, tamen, species quantitatis eque primo participant rationem divisibilis, et hec est eius racio prima a qua sumitur eius unitas.

4.06 Contra istud: videtur falsum assumi, nam unius generis primi tantum est una racio prima, nam aliter non esset genus unum propter pluralitatem racionum primarum; cum, igitur, racio mensure et racio divisibilis sint due raciones formaliter diverse, utraque non potest esse prima racio huius generis. et certum est quod nulla racio<sup>11</sup> tercia ab istis est prima racio quantitatis, nec altera istarum; igitur, nulla. racio enim mensure non est prima racio quia illa non eque primo competit quantitati continue et discrete, ut prius argutum est,<sup>11</sup> nec racio divisibilis quia sic omnes species quantitatis eque primo participant rationem divisibilis. consequens falsum ut probo tibi. primo sic: nam divisibile sonat inpotenciam, unde aliquid est divisibile secundum actum, aliquid secundum potentiam, et racio divisibilis secundum actum primo inest quantitati discrete, nam quantitas discreta habet partes actu diversas et discretas, et racio divisibilis secundum potentiam primo inest quantitati continue, nam continuum est solum divisum in potencia et ita, nulla racio divisibilis primo inest omnibus speciebus quantitatis.

4.07 Secundo sic: divisibile sonat inpotenciam, sed cuius est potencia, eius erit actus, cum propria potencia ordinetur ad proprium actum. si, igitur, divisio secundum potentiam insit quantitati continue, sibi inheret divisio in actu et ita, aliquando erit verum dicere quod quantitas continua est divisa in actu — sed quod est divisum in actu non est continuum, nec quantitas continua; per consequens, aliquando erit verum dicere quod quantitas continua non est quantitas (5<sup>v</sup> b/6<sup>r</sup>a) continua.

4.08 tertio sit: prima racio cuiuslibet generis essencialiter predicabitur de illo genere et de principiis eiusdem generis, ut patet de prima ratione generis substancie, que essencialiter predicatur de substancia que est genus et de principiis eiusdem generis, ut de materia et forma. si, igitur, racio divisibilis sit prima racio quantitatis essencialiter predicatur de principiis illius generis; sed punctum et unitas sunt principia generis quantitatis, cum primum sit principium quantitatis continue et unitas quantitatis discrete; de utroque, igitur, istorum predicabitur hec racio, et ita, utrumque istorum erit divisibile — quod est plane impossibile, cum utrumque sit indivisible.

4.09 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles in litera in numerando predicamenta enumerat quantitatem<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See above, 4.02: si primo modo... per prius inheret quantitati discrete quam continue...

<sup>10</sup> See above, 4.02: si secundo modo, adhuc racio quantitatis prius competenter quantitati continue quam discrete...

<sup>11</sup> See above, 4.02.

<sup>12</sup> *Categories* 4; 1b 26, *ed. cit.* p. 6, l. 28.

4.10 similiter, si non esset genus, non essent x genera prima — consequens falsum et contra philosophum.<sup>13</sup>

4.11 *Ad questionem:* dicendum quod quantitas est genus primum, cuius racio est hec: id, quod predicator univoce de suis speciebus, quo nichil est superius, univocum est genus; sed quantitas est huiusmodi; igitur, et cetera. maior patet nam ideo dicuntur transcendencia non esse genera quia non sunt univoca ad ea ad que sunt communia. minor patet nam quantitas, secundum unam rationem, predicator de omnibus eius speciebus, et nichil est communius ea nisi ens transcendens.

4.12 Ad evidenciam huius, sciendum quod quantitas est genus unum quia unitas generis accidentis accipitur ab unitate modi denominandi substanciam, et hec unitas sumitur a modo inherendi; sed quantitas inest substancie modo absoluto et per rationem materie, ut patet in precedentibus; omnes, igitur, species quantitatis in isto modo inherendi convenient, et ita quantitas, secundum unam rationem, de omnibus dicitur.

4.13 similiter, omnes species contente sub quantitate necessario convenient in una ratione quantitatis, equaliter salvata et participata ab eis, et ita quantitas, secundum illam rationem unam, dicitur de omnibus speciebus suis equaliter, et ita, univoce predictetur de eis.

4.14 Ad videndum, tamen, que sit illa racio prima quantitatis, que equaliter participatur ab omnibus suis speciebus, sciendum quod duplex est racio quantitatis si racio mensure et racio divisibilis, sed racio mensure non est illa racio, que equaliter participatur a speciebus quantitatis, quia racio mensure primo competit quantitati discrete et postea quantitati continue, ut argutum est prius.

4.15 similiter, racio mensure est racio comparata ad aliud, ut ad terminum, sed racio quantitatis non est quid comparatum ad aliud, ut ad terminum; in materia est racio absoluta, cum quantitas sit accidens absolutum et non comparatum ad aliud, ut ad terminum; racio, igitur, mensure non erit sua prima racio, equaliter participata ab omnibus suis contentis. racio, igitur, sua absoluta et prima et equaliter a suis speciebus participata erit racio divisibilis. et huic consonat aristoteles, quinto *metaphysice*, dicens quod quantum est divisibile in singula, quorum quodlibet est hoc aliquid.<sup>14</sup> racio, igitur, divisibilis est prima racio quantitatis in qua omnes species eius eque primo convenient et quantitas de eisdem dicitur secundum nomen et istam rationem, et ita, univoce.

#### Ad I<sup>15</sup>

4.16 *Ad primam rationem:* dicendum quod, licet quantitas predictetur de suis speciebus denominative, predicitur, tamen, de eis essencialiter, et ideo, non sequitur quod quantitas non sit genus. Ad probacionem: dicendum quod, ubi est predicatio denominativa et solum denominativa, ibi est predicatio alicuius de re alterius generis, sicud ‘hic homo est albus,’ sed, licet quantitas predictetur de linea denominative,

<sup>13</sup> See above, second question, 2.34.

<sup>14</sup> *Metaphysics* V, 13; 1020a 7-8, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 124v K: Dicitur quantitas illud, quod dividitur in res, quae sunt in eo, quorum unumquodque, aut unum habet naturam, ut sit aliquid unum...

<sup>15</sup> Left margin: ‘1.’

non, tamen, illa predicacio est solum denominativa, immo est essencialis; unde, predicacio quantitatis de eius speciebus non (6<sup>r</sup> a/b) est solum predicacio denominativa et accidentalis, sed est predicacio essencialis et abstractiva, et ideo, non sequitur quin quantitas sit genus.

4.17 vel aliter potest dici quod<sup>16</sup> aliquid predicari de alio denominative est duplum cetero, vel tanquam aliquid extrinsicum ab eo de quo predicator, et sic quantitas non predicator de suis speciebus, vel tanquam aliquid essencialiter concomitans ipsum de quo predicator, et sic quantitas predicator de suis speciebus. unde, hec predicator est vera: 'linea est quanta,' ut 'linea' respicit suum subiectum; linea, tamen, ut linea non est quanta, sed quantitas.

4.18 vel aliter potest dici, et forte melius, quod hoc est proprium quantitatis, quod ipsa denominative dicatur de suis speciebus, et hoc quia racio divisibilis quantitatis non solum est principium divisibilitatis in aliis a quantitate, sed in se ipsa, et ideo, sicud quantitas, per istam rationem, potest denominare alia a se, ita, per eandem potest denominare se ipsam.

#### Ad II<sup>17</sup>

4.19 *Ad aliam rationem:* dicendum quod, licet racio mensure primo insit quantitatibus discrete, nichilominus quantitas continua et discreta sunt species eque prime sub genere quantitatis, quia convenient in prima ratione quantitatis, que est racio divisibilis.

4.20 Pro quo sciendum quod aliquid esse prius alio est tripliciter: vel via perfectionis essendi, et sic, quantitas continua est prior quantitate discreta quia, ex quantitate continua causatur numerus, qui est quantitas discreta, ut argutum est; vel via cognitionis, et sic, quantitas continua est prior quantitate discreta quia, quantitas continua non cognoscitur per rationem mensurandi nisi per quantitatem discretam quia, quantitas continua non mensurat aliquid nisi ipsa est mensurata quantitate discreta, ut argutum est; vel via rationem generis participandi, et hic primam, et sic, neutra<sup>18</sup> est prior alia quia omnes species equaliter et eque primo participant primam rationem quantitatis, que est racio divisibilis et, per istud, patet qualiter quantitas continua est prior discreta, et qualiter discreta est prior continua, et qualiter sunt coequve, et neutra<sup>19</sup> prior alia.

#### Ad III<sup>20</sup>

4.21 *Ad aliam rationem:* dicendum quod, licet sint duo minima in genere quantitatis, ut punctum et unitas, non, tamen, sunt eque prima nisi racio puncti reducitur ad rationem unitatis, si eius racio sit racio indivisibilis, racio, enim, indivisibilis primo inest unitati, et non inest puncto nisi per unitatem. vel, concessu quod sint duo prima, unum istorum, tamen, est mensura, respectu rerum eiusdem generis, et aliud non. punctum, enim, non mensurat quantitatem continuam quia sic componeretur

<sup>16</sup> Two brackets in right margin, both developed into caricatured human profiles, the first bracketing 4.18, the second 4.19.

<sup>17</sup> Right margin: '2.'

<sup>18</sup> Em. MS: neuter.

<sup>19</sup> Em. MS: neuter.

<sup>20</sup> Right margin: '3.'

ex istis, et ita, continuum componeretur ex indivisibilibus. sed unitas mensurat quantitatem discretam, que quantitas mensurat quantitatem continuam et ideo, racio measure non inest puncto nisi quia unitati, et ideo, reduci habet ad unitatem tanquam ad aliquid prius.

#### Ad IV<sup>21</sup>

4.22 *Ad aliam rationem:* dicendum quod quantitas equivoce predicatur de suis speciebus et de passionibus, ideo non predicatur de passionibus in abstracto. hec, enim, predicacio non est essencialis: ‘brevitas est quantitas.’ et si dicatur quod hec est predicacio essencialis: ‘longitudo est quantitas,’ dicendum quod longitudo equivoce significat quantitatem et passionem speciei quantitatis. si, enim, sumatur pro quantitate, sic est essencialis predicacio; si, autem, pro passione, sic est predicacio falsa, et non essencialis.

#### Ad V

4.23 *Ad ultimam:* patet per posicionem quod omnes species quantitatis essencialiter convenient in prima ratione quantitatis, que est communis omnibus speciebus quantitatis; que, autem, sit illa racio, dictum est in posicione: est, enim, racio divisibilis. et ad argumenta in contrariam, *patet per dicta in posicione.*<sup>22</sup>

#### questio quinta<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum linea sit per se species quantitatis?

5.01 quod non videtur quia, quod est principium speciei alicuius generis, non est species eiusdem generis; sed linea est principium, et cetera, quia, sicut punctum comparatur ad lineam, ita linea ad superficiem; sed punctum est principium linee igitur, et linea erit principium superficie, et superficies est per se species, ut patet in litera;<sup>2</sup> igitur, et cetera. maior premissa patet nam, quia materia et forma sunt principia substancie composite, que est per se species de genere substancie, ideo non sunt species eiusdem generis.

5.02 Preterea, quelibet species compositionem includit; si, igitur, linea esset species, compositionem includeret quia, si includeret compositionem, ex aliquibus componeretur, et non nisi ex punctis; cum, igitur, puncta sint indivisibilia, et linea est quid continuum, componeretur ex indivisibilibus — quod est impossibile.

5.03 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles in litera: est enim linea quantitas continua, cum partes eius copulantur ad terminum communem.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Right margin: ‘.4.’

<sup>22</sup> Words italicized are enclosed in frame.

<sup>1</sup> Top margin: questio .5.’ and ‘questio .6.,’ both in column ‘a’.

<sup>2</sup> See above, text cited in fourth question, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Categories* 6; 4b 23-24, ed. cit. p. 13, ll. 23-24: Est autem discreta quantitas ut numerus et oratio, continua vero ut linea.

questio sexta<sup>1</sup>

LUXTA ISTUD

<Q<sup>2</sup>>ueratur: utrum numerus sit species de genere quantitatis?

I

6.01 quod non, na<m> si sic, esset unus; consequens falsum quia, cum numerus sit accidentis et est unus, est unum accidentis et est in pluribus subiectis quia binarius est subiective in duobus et ita, unum accidentis numero in diversis subiectis numero.

II

6.02 Preterea, numerus est multitudo, quia aggregacio multorum; est, igitur, multa; sed multum et unum opponuntur; igitur, non est unus. quod autem sit multa patet<sup>3</sup> nam sequitur: '5 sunt duo et tria, igitur 5 sunt multa,' et antecedens est verum in sensu composito, igitur consequens, et ita numerus quinarius erit multa.

III

6.03 Preterea, nullum aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum est per se species generis; sed numerus est huiusmodi; igitur, et cetera. minor patet; aggregatur, enim, ex quantitate et substancia.

IV

6.04 Preterea, si numerus esset species quantitatis, unitas non reperiretur nisi in quantitate. consequens patet quia unitas est pars numeri, et pars et totum sunt eiusdem generis. falsitas consequentis patet quia unitas reperitur in quolibet genere, nam aliter non in omni genere esset dare unum primum et minimum quod est mensura posteriorum, cuius oppositum dicit aristoteles decimo *metaphysice*.<sup>4</sup>

6.05 similiter, in intellectivis reperitur unitas quia unum; similiter, reperitur dualitas, igitur unitas et, tamen, non sunt in genere quantitatis cum non sint quante. assumptum patet nam nisi ibi esset dualitas, non sint in celo aliqui angeli quia nec duo, nec 3, et cetera.

V

6.06 Preterea, nullus numerus est species quantitatis quia non quaternarius, nec aliquis alias; eadem ratione, nec ullus, igitur, et cetera. quod non quaternarius ostendo nam, una species non actu includit aliam cum species sint in permixte; sed quaternarius actu includit ternarium et eciam includit binarium; igitur, non est una species.

<sup>1</sup> Top margin and left margin carry 'questio .6.'; formula 'juxta istud' written at end of last line of preceding question.

<sup>2</sup> Small 'q' written within the space left for lettrine of 'Queratur.'

<sup>3</sup> Word added, perhaps by scribe himself.

<sup>4</sup> *Metaphysics* X, 1; 1053a 5-6, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 252<sup>r</sup> A: Quare a quo primo secundum sensum non contingit, hoc omnes mensuram... faciunt; see also text cited above, third question, n. 21.

## VI

6.07 similiter, accipiatur dualitas: hec dualitas est species numeri; addo sibi tertiam unitatem, quod est satis possibile; ista addita, aut dualitas hec est species numeri, aut non. si non, igitur, sola addicio in ea facit de specie non speciem, quod est absurdum dicere; si sic, et ista dualitas manet in ternario, igitur una species in alia et ita, una includit aliam ut prius, sicud partem ipsam componentem.

## VII

6.08 similiter, illa, que sunt infinita, non sunt species alicuius generis quia unius generis non sunt infinite species; sed numeri sunt infinite; igitur, numeri non sunt species alicuius generis et, per consequens, nec numerus. minor patet nam infinite dualitates revolucionum, et eciā animarum, precesserunt hanc animam; et quelibet anima intellectiva, de qua loquitur, adhuc est cum sit incorruptibilis; igitur, infinite dualitates sunt et, per consequens, infiniti numeri sunt.

6.09 *Ad oppositum est aristoteles: dico autem quantitatem discretam ut numerum et oracionem*<sup>5</sup>.

6.10 *Ad primam questionem:* dicendum quod linea est per se species, et cetera (6<sup>v</sup> a/b) quia, quod est per se contentum sub divisibili est per se divisibile et quod est per se divisibile est per se contentum sub quantitate; sed linea est per se contentum sub divisibili, et non solum contentum, sed est per se divisibilis; igitur, per se continetur sub quantitate. si omne per se contentum sub genere, vel est species, vel individuum, quia non potest esse genus, nam sic idem continetur sub se ipso, linea, igitur, vel est species, vel individuum. non individuum quia continetur sub se hanc speciem, et illam, que locum inferiorem tenent in linea possibili; erit, igitur, species quantitatis et ita, per se species.

6.11 similiter, aristoteles dicit hoc plane in litera: est, enim, quantitas continua, et hoc probat in litera, quia partes eius copulantur ad terminum communem.<sup>6</sup>

6.12 *Pro racione:*<sup>7</sup> sciendum quod ista se habent secundum ordinem: linea, superficies, et corpus, et punctum, ita quod punctum est inicium linee et terminus incohans lineam, unde, partes linee ad punctum copulantur sicud ad terminum communem, et partes superficie ad lineam copulantur, et partes corporis ad superficiem; sed partes puncti ad nichil, quia non habet partes, cum sit indivisible.

6.13 *Ad primam rationem:* dicendum per istud quod aliquid esse principium alicuius contingit dupliciter,<sup>8</sup> vel ita, quod sit principium iniciativum, vel principium constitutivum, ita quod sit pars sua, ipsum constituens, primo modo, punctum est principium linee, quia est inicium linee, sicud instans est principium temporis quia inicium temporis, et sic maior est falsa. secundo modo, punctum non est principium linee, et sic maior vera et minor falsa.

<sup>5</sup> *Categories* 6; 4b 23-24; see above, fifth question, n. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Categories* 6; 4b 25-26 and 33-35, the first, *ed. cit.* p. 13, ll. 25-26: Partium enim numeri nullus est communis terminus ad quem partes ipsius coniunguntur, the second, *ed. cit.* p. 14, ll. 5-7: quantitas est oratio manifestum est; mensuratur enim syllaba longa et brevis.

<sup>7</sup> Bracket in left margin, developed into fanciful profile of man.

<sup>8</sup> Bracket in right margin, developed into fanciful profile of man.

6.14 *Ad aliud*: dicendum quod linea includit compositionem, non, tamen, componitur ex punctis, sed componitur ex principiis eiusdem generis; unde, licet accidentis non habeat materiam ex qua, sed materiam in qua, potest, tamen, accidentis habere aliquid materiale, vel habens rationem materie, ex quo materiali cum sua formali constituitur sua essentia et ideo, accidentis diffinitur et componitur per principia eiusdem generis simpliciter; verumtamen, in diffinizione accidentis ponitur subiectum, sed ista diffinizio non est simpliciter diffinizio, vel prima diffinizio, et ideo appellatur diffinizio per additamentum.

6.15 *Ad secundam questionem*: dicendum quod numerus est species quantitatis; est, enim, quantitas discreta, ut dicit autor in litera et probat sic: nam, cum propria rasio quantitatis discrete sit rasio mensure,<sup>9</sup> et hoc est propria ratio numeri, igitur numerus est quantitas discreta.

6.16 similiter, nisi esset species quantitatis, oracio non esset species quantitatis; per eamdem rationem, nec aliquod aliud discretum, et ita, quilibet quantitas esset quantitas continua, et sic quantitas non haberet nisi unam speciem primam, ut quantitatatem continuam, et ita quantitas non esset genus, quod est impossibile.

6.17 similiter, albertus,<sup>10</sup> boecius,<sup>11</sup> et omnes expositores, dicunt numerum esse quantitatem discretam.

6.18 similiter, numerus est accidentis quia non est substancia, certum est, et non est aliud accidentis a quantitate, ut patet induccione, igitur est quantitas, et non continua, ut probatur in litera, nam eius partes non copulantur ad terminum communem;<sup>12</sup> igitur, est quantitas discreta et quilibet talis est species quantitatis; igitur, et cetera.

### Ad I

6.19 *Ad primum argumentum*: dicendum quod numerus est in uno subiecto; est, tamen, in pluribus entibus extra animam, unde dualitas, socratis et platonis, est subiective in socrate et platone, et ita in pluribus entibus extra animam; sed quia ista sunt unum subiectum respectu numeri, ideo est in uno subiecto, sicud quantitas unius virge, cuius medietas est morticina, et alia viva, est subiective in hac parte et in illa, in sensu composito sumendo predicatum, et, tamen, hec pars et illa sunt duo encia divisa, sicud vivum et morticinum, sunt, tamen, unum subiectum.

6.20 vel aliter potest dici, et satis bene, quod accidentis esse in duobus subiectis contingit dupliciter, ita quod illud accidentis sit in uno istorum subiectorum secundum se totum, et secundum se totum sit in alio, vel quod pars (6<sup>v</sup> b/7<sup>r</sup> a) illius accidentis sit in uno istorum, et alia pars in alio. primo modo, impossibile est accidentis esse in duobus subiectis, quia sic, idem accidentis maneret et non maneret simul quia,

<sup>9</sup> See above, fifth question, n. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Albert, *Opera omnia*, ed. cit., *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 3, c. 2, vol. 1, p. 195: Quod autem numerus sit quantitas discreta sic probatur...

<sup>11</sup> Boethius, *In categorias Aristotelis liber II*, PL 64 203 A-B: Discretorum namque quantitatum ipse exempla ponit et species. Oratio enim discreta est quantitas, eodemque modo et numerus, et numerum esse quantitatem nemo dubitat. Discreta vero est, quoniam denarius numerus cum constet ex quinque et quinque.

<sup>12</sup> See above, text cited n. 6 of this question.

corupto uno subiecto, corumpitur et illud accidens, et manente alio, maneret illud accidens. secundo modo, est necessarium, et sic numerus est in pluribus subiectis, quia una unitas, que est eius pars, est in uno subiecto, et alias in alio; totus numerus, tamen, est tantum in uno subiecto.

### Ad II

6.21 *Ad aliud: dicendum* quod multitudo in materialibus materialiter, et unitas formaliter, non opponuntur; stant, enim, simul quod unum sit multa materialiter et unum formaliter. sic est hic quia, numerus est multa materialiter et unum formaliter. et si queratur: a qua est unitas numeri? dicendum quod, nec ab unitate ultima, nec aliqua alia, sed ab ordine unitatum; unde, ordo unitatum ad invicem est unitas numeri.

### Ad III

6.22 Ad aliud:<sup>13</sup> patet per dicta in questione precedenti; ymaginetur quod numerus componeretur ex subiecto et ex quantitate, quod est falsum quia, ut dictum, quia componitur ex principiis intrinsicis et propriis eiusdem generis sufficienter.

### Ad IV

6.23 *Ad aliud:* dicendum quod unitas potest sumi dupliciter: ut est sinonomum, vel convertibile, cum ente, vel ut est in genere quantitatis. primo modo, convertitur cum ente, et reperitur in quolibet genere et in intellectivis, ut argutum est. sed secundo modo, solum reperitur in genere quantitatis, unde, sicud distinguitur de unitate, sic de numero; est, enim, numerus transcendentis, qui reperitur in intellectivis, et in omnibus, ut argutum est prius, et est numerus, qui est in genere quantitatis, et ille non repitur in intellectivis, quia solum reperitur in quantis; unde, ille est numerus in genere, et alias est numerus extra genus.

### Ad V

6.24 *Ad aliud:* dicendum quod aliquid includi in alio est dupliciter: vel quantum ad eius esse materiale tantum, et sic ternarius includitur in quaternario quia unitates ternarii, vel quantum ad eius esse materiale et formale, et sic nullus numerus includitur in alio, et quia species includit totum materiale et formale, et ideo species sunt impermixte, et nulla aliam includit.

### Ad VI

6.25 Per hoc *ad aliud:* quod dualitati, que species est, manente ratione speciei, non potest nova unitas addi de novo; unitatibus, tamen, que sunt materialia in dualitate que species est, potest addi de novo; sed tunc non sequitur quod una species insit alii, sed tantum sequitur quod materialia unius speciei sint in alia specie, et hoc est verum.

### Ad VII

6.26 Ad Ultimum: dicendum quod non est inconveniens, saltim de genere quantitatis, quod illius generis sint infinite species, quia infiniti numeri, et ita, non est inconveniens quod unius generis sint infinite perfecciones, cum quelibet species sit alicuius perfectionis.

<sup>13</sup> Frame is lacking for words 'Ad aliud.'

6.27 Vel aliter posset dici quod non sunt infinite species, nec infiniti numeri. et ad probacionem, negetur hec consequencia: sunt infinite dualitates animarum intellectivarum, sumendo numerum pro numero in genere quantitatis, quia ille numerus non fit nisi ex quantis; sed anima intellectiva non est quanta, cum sit una forma indivisibilis.

6.28 Contra<sup>14</sup> hoc quod dicitur, quod numerus est quantitas discreta, nam, si sic, cum continuum sit quantitas continua, numerus et continuum essent distincte species quantitatis. consequens falsum, quia tunc numerus importaret aliquam rem extra animam, que non est in continuo; sed hoc est falsum quia, circumscripso a continuo quodlibet quod non est de eius essencia, adhuc in continuo est numerus, quoniam includit numerum, quia includit tres, et quatuor, partes; et ita, includit dualitatem parciū, et trinitatem, et ita, binarium, et ternarium; tota, igitur, natura numeri includitur in continuo; non, igitur, sunt diverse species.

6.29 similiter,<sup>15</sup> si numerus esset species quantitatis, quilibet numerus esset species quantitatis, quia ternarius, et quartarius; consequens falsum quia, tunc numerus infinitus esset species quantitatis, (7<sup>r</sup> a/b) et similiter, numerus maximus, et tunc esset accipere numerum maximum qui est in genere, et numerum infinitum, quod est impossibile et contra philosophum dicentem numerum crescere in infinitum.<sup>16</sup> consequencia facta, patet, nam est dare numerum maximum et infinitum quia numerus, factus ex omnibus partibus huius continui, est maximus, quia tot unitates sunt in hoc numero quot sunt, vel possunt esse, quia infinite unitates, quia infinite partes continui, et infinitis non possunt esse plura; iste, igitur, numerus componitur ex tot unitatibus quot sunt, vel possunt esse; igitur, est maximus.

<tria argumenta confirmatoria>

I

6.30 istud confirmatur nam, si aliquis numerus esset, vel posset esse, maior isto, ille contineret plures unitates quam iste, et cum iste continet infinitas, aliqua essent plura infinitis; quod, autem, numerus maior contineat plures unitates quam numerus minor patet, nam aliter, tot unitates, et neque plures neque pauciores, essent in numero maiori et minori.

II

6.31 similiter, iste numerus est infinitus quia componitur ex infinitis unitatibus.

III

6.32 Contra hoc quod dicitur, quod numerus, ut binarius factus a socrate et platonе, est in duobus subiective, arguo sic: accidens presupponit suum subiectum, igitur dualitas, si sit subiective in duobus, presupponit duo; sed non duo sunt sine dualitate; igitur, dualitas presupponit dualitatem, et ita, idem se ipsum.

<sup>14</sup> Left margin: drawing of a pointing hand.

<sup>15</sup> Left margin: drawing of a pointing hand.

<sup>16</sup> *Physics* III, 7; 207b 10-12, Venice ed. vol. 4, fol. 117<sup>v</sup> G: processus aut ad multitudinem possibile est semper imaginari, quoniam divisio mensurae in duas medietates, et medietatis in duas medietates procedit in infinitum, et sic erit in potentia, in actu autem non.

## Ad I

6.33 Ad ista tria per ordinem: dicendum Ad primum, quod hoc continuum non includit aliquem numerum qui<sup>17</sup> est in genere quantitatis; et si dicatur: includit unitates que sunt partes numeri, dicendum quod non includit unitates que sunt principia numeri in genere quantitatis quia non includit nisi unitatem in substancia, et principium quantitatis est unitas in quantitate.

6.34 Et si dicas: includit hanc partem, et illam, et ex hac parte, et illa, potest fieri numerus in genere quantitatis ; igitur, idem numero erit pars componens diversas species. huic dicendum quod hec pars, demonstrata parte continui, non potest componere numerum in genere quantitatis, sed pars illius numeri est unitas in quantitate que fundatur supra unitatem in substancia, ut supra partem continui.

6.35 vel aliter potest dici quod non est inconveniens idem numero componere diversas species, quia eadem unitas, que est pars binarii, si addatur tercia unitas unitatibus binarii, componit ternarium et, tamen, binarius et ternarius sunt distincte species.

## Ad II

6.36 Ad aliud: dicendum quod non est dare numerum infinitum, nec maximum; non infinitum quia, cuilibet numero potest addi unitas de novo, aliter non cresceret numerus in infinitum, et si fiet numerus maior, et infinito nichil est maius. nec valet: componitur ex infinitis unitatibus, igitur est infinitus, nec eciam est dare maximum numerum sic, quin, quolibet dato, potest esse numerus maior et, tamen, sit dare numerum maximum, quo non est numerus maior, et ideo, est dare maximum numerum existentem, quia numerum factum ex omnibus unitatibus existentibus. eo, tamen, adhuc potest esse numerus maior, et ideo non est dare maximum numerum, quin eo potest esse maior, et sic intelligit aristoteles. et quando dicitur: tot unitates sunt in numero facto ex omnibus partibus huius continui quot sunt, vel possunt esse, igitur, isto numero non potest esse numerus maior, dicendum quod non sequitur quia, licet non sint plures unitates quam sunt in isto numero, quia nulla sunt plura infinitis, quia, tamen, alique sunt unitates, et possunt esse que non sunt, alique de numero istarum <possunt esse> istius numeri; ideo, numerus factus ex illis, et ex omnibus unitatibus huius numeri, est maior isto numero.

## Ad III

6.37 Ad ultimum: dicendum quod subiectum presupponitur ab accidente uno modo, et alio modo non. unde, aliquid presupponere aliud est dupliciter: vel sic, quod aliud prius sit quam ipsum, et sic non quodlibet accidens presupponit suum subiectum, quia sic subiectum esset sine sua passione; alio modo, aliquid presupponit aliud ita quod illud aliud est prius naturaliter, et apud intellectum, quam<sup>18</sup> illud, et sic numerus presupponit suum subiectum, et ideo, idem non presupponit se.

<sup>17</sup> Em. MS: que.

<sup>18</sup> Em. MS: quod.

## questio septima

CIRCA RELATIVA NUNC PRIMO QUERATUR ET HIC CIRCA SPECIES RELACIONIS<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum per se relativa, cuiusmodi sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, sint per se in genere relacionis?

## I

7.01 quod sic, ostendo nam illa que per se referuntur sunt per se in genere relacionis; sed pater, <et cetera,> sunt huiusmodi; planum est; igitur, et cetera.

## II

7.02 Preterea, illud quod per se est ad aliud, sicud ad terminum, est per se in genere relacionis; sed pater est huiusmodi quia est per se ad filium; igitur, et cetera.

## III

7.03 Preterea, pater est ad aliquid, igitur est relacio; et non est genus relacionis, nec individuum, igitur species.

## IV

7.04 Preterea, nisi talia essent de genere relacionis, nulla relativa essent in genere relacionis.

## V

7.05 Preterea, aristoteles, in exemplificando de relacione et de illis que sunt in illo genere, exemplificat per patrem et filium;<sup>2</sup> igitur, ista sunt illius generis.

## VI

7.06 Preterea, secundum boecium, capitulo de ad aliquid, 'nichil prohibet' idem diverse esse in 'diversis generibus,' et exemplificat de socrate qui est in genere substancie inquantum socrates, est, tamen, in genere relacionis inquantum pater;<sup>3</sup> igitur, secundum ipsum, pater est in genere relacionis.

7.07 Ad oppositum: illa, que non sunt in alico genere, non sunt in genere per se relacionis; sed concreta accidentalia non sunt in alico genere per se, quoniam album non est in genere, per philosophum, per se,<sup>4</sup> propter diversum significare; sed pater et filius, et huiusmodi relativa, sunt concretive dicta; igitur, non sunt per se in alico et, per consequens, non in genere relacionis.

<sup>1</sup> Top margin carries 'questio .7.' and 'questio .8.', both of which begin in column 'a'; left margin carries '7.'; title follows last line of question six.

<sup>2</sup> Father-son exemplification is not used in *Categories*, but see *Metaphysics* V, 15; 1021a 21-25, *ed. cit.* vol. 8, fol. 128<sup>r</sup> E-F. Et dicuntur relativa illa, quae sunt secundum tempus, ut agens ad patiens; et illud, quod aget, ad illud quod patietur. et sic dicitur pater est pater filii, pater etiam: quoddam enim est agens et patiens etiam.

<sup>3</sup> In *categorias Aristotelis Liber II*, De relativis, PL 64 220 D: Atqui ut alia significatione una res diversis generibus supponatur, nihil prohibet, Socrates namque in eo quod est Socrates substantia est, in eo quod pater vel filius ad aliquid...

<sup>4</sup> Reading would be smoother had Bradley, or his scribe, written: album non est in genere per se, secundum philosophum, propter diversum significare...

7.08 Preterea, si pater esset in genere, et cetera, tunc omnis pater esset, et cetera, quia in eodem genere est species et eius individuum, et quilibet pater est individuum ‘patris.’ falsitas consequentis patet quia, eadem ratione, omnis filius esset in genere relacionis, et ita hec vera in sensu compositionis: ‘omnis pater, vel filius, est in genere, et cetera.’ sed nunc arguo sic: omnis pater et filius, et cetera; omnis homo est pater vel filius; igitur, omnis homo est in genere relacionis. conclusio est satis igitur, maior est impossibilis.

7.09 similiter, pater est aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum quia aggregatum in se substancial patris cum paternitate, et paternitas est accidentis et nullum tale est per se in genere; igitur, et cetera.

#### questio octava

#### IUXTA ISTUD<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum relativa sint simul natura?

#### I

8.01 quod non, nam prius et posterius sunt relativa et non sunt simul natura quia prius precedit posterius; si, igitur, esset simul cum eo, et illud, cum quo est simul, non precedit idem; igitur, precederet et non precederet.

#### II

8.02 similiter, prius tempore et posterius tempore sunt relativa; non sunt simul natura quia, si sic, essent simul tempore, et sic, quod est prius tempore alico esset simul tempore cum eo.

#### III

8.03 Preterea, animal quod est genus, refertur ad speciem quia genus et species referuntur; animal tunc significat rem sub isto respectu, et animal sub isto respectu refertur ad speciem, quia est genus; animal, tamen, sub isto respectu, est prius specie, quia predicitur de omnibus de quibus species, et de pluribus; igitur, est communius et, per consequens, prius.

#### IV

8.04 Preterea, causa et causatum sunt relativa et non sunt simul natura, cum causa prior est causato.

#### V

8.05 sciencia et scibile sunt relativa et, tamen, non sunt simul natura quia scibile est prius sciencia; potest, enim esse, sciencia destructa, ut probatur in litera.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Left margin: ‘.8.’; top margin, see above, seventh question, n. 1; formula ‘iuxta istud’ fills out last line of previous question.

<sup>2</sup> *Categories* 7; 7b 23-30, ed. cit. p. 21, ll. 7-13: Non autem in omnibus relativis verum videtur esse simul naturaliter; scibile enim scientia prius esse videbitur... Amplius scibile sublatum simul auferit scienciam, sciencia vero non simul auferit scibile...

8.06 *Ad oppositum est aristoteles dicens relativa esse simul natura.*<sup>3</sup>

8.07 *Ad primam questionem:*<sup>4</sup> dicendum quod relativa concretive dicta, ut pater et filius, dominus et servus, et cetera, non sunt per se in genere relacionis, cuius ratio est hec, nam illa, que denominative dicuntur ab alico non sunt per se in illo genere in quo sunt sua denominativa, sicud patet, nam album et nigrum non sunt per se in genere qualitatis, sicud albedo et nigredo; sed pater et filius, et cetera, denominative dicuntur ab alico; dicitur, enim, 'pater' denominative a paternitate, et 'filius' denominative a filiacione; cum, igitur, paternitas et filiatio sint per se in genere relacionis, pater et filius in eodem genere non erunt per se.

8.08 similiter, illa que per se sunt in alico genere suscipiunt predicacionem eiusdem in abstracto, sicud patet de socrate, qui est in genere substancie, et ideo, hec est vera: 'socrates est substancia', sed pater, et filius, et huiusmodi, non suscipiunt predicacionem relacionis in abstracto quia tales sunt impossibilis: 'pater est relacio', (7<sup>v</sup> a/b) 'filius est relacio.' 'pater', igitur, et 'filius', et huiusmodi, relativa concretive dicta, non erunt per se in genere relacionis. unde, sicud album non est per se in genere qualitatis, sed albedo est per se in illo genere, et album per reduccionem, ita pater et filius. et, universaliter, relativa concretive dicta non sunt per se in genere relacionis, sed illa sunt per se in illo genere a quibus denominative dicuntur, ut paternitas, et filiatio, et relativa, que denominative dicuntur ab illis, sunt in eodem genere solum per reduccionem.

8.09 similiter, si pater esset per se in genere relacionis, cum pater non sit accidentis, nec relacio, sequeretur quod aliquid esset per se in genere relacionis quod non esset accidentis, nec relacio, et ita, aliquid posset esse in genere substancie, quod non est substancia.

8.10 similiter, sequeretur, ut argutum est prius,<sup>5</sup> quod omnis homo esset in genere relacionis, et quidlibet esset in genere relacionis; que, igitur, sunt in genere relacionis per se, et que non per se sed per reduccionem tantum, patet per iam dicta.

### Ad I

8.11 *Ad primum argumentum:*<sup>6</sup> dicendum negando maiorem quia, ex antecedente sequitur oppositum consequentis, eo, enim, ipso quod est per se relacio non est per se in genere relacionis, nam quod refertur per se, non est per se in genere nisi per reduccionem, sed principium, quo id refertur ad aliud, est per se in genere, et ideo, paternitas est per se principium relacionis, pater, autem, nequaquam.

### Ad II

8.12 *Ad aliud:*<sup>7</sup> dicendum negando maiorem, ut patet per iam dicta.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 7; 7b 15, p. 21, l. 1: Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura...

<sup>4</sup> That is, to the seventh question, arguments for which were adduced, but no solution given, nor any counter-arguments pressed: hence the reference here is to: *utrum per se relativa, cuiusmodi sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, sint per se in genere relacionis?*

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the 'Ad oppositum,' 7.08.

<sup>6</sup> That is, 7.01.

<sup>7</sup> That is, 7.02.

## Ad III

8.13 *Ad aliud*:<sup>8</sup> dicendum quod, sic dicto: ‘pater est ad aliquid,’ ‘ad aliquid’ supponit pro corelativo ‘patris,’ ut pro filio, et sic non sequitur: ‘igitur pater est relacio.’ sic, tamen, dicto: ‘paternitas est ad aliquid,’ ‘ad aliquid’ supponit pro predicamento relacionis, et sic non verificatur de ‘patre.’

## Ad IV

8.14 *Ad aliud sequens*:<sup>9</sup> dicendum concedendo quod nulla per se relativa et secundum esse sunt per se in genere relacionis; relativa, tamen, secundum rationem bene possunt esse in illo genere per se, ut paternitas, que sibi refertur secundum rationem, quia est eadem sibi.

## Ad V

8.15 *Ad aliud*:<sup>10</sup> dicendum quod aristoteles, in exemplificando de relacione et de eis que sunt per se in illo genere, exemplificat per relativa concretive dicta, ut per patrem et filium, et cetera, quia talia sunt nobis nociora abstractis. vel posset dici quod et si ponat exemplum de eis, non oportet illa esse per se in genere relacionis nam, per aristotelem in *prioribus*, exempla ponimus non ut communia<sup>11</sup> sic, et cetera.<sup>12</sup>

## Ad VI

8.16 Ad aliud:<sup>13</sup> dicendum quod boecius non Wult ibi dicere patrem, nec aliud tale relativum, esse in genere relacionis per se, sed Wult dicere ibi solomodo quod socrates, inquantum socrates, est substancia, inquantum, autem, pater, est ad aliquid. sed non sequitur: ‘igitur est per se in genere relacionis,’ unde, quod ipse dicit, idem esse in diversis generibus sub diversa ratione, forte est verum, sed nichil ad propositum quia non dicit hoc de ‘patre’, nec eciam de socrate, quod, scilicet, alterum istorum sit per se in genere substancie, et per se in genere relacionis, sub diversa ratione.

<sup>8</sup> That is, 7.03.

<sup>9</sup> That is, 7.04.

<sup>10</sup> That is, 7.05.

<sup>11</sup> Reading is not certain, owing to state of parchment; the intention seems to be that Aristotle has proposed that examples function on grounds other than those at stake in deduction and induction: in the first, particulars are subsumed *per se* under a distributed middle as necessarily as are parts under their whole; in the second, all relevant individuals have been examined. Hence, Bradlay can refer to the *Prior Analytics* II, 24; 68b 38-69a 19, as an explanation that examples such as ‘father’ and ‘son’ for relation, can function in reasoning, but not because they are ‘common’ links between the extremes in the fashion of a distributed middle or an adequate induction.

<sup>12</sup> If the reading proposed is correct, then the crucial passage is *Aristoteles Latinus* III.1-4, *Analytica Priora*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, (Bruges-Paris, 1962), p. 135, 11.5-11: Manifestum igitur quoniam exemplum est neque ut pars ad totum neque ut totum ad partem, sed ut pars ad partem, quando ambo quidem insunt sub eodem, evidens autem alterum. Et differt inductione quoniam haec quidem ex omnibus individuis extremum ostendebat inesse medio et ad extremum non copulabat syllogismum, hoc autem et copulat et non ex omnibus ostendit.

<sup>13</sup> Frame lacking; reference is to 7.06.

8.17 *Ad aliam questionem:*<sup>14</sup> dicendum quod relativa sunt duplia: per se et secundum esse, et quedam per accidens et secundum dici. loquendo primo modo, sunt simul natura, secundo modo, non. primum patet, nam relativa per se et secundum esse sunt illa que inponuntur ad significandum primo respectum, sive rem, de genere relacionis, ut 'pater,' qui primo significat paternitatem, et 'filius,' 'dominus,' 'servus,' 'duplum,' 'singulum,' quorum quodlibet primo significat rem de genere relacionis. huiusmodi, enim, sunt simul natura, quia illa sic se habent<sup>15</sup> quod, posito uno, ponitur et relium et, perempto uno, perimitur et relium, et e contra, ita quod dicuntur ad convertenciam<sup>16</sup> negative et affirmative sunt simul natura; huiusmodi, autem sunt relativa per se et secundum esse, ut patet in litera; igitur, illa sunt simul natura.

8.18 secundum patet sic: nam relativa secundum dici et per accidens sunt illa que significant primo rem abstractam, ut rem alterius generis a relacione, et ex consequenti quemdam respectum importatum ad terminum fundatum in primo eorum significato, ut patet de sciencia et scibili; 'sciencia' enim, primo significat qualitatem, et ex consequenti quemdam respectum ad scibile. 'scibile' etiam significat primo rem abstractam, et tales non sunt simul natura quia illa, que sic se habent quod, posito uno, non ponitur relium, sed cum esse unius (7<sup>v</sup> b/8<sup>r</sup> a) stat non esse alterius, non sunt simul natura quia, si essent in quacunque mensura, cum esse unius esset esse alterius, sed sic se habent relativa per accidens et secundum dici, ut scibile et sciencia, causa et causatum nam, posito scibili, non est necesse scienciam ponи, quia scibile potest esse, nulla sciencia existente, ut patet in litera; igitur, et cetera.

8.19 Est, tamen, sciendum quod aliqua relativa sunt simul secundum esse et habitudinem, ut pater et filius, et universaliter relativa per se et secundum esse; aliqua, autem, sunt simul secundum habitudinem et non secundum esse, ut prius et posterius; et aliqua, nec secundum esse, nec secundum habitudinem simpliciter, ut sciencia et scibile. non sunt simul secundum esse, certum est, cum scibile potest esse, sciencia destructa, nec secundum habitudinem simpliciter, quia, licet sciencia ad scibile sit habitudo realis et simpliciter, scibilis, tamen, ad scienciam non est aliqua habitudo nisi secundum rationem, quomodo quidlibet habet habitudinem ad terminum, cum quidlibet referatur ad se ipsum secundum rationem, nam aliter non quidlibet esset idem sibi.

### Ad I et II

8.20 *Ad primum argumentum et secundum:*<sup>17</sup> dicendum per idem, quod prius et posterius possunt accipi pro istis intencionibus, ut pro prioritate et posterioritate, vel pro rebus subiacentibus istis. primo modo sunt simul natura, et sic sunt solum relativa secundo modo, nec sic sunt relativa. vel posset dici quod non oportet ista esse simul natura, quia non sunt relativa per se et secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem; istud, enim, dicit avicenna, capitulo de ad aliquid, in *metaphysica* sua nam, per ipsum ibi-

<sup>14</sup> That is, to the eighth question : utrum relativa sint simul natura ?

<sup>15</sup> Em. MS: quia illa que sic se habent...

<sup>16</sup> *Categories* 7; 6b 29, ed. cit. p. 19, l. 3: Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur...

<sup>17</sup> That is, 8.01 and 8.02.

dem, prius et posterius sunt de numero relativorum que ab anima causantur,<sup>18</sup> et talia sunt relativa secundum rationem.

8.21 Si arguatur contra primam responsionem sic: si prioritas et posterioritas sint simul natura, igitur quandocunque prioritas est, posterioritas est, et quando posterioritas est, subiectum posterioritatis est, quia aliter accidentis esset sine subiecto, et quando prioritas est, subiectum prioritatis est, propter idem quod prius, igitur quando prioritas est, et posterioritas est, subiecta istarum sunt, et ita, repugnat dicere quod iste intenciones sint simul natura et res subiecte non, Ad istud: dicendum quod, quando prioritas est, secundum esse habitudinis inter prioritatem et posterioritatem, posterioritas est secundum idem esse, sed non valet: ‘est secundum idem esse, igitur est’ quia in consequente predicatur esse existentie, et in antecedente esse habitudinis, et sic equivocatur ‘est’.

### Ad III

8.22 *Ad aliud:*<sup>19</sup> dicendum quod genus refertur ad speciem ratione intencionis generis et speciei; ratione, tamen, rerum subiacencium istis intencionibus, non referuntur. et ideo, iste intenciones sunt simul natura, non, tamen, res subiacentes.

8.23 et si dicatur: ‘res generis, ratione rei, est superior ad speciem, igitur res erunt relate, et ita, simul natura,’ dicendum est quod, non obstante quod res ‘animalis’ sit superior ad rem speciei, ‘animal,’ tamen, non refertur ad speciem nisi quia est genus et superior ad speciem. et ideo, racio generis et racio speciei sunt simul natura, vel posset dici quod, quia genus et species, et superius et inferius, sunt relativa secundum rationem tantum, ideo non oportet ea esse simul natura.

### Ad IV

8.24 *Ad aliud:*<sup>20</sup> dicendum eodem modo, sicud dictum est ad precedencia; uno modo, quod causa et causatum, quo ad istas intenciones, sunt relativa, et sic simul sunt natura; quo, tamen, ad res subiacentes, causa precedet causatum. vel alio modo dicitur ut prius, quod quia causa et causatum non sunt relativa per se et secundum esse, sed alterum istorum est relativum solum secundum rationem, ut causa, ideo, non oportet ea esse simul natura.

<sup>18</sup> *Avicenne metaphysica*, Venice, 1495, Tractatus tertij vel tertij libri Capitulum decimum de ad aliquid: Horum autem que sunt prius et posterius in tempore et quid est huiusmodi unum est privatum. Sed inter aliqua que sunt prius et posterius sunt due relationes sicut inter esse quando intelligitur et inter intellectum quod non accipitur ex esse proprio. Scias autem quod res in se non est prius nisi eo quod est simul cum ea et hec species prioris et posterius est cum utraque sunt simul in intellectu. Cum enim presentatur in intellectu forma prioris et forma posterioris intelligit anima hanc comparationem incidere inter duo que sunt in intellectu, quoniam hec comparatio est inter duo que sunt in intellectu. Sed autem hec res in se non est prior quo enim erit prior res que non habet esse igitur que fuerint de relativis secundum hunc modum non erit eorum relatio nisi in solo intellectu nec intelligentur existere in esse secundum hanc prioritatem et posterioritatem hic enim prius et posterius est certe de intentionibus intelligentibus, ex comparationibus quas ponit intellectus ex respectibus qui acquiruntur rebus cum comparat inter eas intellectus et designat eas.

<sup>19</sup> That is, 8.03.

<sup>20</sup> That is, 8.04.

## Ad V

8.25 Ad ultimum:<sup>21</sup> dicendum per iam dicta quod, quia scibile non refertur ad scienciam nisi secundum rationem, ideo non oportet ista esse simul natura; que, igitur, relativa sunt simul natura, et que non, patet per iam dicta.

questio nona<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum habitus et disposicio sint unum in specie qualitatis, ita quod non sunt due species diverse?

## I

9.01 quod non, nam, si sint unum in specie qualitatis, aut igitur sunt unum numero, aut unum specie, aut unum numero et diversa specie; non primo modo, quia ita, que sunt unum numero utrumque (8<sup>r</sup> a/b) de alio predicatur universaliter, sed licet hec sit vera: 'quilibet habitus est disposicio,' hec, tamen, est falsa: 'quilibet disposicio est habitus,' ut patet in litera.<sup>2</sup> nec secundo modo, quia tunc frustra eidem speciei inponerentur diversa nomina. nec tertio modo, quia illa, que sunt diversa numero, neutrum de alio predicatur universaliter, sed disposicio est id de quo predicatur habitus universaliter, vel saltim, disposicio predicatur de habitu universaliter, qui hec est vera: 'quilibet habitus est disposicio', ut patet in litera.

9.02 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles in litera; est, autem, prima species qualitatis, ut habitus et disposicio, et ita ista non variant speciem.

9.03 Ad questionem: dicendum quod habitus et disposicio sunt eiusdem speciei qualitatis; cuius ratio est hec, nam qualitas est genus sub quo continentur habitus et disposicio, que sunt eiusdem speciei quia non differunt nisi secundum diversos gradus eiusdem speciei, secundum quod habitus est qualitas de difficiili mobilis, et disposicio est qualitas de facili mobilis, ut dicitur in litera, in dando differentiam inter habitum et dispositionem: est, enim, habitus, ut sciencia, et disposicio, ut tristitia et leticia; est etiam habitus corporis, ut accidens inseparabile, ut cicatrix Vulnerum; disposicio, autem, ut albedo et nigredo.<sup>3</sup>

9.04 unde, secundum boecium, habitus et disposicio non differunt nisi sicud qualitas intensa et remissa,<sup>4</sup> sed qualitas intensa et remissa non variant speciem, nam minus album non variat<sup>5</sup> speciem, cum illud idem, quod nunc est minus album, statim erit magis album, eadem essencia albedinis manente. habitus, igitur, et disposicio non variant speciem, sed erunt unum in specie.

<sup>21</sup> Frame lacking; refers to 8.05.

<sup>1</sup> Left margin: '9.'

<sup>2</sup> *Categories* 8; 9a 10-14, *ed. cit.* (translatio Guillelmi) p. 102, ll. 23-25: Sunt autem habitus quidem et dispositiones, dispositiones autem non ex necessitate habitus.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 9a 8-10, p. 102, ll. 21-23: Quare differt habitus a dispositione eo quod hec quidem facile mobilis sit, hic autem diuturnior et difficilius mobilis.

<sup>4</sup> In *categorias* Aristotelis *Liber III*, de qualitate, PL 64 243 C: Quocirca cum quidquid est habitus, dispositio sit, quidquid dispositio non omnino sit habitus, videtur genus esse quoddam habitus dispositio, sed illud verius, ubi intentio est atque remissio.

<sup>5</sup> Em. MS: variant.

- 9.05 similiter, istud dicunt plane omnes expositores et albertus.<sup>6</sup>
- 9.06 sed contra istud, potest argui sic: si omnes habitus est disposicio, ut dictum est, et non omnis disposicio est habitus, ut dictum est, igitur, disposicio habebit rationem generis respectu habitus, sicud patet quia omnis homo est animal, et non omne animal est homo, ideo animal est genus respectu hominis; ita, igitur, sequitur in proposito et, per consequens, habitus et disposicio non erunt eiusdem speciei.
- 9.07 Preterea, si habitus sit qualitas de difficiili mobilis, et disposicio qualitas de facili mobilis, ut dictum est, et omnis habitus est disposicio, ut dicitur in litera, igitur qualitas de difficiili mobilis est qualitas de facili mobilis: ubi includuntur opposita.
- 9.08 Ad primum istorum: dicendum negando hanc consequenciam: omnis habitus est disposicio, et non e contra, igitur, disposicio est genus, vel rationem generis habet, respectu habitus. sed rationem generis animal habet respectu hominis,<sup>7</sup> sicud ens rationem unius generalis habet respectu x generum, non, tamen, rationem generis. unde, hec est vera: esse minus album est album, et non e contra, et, tamen, non sequitur: album esse genus respectu minus album et magis album.
- 9.09 similiter, nec homo est genus, respectu socratis, licet omne id quod est socrates sit homo, et non e contra.
- 9.10 Ad aliud: dicendum quod disposicio dupliciter potest accipi: vel ut disponit, vel ut est qualitas de facili mobilis. primo modo predicacio eius de habitu est necessaria; secundo modo, impossibilis. unde, si arguatur silogistice: habitus est disposicio; et disposicio est qualitas de facili mobilis; igitur, et habitus, est plane fallacia accidentis, cum penitus sit alia racio dispositionis inquantum disponit illud, cuius est, solum et inquantum est qualitas de facili mobilis.

### Ad I

- 9.11 *Ad argumentum principale:* dicendum quod potest concedi, sine inconvenienti, habitum et dispositionem esse unum numero quodammodo, sicud minus album et magis album sunt quodammodo unum numero, unde, illud, quod nunc est minus album, statim erit magis album, eadem essentia albedinis manente, et eodem albo numero manente. vel potest dici satis bene, ut dictum est prius,<sup>8</sup> quod sunt diversa numero, et unum in specie, et istud forte est verius, quia nulla albedo simpliciter, nulla qualitas simpliciter, potest intendi et remitti, immo est alia et alia, intensa et remissa; albedo, tamen, intenditur et remittitur, et suscipit magis et minus, subiecto supponente simpliciter.

- 9.12 Ad probacionem: dicendum quod, dispositione sumpta pro dispositione inquantum disposicio, sic predicatur de habitu universaliter sumpto, et sic habitus et disposicio sunt unum numero; dispositione, tamen, sumpta ut est qualitas de facili mobilis, sic non predicatur de habitu, quia sic habitus et disposicio sunt unum in specie et diversa numero.

<sup>6</sup> *Opera omnia, ed. cit., Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 5, c. 2, vol. 1, p. 246: Quamvis autem circa idem sunt habitus et dispositio, et ideo dicuntur una species qualitatis,... unus modus dicitur habitus, et alias modus dicitur dispositio. Habitus autem est nomen perfecti in hac specie, dispositio autem est nomen imperfecti.

<sup>7</sup> Em. MS: habitus

<sup>8</sup> That is, 9.03.

questio decima<sup>1</sup>

<Q>ueratur: utrum potencia sit de genere qualitatis?

### I

10.01 quod non videtur quia potencia non ens actu, igitur non est de genere qualitatis. antecedens patet quia potencia et actus opponuntur; consequentia patet nam, si potencia esset de genere, et cetera, suscipiet predicacionem qualitatis et, per consequens, cum qualitas, que est predicamentum, sit ens actu, quia, licet genus rationem materialem habeat, (8<sup>r</sup> b/8<sup>v</sup> a) est, tamen, ens, et non prima materia, et ita potencia erit ens actu; igitur, ex opposito, si non est in actu, non est in genere.

### II

10.02 Preterea, aristoteles, quinto *metaphysice*,<sup>2</sup> in determinando de speciebus qualitatis, enumerat species qualitatis et ibidem nullam mencionem facit de potencia, igitur, ut videtur, vel est ponendum quod potencia non sit in genere qualitatis, vel quod aristoteles est insufficiens.

### III

10.03 Preterea, potencia est ad aliquid quia potencia, secundum id quod est alicuius actus est potencia; potencia, igitur, est in genere relacionis; cum, igitur, idem non potest esse simul in diversis generibus, potencia non erit in genere qualitatis.

10.04 *Ad oppositum* est aristoteles dicens quod aliud genus est, ut potencia naturalis et innaturalis.<sup>3</sup>

10.05 ad questionem: dicendum quod potencia naturalis et innaturalis sunt qualitates. Circa quod sciendum quod potencia dupliciter potest considerari, vel ut importat quemdam respectum ad actum, cuius est potencia, vel ut importat fundamentum illius respectus, quod non est aliud quam aptitudo quedam. unde, potencia potest importare quamdam aptitudinem, secundum quam nos denominamur et dicimur quales. unde, cursor non dicitur ex hoc quod actu currit, sed quia aptitudinem et potentiam naturalem habet ad bene currendum, unde, ista aptitudo seu potencia dicitur naturalis propter agibilitatem, sive dispositionem naturalem membrorum, tali actui competentem. hoc idem patet de pu<gi>llatore et salubribus.<sup>4</sup> potencia, autem, primo modo sumpta, est in genere relacionis, quod sic non est aliud quam respectus quidam, qui est in genere relacionis.

10.06 sed potencia secundo modo dicta, est in genere qualitatis; potencia, enim, ut aptitudinem importat, est in genere qualitatis, quod sic patet, nam illud, secundum quod nos dicimur quales est in genere qualitatis, sed potencia, ut nominet aptitu-

<sup>1</sup> Right margin: '10.'

<sup>2</sup> *Metaphysics* V, 14; 1020a 33-b 25.

<sup>3</sup> See discussion of distinction between the nameless 'natural' capacities, in virtue of which one is an effective runner or boxer, and the 'science' of 'boxing' or 'wrestling' that has just such a name: *Categories* 8; 10a 27-b 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Categories* 8; 9a 14-16, *ed. cit.* p. 24, ll. 23-26: Aliud vero genus qualitatis est secundum quod pugillatores vel cursores vel insalubres dicimus, et simpliciter quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem vel impotentiam dicuntur.

dinem naturalem est id, secundum quod denominamur et dicimur quales; concluditur, igitur, potentiam ut sic, esse in genere qualitatis. dubium, tamen, est: utrum naturalis potentia et inpotencia sint distincte species, vel unius speciei? ad quod dicendum quod sunt distincte species; hoc, enim, dicit boecius,<sup>5</sup> et ideo dicit aristoteles in litera: dico autem aliud genus qualitatis<sup>6</sup> et non aliam speciem ut naturalem potentiam vel inpotenciam, unde, per istud dictum innuit ipse naturalem potentiam et naturalem inpotenciam esse diversas species qualitatis.

### Ad I

10.07 *Ad primum argumentum:*<sup>7</sup> dicendum quod potentia, secundo modo dicta, sufficientem actualitatem habet ad hoc quod aliquid sit in genere et, si arguatur: potentia refertur ad actum, cum potentia et actus sunt relativa, igitur, potentia opponitur actui, cum opponuntur relativa, sit opposicio, ut patet in litera quando ducitur opposicio in oppositionem relativam privativam, et cetera<sup>8</sup> et, per consequens, potentia simpliciter est non ens, huic dicendum quod potentia, ut nominat respectum quemdam ad actum, sic refertur ad actum et opponitur actui, sicud pater opponitur filio et ideo, licet ut sic non sit in actu, quod, tamen, non oporteret concedere quia opposicio relativa non requirit alterum extreum esse non ens, sicud patet de relatione inter patrem et filium. non, tamen, concluditur per argumentum potentiam, que aptitudinem naturalem nominat esse non esse; unde illa est ens, et in actu, quia est species in genere qualitatis.

### Ad II

10.08 *Ad aliud argumentum:* dicendum quod ideo aristoteles, quinto *metaphysice*, non enumerat potentiam naturalem nec innaturalem inter species qualitatis, quia eis non sunt nomina imposita. vel aliter potest dici satis bene quod ideo non enumerat potentiam naturalem et innaturalem, quia reduci habent ad alicos modos, vel ad illum modum, secundum quem aliqui dicuntur agere vel pati.

### Ad III

10.09 *Ad aliud argumentum:* dicendum quod potentia, primo modo dicta, est ad aliquid, et hoc est concessum in posizione. potentia, tamen, secundo modo dicta, est in genere qualitatis, ut est idem totaliter. potentia, primo modo dicta, et secundo modo dicta, vel sustinendo quod sit idem, adhuc non sequitur: potentia est in genere ad aliquid, igitur non est in genere qualitatis, quia, secundum boecium, capitulo de ad aliquid, idem, diversimode sumptum, potest esse in diversis generibus.<sup>9</sup> hoc eciam patet ratione, nam corpus, sumptum pro tribus divisionibus, est in genere

<sup>5</sup> In *categorias* Aristotelis Liber III, de qualitate, PL 64 245 B: Sed si qua tamen invenienda atque exprimenda sit, talis est quam ipse Aristoteles hoc modo denuntiat, quae sit secundum potentiam aliquid faciendi, vel impotentiam aliquid patiendi.

<sup>6</sup> *Categories* 8; 9a 14-16, cited above, this question, n. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Left margin: 'argumentum.'

<sup>8</sup> *Categories* 10; 11b 18-20, ed. cit. p. 30, l. 28-p. 31, l. 2: Dicitur autem alterum alteri opponi quadrupliciter, aut ut ad aliquid, aut ut contraria, aut ut habitus et privatio, aut ut affirmatio et negatio.

<sup>9</sup> See above, text cited seventh question, n. 3 in which Boethius argued that Socrates as Socrates is in the genus of substance, but inasmuch as he is father or son, in the genus of relation.

qualitatis; idem, tamen, corpus, sumptum pro natura differente illas tres divisiones, est in genere substancie.

questio undecima<sup>1</sup>

<Q><sup>2</sup>ueratur: utrum medius color, ut fustum vel palidum, componatur ex coloribus extremis, ut ex albo et nigro?

I

11.01 quod non ostendo nam, illa, que componunt aliquod tertium, manent in composito; sed extremi colores non manent in colore medio; igitur, color medius non componitur ex coloribus extremis. maior patet nam, componencia sunt partes compositi, et partes manent in toto; minor patet nam, omne quod est in alio, aut predicator de eo essencialiter, aut denominative; essencialiter, ut pars essencialis, denominative, ut pars integralis; si, igitur, extremi colores manerent in colore medio, de eo predicarentur essencialiter, vel denominative; quorum utrumque est impossible.

11.02 huic dicitur quod, ista ratione, ymaginatur colorem medium compositum ex coloribus extremis tanquam ex aliquibus actu manentibus in eo, et hoc secundum actualitates proprias et ultimatas, quod non est verum, quia, solum modo manent in colore medio virtute, sicud elementa virtute manent in mixto, ut patet per (8<sup>v</sup> a/b) philosophum, capitulo de mixtione, *de generacionibus*.<sup>3</sup>

11.03 Contra istud arguitur: si colores extremi manerent in colore medio secundum virtutem, et color medius neque actu, neque virtute manent in coloribus extremis, igitur color medius perfecciorem formam habet quam colores extremi, et ita, color medius esse fustum esset perfeccius ens quam color extremus, quod, tamen, videtur impossibile. consequencia patet in exemplo adducto nam, quia elementa virtute manent in mixto, et mixtum non manet virtute in elementis, ideo mixtum perfeccius ens est et perfecciorem formam habet quam elementum.

II

11.04 *Aliud principale*: medius color maiorem simplicitatem habet quam alter extremorum, igitur magis est ponendum colores extremi componi ex medio quam e contra, cum medium sit simplicius extremis. assumptum patet nam, in omni genere est ponere unum primum et simplicissimum, decimo *metaphysice*,<sup>4</sup> igitur, in genere coloris est ponere unum tale, et certum est quod illud est albedo. ex quo arguo sic: quanto aliquid magis accedit ad naturam simplicissimi, illud est magis simplex; illud, igitur, quod maxime accedit ad naturam simplicissimi in genere coloris, ut ad naturam albedinis quam alter extremorum, quantum magis accedunt medii colores ad naturam albedinis quam nigredo, que est color extremus; de numero, enim, istorum, colores medii magis accedunt ad naturam primi; igitur, et cetera.

<sup>1</sup> Top margin: 'questio .11.'

<sup>2</sup> Left margin, small 'q' for lettrine of 'Queratur.'

<sup>3</sup> *De generatione et corruptione* I, 10; 327b 22-26, Venice ed. vol. 5, fol. 369<sup>r</sup> D-E: Quoniam autem sunt entium illa quidem potentia, haec autem actu, contingit mista, esse quodam modo, et non esse, actu quidem existente alio generato ex ipsis, potentia autem quid utriusque eorum, quae erant, antequam miscerentur, et non perdita.

<sup>4</sup> *Metaphysics* X, 4; 1055a 10-12; for text, see above, third question, n. 21.

11.05 *Ad oppositum*: secundum philosophum, medii colores non sunt componencia, sed compositi; colores, autem, extreimi sunt componencia, et non compositi.

11.06 Preterea, secundum philosophum, medius color, ut fustum, in comparacione ad nigrum est album et in comparacione ad album est nigrum;<sup>5</sup> sed istud non foret verum nisi medium componeretur ex extremis coloribus.

11.07 similiter, medium participat naturam utriusque extreimi, igitur medius color, ut fustum, participat naturam albi et nigri et, per consequens, includit utrumque, sicut partes ipsum componentes.

11.08 *Ad questionem*: dicendum quod composicio est triplex: quedam est composicio quantitativa, et ex partibus quantitativis, et sic componitur quodlibet quantum, et est divisibile in similia quorum quodlibet est hoc aliquid; et sic non componitur medius color ex extremis, tum quia extreimi colores non sunt partes quantitative medii coloris, tum quia medius color non est quantus.

11.09 secunda est composicio potencie cum actu, ut forme cum materia, sive generis cum diferencia, et isto modo non componitur medius color, et cetera, quia neutrum extreborum habet rationem generis respectu medii coloris. similiter, neutrum habet rationem potencie, nec materie, respectu alterius, nec eciam respectu medii coloris, cum utrumque, et inter se et respectu tertii, haberet rationem forme simpliciter.

11.10 tercia est composicio ex aliquibus corruptis, quantum ad actualitates proprias et ultimas, manentibus, tamen, secundum virtutem, et ita, composicio videtur esse virtualis, ut patet in mixto composto ex elementis, que manent ibidem secundum virtutes, non, tamen, secundum actualitates proprias. et isto modo medius color componitur ex extremis.

11.11 Per hoc dicendum ad questionem quod medius color componitur ex extremis coloribus; colores, tamen, extreimi non actu et secundum proprias actualitates manet in medio colore. primum patet nam alter medius color, ut rubius, non esset albus in comparacione ad nigrum nec niger in comparacione ad album, quod, tamen, est falsum et contra philosophum; componitur, igitur, medium ex extremis. secundum patet, scilicet, quod extreimi non maneant actu in medio, secundum suas actualitates proprias. patet, nam, albedo et nigredo sunt forme contrarie, et utraque simplex forma et fustedo, non obstante sua compositione, est forma simplex quia nigredo est forma simplex et fustedo magis accedit ad naturam simplicissimam in genere coloris, ut albedinem, quam nigredo; igitur, a multo forciori, fustedo erit forma simplex. ex quo arguo: impossibile est duas formas contrarias, manente contrarietate, actualiter simul esse in eadem forma simplici, et ita, impossibile est extremas colores, secundum actualitates proprias, manere in medio colore.

### Ad I

11.12 *Ad primum argumentum*: dicendum quod, ubi est composicio ex aliquibus solum modo manentibus secundum virtutem, et non secundum actum, sicut est in mixto

<sup>5</sup> Bradley seems to have in mind the following text on the relative intensities between black and white: *Topics* III, 5; 119a 26-31, Venice ed. vol. 1, 3, fol. 58v 1-59r A: Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia. Vt albius quidem nigro impermixtius. Amplius, praeter ea quae dicta sunt prius, quod magis suscipit propriam propositi rationem. Vt si albi est ratio, color disaggregatus visus: albioris est, color magis disaggregatus visus.

et in medio colore, non oportet alterum istorum componencium predicari de composito essencialiter vel denominative. unde, hec est falsa: 'elementum est mixtum.' et eodem modo est hic dicendum ad argumentum in contrariam: dicendum quod non est simul, est de immediato, et medio colore, nam neutrum elementorum habet rationem privacionis respectu alterius, et idem sunt ad invicem nata agere et pati, et mixtum perfeccorem formam habet quam aliquod elementorum; sed extremi colores sic se habent quod unus est privacio respectu alterius, est, enim, nigrum privacio albi, et ideo, huiusmodi sit concedendum: medium colorem habere perfeccorem formam quam<sup>6</sup> alter extremorum, ut nigredo, que privacio est; minus, tamen, perfectam habet quam albedo.

11.13 Contra istud potest argui sic: et probatur quod nigredo est perfeccior forma quam albedo, nam, quod est magis proporcionale visui est perfeccius; sed nigrum est proporcionalius visui quam album, cum nigrum sit congregatum visus, et album dis- (8v b/ slip) -gregatum visus, et disaggregatio magis nocet visum quam congregacio.

11.14 similiter, hoc non videtur verum, quia album et nigrum sunt contraria, cum contraria non insint eidem simul, et album et nigrum insunt eidem simul, quia idem oculus simul videt album et nigrum.

11.15 Ad primum istorum: dicendum negando hanc consequiam: est magis proporcionale potencie visive, igitur est perfeccius, nam caliditas est obiectum tactus et caliditas ignis, inter omnes caliditates, minus proporcionatur tactui, quia corumpit tactum et, tamen, non sequitur illam caliditatem esse minus perfectam, et sic non sequitur hic.

11.16 Ad aliud: dicendum quod oculus, videntis simul album et nigrum, non recipit secundum eamdem partem speciem utriusque, ut disaggregationem et congregacionem, et ideo, non est idem subiectum inmediatum utriusque. recipit, enim, speciem albi et disaggregationem in una parte, et speciem nigri et congregacionem in alia parte, sicud patet de scuto, cuius una medietas est alba et alia nigra; recipit, enim, simul albedinem et nigredinem, sed non secundum eamdem partem, sed diversam, et ideo, non est idem subiectum inmediatum utriusque. nam, si sic, denominaretur ab utroque, et sic esset simul album et nigrum.

## Ad II

11.17 *Ad ultimum principale:* dicendum quod argumentum concludit medium colorem habere maiorem simplicitatem quam nigredo, que est alter extremorum colorum, et hoc est concessum, quia magis accedit ad simplicissimum, ut argutum est, quam nigredo; sed non probat medium colorem habere maiorem simplicitatem albedine, cum ipsa sit primum in genere coloris, et simplicissimum, et simplicissimo alicuius generis nichil est simplicius; igitur, et cetera.

11.18 *Expliciunt questiones date a Magistro petro de bradlay.*

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

<sup>6</sup> Em. MS: quod.

Bibliographia Gotica  
A Bibliography of Writings on the Gothic Language  
Third Supplement: Additions to the end of 1965

ERNST A. EBBINGHAUS

WITH the publication of its Third Supplement the *Bibliographia Gotica* will again appear at regular intervals, and further supplements will be printed every three or four years in future issues of *Mediaeval Studies*.

In the present supplement I have attempted to list the publications from about the middle of 1957, the cut-off date of the Second Supplement (*MedSt.* 19 (1957), 174), to the end of 1965. Of items omitted in earlier parts of the work I have added only the more recent ones, i.e. publications from approximately 1950 on. All other additions as well as *corrigenda* have been reserved for a revised edition of the whole bibliography which I hope to be able to present a few years hence.

It is a great pleasure to express here my thanks to all those who have so promptly responded to the request printed in last year's issue of *MedSt.*, have aided me with offprints, and upon inquiry have supplied bibliographical and other information. Since almost none of the linguistic and philological journals, academy publications, etc. are available to me here, their help has been invaluable. I must single out Margaret Schlauch, G. J. Metcalf, Dr R. G. van de Velde, and last but not least two valued friends: W. H. Bennett and G. W. S. Friedrichsen. Finally I must thank Dr R. Hirsch and the friendly staff of the Library of the University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) where much of the work was done.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>ADA</i>	Anzeiger für deutsches Altertum.
<i>ANI Ja</i>	Akademija Nauk. Institut Jazykoznanija.
<i>Archiv</i>	(Herrigs) Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen.
<i>BSL</i>	Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris.
<i>DA</i>	Dissertation Abstracts.
<i>Diss.</i>	Dissertation.
<i>EG</i>	Études Germaniques.
<i>EGS</i>	English and Germanic Studies.
<i>Fs</i>	Festschrift (Festgabe).
<i>Germ</i>	Germanistik.

<i>GermWrat</i>	Germanica Wratislaviensia.
<i>GöteborgHandl</i>	Göteborgs Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar.
<i>GR</i>	Germanic Review.
<i>HFMKDVS</i>	Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser Udgivet af Det Kongel. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab.
<i>HMZ</i>	Handelingen der Koninkl. Nederlands Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis.
<i>IF</i>	Indogermanische Forschungen.
<i>JEGP</i>	Journal of English and Germanic Philology.
<i>KwartNeofil</i>	Kwartalnik Neofilologiczny.
<i>KZ</i>	(Kuhns) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung.
<i>LB</i>	Leuvense Bijdragen.
<i>Lg</i>	Language.
<i>MedAev</i>	Medium Aevum.
<i>MLN</i>	Modern Language Notes.
<i>MLR</i>	Modern Language Review.
<i>Monatsh</i>	Monatshefte.
<i>Neophil</i>	Neophilologus.
<i>NTSt</i>	New Testament Studies.
<i>PBB</i>	(Paul und Braunes) Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur (Halle, 1874 ff.)
<i>PBB (T)</i>	(Paul und Braunes) Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literature (Tübingen, 1955 ff.)
<i>PMLA</i>	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America.
<i>RFRG</i>	Revista de Filologie Română și Germanică.
<i>StLing</i>	Studia Linguistica.
<i>StNeophil</i>	Studia Neophilologica.
<i>UZ</i>	Učenye Zapiski.
<i>VJ</i>	Voprosy Jazykoznanija.
<i>ZDA</i>	Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
<i>ZDP</i>	Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie.
<i>ZDW</i>	Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung.

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*Pennsylvania State University.*

# A Twelfth-Century Sequence: Text and Music

JOANNA DUTKA

THE prose, or sequence, *Laetabundi jubilemus* is described by Chevalier<sup>1</sup> as existing in two similar versions whose sources the *Analecta hymnica* gives as Paris, B.N., Lat. 1086 and B.N., Lat. 1139.<sup>2</sup> A third, hitherto unknown version of the sequence, similar in text but totally different musically, is found in the Toledo Cathedral Library on the last folio, *recto*, of a commentary of Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius' *opuscula*. This manuscript, numbered 13.4, contains 126 folios, with no other music but the sequence, which begins on the second line of folio 126. The last words of Boethius' *De duabus naturis* and the title of the sequence occupy the first line: "...omnium bonorum causa perscritbit. Explicit boecius. Vincentii Prosa."<sup>3</sup>

Paris 1086 is a *troparium* from the Augustinian priory of St. Leonard in Limoges.<sup>4</sup> It contains 132 folios of procession antiphons, troped and untroped Mass movements, and a number of sequences. *Laetabundi jubilemus* is found on folios 117r-119r in this manuscript with the title, "unius apostoli vel unius martiris." The sequence occurs on folios 219r-220v of Paris 1139, which has 236 folios of liturgical dramas, sequences and tropes. The collection was made at the monastery of St. Martial,<sup>5</sup> in Limoges, and the sequences preceding and following *Laetabundi* are in honour of that saint, *Laetabundi* itself having no attribution.

The writing in the three versions of the sequence is clear, with exceptionally few abbreviations: *7* for *et*; *ꝝ* for *per*, both initially and medially; *qd'* for *quod* are used consistently in all the sequences. The hands are similar to those found in liturgical books of the twelfth century, and large, ornamental letters mark the beginning of each line of text. The

<sup>1</sup> Ulysse R. Chevalier, *Repertorium hymnologicum* (Louvain, 1890-1912), II, 4, 2, no. 9989.

<sup>2</sup> Guido M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica* (Leipzig, 1890), 8, 92.

<sup>3</sup> I am grateful to Nicholas M. Haring for bringing to my attention the Toledo version of the sequence. The description of the manuscript is in José M. Octavio de Toledo, *Catálogo de la librería del Cabildo Toledano* (Madrid, 1903), 59.

<sup>4</sup> Ph. Lauer, *Catalogue général des manuscrits latins* (Paris, 1939), 1, 394; Jacques Chailley, *L'école musicale de St. Martial de Limoges* (Paris, 1960), 116; Heinrich Husmann, "Notre-Dame und Saint-Victor, Repertoire-Studien," in *Acta Musicologica* 36 (1964), 196.

<sup>5</sup> Chailley, 109.

initial letter *L*, in particular, is larger in size, and in Paris 1086, considerably more elaborate. That these larger letters were written after the text is apparent from Paris 1139, where the scribe has left blanks for the letters, but has forgotten in some instances to go back to fill them in (folio 219r, ll. 2 and 3; folio 220r, ll. 1, 2, and 4).

The notation of all three sequences is Aquitanian, on one staff line. It is impossible to determine from microfilm whether the line in Toledo 13.4 is dry or in color; the catalog, moreover, gives no indication. There are no letter clefs in this version. The line in Paris 1086 is drawn in red,<sup>6</sup> and although there are letter clefs throughout the manuscript, *Laetabundi* has none. The same lack holds true of *Laetabundi* in Paris 1139, although what might be the letter *f* appears to have been covered by the decorated *L* which begins the sequence. This manuscript has notation ranging from diastematic to that written on a four-line staff; *Laetabundi* is written on a dry-point line.<sup>7</sup>

The text is in typical "late-sequence" style:<sup>8</sup> each stanza, of which there are ten, plus a single line, contains two rhyming lines. The music follows the textual pattern in that each line of each stanza is set to the same melody, but each stanza is different; this, too, is the normal late-sequence style of musical setting.

The manuscripts and the sequence appear to be almost contemporaneous. Lauer suggests that the section of Paris 1139 containing *Laetabundi* dates from the end of the twelfth century; Chailley agrees with this estimate, partly on the basis of the manuscript, and partly on the poetic and musical styles.<sup>9</sup> Paris 1086 is dated by Chailley with these same criteria, but also more precisely on the basis of internal evidence: folio 36 contains a reference to Saint Thomas of Canterbury, who was martyred in 1170; hence, the manuscript "ne peut être antérieur à la fin du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle."<sup>10</sup> I would consider the sequence of Toledo 13.4 to have been notated during the first quarter of the thirteenth century, even though the Toledo Cathedral Library catalog attributes the manuscript to the end of the thirteenth century or the beginning of the fourteenth.<sup>11</sup> The sequence-folio should

<sup>6</sup> Lauer, 1, 394.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 416.

<sup>8</sup> Heinrich Husmann, *Tropen- und sequenzenhandschriften* (Munich, 1964), 122.

<sup>9</sup> Lauer, 1, 416; Chailley, 113.

<sup>10</sup> Chailley, 116.

<sup>11</sup> Octavio de Toledo, 59. Confirmation of the early date is given in Nicholas M. Haring's book, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, *Studies and Texts* 13, Toronto, 1966), on p. 28, where the date of the MS is given as "saec. xiii (ab. 1210)." The hands of the MS and the sequence-text appear to be the same.

not have been written so late because Aquitanian notation gave way to square generally by mid-thirteenth century, and this sequence shows no signs, even incipient, of the later development.<sup>12</sup> In addition, the diagonal lines throughout the piece are seen in other Aquitanian examples of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but apparently not later.<sup>13</sup>

From the variants in the poems and melodies,<sup>14</sup> I would suggest Toledo 13.4 to be a copy of neither Paris 1086 nor Paris 1139, but of some intermediate version, or versions, which probably used Paris 1086 as the model. I feel Paris 1086 rather than 1139 to represent the original version, although it may not be in itself the original, since its melody is the simpler of the two (although this, like all stylistic criteria, is not conclusive), and more particularly, because the notation of Paris 1139, certainly Aquitanian, shows, in addition, certain characteristics of square notation.<sup>15</sup> An examination of the complete section in the manuscript written by this particular scribe would have to be made, however, before one could establish a date on the basis of notation.

Textually, Paris 1086 appears older in virtue of line 7a.<sup>16</sup> The rhyme of the poem, both internal and final, is carefully conceived; on the other hand, the version of Paris 1139 is jarring in an otherwise well-planned poem. Although Dreves states that the particular saint's name is merely an example, and in the *Analecta hymnica* that it is used only to fit the versification,<sup>17</sup> it appears that the precedent became the rule, since by the time the Toledo version was copied, the sequence was considered to be in honour of Saint Vincent. Moreover, line 6b, "Ibi manent sublimati, una stola decorati, securi de reliqua," appears to indicate a particular Saint Vincent. The chief relic of Vincent, deacon of Caesar Augusta (Saragossa),<sup>18</sup> is his stole, taken from Spain to France by King Childeric I in the sixth

<sup>12</sup> Willi Apel, *Gregorian Chant* (London, n.d.), 123, and Willi Apel, *Notation of Polyphonic Music* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 217.

<sup>13</sup> Similar marks are found in Plates 95 (twelfth century) and 98 (twelfth or thirteenth century) of *Paléographie musicale* (Solesmes, 1891), II, and in Plate 105 (twelfth or thirteenth century) of Henry M. Bannister, *Monumenti vaticani di paleografia musicale latina* (Leipzig, 1913). One notes, however, that Bannister, in Plates 100-103, shows fourteenth-century Aquitanian notation from the Toledo Cathedral Library.

<sup>14</sup> See below. In line 6a, Toledo and Paris 1139 are similar. The same holds true for line 6b. Yet, in line 7a, Toledo and Paris 1086 use the same saint's name. This suggests some form of dependence.

<sup>15</sup> See below.

<sup>16</sup> See below for the text.

<sup>17</sup> Guido M. Dreves, *Lateinischer Hymnendichtung* (Leipzig, 1909), 2, 372-373, and *Analecta hymnica*, 8, 92.

<sup>18</sup> *Acta sanctorum*, 3 (Paris, 1863), 6-27.

century, and venerated in the church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés for centuries.<sup>19</sup> Surely this line, with its reference to the stole which is the deacon's symbol, and, in this case, the triumphant sign of martyrdom, suggests that the sequence was written for the feast of a specific saint. Finally, the precise indication of liturgical function, as is seen in Paris 1086, "unius apostoli vel unius martiris" (folio 117r), would conceivably indicate antecedence in comparison with a sequence that has no attribution, but which may have been copied because of popularity.

In the transcribing of these sequences, certain notational peculiarities were encountered. Paris 1086 is an incompletely erased palimpsest; hence, the chief problem is to decipher the music of the sequence from the original work. The scribe uses a *pressus major* and a *trigon* interchangeably in two instances;<sup>20</sup> a lack of differentiation is shown as well between the *distropha* and *oriscus* on folio 118v, ll. 1 and 3. The *custos* is used regularly and accurately throughout the piece, with only two instances of its lack: folio 118r, l. 7, and folio 119r, l. 4.

In Paris 1139, an incomplete *epiphonus* is seen on folio 219v, l. 6, over the word *Christi*, and again on folio 220r, l. 1, over *interna*, whereas the same pitches in the stanzas' second lines use the *punctum* (folio 219v, l. 7, *visione*, and folio 220r, l. 2, *tanto*). The *virga* with downward stem on the right is found in composite neumes, with two exceptions: folio 219r, l. 6, *sententia*, and folio 219v, l. 7, *in*. In both these cases it is used alone, while the corresponding neumes in the other lines of the stanzas are, respectively, a *punctum* (folio 219r, l. 7, *caeli*) and a *climacus* (folio 219v, l. 6, *diademathe*). The same pitch is given different neumes in the first and second halves of a stanza in ll. 1 and 2 of folio 219r (*martyrum* and *eius*). A *punctum* replaces an *epiphonus* over the latter word, although a liquefiant neume would seem to be required. This manuscript shows incipient square notation in the *torculus* neumes on folio 219v, ll. 4, 5, 6, and 7. The scribe has been extremely careless in using the *custos*. It occurs only sporadically in this version: on folio 219r, in the last two lines, with the penultimate giving only the diagonal line without the *punctum*; folio 219v, l. 3, only the *punctum* without the line, l. 9, the complete *custos* form; folio 220r, ll. 1, 2, and 4 the complete *custos*.

Toledo 13.4 has rudimentary "bar lines" used medially and almost always at the ends of lines.<sup>21</sup> The *custos* has two different forms: where used at the end of a line, it has the shape •|; where written medially, it appears

<sup>19</sup> *Vies des saints*, ed. Baudot and Chaussin (Paris, 1935), 1, 434.

<sup>20</sup> Folio 117r, lines 7 and 8; folio 117v, lines 2 and 3.

<sup>21</sup> See above, n. 13.

as ♦|. This medial *custos* marks the use of a shifting clef line. The line indicates *D* at the beginning of the sequence, but becomes *F* in the middle of line 2 for exigencies of space. It reverts back to *D* at line 5 since the range is low again, and is changed near the end of that line to *F*, where it remains for the rest of the sequence. It seems quite obvious from the manipulation of the clef line that the text of this sequence was written before the music.

In the following transcriptions, neumes of more than one tone are indicated by square brackets, liquefiant neumes by round brackets. The rhythm has been left noncommittal, and modern notation has been chosen rather than square for purposes of clarity. The clef line has been read as *F* in all cases (with the exceptions noted above) on the basis of the red line in Paris 1086, and the modality of the sequences. Editorial accidentals have been omitted since Aquitanian notation provides certain problems regarding the *b* flat, problems which necessitate caution in suggesting any sort of tonality.<sup>22</sup>

The text is as follows:

- 1a. Laetabundi jubilemus, laeta mente celebremus martirum sollemnias;
- b. Qui in mundo morientes, sed in Christo renascentes eius vivunt gratia.
- 2a. Cuius testes extiterunt, dum mundana respuerunt quaerendo caelestia;
- b. Quem ad mortem dilexerunt, ipsum sequi voluerunt per mortis compendia,
- 3a. Crucem sibi baiulantes, sola cruce gloriantes audita sententia:
- b. Si quis post me vult<sup>1</sup> venire, tollat crucem, si redire vult ad caeli gaudia.
- 4a. Sic per multas passiones ad supernas mansiones gloriosi proceres
- b. Festinabant sed in via experti sunt ludibria, vincula et carceres.
- 5a. Flagellati, lapidati et per multa cruciati tormentorum genera,
- b. Torcularis in pressura, faex deorsum sed vis<sup>2</sup> pura manavit ad supera.
- 6a. Ubi<sup>3</sup> manet aeternale, quod hic fuit temporale carne tectum lubrica;

<sup>22</sup> See Dom G. Sunol, *La paléographie musicale grégorienne* (Paris, 1935), 264, who points out that Aquitanian notation, in contradistinction to many other types, often uses *b* natural for both cadences and melodic formulas.

<sup>1</sup> Toledo 13.4, *vult post me*.

<sup>2</sup> Toledo 13.4, *vix*.

<sup>3</sup> Paris 1139, *Ibi*; Toledo 13.4, *Ibi*.

PLATE V

1a. Lac-ta-bun-di ju-bi- le-mus, lac-ta-men-te ce-le-bre-mus mar-ti-rum sol-lem-ni-a;  
1b. Qui in mun-do mo-ri- es, cu-tes, sed in Chris-to re-nas-cen-tes e-ius vi-vuntgra-ti-a.

2a. Cu-ius tes-tes ex-ti-te runt, dum mun-da-na res-pu-e-runt quae-ren-do cae-les-ti-a;  
2b. Quem ad mor-tem di-lex-e runt, ip-sum se-qui vo-lu-e runt per mor-tis com-pen-di-a,

3a. Cru-cem si-bi ba-si-lan-tes, so-la cru-ce glo-ri-an-tes au-di-ta sen-ten-ti-a;  
3b. Si quis post me vult ve-ni-re, tol-lat cru-cem, si re-di-re vult ad cae-li gau-di-a,

4a. Sic per mal-tas pas-si-o-nes ad su-per-nas-man-si-o-nes glo-ri-o-si pro-ce-res  
4b. Fes-ti-na-bant sed in vi-a ex-per-ti sunt lu-di-bri-a, vin-cu-la et car-ce-res,

5a. Fla-gel-la-ti-la-pi-da-ti et per multa cru-ci-a-ti tor-men-to-rum ge-ne-ra,  
5b. Tor-cu-la-ris in pres-su-ra, faex de-or-sum sed vis-pu-ra ma-na-vit ad su-pe-ra,

6a. Ubi ma-net ae-ter-na-le, quod hic fu-it tem-po-ra-le car-ne tec-tum lu-bri-ca;  
6b. Ibi ma-nent sub-li-ma-ti, u-na sto-la de-co-ra-ti, se-cu-ri-de-re-li-qua,

7a. Hic, Vin-cen-ti, mar-tir Chris-ti, lau-re-a-ri me-ru-is-ti cla-ro-di-a-de-ma-te,  
7b. Cer-ta fru-en-si vi-si-o-ne, quod pal-pa-mus ra-ti-o-ne si-cut in-e-nig-ma-te.

8a. U-ni-ta-tem tri-ni-ta-tis, tri-ni-ta-tem u-ni-ta-tis, quod est in-e-fa-bi-le,  
8b. Il-lud mag-num sac-ra-men-tum, ad quod nul-lum ar-gu-men-tum ha-be-mus pro-ba-bi-le,

9a. Ma-ni-fes-te con-tem-pla-ris, con-tem-plan-do sa-ti-a-ris in-ter-na dul-ce-di-ne,  
9b. Qua-re-fec-tus e-su-ri-re nul-lus po-test aut si-ti-re tan-to fru-en-si lu-mi-ne.

10a. O con-ei-vis an-ge-lo-rum, ad su-per-na-nos po-lo-rum  
10b. Post han-c vi-tam sub-le-va-ri, quos hie-nis ad-gra-va-ri  
tu-o-fac-pre-ca-mi-ne  
mul-ti-for-mi-ca-mi-ne.

11. Pos-cat is-te et tu, Chris-te, lar-gi-a-ris Do-mi-ne, A-men.  
Paris, B.N., Lat. 1139, fol. 219r-220r.

PLATE III

1a. Lae-ta - bun - di ju - bi - le - mus, lae-ta men-te ce-le-bre - mus mar-ti - rum  
b. Qui in mun - do mo - ri - en - tes, sed in Chris-to-re-nas-cen - tes e - ius vi - sol - lem - ni - a;  
vunt gra - ti - a.

2a. Cu - ius tes - tes ex - ti - te - runt, dum mun - da-na res - pu - e - runt que - ren - do  
b. Quem ad mor - tem di - lex - e - runt, ip - sum se - qui vo - lu - e - runt per mor - tis cae - les - ti - a;  
com - pen - di - a,

3a. Cru - cem si - bi ba - iu - lan - tes, so - la cru - ce glo - ri - an - tes au - di - ta sen - ten - ti - a;  
b. Si quis post me vult ve - ni - re, tol - lat cru - cem, si re - di - re vult ad cae - li gau - di - a,

4a. Sic per mul - tas pas - si - o - nes ad su - per - nas man - si - o - nes glo - ri - o - si pro - ce - res  
b. Fes - ti - na - bant sed in vi - a ex - per - ti sunt lu - di - bri - a, vin - cu - la et car - ce - res,

5a. Fla - gel - la - ti, la - pi - da - ti et per mul - ta cru - ci - a - ti tor - men - to - rum ge - ne - ra,  
b. Tor - eu - la - ris in pres - su - ra, faex de - or - sum sed uis pu - ra ma - na - uit ad su - pe - ra,

6a. U - bi ma - net aec - ter - na - le, quod hic fu - it tem - po - ra - le car - ne tec - tum lu - bri - ca;  
b. I - bi ma - nes - tis - ubi - ma - ni, u - na sto - la de - co - ra - ti, se - cu - ri de - re - li - qua,

7a. Hic, Vin - cen - ti, mar - tir Chris - ti, lau - re - a - ri me - ru - is - ti clau - di - a - de - ma - te,  
b. Cer - da, Ira - ens vi - si - o - ne, quod pa - pa - mi - us ra - ti - o - ne si - cut in e - nig - ma - te,

8a. U - ni - ta - tem tri - ni - ta - ti, tri - ni - ta - tem u - ni - ta - ti, quod est in - ef - fa - bi - le,  
b. Il - lud mag - num sac - ra - men - tum, ad quod mul - lum ar - gu - men - tum ha - be - mus pro - ba - bi - le,

9a. Ma - ni - fes - te con - tem - pla - ris, con - tem - plan - do sa - ti - a - ris in - ter - na dul - ce - di - ne,  
b. Qua - re - lec - tus e - su - ri - re mul - lis po - test aut si - ti - re tan - to fra - ens lu - mi - ne,

10a. O con - ci - vis an - ge - lo - rum, ad su - per - ri, quo - sic cer - na nos po - lo - rum  
b. Post han - ci - vi - tam sub - le - va - ri, quo - sic cer - na ad - gra - va -

tu - o - fac - pre - ca - mi - ne  
mul - ti - for - mi - cri - mi - ne,

11. Pos - cat is - te et tu, Chris - te, lar - gi - a - ris Do - mi - ne, A - men.

PLATE I

1a. Lac-ta - bum - di ju - bi-le-mus, lac - ta men-te ce-le- bre-mus mar-ti-rum sol-le-ni-a;  
 b. Qui in mun-do mo-ri-en-tes, sed in Chris-to re-na-sen-tes e - ius vi-vunt gra-ti-a.  
  
 2a. Cu - ius tes - tes ex - ti - te - runt, dum mun-da - na res - pu - e - runt que-rendo cae-les- ti - a;  
 b. Quem ad mor-tem di - lex - e - runt, ip - sum se - qui vo - lu - e - runt per mor-tis com-pen-dia,  
  
 3a. Cru - cem si - bi ba - in - lam-tes, so-la cru - ce glo - ri - an - tes au - di - ta seu - ten - ti - a;  
 b. Si quis post me vult ve - ni - re, tol - lat cru-cem, si re - di - te vult ad cae - li - gau - di - a,  
  
 4a. Sie per mul - tas pas - si - o - pes ad su - per - nas man-si - o - nes glo - ri - o - si pro - ce - res  
 b. Fes - it - na - bant sed in vi - a ex - perti - sunt lu - di - bri - a, vin - cu - la et car - ce - res,  
  
 5a. Fla - gel - la - ti, la - pi - da - ti et per mul - ta cru - ci - a - ti tor - men - to - rum ge - ne - ra,  
 b. Tor - cu - la - ris in pres - su - ra, faex de - or - sum sed vis pu - ra ma - na - vit ad su - pe - ra,  
  
 6a. U - bi ma - net ae - ter - na - le, quod hic fu - sit tem - po - ra - le car - ne tec - tum lu - bri - cat;  
 b. I - bi ma - net sub - li - mati, u - na sto - la de - co - ra - ti, se - cu - ri de re - li - qua,  
  
 7a. Hic, Vin - cen - ti, mar - tir Chris - ti, lau - re - a - ri me - ru - is - ti cla - ro di - a - de - ma - te,  
 b. Cer - ta fru - ens vi - si - o - ne, quod pa - pa - mus ra - ti - o - ne si - cut in - e - nig - ma - te,  
  
 8a. U - ni - ta - tem tri - ni - ta - tis, tri - ni - ta - tem u - ni - ta - tis, quod est in - ef - fa - bi - le,  
 b. Il - lud mag - num sac - ra - men - tum, ad quod nu - lum ar - gu - men - tum ha - be - imus pro - ba - bi - le,  
  
 9a. Ma - ni - fes - te con - tem - pla - ris, con - tem - plan - do sa - ti - a - ris in - ter - na - tant - to fru - dul - ce - ens lu - di - ne,  
 b. Qua re - fec - tus e - su - ri - re nul - lus po - test aut si - ti - re  
  
 10a. O con - ci - vis an - ge - lo - rum, ad su - per - na nos po - lo - rum tu - o fac pre - ca - mi - ne  
 b. Post hanc vi - tam sub - le - va - ri, quos hic cer - nis ad - gra - va - ri mul - ti - for - mi cri - mi - ne,  
  
 11. Pos - cat is - te et tu, Chris - te, lar - gi - a - ris Do - mi - ne.

Toledo, Cathedral Library, 13.4, f. 126<sup>r</sup>.

- 7b] *in, a*  
 8b] *magnum, a-a*  
 10a] *fac, F-G*  
 10b] *sublevari, F-D-D-E-G*  
*crimine, C-D-D*  
 Toledo, Cathedral, 13.4  
 1b] *Christo, C-B*  
 4b] *experti, a-G-D-F-A*  
 5a] *Flagellati, a-F-E-D-E-F*  
*cruciati, d-c-b-b-a*  
 5b] *Torcularis, a-G-F-D-E-F*  
*in, a*  
*deorsum, b-c-c-a-b*  
*ad supera, D-E-C-C-D*  
 6a] *carne, G-F-F*  
 9a] *contemplaris, D-E-C-D-*  
*satiaris, b-G-b-a-G-F-G*  
 9b] *fruens, F-E-D-D*  
*lumine, E-F-D-C-G-F-E-D*

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.*

# Mediaevalia

## CLERKS AND QUITING IN THE *REEVE'S TALE*

SHEILA DELANY

In the pair of fabliaux narrated by Chaucer's Miller and Reeve, two sets of young clerks have a special function: they are agents of the kind of retributive justice called "quiting". The theme of quiting controls this section of the *Canterbury Tales* from the Miller's prologue through the conclusion of the *Reeve's Tale*,<sup>1</sup> and the various shades of meaning given the word by Host, Miller, and Reeve offer a clue to the moral nature of each. Moreover, while both the Miller's and Reeve's tales illustrate the principle of even-handed justice, our appreciation of the latter work depends especially on the fact that the victors are clerks, and on the unique suitability of clerks to that role. The source of the literary role of the medieval clerk is his oddly ambiguous social position, which, since it carries the final irony of the *Reeve's Tale*, allows us to judge the narrator of the tale as well as its characters.

Harry Bailey first uses the word "quite" in his request that the Monk tell the second story of the day:

"So moot I gon,  
This gooth aright; unbokeled is the male.  
Lat se now who shal telle another tale;  
For trewely the game is wel bigonne.  
Now telleth ye, sir Monk, if that ye konne  
Somewhat to quite with the Knyghtes tale." (A, 3114-19)

Harry Bailey's notion of quiting reveals that instinctive, sometimes undiscriminating, approval of harmony and propriety which governs his response to many of the tales. His request serves an esthetic and a social end at once, for he hopes that in matching the standard of excellence established by the Knight, the second teller will again draw the pilgrims together in unanimous approbation. These good intentions are subverted when the Miller announces that he will follow the Knight:

"By armes and by blood and bones,  
I kan a noble tale for the nones,  
With which I wol now quite the Knyghtes tale." (A, 3125-27)

<sup>1</sup> The notion of quiting extends through the Cook's prologue as well (cf. line 4362), which suggests that Chaucer may have intended these tales to stand as a trio linked by a shared definition of morality. But since the *Cook's Tale* is hardly begun, it is possible only to speculate on structural relations between the three fabliaux. Chaucer quotations in my text are from *Works*, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd edition (Boston, 1957).

The Miller wishes to quit by contrast, not by similarity. In this he succeeds, providing a vulgar counterpoint to the amenities of rhetoric, philosophy, and courtly love in the *Knight's Tale*. Further, the tale told by the Miller is constructed according to the requirements of retributive morality. Every fault (except Alison's adultery) is punished at its source: the old carpenter's folly, Absolon's foppishness, the lechery of handy Nicholas. In spite of its scurrility, the *Miller's Tale* is well received by the general company — except for Oswald the Reeve. For whatever reasons, the Reeve interprets the tale as an offense to himself.<sup>2</sup> In his prologue, quiting degenerates into a narrow vengefulness which is not related to any larger scheme of order or justice, and a note of personal spite is introduced:

"So theek," quod he, "ful wel koude I thee quite  
With bleryng of a proud milleres ye,  
If that me liste speke of ribaudye...  
This dronke Millere hath ytoold us heer  
How that bigyled was a carpenteer,  
Peraventure in scorn, for I am oon.  
And, by youre leve, I shal hym quite anoon;  
Right in his cherles termes wol I speke.  
I pray to God his nekke mote to-breke;..." (A, 3864-66; 3913-18)

As used by the Reeve, quiting is equivalent to simple vindictiveness; but the operation of quiting in the tale of itself indicates some of the limitations of this definition of morality. To the Reeve it is appropriate that Simkin, the miller in his own fabliau, be cuckolded as was John the carpenter in the *Miller's Tale*. It is appropriate too that Simkin be deceived by clerks as John was. But this very insistence on symmetrical justice defeats the Reeve's attempt to vindicate himself and those of his profession. His tale demonstrates only the ingenuity of clerks at the expense of a proud miller, as the preceding tale had done with a foolish carpenter. The Miller's and Reeve's tales do not assert the superiority of millers and carpenters respectively; they only confirm the superiority of clerks to both.

Why did Chaucer consider the clerk to be a particularly suitable agent of quiting? One reason is found in the tradition of the French fabliau, where the clerk is conventionally a conquering hero. In his study of the fabliaux, Per Nykrog shows that the clerk-lover is uniformly successful, and that his success, unlike that of other types of lover, does not depend on the social rank of the challenged husband.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, since the clerk does not appear in the fabliaux as a husband, he himself cannot be cuckolded. Clerks are opposed to

<sup>2</sup> The Miller disclaims any intention of personal satire against the Reeve (3150-66). Some interpretations of the relation between the two men are: Paul A. Olson, "The Reeve's Tale: Chaucer's *Measure for Measure*," *SP*, 59 (1962), 1-17; Robert A. Pratt, "Was Robyn the Miller's Youth Misspent?" *MLN*, 59 (1944), 47-49; Walter Clyde Curry, "The Reeve and the Miller," in *Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences* (New York, 1926); Frederick Tupper, "The Quarrels of the Canterbury Pilgrims," *JEGP*, 14 (1915), 256-70.

<sup>3</sup> Per Nykrog, *Les Fabliaux* (Copenhagen, 1957).

a miller in the extant French analogues to the *Reeve's Tale*, and while this may partly account for their presence in Chaucer's version, it does not explain their function.<sup>4</sup> For that we must turn to the actual social position of the medieval clerk.

Town-gown hostility has always been a feature of academic life, but during the middle ages it approached the dimensions of continual warfare. The so-called "slaughters" at Oxford (1228 and 1354), Toulouse (1332) and Orleans (1387) are only a few of the best-known in a long series of raids, assaults, and brawls. Some of these conflicts were provoked by specific trivial incidents, but the results are so disproportionately violent that most of them are understandable only as manifestations of a relation that was strained at best, one created largely by the special privileges enjoyed by all University students and personnel.<sup>5</sup> The establishment of scholarly privileges was usually initiated when a representative of the University petitioned the king for redress of grievances suffered at the hands of townspeople or the mendicant orders. The privilege was confirmed by papal approval, and interference with it might incur excommunication as well as fines and imprisonment, so that the Universities enjoyed protection of the highest civil and ecclesiastical authorities. Most significant among these privileges was ecclesiastical immunity, or exemption from normal civil judicial process. This meant, among other things, that an accused clerk could not be tried in civil court but was bound over to the Chancellor for trial. The converse of clerical immunity was lay liability, for in a case to which a clerk and a layman were parties, the layman was subject to Chancellor's jurisdiction. Punishment was often administered to the satisfaction of the offended clerk; in the event of murder or of serious injury to a clerk, the entire community might be fined.

Clerical privileges intruded on other areas of civil life than the judicial, especially on those affecting the *petite bourgeoisie*. Rents and repairs in all houses letting to students were controlled by a University commission, and in many towns the University was also responsible for the inspection and control of weights, measures, and prices. Scholars were usually exempt from such civic obligations as military service, local purchase and property taxes, tolls and duties while travelling to and from the University. At Bologna, all noisy occupations (smiths, wheelwrights, coopers) were prohibited from the University area; the butchers of Paris were required, at University pressure, to clean streets at their own expense and to slaughter animals only outside city limits; the citizens of Oxford were similarly made to clean and pave their streets. Besides the supervision of professional conduct, it was at Oxford the University's right to investigate and correct the morals of the laity. For this purpose the

<sup>4</sup> See "Le Meunier et les .II. Clercs," in *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales*, ed. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (New York, 1941), 126-147.

<sup>5</sup> For the following summary of medieval academic privileges I have used Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1895; revised ed. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 1936), 3 vols.; Pearl Kibre, *Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1962); and Astrid L. Gabriel, "The College System in the Fourteenth Century Universities," in *The Forward Movement of the Fourteenth Century*, ed. Francis Lee Utley (Columbus, 1961). Unless otherwise stated, the privileges mentioned are valid for most of the major European universities.

town was divided into districts, and offenders were summoned to the Chancellor's court. With typical vividness, Rashdall writes that by the middle of the fifteenth century, the town of Oxford "had been crushed, and was almost entirely subjugated to the authority of the University. The burghers lived henceforth in their own town almost as the helots or subjects of a conquering people."<sup>6</sup>

The nascent aristocracy of intellect found its natural ally in the courtly aristocracy. The two were united partly by a common opponent, the bourgeoisie, and partly by shared special influence with king and Pope. More than this, the University often owed its physical existence to aristocratic patrons (including ecclesiastical aristocrats) who donated libraries, endowed lectureships, and founded residential colleges. Remarkable, but hardly surprising, is the absence of the *haute bourgeoisie* among the founders of colleges; in England the single exception is the founding of Corpus Christi College (Cambridge) by the united guilds of Corpus Christi and the Blessed Virgin Mary. The political and economic connections between University and aristocracy, together with the University's estrangement from the bourgeoisie, placed the medieval clerk in an unusually flexible social position which had little to do with his own actual origin. This position helps qualify the clerk for his unique role in the fabliaux, and intensifies the irony of John's and Alain's vengeance in the *Reeve's Tale*.

The first encounter between Simkin and the two clerks reveals the miller's resentment of scholars as a group. He responds as follows (albeit silently) to John's simple-minded scheme for supervising the grinding of grain:

"Al this nys doon but for a wyle.  
They wene that no man may hem bigyle,  
But by my thrift, yet shal I blere hir ye,  
For al the sleighe in hir philosophye.  
The moore queynte crekes that they make,  
The moore wol I stele whan I take.  
In stide of flour yet wol I yeve hem bren.  
'The gretteste clerkes been noght wisest men,'  
As whilom to the wolf thus spak the mare.  
Of al hir art ne counte I noght a tare." (A, 4047-56)

Later, when the theft is accomplished, Simkin gloats:

"I trow the clerkes were aferd.  
Yet kan a millere make a clerkes berd,  
For al his art;..." (A,4095-97)

The contempt that Simkin displays in these two passages is directed partly at the clerks' practical naiveté, partly at the intellectual preoccupations of clerks in general. Traditional bourgeois hostility is evident in the proverb which Simkin wrenches round to his own malicious use, and in the phrases "for al

<sup>6</sup> Rashdall, vol.3, p. 79.

the sleighte in hir philosophye," "for al his art." The motif reappears when Simkin agrees to let the exhausted clerks stay with him for the night:

"If ther be envy,  
Swich as it is, yet shal ye have youre part.  
Myn hous is streit, but ye han lerned art;  
Ye konne by argumentes make a place  
A myle brood of twenty foot of space.  
Lat se now if this place may suffise,  
Or make it rowm with speche, as is your gise" (A, 4120-26)

Here the miller, secure in having deceived John and Alain, dares to taunt them openly about the dubious achievement of their training, for Simkin's own values are above all materialistic. Chaucer has taken pains, in his version of the fabliau, to provide the proper social background for these values. In "Le Meunier et les II. Clers," the miller is clearly of the vilain class and is referred to as "li vilains" in text A of the fabliau.<sup>7</sup> His poverty is also apparent in the limited hospitality he is able to offer:

Li muniers lor fait aporter  
Pain et lait, et eues, et fromage,  
C'est la viande del bochage;  
Aus .II. clers assez en dona. (A, 170-173)

Chaucer's clerks, by contrast, feast on roast goose, bread, and strong ale. His miller is something more than a vilain, for red stockings, a sword, and hopes of a daughter's high marriage are outside the vilain's world; they do not appear in the analogues. Had Simkin been unequivocally a vilain, he would have had neither incentive for advancement nor the means to achieve it. As an established bourgeois, on the other hand, he would have had small reason for insecurity about his social position or that of his daughter. Chaucer has deliberately given Simkin an indefinite social rank; the miller is a parvenu, anxious to keep and augment his share in what he conceives to be the good life. He grasps anything that may advance his status, particularly the hope of a profitable marriage for his daughter — which hope is so effectively blasted by Alain.

Are the clerks really Simkin's social inferiors? He thinks they are, and according to his strictly materialistic standards, Simkin is right.<sup>8</sup> But other criteria are present in the tale, which would have been apparent to Chaucer's audience; namely the literary reputation of the clerk as love-hero, and the long-standing sympathy between clerks and aristocracy. This double tradition allows the clerks to transcend Simkin's measure, and offers another means of

<sup>7</sup> Line 157: "Li vilains n'ot pas grand cointie..."

<sup>8</sup> J. R. R. Tolkien proved that the clerks' dialect and provenance establish them as rustics: "Chaucer as a Philologist: the *Reeve's Tale*," *Transactions of the Philological Society* (1934), 1-70. Charles Muscatine's interpretation of the tale relies on this point: "The two clerks of Cambridge are the ones who violate the miller's vessels of 'hooly blood.' The irony of this sacrilege lies in the fact that their speech represents them to the miller as country bumpkins of no social position whatever." *Chaucer and the French Tradition* (Berkeley, 1957), 201.

judging the miller. Chaucer might, after all, have used a vilain as the agent for frustrating the miller's social ambition; there is some precedent in the French fabliaux for that situation, and it would fulfill the requirement of social inferiority for the quiter. In that case, though, one dimension of irony would be lost, for the vilain can in fact be classified by Simkin's social standards. The audience would have to concede the genuine inferiority of the quiter, and, by sharing that opinion with Simkin, would implicitly have accepted his values. To maintain perspective on the almost-bourgeois Simkin, then, the *Reeve's Tale* requires a hero whose social position is fluid enough to be considered inferior by the cuckolded miller, and at the same time to be recognized as inherently superior by an aristocratic audience. Thus the presence of John and Alain in the *Reeve's Tale* is not controlled simply by the presence of clerks in the analogues, but by the moral structure of the tale itself. I would suggest further that the clerk's ambivalent social status is at least partly responsible for his role in the French fabliaux as a tool of satire against all classes of deceivable husband.

The Reeve ends his tale with the remark, "Thus have I quyt the Millere in my tale," and his last lines are a malicious parody of the Miller's own conclusion. In the narrowest sense the Reeve has quit the Miller; but Oswald's values, like Simkin's, are crude, and through these values he exposes himself to the kind of justice he is so eager to apply to another. While blaming the Miller's ribaldry, the Reeve produces a confession of lascivious old age which is far more offensive than anything in the preceding tale. He chooses as instruments of vengeance two clerks, whom the audience knows would as gladly and successfully deceive a carpenter as a miller. Finally, the Reeve's character, as revealed in the General Prologue and in his own confession, makes him an unusually apt target for vindictive judgment: he is lecherous, spiteful, and doubtless as practised a thief as Simkin (if a subtler). Nevertheless the Reeve is thriving, and there is no sure sign that he has been or will be punished. In thus refraining from quiting the Reeve, Chaucer dissociates himself from a too-narrow definition of morality as mathematical retribution. Vindictiveness, he implies, provides its own punishment: now in the opinion of men, and later by the standards of merciful justice.

*Queens College, City University of New York.*

## ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S VIEWS ON ASTROLOGY

RICHARD C. DALES

Robert Grosseteste and Michael Scot were the leading European scholars of the early thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup> Michael Scot,<sup>2</sup> who left his homeland and earned great fame as a translator and scholar in Spain and Italy, was one of the most famous and successful of all European astrologers and made a good living reading the stars for the *Stupor Mundi*, Frederick II. Robert Grosseteste, though he may have studied Theology at Paris,<sup>3</sup> and late in life made several trips to France, spent the greater part of his life at Oxford and Lincoln and was a leader in introducing into England not only the "New Aristotle,"<sup>4</sup> but also the recently translated works of Hellenistic and Moslem astrology and astronomy, on which subjects he himself wrote several extremely important works.<sup>5</sup> Concerning Michael Scot's attitude toward astrology, there is no doubt; he was its most famous practitioner and was employed in this capacity by the emperor himself. Robert Grosseteste's attitude toward astrology, however, has never been made clear; and since he was regarded during his lifetime (d. 1253) and again between 1300 and 1450 as one of the greatest of all European scholars,<sup>6</sup> it seems worthwhile to attempt a clarification here.

As a young man, Grosseteste seems to have accepted without misgivings the doctrines of the astrologers, and to have been intensely interested in Moslem astronomy. Very early in his career, probably before 1209,<sup>7</sup> he composed a

<sup>1</sup> This is the judgment of George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2, pt. 2, (Baltimore, 1931), 497, and it would be difficult to dispute.

<sup>2</sup> See C. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), 272-298. L. Thorndike, *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, 2 (New York, 1923), 307-337; and L. Thorndike, *Michael Scot* (London, 1965).

<sup>3</sup> For the best discussion of the many vexed questions concerning Grosseteste's life, see D. A. Callus, ed., *Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop* (Oxford, 1955), 1-11.

<sup>4</sup> See D. A. Callus, "The Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 29 (1943), 252-255; and L. Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln* (Muenster i. W., 1912), 15\*-50\*.

<sup>5</sup> *De sphaera*, *De motu supercaelestium*, *Theorica Planetarum*, *De impressionibus aeris seu de prognosticatione*, *Kalendarium*, *Comptus Correctorius*, *Comptus Minor*, and *Ptolemeus de Novem Planetis*. For bibliographical details, see S. H. Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253* (Cambridge, 1940). For an evaluation of Grosseteste's work on the calendar, see A. C. Crombie's chapter, "Grosseteste's Position in the History of Science," in D. A. Callus, ed., *Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop*, 112-115.

<sup>6</sup> I base this judgment upon both the MS tradition of his works and the frequency with which he is cited as an authority between the dates mentioned.

<sup>7</sup> Since this work is very clearly a classroom lecture, accompanied by sketches and referring to astronomical tables which the students (but not the reader) had access to, it would probably

work entitled *De impressionibus aeris sue de prognosticatione*,<sup>8</sup> which enjoyed a considerable vogue and was used on several occasions by Roger Bacon.<sup>9</sup> This work is concerned solely with weather forecasting, and so avoids some of the knottier problems concerning the influence of the stars on man's free will, but it accepts without any question the basic tenets of the astrologers concerning "the powers of the (zodiacal) signs, the natures of the planets, and the qualities of the four quarters of the circle described by the daily rotation of the heavens."<sup>10</sup>

An example of classroom teaching, it presents with admirable precision the main outlines of astrological lore. First, Grosseteste gives the natures of the twelve signs of the zodiac. He then explains the nature of each of the planets. This is followed by an account of the *testimonia* and how they are determined by the *domus, exaltatio, triplicitas, terminus* and *facies*. Each of these terms is explained, and then the significance of the five aspects (*oppositus, quartus, trinus, sextilis* and *coniunctus*) is made clear. Further refinements resulting from the epicyclic motions of the planets are then thoroughly investigated and explained and are illustrated by the influence of the moon on the tides. Then, stepping to his equivalent of a blackboard, Grosseteste drew for his students a large diagram of the universe, with the circles of the planets and the zodiac clearly marked "so that you might understand all the foregoing without labor or tedium," and proceeded to give an example of how the weather might be forecast for a specific date (April 15, 1249) and to explain how to predict when it would be hot, cold, wet, or dry by calculating when the appropriate planets would be in positions of dominance.

Not too long afterward, probably while he was working on his degree in Theology, Grosseteste developed his Light Metaphysics, which he set forth in his treatise *De luce*.<sup>11</sup> From this point on, all of his works either assume or explicitly state the doctrine of the Light Metaphysics. Although there is no reference to astrology in *De luce*, the Metaphysics of Light provides ample opportunity for introducing astral influences on mundane affairs. According to it, light, the first corporeal form, extended matter into three dimensions and is the efficient cause of all bodily motions. Light then becomes the means by which the heavenly bodies could impress their effects on the earth; and in his

date from Grosseteste's regency on the Oxford Arts faculty, that is, before 1209. As further evidence of its early date, it shows considerable knowledge of Moslem astronomy and of Ptolemy, but it completely ignores Aristotle, as well as Averroes; and it contains a statement — "omnes planetae, quanto a terra remotiores sunt, tanto fortiores" — which definitely contradicts the requirements of the Light Metaphysics and the mathematical rules laid down in *De lineis* and *De natura locorum*. See R. C. Dales, "The Authorship of the *Questio de Fluxu et Refluxu Maris* Attributed to Robert Grosseteste," *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 586, note 29.

<sup>8</sup> Printed in Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke*, 41-51.

<sup>9</sup> In his *Secretum Secretorum*, *Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi*, ed. R. Steele (Oxford, 1909), 5, 20 and *Metaphysica*, ed. cit., 1, 49; and his *Opus Majus* ed. J. H. Bridges (Oxford, 1897), 1, 261. See Thomson, *Writings*, 103.

<sup>10</sup> Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke*, 42.

<sup>11</sup> Printed in Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke*, 51-59. English translation by C. C. Riedl, *Robert Grosseteste On Light (De Luce)* (Milwaukee, 1942).

*De fluxu et refluxu maris*, Grosseteste states explicitly that heavenly bodies act on inferior bodies only by means of their light.<sup>12</sup> In *De fluxu*, however, he shows some signs of dissatisfaction with astrological assumptions when, in trying to explain why there were tides when the moon was in the two quarters of the sky below the horizon, he said: "Astronomers answer this by saying that opposite quarters of the sky have similar effects, but whether this is true remains to be proved and is in need of further investigation."<sup>13</sup>

He still, however, maintained the validity of astrological doctrine in his treatise *De cometis*,<sup>14</sup> written between 1228 and 1230. This work attributes comets to the power of a fixed star or a planet, which sublimates fire from its terrestrial nature and assimilates it to a celestial nature. Each comet has a specific star for its effective cause. Consequently a comet

is a sign of a preceding sublimation of an uncorrupted spiritual nature by things connected and assimilated to earth in a spiritual nature; thus it is a sign of weakness or corruption of connected things which are dominated by the planet to whose nature the comet is assimilated. For example, if there were a star drawing a comet of the nature of the sun, and the power of this star sublimated the comet and separated it from its terrestrial nature, it would separate the spirits which are in complex bodies from the assimilated nature of the sun, and there will be an infirmity or corruption in men, animals and plants over which the sun principally rules. Similarly if there were a star drawing a comet of the nature of Mars, martial things will undergo a weakening or corruption.<sup>15</sup>

Grosseteste also admits that perhaps a comet can move the souls of men towards some emotion, such as admiration or fear or horror. It also moves the souls of those seeing it in such a way as to give them a glimpse into the future and enable them to sense complete effects which are yet inchoate. And from the similarity of the emotion which it impresses on the minds of those seeing it, the quality of future things of which it is the sign is set forth.

Throughout the 1220's, Grosseteste was becoming increasingly interested and competent in mathematics. In about 1231, he wrote a work entitled *De lineis, angulis, et figuris*, in which he emphasized the importance of geometry in understanding the world of nature. In this work, he definitely abandoned the strict letter of astrological teaching by revising his theory of the moon's action on the tides, giving up the astrological notion that a planet's power was stronger when

<sup>12</sup> E. Franceschini, "Un inedito di Roberto Grossatesta: la 'Questio de accessu et recessu maris,'" *Rivista de filosofia neoscolastica*, 44 (1952), 18..

<sup>13</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> S. H. Thomson, "The Text of Grosseteste's *De Cometis*," *Isis*, 19 (1933), 19-25; addenda S. H. Thomson, "Grosseteste's *Questio de Calore*, *De Cometis* and *De Operacionibus Solis*," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 11 (1957), 36-37. On the date, see R. C. Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's Scientific Works," *Isis*, 52 (1961), 391-392.

<sup>15</sup> Thomson, "Grosseteste's *Questio de Calore*, *De Cometis* and *De Operacionibus Solis*," 36.

the planet was rising and weaker when it was setting, and replacing this with the strictly geometrical scheme of short, straight lines (of light) exerting maximum force, the force decreasing as the angle of incidence declined from the perpendicular.<sup>16</sup> He also solved, to his satisfaction, the problem of how the moon caused tides when it was beneath the horizon by giving up completely the notion that "opposite quarters have similar effects," and deciding that the reflection of the moon's rays produced the effect.<sup>17</sup> These changes were apparently made for purely scientific reasons, but Grosseteste's disillusionment with astrology and his awareness of its incompatibility with Christian doctrine were rapid thereafter. In about 1235, in his *Hexaemeron*, he gives us his mature and apparently final position on astrology.

Commenting on the text *et sint in signa* (*Gen. I*: 14), he first shows that there are some signs in the heavens which it is lawful to consider, since they are firmly based on truth. The signs he refers to are confined to indications of changing weather, but he will no longer allow an astrological explanation. Basing his case largely on Matthew, XVI: 1-3 and on Augustine<sup>18</sup> and Basil,<sup>19</sup> he argues that since the heavenly bodies do in fact cause changes in the air, they are reliable indices of winds, rain, snow, thunderstorms, of the direction the winds will come from, and whether it will be stormy or calm. "Who will ignore," he asks, "the observation of these things which are so useful for the convenience of man? They enable the pilot to foresee dangers and keep his ship in port. The traveller is warned by the angry sky and waits for a time of tranquillity. Farmers judge the proper time to plant their crops."<sup>20</sup>

"But," he goes on, "there are other signs which the astrologers pretend exist in the heavenly bodies. These are completely empty and false, and it is profane to consider them; and even if it were not profane, it would nevertheless be fruitless and vain."

Grosseteste opens his attack on the astrologers by granting for the sake of argument that the stars actually can influence man's free will, fortuitous events, and human character. Even if this were true, he points out, the degree of precision possible with present astronomical instruments and the astronomical tables would not permit the astrologers to make reliable judgments.<sup>21</sup> By their own admission, they must know the exact location of a spot on the earth's surface, the precise moment of time and the position of the stars in the heavens to within less than a second. Not even the most skillful astronomer could know this, says Grosseteste, "which is clear to anyone who has spent much time and effort studying the astronomical tables."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke*, 70.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.* See Dales, "The Authorship of the *Questio de Fluxu et Refluxu Maris*," 588.

<sup>18</sup> *De Civitate Dei*, V, 3-9; *Enarratio in Psalmum LXI*, 23; *Enarratio in Psalmum XCI*, 7; *In Joanis Evangelium*, tractatus IX, cap. ii, 11.

<sup>19</sup> *Hexaemeron*, homilia VI, 4-6.

<sup>20</sup> *Hexaemeron*, Bodleian MS lat. th. c. 17, fol. 214C-D. All subsequent citations of Grosseteste's *Hexaemeron* are from this MS.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Augustini *Confessiones*, VII, 6.

<sup>22</sup> Fols. 214D-215A.

"However," he says, "we should not concede, except for the sake of argument, that the stars have any effect on free will or on human character and the voluntary acts of man." Then follows a series of arguments, based on human dignity, the freedom of the will, and the omnipotence of God, to show that the claims of the astrologers are false. The first of Grosseteste's arguments contends that "the free choice of a rational mind is subject to nothing in nature, save only God, but rather is placed above all corporeal creatures. And since the agent is more noble than the patient, a corporeal nature cannot, by its action, impress passions on the freedom of the will. ...Therefore, whoever posits the efficacy of the stars on free will, subjects the nature of the rational soul and the dignity of the human condition to a corporeal nature, and these people are enemies of human nature." They also blaspheme against God by denying to the rational soul the dignity of being His image. Since an image is a greatest and nearest similitude, by making God's image subject to corporeal natures, they make God something less than He is, and therefore not God.<sup>23</sup>

But some astrologers assert that "the stars have incorporeal living and rational spirits, and by these spirits they act on human spirits, while by their bodies they act on human bodies." This too, Grosseteste says, is completely false for two reasons. First, even if we were to grant that the stars do have rational spirits, "nevertheless in no way would it be true that the spirit of a star would be superior to the spirit of a man since man, through his spirit, is the image of the Trinity." Also, we read in *Deuteronomy*, IV: 19: *the sun and moon and all the heavenly bodies created by God to serve all the nations under the heaven.* It is surely more in accordance with nature that they, the servants, should be acted upon and commanded by man than the contrary. Joshua demonstrated this when at his command the sun stood still.<sup>24</sup> The second argument has to do with the nature of free will. It is in no way defective, says Grosseteste, and has sufficient power to bring about its proper effects, with the help only of divine grace.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> "Nec est verum nec nisi disputacionis gracia concedendum quod stelle habeant effectum super liberum arbitrium vel super mores et actus voluntarios hominum. Liberum enim arbitrium mentis rationalis in ordine rerum naturali nulli subicitur nisi soli Deo, sed omnibus corporalibus creaturis prelatum est. Unde, cum agens nobilior sit paciente, non potest corporalis natura in arbitrii libertatem per suam actionem passiones imprimere, eset enim natura corporalis libertate arbitrii nobilior et superior si eidem passiones imprimaret. Qui igitur ponunt astris efficienciam in liberum arbitrium, naturam anime rationalis et dignitatem humane condicionis subiciunt nature corporali et inimici sunt humane nature, cum eam subiciant sibi naturaliter subiecto, auferantque ei esse ymaginem Dei. Ymago enim est summa et propinquissima similitudo. Blasphemi quoque sunt in Deum, quia detrahunt Deo suam dignitatem, cum mentem rationalem quam concedunt esse Dei ymaginem, ponant corporibus inferiorem. Si enim corpus vel aliquid vilius corpore eset Dei ymago et summa similitudo, non esset Deus hoc quod ipse est, sed aliquid minus quam est; et ita non esset Deus." Fol. 215B. Grosseteste greatly expands the definition of "imago" as the "summa et propinquissima similitudo" later in his *Hexameron*. See J. T. Muckle, "The Hexameron of Robert Grosseteste: The First Twelve Chapters of Part Seven," *Mediaeval Studies*, 6 (1944), 151-174.

<sup>24</sup> *Josue*, X: 43.

<sup>25</sup> "Preterea natura libertatis arbitrii est quod ipsa est in sui ipsius potestate potens sponte profere adiutrice sola divina gratia. A nullo autem cogi potest in defectum." Fol. 215 B.

The next question to be discussed is the assertion of "professors of this kind of vanity" that the heavenly bodies make impressions on the human body, and that when the body undergoes these, the soul must undergo them too. "For the body, as the physicians say, follows the soul in the actions of the soul, and the soul follows the body in the passions of the body... not because the body acts upon the soul, but because the soul moves itself comproportionally to the motion of the body to which it is united;" therefore, they say, astrologers are competent to make judgments concerning the motions and passions of the soul which it has through compassion with its own body. In denying this, Grosseteste makes a distinction between the human body as a natural physical object and as the instrument of the human soul. As a natural physical object, it is moved by the heavenly bodies. But it also receives motions and impressions from the action of its own soul. "And since the soul, with respect to its rational power, is subject to God, it has the ability through its reason to command inferior powers, and it is more powerful in affecting its own body than are the stars."<sup>26</sup>

But then are evil men who follow their carnal passions subject to astrological judgment? Again Grosseteste says no, since "he who is now evil can suddenly be made good. Nor is it in the power of the astrologers to foretell this, since the conversion of man comes about through divine grace."<sup>27</sup> Another somewhat more mundane reason is that medicines can often counteract bodily affections caused by the stars.

The final question to be discussed is whether the constellations can influence human character. Grosseteste first attacks such an assumption as patently ridiculous and cites a section of Basil's *Hexaemeron* making fun of astrologers for thinking a man will have the characteristics of the animal under whose sign he is born.<sup>28</sup> Then he constructs a dilemma proving the claim false. If the stars are able to force or persuade one to do evil, they themselves are evil either with respect to their nature or their will. If by nature, their creator, God, is evil, which is blasphemous to say. If by will, there is sin and error in the heavens, which is impossible.<sup>29</sup>

After mentioning that in addition to scripture and Christian writers, even pagan philosophers have pointed out the falseness of the claims of the astrologers, he concludes: "Nevertheless, we wish in conclusion to warn that astrologers are both seduced and seducers, and their teaching is impious and profane and written at the dictation of the devil. Therefore their books ought to be burned. And not only they, but all who consult such people, are lost."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Fol. 215C.

<sup>27</sup> "Quod si dicat aliquis quod mali homines qui sequuntur libidines et passiones carnales subiacent iudicio astrorum, dicendum est ei quod qui nunc malus est, subito potest fieri bonus. Nec hoc predicere est in astronomi potestate, cum hominis conversio sit per operationem divine gracie." Fol. 215C.

<sup>28</sup> Basilius *Hexaemeron*, homilia VI, 6. PG, 29, 129-131.

<sup>29</sup> Fol. 215D.

<sup>30</sup> "Hec tamen in calce volumus admonere quod huiusmodi iudices seducti sunt et seductores et eorum doctrina impia est et profana, diabolo dictante conscripta. Ideoque et libri eorum comburendi; et non solum isti, sed etiam qui consulunt tales sunt perditii." Fol. 215D.

Although this final position of Grosseteste's appears at first glance to be a complete reversal of his earlier views, the change is not quite as complete as the fervor of the language would make it seem. When Grosseteste was a young man, during the last quarter of the twelfth century, the excitement caused among young scholars by the new translations of Ptolemy's *Almagest* and *Quadripartitum* and numerous Moslem works must have been considerable. The quality of the astronomical works was high — an immense improvement over what had previously been available to the Latins — and it was natural to put an equally high value on the astrological teachings that accompanied them. Grosseteste mastered these doctrines and taught them, but in his early works there is no evidence that he had faced, or was aware of, the implications of astrology for free will and human dignity. If he had, he might well have rejected it earlier, although there is no way to be certain of this. Still, his early acceptance of astrology does not necessarily imply a denial of the views expressed later in the *Hexaemeron*. It shows only that he had not yet realized the ultimate incompatibility of these views and astrology. Also, Grosseteste continued to accept certain parts of the astrologers' doctrines to the end. In *De Cometis* it was still quite a considerable part, and even in the *Hexaemeron* he continues to admit that the stars can influence the human body by constraining or inflaming the blood, and other things of this sort,<sup>31</sup> and only insists that the soul has a greater power over its own body than do the stars.

His final position was brought about by two types of considerations. The first of these was scientific and was the result not of malice but of skepticism. He could not devise an explanation of the tides which would satisfy him on the basis of astrological assumptions, and so he replaced certain of them with alternative views. Also his growing awareness of the inescapable inaccuracy of all human measurements<sup>32</sup> led him to realize the inherent inability of astrology to do what its practitioners claimed, since the accuracy they pretended to was unobtainable.

But more important in bringing about his final rejection of the greater part of astrological doctrine was his increasing realization that it was incompatible with his deeply held, essentially "humanistic," convictions of the freedom and self-sufficiency of man's will and the dignity of the human condition. In this, he is a superb example of the Christian humanism which gave to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries so much of their greatness.

*University of Southern California.*

<sup>31</sup> "Recipit enim [anima] multas passiones et impressionibus a sideribus... Unde quantumcumque moveat Saturnus vel Mars corpus, sive hic sanguinem constringendo, sive ille sanguinem accendendo, ut proveniat tristitia vel ira in anima...". Fol. 215C.

<sup>32</sup> This problem is treated fully by Grosseteste in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. See R. C. Dales, ed., *Roberti Grosseteste Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Boulder, 1963), 56-57, 89-92.

# A PROMISING NEW DISCOVERY FOR SIGERIAN STUDIES

WILLIAM DUNPHY - ARMAND MAURER, C.S.B.

The recently published inventory of MS lat. 2330 in the National Library of Vienna by the Dominican scholars Antoine Dondaine and Louis J. Bataillon has given new impetus to Sigerian studies.<sup>1</sup> Through painstaking detective work, aided by a tip from the American mediaevalist S. H. Thomson, Fathers Bataillon and Dondaine have brought to light several new works of Siger of Brabant. If their conclusions are correct, the Vienna codex contains several hitherto unknown works of Siger of Brabant: *Quaestiones super librum De causis*, *Sententia super 4<sup>m</sup> Meteororum*, *Sententia super librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae*, and *Sententia super librum De somno et vigilia*. It also contains another version of Siger's *Quaestiones super librum Metaphysicae*, V-VII.<sup>2</sup>

Fathers Bataillon and Dondaine call attention to the affinity of the latter work to Siger's *Quaestiones super librum Metaphysicae*, II-VII conserved in MS 152 of Peterhouse College, Cambridge.<sup>3</sup> Comparing these two intimately related works, they point out the much longer development and vivacious style of the Vienna Questions. "If we are not mistaken," they write, "there is in this manuscript of Questions on the *Metaphysics* one of the literary works most representative of the authentic oral style of Siger, and consequently one of the most faithful witnesses of his thought."<sup>4</sup>

This discovery is of special interest to the present writers, for they had already decided to publish the Questions on the *Metaphysics* in the Peterhouse and Vienna manuscripts. Some years ago one had pointed out the possible Sigerian authorship of the Peterhouse Questions,<sup>5</sup> and the other had de-

<sup>1</sup> "Le Manuscript Vindob. lat. 2330 et Siger de Brabant" *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, 36 (1966) 153-261.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 155-159. Professor Thomson had deciphered two identical cryptograms appearing in the upper margins of the folios containing the beginnings of the *Questions on the Metaphysics* V-VII and of the *Questions on the Liber de Causis*. When deciphered, they read: "Questiones Magistri Seieri." The table of contents for the entire manuscript revealed erasures and a retouching of the name Seiero to Petro (Peter of Auvergne) in the case of four works: (1) sententia super 4<sup>m</sup> metheororum; (2) sententia super librum de causis longitudinis; (3) sententia super librum de sompno et vigilia; (4) questiones quedam super 5, 6, et 7<sup>m</sup> metaphysice. The attribution of another work, the "questiones super librum de causis" to the supradicto Magistro Seiero escaped the corrector's pen. The hypothesis that the corrector wished to disguise the Sigerian authorship of these works in the wake of the Parisian condemnation of 1277 seems reasonable when one considers the mutilation of Siger's *Questions on the Metaphysics* II-V in Munich *Clm.* 9559.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 196-205; 215-220.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 202.

<sup>5</sup> A. Maurer, "Siger of Brabant and an Averroistic Commentary on the *Metaphysics* in Cambridge, Peterhouse MS 152" *Mediaeval Studies*, 12 (1950) 233-35. See also Maurer, "Siger of Brabant's *De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum* and Ms Peterhouse 152" *Mediaeval Studies*, 14 (1952) 48-60.

cided on internal evidence that the ascription to Peter of Auvergne of the Questions on the *Metaphysics*, V-VII in the Vienna manuscript was not correct, and that they are in fact closely linked to the Peterhouse Questions and probably represented a classroom report of Siger's lectures.

With a generosity equal to their scholarship, Fathers Bataillon and Dondaine have graciously encouraged our publishing an edition of these Questions on the *Metaphysics*. We are accordingly planning a joint publication of these two intimately related sets of Questions from the Peterhouse and Vienna manuscripts.

As an illustration of the relationship between these two Sigerian manuscripts we are printing below in parallel columns the texts of Book VI, Question 2, which distinguishes between philosophical theology and the theology of Sacred Scripture. The greater length of the Vienna Question is apparent at once. The Peterhouse manuscript contains the same ideas but expressed more succinctly and with less repetition.

For the moment Siger finds six ways in which philosophical theology differs from the theology based on Sacred Scripture. All six distinguishing marks appear in both manuscripts, though their order is slightly different. The fourth and fifth in the Vienna manuscript are in reverse order in the Peterhouse manuscript. This may be a slip on the part of the scribe; more likely it indicates that the manuscripts represent two different courses of lectures on the *Metaphysics*.

The Question on theology edited below is of vital importance for an understanding of Siger's conception of the science and its relation to philosophy. It is also clear proof that he was under the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas, for he takes many of his ideas and even some of his language from St. Thomas' treatise on the nature of theology in the *Summa Theologiae*, I, 1.

Siger distinguishes the theology that is a part of philosophy from the theology based on Sacred Scripture in six ways. First of all they differ in their mode of inquiry. Philosophical theology begins with principles known by the light of human reason and acquired by sense, memory and experience, whereas the theology of Sacred Scripture starts with principles known by the light of divine revelation. Second, they differ in their objects. Philosophical theology considers God insofar as He can be known by human reason rising from His effects to a knowledge of their cause, while the theology of Sacred Scripture deals with God insofar as He transcends human reason. Like St. Thomas, Siger does not limit the latter kind of theology to objects transcending human reason; it also considers some objects knowable by reason, whether they concern God, nature, morals, or mathematics. As long as they are treated from the perspective of revelation they are revealable (*revelabilia*), and as such they fall under this science.<sup>6</sup>

A third difference between the two kinds of theology follows from the second: philosophical theology is less universal in its subject matter than the theology of Sacred Scripture. Fourth, the theology of Sacred Scripture is more practical than philosophical theology, which is a purely speculative science. This is because the former is based on revelation, which includes both practical and speculative matters. Quoting a phrase from St. Thomas, Siger calls revelation "an impression of the divine science" (*impressio quaedam scientiae divinae*).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> In the Cambridge MS Siger uses the Thomistic term *revelabilia*. See *Summa Theologiae*, I, 1, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2m.

In God there is no difference between practical and speculative knowledge; hence His revelation, which bears the stamp of the divine knowledge, includes both the practical and speculative.

Fifth, the theology of Sacred Scripture is more certain than philosophical theology because the former is grounded in divine revelation, which, unlike human reason, cannot err. Sixth, both kinds of theology merit the title of wisdom because they treat of God, the highest being, but the theology of Sacred Scripture is a more excellent wisdom because it embraces knowledge of the divine both accessible to human reason and transcending it.

The Question in the Vienna manuscript concludes with a criticism of those theologians who believe that the method of demonstration is of universal application in theology. This, he says, is the worst possible procedure in the theology of Sacred Scripture, for the principles of demonstration must be known by means of sense, memory and experience, whereas the principles of the theology of Sacred Scripture are known through divine revelation.

The importance of this text for an understanding of Siger's notion of theology and his relation to Thomism is clear enough. The publication of the entire set of Questions on the *Metaphysics* in the Cambridge and Vienna codices will provide mediaevalists with significant new material for an evaluation of the thought of Siger of Brabant.

Vienna 2330 fol. 102<sup>vb</sup>

*Quaestiones super Metaphysicam VI, 2*

Consequenter quaeritur qualiter differat scientia theologia quam prae manibus habemus, quae est pars philosophiae, et scientia theologia quae non est pars philosophiae, sed est sacra scriptura, nam utraque dicuntur theologia. Quomodo ergo differunt?

Dicendum quod sicut nunc mihi apparet, differunt quantum ad sex: primo, quantum ad modos considerandi; secundo, quantum ad considerata in utraque; tertio, quia theologia quae est sacra scriptura, ipsa est magis universalis quam theologia quae est pars philosophiae; quarto, quia iterum est magis certa; quinto, quia ipsa etiam est practica, theologia vero quae est pars philosophiae, ipsa non est practica; sexto, quia theologia quae sacra scriptura est, est magis sapientia quam theologia ista.

Dico ergo quod differunt quantum ad modum considerandi, quia modus considerandi in ista theologia quae est pars philosophiae est procedere ex prin-

Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 90<sup>vb</sup>

Sed cum scientia ista et etiam sacra scriptura dicantur theologia, quaereret aliquis in quo differt haec ab illa.

Et quantum mihi occurrit ad praesens, videntur differre quantum ad sex.

Primo quantum ad modum considerandi seu procedendi. Nostra enim theologia tantum procedit ex principiis cognitis lumine rationis humanae et

cipiis quae sunt nota nobis via sensus, memoriae et experimenti, ex lumine et ratione naturali. Modus autem considerandi in theologia quae est sacra scriptura non est procedere ex principiis quae sint nota via sensus, memoriae et experimenti et lumine naturali, sed proceditur in eis ex principiis notis per divinam revelationem, sicut multis sanctis nota fuerunt per revelationem, divinam. Deinde autem ex illis principiis sic notis per revelationem divinam proceditur per investigationem humanam applicando ad alia, sicut ad conclusiones illius scientiae, illa principia.

Differunt etiam quantum ad considerata in eis, quia haec scientia theologia, quae est pars philosophiae, non extendit<sup>8</sup> considerationem suam nisi usque ad ea quae per rationem humanam et per creaturas tantum possunt cognosci a nobis. Illa autem scientia theologia quae est sacra scriptura extendit considerationem suam ad ea quae sunt supra rationem humanam et quae per creaturas tantum non possunt cognosci, nam, sicut dictum est, ipsa considerat ea quae per revelationem divinam tantum possunt cognosci. Unde et quaecumque scibilia sunt per modum divinae revelationis, sive sint entia naturalia, sive divina, sive mathematica, sive quaecumque, in eo quod cadunt vel cadere possunt sub modo sciendi vel cognoscendi ea per revelationem divinam, considerat haec scientia theologia quae est sacra scriptura, quae non est pars philosophiae.

Differunt etiam tertio, quia theologia quae est sacra scriptura est magis universalis, quod patet ex praedictis. Nam supra considerat omnia illa quaecumque possunt cadere sub ratione divinae revelationis. Et haec non tantum possunt esse principia scientiarum parti-

habitis via sensus, memoriae et experi- menti; alia autem procedit ex prin- cipiis cognitis lumine divinae revela- tionis.

Secundo differt quantum ad considerata. Nostra enim considerat de Deo tantum quae possunt cognosci per rationem humanam et quae tantum pos- sunt cognosci ascendendo ab effectibus ad cognitionem causae; alia autem considerat de illis quae sunt supra rationem humanam quae revelatione divina habita sunt, et etiam de aliis quae ratione humana comprehendi pos- sunt. Unde quaecumque entia, seu di- vina seu naturalia seu moralia, in quantum revelata sunt, cadunt in scien- tiam illam.

Ex hoc etiam sequitur tertia diver- sitas, scilicet quod nostra est minus universalis, alia autem magis, quia nostra considerat tantum quae ratione humana comprehendi possunt, alia autem et considerat illa et quae supra rationem humanam. Item nostra, et

<sup>8</sup> MS extenditur.

cularium, sed etiam conclusiones particularium scientiarum. Sed scientia haec theologia quae est pars philosophiae non intermittit se de conclusionibus aliarum scientiarum particularium, sicut Commentator dicit. Ideo, illa scientia theologia magis est universalis quam ista.

Differunt quarto, quia theologia quae sacra scriptura est, magis est certa quam ista theologia quae est pars philosophiae. Et hoc etiam appareat ex praedictis, quia, sicut dictum est, theologia quae est pars philosophiae procedit ex principiis notis via sensus, memoriae et experimenti, et ita in cognitione suorum principiorum potest cadere error; non sic cognoscitur sicut in hac scientia cognoscitur. Sed theologia sacra scriptura procedit ex principiis notis per divinam revelationem. In tali autem cognitione non potest cadere error. Et ideo, quia principia ex quibus procedit scientia theologia quae est sacra scriptura sunt magis nota et certa quam principia ex quibus procedit scientia theologia quae est pars philosophiae, et cujus principia sunt magis nota ejus conclusiones sunt magis notae et certiores, et per consequens tota scientia magis certa, hinc est quod theologia sacra scriptura est certior.

Differunt etiam quinto per hoc quod illa est practica, ista vero non. Et quod theologia quae est sacra scriptura sit practica et non tantum speculativa appareat per duas rationes. Quarum prima est quia, sicut dictum est, illa considerat omnia illa quae cognosci possunt per revelationem divinam; haec autem possunt esse non solum speculabilia, verum etiam practica, id est, factibilia vel agibilia. Ergo practicabilia vel agibilia ipsa considerat in quantum ipsa possunt cadere sub revelatione divina vel sub cognitione quae est practica. Ergo ipsa aliquo modo

etsi descendat ad principia scientiarum specialium, ad conclusiones tamen earum non descendit. Ista autem et ad principia et ad conclusiones omnium scientiarum descendere potest in quantum revelata sunt.

Quarto differunt in hoc quod alia magis est practica quam ista. Cujus ratio potest esse duplex, quoniam omnia in quantum revelata cadunt in scientiam illam. Possunt autem esse revelata tam speculativa quam practica. Item revelatio non est nisi "impressio quaedam scientiae divinae."<sup>9</sup> In Deo non differunt scientia practica et speculativa. Ideo revelabilia sunt tam speculabilia quam agibilia.

Quinto differunt quia alia est magis certa quam ista. Certitudo enim scientiae est ex certitudine principiorum. Principia autem illius modo certiora accepta sunt quam principia hujus, quia quoniam principia illius accepta sunt modo tali in quo non potest accidere error, scilicet per revelationem divinam, principia autem hujus accepta sunt per viam cognitionis humanae, in qua potest error accidere.

<sup>9</sup> St. Thomas, *ibid.*

est practica scientia. Hoc etiam patet alia ratione, nam supra considerat ea quae imprimuntur in nobis per revelationem divinam. Tunc ex ipsa impressione appareat quod est activa. Ita quod, sicut theologia quae est pars philosophiae est scientia una speculativa, sic et theologia quae est sacra scriptura est scientia una practica seu activa, et non tantum speculativa, sicut ex praedictis patet. Haec autem theologia nullo modo est practica. Ergo etc.

Differunt etiam sexto per hoc quod theologia quae est sacra scriptura magis est sapientia quam ista. Quod appetet sic. Nam dicit Aristoteles in principio primi libri hujus scientiae, quod illa scientia dicitur sapientia quae considerat de primis causis et primis principiis, ut de Deo et aliis substantiis separatis. Tunc arguo, illa scientia dicetur magis sapientia quae maiorem cognitionem et certiorem habet de primis principiis entium. Sed sicut ex praedictis appetet, theologia quae sacra scriptura est, ipsa maiorem et certiorem cognitionem habet de ipsis quam ista theologia, cum sint nota in ea per divinam revelationem, ad quam cognitionem non potest pertingere ratio humana per se, et ita nec ista theologia quae dicitur pars philosophiae. Cum ipsa consideret solum illa quae per inventionem et rationem humanam lumine et ratione naturali sciri possunt, hinc est quod illa est magis sapientia quam ista.

Sic ergo quantum mihi videtur nunc, ipsae differunt in hiis sex iam dictis. Ex quibus iam dictis appetet quod pessime volunt procedere illi qui in illa scientia volunt procedere in omnibus modo demonstrativo. Principia enim demonstrationis debent esse nota via sensus, memoriae et experimenti. Principia autem illius scientiae nota sunt, ut visum est, per revelationem divinam.

*St. Michael's College, Toronto  
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies*

Sexto differunt quia illa magis sapientia est quam ista. Utraque enim sapientia dicitur quia de nobilissimo et maxime ente, scilicet de Deo, considerat. Talis autem est alia, non ista; considerat enim tam ea quae via rationis comprehendunt quam quae supra rationem humanam. Ista autem tantum de Deo considerat quae cognosci possunt via rationis humanae.

## NUMEROLOGY AND PROBABILITY IN DANTE

RICHARD J. PEGIS

In a recent article on the occasion of the Dante Centennial, Professor C. Singleton<sup>1</sup> has employed an argument based on numerology to support several conclusions regarding the interpretation of the *Divine Comedy*. The technique used in the argument involves the counting of lines in the individual cantos and looking for patterns involving symmetry or connections with the numbers 3, 7 or 10. When such patterns are found it is assumed that Dante intended them to be there. "For we have certainly to face the fact that the poet had to have the plan of that design in mind from the first canto to the last and never lose sight of it; for might it not fall out, simply happen, in part and quite accidentally, somewhere in the hundred canto lengths, and thus obscure the clear outline of it at the center?"<sup>2</sup>

It has been suggested by Professor E. Gilson<sup>3</sup> that if an author never specifically admits the use of a numerical symbolism which is later found in his work, we should consider the possibility that it is totally unintentional. The purpose of this paper is to show that probability theory is well suited for determining the likelihood that a given pattern would have arisen accidentally. The analysis is geared to Professor Singleton's patterns, though the extension to any other well defined pattern is quite simple.

The basic contention of numerology seems to be that certain numbers are of special significance whenever they occur. Usually the numbers 3, 7 and 10 are given the most emphasis, though for larger numbers like 235, the sum of the digits is taken and the 'significant' number 10 is found. We use this example because, if we look at it further, we note that the sum of the first and last digits is 7 and the middle digit is 3, so all of the 'significant' numbers mentioned above are involved in one way or another. This analysis suggests that, given almost any number with several digits, we have a good chance of being able to operate on it in such a way as to bring any arbitrary set of 'significant numbers' into play. This in turn suggests the possibility of a scientific approach to the interpretation of suspected numerological significance.

If a number, say 235, is given by a writer who is not available for questioning, there is no mathematical answer to the question, "Did he think that the fact that the sum of the digits is 10 is significant?" The only way to answer the question is to find out from the historical record whether or not the writer ever said he

<sup>1</sup> C. S. Singleton, "The Poet's Number at the Center" *Modern Language Notes* 80, 1, 1-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> The suggestion was made in a private letter of May 1, 1966. "Since numerical symbolism can neither be proved nor disproved, is not the comparison with the result of a mere calculus of probability the only *objective* ground for an answer?" I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Gilson for bringing the idea to my attention and suggesting this paper.

thought it was significant. No amount of analysis of the number itself will shed light on the man's past state of mind. However, when we suspect that a certain number or number pattern was deliberate on the part of its author we can evaluate the probability that it could have happened by chance. If this probability is extremely low, then we can say it is likely that the author produced the pattern deliberately. But if it is not extremely low, then we have to concede that the pattern could very well have happened by chance.

A very simple example of this probabilistic argument is found in the case of a fairly rigid poetic form such as the sonnet. If a new poem by an otherwise unknown author is discovered, and it happens to be composed of fourteen lines with the rhyme scheme *abbaabacdecde*, we would not hesitate to call it a sonnet and even to assume that the otherwise unknown author must have had contact with the form. The probability against it is microscopic, though it has to be conceded that the situation *could* have arisen where this form was unwittingly followed. Thus the science of probability gives us a yardstick whereby we can measure the likelihood that a seemingly contrived occurrence was in fact purely accidental. Such measurement can neither confirm nor deny an author's intention, but when the probability of accident is more than negligible it refutes the kind of argument which says, "This pattern occurred; ergo the author intended it to occur."

Let us return to the case of Professor Singleton's application of the classical numerological argument to the interpretation of Dante. We find that he has counted the lengths of the cantos of the *Inferno*, the *Purgatorio* and the *Paradiso*, and was happy upon the discovery that at the center of the *Purgatorio*, cantos 14 through 20 have a symmetric configuration of lengths, namely

151, 145, 145, 139, 145, 145, 151.

We are not concerned here with the inferences which Professor Singleton makes about the structure of the poem as a result of the number patterns. We are concerned with his tacit assumption that because the pattern is there the poet must have intended it to be there. We propose to show that the odds are fairly good that the symmetric seven happened by chance. In fact, another symmetric seven actually *did* occur in cantos 3 through 9 of the *Purgatorio*, namely

145, 139, 136, 151, 136, 139, 145.

Relationships between these numbers and Numerology would not be hard to invent.

There are several ways to investigate the probability of occurrence of a symmetric seven in the *Divine Comedy*. The way that is conceptually the simplest is straightforward case-counting. From the Table of Canto Lengths in Professor Singleton's paper we derive a table of the frequency of occurrence of each length. Such a table is given below for the *Purgatorio*:

<i>Length</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
133	2
136	5
139	5
142	2

<i>Length</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
145	9
148	2
151	3
154	4
157	0
160	1

We now count up two totals M and N which are defined as follows:

- M = the total number of arrangements of 33 cantos with the given distribution of lengths and having at least one symmetric seven;  
 N = the total number of arrangements of 33 cantos with the given distribution of lengths.

The probability of occurrence of a symmetric seven *given the distribution of lengths* is then the ratio M/N. The counting is extremely tedious since the number of arrangements is very large. With the aid of an IBM 1620 computer we obtained the following values:

$$\begin{aligned}M &= 73826117779244935104000 \\N &= 1442479266970848933120000\end{aligned}$$

The probability M/N is thus approximately .051 or about 5%. What this means is that of all possible arrangements of a collection of cantos with the same distribution of lengths that Dante used, 5% would contain at least one symmetric seven. Let us put this in terms of a judgment of the contrived or random character of the situation. If we were presented with a large collection of such cases and stated categorically that they were all contrived, then we should not only be mistaken in judgment about 5 times in each 100 cases, but we should be always wrong for having spoken categorically. The situation may be compared with a street intersection where 5%, or 1 in 20 pedestrians is hit by an automobile. By no stretch of the imagination could a traffic engineer use these data to advise us that the intersection was safe.

The above analysis introduces an element of doubt into the declaration that the number pattern had to be deliberate. However, the argument is open to the objection that it assumes the specific frequency distribution given in our table. A more general argument would assume no more than a probability distribution for the actual canto lengths used by the poet. Such a distribution must take into account the facts that the average canto length in the *Purgatorio* is 145 lines and that cantos vastly different from this in length are unlikely. The overall structure of the poem requires further that if the canto length differs from 145 then it does so by a multiple of 3. We shall set up a model which takes the above features into account but is otherwise strictly probabilistic. What model we use is unimportant, for we are merely investigating what *would have happened* if the poet had acted randomly in this regard.

We choose a *binomial distribution*, in which the model consists of tossing a coin 10 times and letting X be the number of heads. Then we assign to a given canto  $145 + 3(X-5)$  lines and repeat the whole experiment for the next canto. Since the commonest outcome is  $X = 5$ , the commonest length will be 145, and the others will cluster about it. This distribution correlates quite well

with the observed frequencies, since from it we can calculate mathematically a probability of 252/1024 for the occurrence of the length 145, and in fact this length occurs 9 times among the 33 cantos of the *Purgatorio*. Both ratios are approximately 1/4.

Based on this distribution, the probability of occurrence of at least one symmetric seven in the 33 cantos of the *Purgatorio* works out to 13.8%, and the probability of finding at least one in the whole *Divine Comedy* works out to 36.2%. The details of the mathematics are beside the point here.<sup>4</sup> We must conclude that while the mind of Dante cannot be known through twentieth-century mathematical analysis and computation, the pattern of the symmetric seven as described by Professor Singleton would have been likely even if the poet had resorted to coin tossing to determine the lengths of the cantos.

*St. John Fisher College, Rochester, New York*

<sup>4</sup> The mathematical calculations for the approach by frequency distributions and a summary of the tabulation for the approach by case counting are available from the author. For a sound but fairly non-technical account of the methods used in such calculations the reader is referred to the chapters on combinations and probability in a text on finite mathematics such as Kattsoff and Simone, *Finite Mathematics* (New York, 1965).

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